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Humans have a long evolutionary history of violence. The psychological mechanisms 
underlying aggression can be viewed as “solutions” (albeit undesirable solutions) to any 
one of a number of adaptive problems that exist in social life. Sometimes that aggression 
takes the form of the killing of one person by another – in legal parlance this is homicide.  
This thesis contends that these adaptive “solutions” might explain why people commit 
homicide in certain circumstances.  In this sense, these explanations broadly align with 
“motives” for certain types of homicide.  In some cases, such motives might constitute 
justifications or excuses; in others, aggravating features. 
The criminal justice system in New Zealand is underpinned by an assumption of rationality 
which is not always supported in individual cases. As a result, the legal mechanisms for 
apportioning blame in cases of culpable homicide are insufficient to recognise the different 
degrees of moral blame which can exist when one individual kills another.  Therefore, the 
current regime for determining moral blame leads to inconsistent outcomes for factually 
similar cases, contrary to the rule of law which requires equality before the law. This thesis 
considers whether changing the definitions of murder and manslaughter will allow courts 
to legitimately recognise all relevant mitigating (and aggravating) circumstances in 
determining guilt. It will also consider whether there are other options for reform that might 
better deliver justice in the round.  
If law is to be relevant, it must reflect current knowledge about why people act in the ways 
that they do.  If the law does not reflect science, it moves too far away from the realities of 
the community. Looking at homicide through a “brain sciences” lens can give us a better 
understanding of the psychological mechanisms involved in homicide, and allow for the 
formulation of an evidence-based approach which leads to a better appreciation of the 
degree of moral blame involved in particular killings. From this it follows that the criminal 




Three types of cases, in particular, illustrate that presently not all defendants charged with 
homicide are treated consistently: young defendants who kill; victims of violence who kill 
their abuser; and defendants who kill children. Defendants within these categories might 
demonstrate the same degree of moral blame, but the outcomes in case disposition differ 
wildly; or outcomes may be the same for very different degrees of moral blame. 
Inconsistency of outcomes means that a fundamental requirement of the rule of law is 
absent – the requirement of equality before the law. When elements of the rule of law are 
not upheld, justice is not delivered. 
This thesis argues that if our legal system recognises, in its application, different degrees of 
moral blameworthiness, then it would be as well to be upfront about them: the court’s 
“commiseration [should be] actually codified in the law’. 1   The thesis therefore 
recommends a series of statutory amendments to the law of culpable homicide, including 
the creation of a “degrees of culpable homicide” regime with attendant defences, as well 




                                                 
1  D Barret Broussard “Principles for passion killing: an evolutionary solution to manslaughter 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
OVERVIEW 
This introductory chapter “sets the scene” for the formulation of the following thesis 
statement: 
The criminal justice system in New Zealand is underpinned by an assumption of individual 
rationality which is not always supported. Thus, the legal regime for apportioning blame 
in cases of culpable homicide is insufficient to recognise the different degrees of moral 
blame which can exist when one individual kills another.  This leads to inconsistent 
outcomes for factually similar cases, contrary to the rule of law which requires equality 
before the law.  This thesis will consider the question of whether changing the definitions 
of murder and manslaughter will allow courts to legitimately recognise all relevant 
mitigating circumstances in determining guilt, and whether there are other options for 
reform that might better deliver justice in the round. 
This scene-setting exercise includes an overview of the conceptual framework within 
which the thesis statement will be tested, along with a word of caution about potential 
limitations and misapplications of that framework. From there I move to a discussion of 
the current legal regime relating to homicide and its defences, to establish the limitations 
of that regime. This section is followed by a discussion of several cases which demonstrate 
how these limitations in the legal landscape have worked in practice to create inconsistent 
outcomes for defendants. Next, the chapter expands upon the central assumption that this 
thesis addresses – that the law’s assumption of rationality means it does not always reflect 
moral blameworthiness – and provides an overview of potential reforms to address this 
issue. That section also provides the context for the synopsis that follows of the three case 
studies that this thesis relies upon as reflecting its central argument about degrees of moral 
blame. These are young defendants who kill, victims of violence or coercion who kill their 
abusers, and those who commit child homicide.  
SETTING THE SCENE 
Juror Vincent Moss … discussed what he clearly considered an even more pivotal point 
than the length of sentence: did these ten-year-olds know right from wrong, and could they 
be considered responsible for their actions?  In his opinion they could not be considered 
responsible in the same sense as a mentally competent adult … He felt that a jury’s 
possibilities in an adult trial, murder or manslaughter – was far too restrictive for such a 
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case.  ‘We should have gone back into court,’ he said, ‘and we should have said, ‘Yes, we 
do have a verdict: these boys are in urgent need of social and psychiatric help’.2 
Vincent Moss was a juror in the trial of ten-year-olds Jon Venables and Robert Thompson 
for the murder of almost three-year-old James Bulger in England in 1993.  Moss’s 
comments reveal the often limited choices available to those tasked with deciding a 
defendant’s liability for culpable homicide.  The issue is that a defendant’s liability for 
culpable homicide depends upon an assessment of their legal blameworthiness, which does 
not always reflect their degree of moral blameworthiness, in other words the extent to 
which they had, in some sense, a “bad motive”.  
As was apparent from the public furore that emerged from the killing of James Bulger, the 
prosecution and sentencing of killers is a topic that often elicits concerns about 
whether justice is done in the individual case, particularly when the killing is thought 
to have been at the more grievous end of the spectrum.3 These concerns have also been 
apparent in New Zealand – the palpable outrage,4 for example, that Clayton Weatherston 
sparked a decade ago when he claimed (albeit unsuccessfully) that he was provoked by 
Sophie Elliot, whom he stabbed more than 200 times in an attack that was described by a 
pathologist as “persistent, focused and determined”.5 Prior to the killing Weatherston and 
Elliot had been in a relationship. He alleged that, on the day of the killing, she attacked him 
with some scissors and knocked off his glasses. That, combined with his claim of rejection 
by her, was alleged by Weatherston to provide a catalyst for the killing.6   
                                                 
2  Vincent Moss, juror in the trial of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson for the murder of James 
Bulger, cited in Gitta Sereny Cries Unheard: The Story of Mary Bell (Macmillan, London,1998) at 
123. 
3  For a review of the media coverage of the Bulger case, see Bob Franklin and Julian Petley “Killing 
the Age of Innocence: Newspaper Reporting of the Death of James Bulger” in Jane Pilcher and 
Stephen Wagg (eds) Thatcher’s Children: Politics, Childhood and Society in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Falmer Press, London, 1996). Franklin and Petley refer to the Daily Star’s report on the guilty 
verdicts under the heading “How do you feel now you little bastards?” (at 134). Franklin and Petley 
also compare the reaction to the Bulger case with that relating to the 1994 murder of  5-year-old 
Norwegian girl, Silje Marie Raedergard. Norwegian press reporting of the case was significantly 
different to that provided by English media on the Bulger killing. Franklin and Petley observe that 
the comparisons between the two cases “reveal striking differences … which illuminate distinctive 
contemporary attitudes towards children within the different communities” (at 135). 
4  See, for example, Kerre Woodham “Murderous butcher too evil to watch” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, 26 July 2009); “Women’s Refuge outraged by trial” Otago Daily Times (online ed, 22 
July 2009); Andrew Koubaridis “Chilling murderer caused nationwide revulsion” The New Zealand 
Herald (online ed, 6 January 2010). 
5  R v Weatherston [2009] NZCA 267 at [5]. 
6  At [4]. 
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More recently – in 2016 – when the prosecution accepted manslaughter pleas from the 
killers of 3-year-old Moko Rangitoheriri, there was much horrified questioning about why 
the killers were not prosecuted for murder. Moko had been left in the custody of Tania 
Shailer and David Haerewa.  He died on 10 August 2015, after he was rushed to hospital. 
The cause of Moko’s death was found to be multiple blunt force injuries, including 
lacerations and haemorrhages deep inside his stomach. There was older bruising and 
damage to his bowel, which had caused it to rupture, which in turn lead to peritonitis and 
septic shock.  Moko’s brain was swollen, with significant clots and haemorrhages on his 
brain, which indicated multiple injuries had been inflicted over a period of days. The 
pathologist suggested that a further possible cause of the brain swelling, and therefore death, 
was smothering, as there were mouth and face injuries consistent with that conclusion.7  
Even before these cases, attempts had been made to reform the law of culpable homicide 
in New Zealand to try to address some of the perceived injustices.  In 1996, Brian Neeson 
introduced a Bill in the House of Representatives, aimed at creating a “degrees of murder” 
approach in New Zealand.8 Progress of the Bill was slow, and ultimately it was defeated 
in 2001. The Hon Margaret Wilson, then Associate Minister of Justice, said that the Bill 
was “fundamentally misconceived” because, among other things, it attempted to deal with 
the problems inherent in sentencing and parole by changing the definition of murder.9 At 
that time, the Government’s Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill had also been introduced 
into Parliament, which ultimately resulted in the passage of the Sentencing Act 2002 and 
the Parole Act 2002, both of which significantly altered the approach to be taken in these 
respective contexts. 
While sentencing and parole processes can take into account different degrees of moral 
blameworthiness in determining punishment, they have their limitations, much as did 
England and Wales at the time of the Venables and Thompson trial. As the law currently 
stands in New Zealand, both murder and manslaughter convictions result in the offender 
being liable to imprisonment for life.10 Under s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002, there 
is a presumption in favour of life imprisonment for murder, although this will be the 
maximum rather than mandatory penalty. The presumption in favour of life imprisonment 
                                                 
7  R v Shailer [2016] NZHC 1414. 
8  Degrees of Murder Bill 1996 (157-1). 
9  (17 October 2001) 596 NZPD 12562. 
10  Crimes Act 1961, ss 172, 177. 
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is strong — an offender convicted of murder must be sentenced to imprisonment for life 
unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, life imprisonment would 
be manifestly unjust. Unless the three-strikes sentencing provisions11 apply, the minimum 
period of imprisonment for murder generally will be ten years.12 Furthermore, under s 104 
of the Sentencing Act 2002, the court must (unless it is satisfied that it would be manifestly 
unjust to do so) impose a minimum  period of 17 years or more, in certain circumstances, 
including situations where the murder was committed  in an attempt  to avoid  detection,  
prosecution,  or conviction;  or involved calculated  or lengthy planning, including murder 
for hire; or was committed  as part of a terrorist act; or was committed  with a high level of 
brutality, cruelty, depravity,  or callousness; or where the deceased was particularly 
vulnerable because of his or her age, health, or any other  factor;  or if the deceased was a 
member of the police or a prison  officer acting in the course  of his or her duty. 
These sentencing provisions set the limits regarding the extent to which moral 
blameworthiness can be considered post-conviction. More importantly, however, 
sentencing and parole decisions do not determine the moral culpability of the offender; 
rather they determine the extent to which they should be punished.  The authority to punish 
an offender arises out of the fact that they have first been found legally blameworthy.  At 
present, in the context of culpable homicide, the only options in relation to findings of legal 
blameworthiness are (essentially) murder and manslaughter. These two options must cover 
the extremely wide range of circumstances in which one person kills another.  As will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, there is a failure in the mechanisms that determine legal 
blameworthiness to accurately reflect moral blame. This is problematic because moral 
blame ought to be the basis for criminalisation – the fundamental assumption underpinning 
the criminal justice system is that people are rational actors, capable of knowing the 
difference between “right” and “wrong” and making choices between the two.13  To be 
morally blameworthy, individuals must have the capacity to make moral judgments about 
                                                 
11  Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010. Justice Minister, Andrew Little, has announced the 
Government’s intention to repeal the three-strikes sentencing regime sometime in the next year: 
“Three strikes law not working, says Justice Minister Andrew Little” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 1 November 2017). 
12  Sentencing Act 2002, s 103. 
13  Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Sydney, 2017) at 177-178. 
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their actions.14  The case of Californian man, Robert Harris, provides a stark example of 
the injustice that arises as a result of the assumption of rationality. Harris was executed:15 
… for the brutal and senseless killing of two teen age boys. The trial jury, state appellate 
courts, and numerous federal courts found that evidence presented at Robert Harris’ trial 
demonstrated his moral culpability for the crimes, thus qualifying him as death-eligible.  
The courts affirmed his death-eligibility (and ultimately the death sentence itself) despite 
the fact that he suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome and was subjected to severe physical 
and psychological abuse by both of his alcoholic parents throughout his childhood — abuse 
that might have severely impaired the moral sensibilities of most human beings. 
Blumoff argues that “[s]ometimes making the right choice is beyond the grasp of many 
damaged individuals”. 16  While the category of defendants with impaired “moral 
sensibilities” is so wide that its limits cannot be precisely defined, this thesis will rely upon 
three case studies that provide particular challenges to the idea of fairness in the context of 
culpable homicide. These are cases where the killer is a young person; cases in which a 
victim of violence kills her abuser; and cases involving defendants who kill children. 
To support my arguments, I will be relying on various “brain sciences”, including 
evolutionary biology, evolutionary and other psychologies, and cognitive and 
developmental neuroscience.  As Blumoff suggests, we should review new findings from 
brain sciences and ask whether they should inform normative discussions about criminal 
law and punishment.17  He adds that bringing data from brain science into the conversation 
will enable the criminal justice system to more fully take account of “the limitations that 
many among us are condemned to suffer”, 18  which, in turn, should lead to greater 
understanding and compassion in the criminal law.19 Blumoff laments the fact that legal 
systems generally only take these “limitations” into account at the sentencing stage, after 
conviction, and even then the usefulness of that information can be undermined. Greene 
and Cohen argue that whenever we know the causes of a person’s bad behaviour, we cease 
to see them as truly deserving of punishment; an insight expressed by the French proverb, 
“to know all is to forgive all”.20 As Greene and Cohen observe, this is something also 
                                                 
14  Peter Arenella “Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship between Legal and 
Moral Accountability” (1992) 39 UCLA L Rev 1511 at 1518. 
15  At 1514. 
16  Theodore Y Blumoff “Foreword: The Brain Sciences and Criminal Law Norms” (2011) 62 Mercer 
L Rev 705 at 716. 
17  At 706. 
18  At 706. 
19  At 706. 
20  Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen “For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything” 
(2004) 359 Phil Trans R Soc Lond B 1775 at 1783. 
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expressed by Jesus and Buddha, both of whom “preach a message of universal 
compassion”.21 
Greene and Cohen argue that “neuroscience will challenge and ultimately reshape our 
intuitive sense(s) of justice”.22  They continue:23  
Cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the specific mechanisms responsible for behaviour, 
will vividly illustrate what until now could only be appreciated through esoteric theorizing: 
that there is something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and 
responsibility, and that, as a result, the legal principles we have devised to reflect these 
conceptions may be flawed. 
Humans have a long evolutionary history of violence.24 The psychological mechanisms 
underlying aggression can be seen as “solutions” (albeit not desirable solutions) to any one 
of a number of adaptive problems that exist in social life.25 Sometimes that aggression 
takes the form of the killing of one person by another – homicide, in other words.26  It is 
my argument in this thesis that these adaptive “solutions” might explain why people 
commit homicides in certain circumstances.  In this sense, it is suggested that these 
explanations might broadly align with “motives” (or, in some cases, “justifications”) for 
certain types of homicide.  It is crucial to note that use of the term “solutions” does not 
imply that the homicide is defensible. In some cases, the homicide is at the top of the list 
of most morally blameworthy killings, despite the fact that it can be “explained” in terms 
of evolutionary psychology. In such cases the law rightly says that there is no good reason 
for acting in that particular way.  On the other hand, sometimes the psychological or 
biological imperative behind a killing might mitigate responsibility. As already stated, the 
criminal justice system is underpinned by the notion that people are rational and capable of 
making the right choices. But this is simply an assumption – not all individuals are 
rational,27 or at least they are not rational all the time or in all circumstances.  Thus, the law 
recognises, in some circumstances, that a defendant is unable to make the right choice (their 
will may have been overridden by the will of another, as in the case of compulsion, for 
                                                 
21  At 1783. 
22  At 1775. 
23  At 1775. 
24  DM Buss and TK Shackelford “Human aggression in evolutionary psychological perspective” 
(1997) 17(8) Clin Psychol Rev 605 at 606. 
25  At 617. 
26  In New Zealand, homicide is defined under s 168 of the Crimes Act 1961 as “the killing of a human 
being by another, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever”, although the means by which the 
killing is effected do not necessarily need to be “violent”. 
27  Reece Walters and Trevor Bradley Introduction to Criminological Thought (Pearson Education New 
Zealand, Auckland, 2005) at 56. 
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example). In other circumstances the law may say that a killing by a truly rational actor is 
justified because there is a good reason for so acting (self-defence being the most obvious 
example). 
Criminal behaviour is human behaviour and therefore can be explained using the same 
theories. It is also important to observe that there can be no crime without a law proscribing 
certain conduct (although some may argue that causing the death of another is a crime 
against nature). However, there are several circumstances in which killing is not unlawful, 
such as in the case of withdrawing life-supporting treatment, or indeed, in justifiable self-
defence. 
This thesis will argue that law of culpable homicide as it currently stands in New Zealand 
is inconsistent with current knowledge about human behaviour. The thesis will use 
principles from evolutionary and other psychologies as a framework for examining laws 
that govern human behaviour (in this context, homicide) to determine how the law ought 
to operate to regulate that behaviour and determine culpability.  If law is to be relevant, it 
must reflect current knowledge about why people act in the ways that they do.  If the law 
does not reflect science, it moves too far away from the realities of the community. Looking 
at homicide through a “brain sciences” lens can give us a better understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms involved in homicide and allow for an evidence-based 
approach to be formulated which would lead to a better appreciation of the degree of moral 
blame involved in particular killings, and consequently how the criminal justice system 
ought to respond to those degrees of moral blame. 
A NOTE OF CAUTION   
There is empirical support for claims that evolutionary psychology has some degree of 
explanatory power in the context of homicide.   At the outset, there are two important points 
to be made. The first acknowledges the risks associated with employing an evolutionary 
analysis.  As Hanna notes, the linking of crime and biology is a “dangerous intersection”28.  
A biological inquiry, she argues, downplays human autonomy and individualism. 29 
Further, an evolutionary approach to crime causation could foster a belief that criminals 
                                                 
28  Cheryl Hanna “Can a Biological Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Females? Or what’s 
a nice ‘gal’ like me doing at a conference like this?” (1997) 22 Vermont LR 333 at 334. 
29  At 335. 
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have genes that are not present in non-criminals and therefore that crime is driven by people 
with criminal minds, rather than by criminal moments or opportunities.30 It could lead 
people to believe that humans act the way animals do in the wild. To manage this risk, it 
must be clearly stated that employing an evolutionary analysis does not equate to an 
assertion that crime is a result of biological determinism, or that genes determine 
behaviour.31 While genes do play a role in human behaviour, they do not determine it.32 
Evolutionary theory provides information that is probabilistic, not deterministic,33 and 
probability is not inevitability.  In other words, predispositions do not guarantee any 
behaviour from any individual. 34   Furthermore, evolutionary analysis tells us about 
behavioural patterns likely to emerge in a large population.  It does not explain why a 
certain individual acted the way she or he did on a particular occasion.  According to 
Schwartz:35 
Human nature, like the nature of anything else, is a set of potentials to behave certain ways 
in given environments, not a nonsocial genetic something that inevitably produces the same 
result in any environment. To say that existing inequalities are due to genetics, and 
therefore inalterable, ignores that genetic propensities may be manifested differently in 
different environments.36 
Hanna also expresses concern that if a biological inquiry suggested, for example, that men 
are predisposed to violence, then the “naturalistic fallacy” would lead to a conclusion that 
such behaviour is acceptable.37  Evolutionary theory explains behaviour without justifying 
it.38  Ultimately, Jones argues that even though biology has been used to justify political, 
social, and economic agendas, including discriminatory and even genocidal policies, 
“important roles for biology remain – even in law”.39  He does note, however, the need for 
vigilance for “invidious reductionism, determinism, and divisiveness”.40 
                                                 
30  Owen D Jones “Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context” (2006) 69 LCP 81 at 97. 
31  Owen D Jones “Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An introduction and application to child abuse” 
(1997) 75 NC L Rev 1117 at 1125. 
32  Randolph Roth “Biology and the Deep History of Homicide” (2011) 51 Brit J Criminol 535 at 535. 
33  Owen D Jones “Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior” (1997) 8 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 167 at 205; Hanna, above n 28, at 338. 
34  Owen D Jones “Time-shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: behavioral economics 
meets behavioral biology” (2001) 95 NWU L Rev 1141 at 1168. 
35  Rolando Mazariegos “The Frequency of Abuse and Neglect on Stepchildren: evolutionary 
perspective and biosocial dimensions” (2000) 21 J Juv L 56 at 71.  
36  Justin Schwartz “It Ain’t Necessarily So: the misuse of ‘human nature’ in law and social policy and 
the bankruptcy of the ‘nature-nurture’ debate” (2012) 21 Texas J Women & L 187 at 188. 
37  Hanna, above n 28, at 335. 
38  Jones “Behavioral Genetics”, above n 30, at 94. 
39  Jones “Evolutionary Analysis”, above n 31, at 1120. 
40  At 1120. 
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The second point is that an evolutionary approach does not unseat all other theories of the 
causes of homicide. 41   Most researchers acknowledge that crime is a result of a 
combination of factors, some biological, some environmental.  Justice will be better served 
by a legal system that considers all possible approaches to a problem.42 A comprehensive 
theory will integrate biological, social and cultural influences.  Nature and nurture are 
inseparably intertwined and all biological processes, including normal brain development, 
ultimately depend upon environmental inputs.43  The nature-nurture dichotomy is a false 
one – evolutionary explanations are not alternatives to environmental ones.44  In addition, 
what is defined as criminal behaviour varies by culture, time and context45, so while 
evolutionary theories may explain some behaviour, per se, it does not explain why such 
behaviour is criminal. 
THE LEGAL AND CONTEXTUAL LANDSCAPE 
Culpable homicide and its defences  
Culpable homicide essentially includes all situations in which there is a degree of legal 
blameworthiness in the circumstances surrounding the death of a person.  Culpable 
homicide involves murder, manslaughter, killing in furtherance of a suicide pact46 
(which is manslaughter) and infanticide. 47  Infanticide is a form of diminished 
responsibility, in that it provides a partial defence to a murder or manslaughter charge, 
where a mother who kills a child does so because she has not fully recovered from the 
effects of giving birth. All forms of culpable homicide are legally blameworthy, 
although the degree of culpability varies according to the specific charge and the 
particular circumstances of the death. Culpable homicide covers a wide range of situations 
in which there is a killing of one person by another, ranging from premeditated killings, to 
criminally negligent deaths, to the killing of an infant by a mother who suffers from a post-
partum mental disorder.  Given the wide range of circumstances that meet the legal 
elements of culpable homicide, there are several factors that the criminal justice system 
                                                 
41  Mazariegos, above n 35, at 57; Jones “Evolutionary Analysis”, above n 31, at 1125. 
42  Mazariegos, above n 35, at 57; Hanna, above n 28, at 337. 
43  Jones “Time-shifted Rationality”, above n 34, at 1168. 
44  Martin Daly and Margo Wilson “Discriminative Parental Solicitude: a biological perspective” 
(1980) 42(2) J Marriage and Fam 277 at 277. 
45  Jones “Behavioral Genetics”, above n 30, at 89. 
46  Crimes Act 1961, s 180. 
47  Crimes Act 1961, s 178. 
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utilises in determinations of culpability. These include the mens rea (the mental state of the 
defendant such as intention or recklessness); the actus reus (the criminal act); and any 
relevant defences.  As the law currently stands, even intentional killings can be 
characterised as not culpable if, for example, the offender acted in self-defence, was insane, 
or was under the age of ten years.   
Despite the wide range of circumstances meeting the legal elements of culpable homicide, 
there are only limited means by which different degrees in legal culpability can be reflected 
— in essence, murder, manslaughter or infanticide.  This limited range of options is 
compounded by a similarly narrow range of defences for culpable homicide. Defences 
generally fall into two categories – justifications and excuses. Justifications exempt a 
defendant from criminal responsibility because their conduct, which would otherwise be 
illegal, is morally justified in the circumstances.48  Self-defence is an example of a 
justification. Excuses, on the other hand, do not deny the moral blameworthiness of 
the conduct, but prevent a defendant from being held responsible in circumstances 
where it would be unfair to punish them.49 Insanity is an example of an excuse.  
McDiarmid argues that the provision of defences in the criminal law is the most basic 
requirement of equality of arms.50 Likewise, Smith points out that defences have a crucial 
role in ensuring that criminal responsibility is kept within appropriate bounds.51  
In terms of the law on culpable homicide in New Zealand, the following discussion 
illustrates some of its limitations.  Self-defence52 justifies the use of force to protect the 
defendant or another and by its very nature is limited to situations where the killing is 
a response to a perceived threat of imminent death or serious violence. Compulsion 
is statutorily barred from applying to murder53; but not manslaughter although it is 
difficult to conceive of situations in which it will apply in that context.   The common 
law defence of necessity, to the extent that it is preserved by s 20 of the Crimes Act 196154, 
                                                 
48  Stephen F Smith “Overcoming overcriminalization” (2012) 102(3) J Crim Law Criminol 537 at 577. 
49  At 577. 
50  Claire McDiarmid “How Do They Do That? Automatism, Coercion, Necessity, and Mens Rea in 
Scots Criminal Law” in A Reed, M Bohlander, N Wake and E Smith General Defences in Criminal 
Law: Domestic and Comparative Perspectives (Ashgate, UK, 2014) at 160. 
51  Smith, above n 48, at 577. 
52  Crimes Act 1961, s 48. 
53  Crimes Act 1961, s 24(2). 
54  Crimes Act 1961, s 20, “General rule as to justifications” provides: “(1)All rules and principles of 
the common law which render any circumstances a justification or excuse for any act or omission, 
or a defence to any charge, shall remain in force and apply in respect of a charge of any offence, 
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does not apply to murder.  It potentially could apply to manslaughter by an unlawful act, 
but in New Zealand the law in this area is not settled.  Insanity55 applies to murder and 
manslaughter (as well as other offences) but the legal meaning of insanity is quite 
restrictive, requiring the defendant to prove, on the balance of probabilities that they 
suffered from “natural imbecility” or a “disease of the mind” (which are legal, not 
medical, constructs) which rendered them incapable:56 
(a) Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or 
(b)  Of knowing   that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the 
commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. 
 
Sane automatism, a common law defence (again, to the extent it is preserved by s 20 of 
the Crimes Act 1961) may apply to murder and manslaughter but the application of 
the defence is limited to situations in which the defendant acted “without conscious 
volition”; in other words, they were  an automaton.57 Significantly, the defence of 
provocation, which did provide  juries with a way of recognising certain mitigating  factors 
— covering situations in which  the defendant  was provoked into  a loss of self-control  
that  caused  them  to  kill — was repealed with  effect from  8 December 2009.  While 
its ultimate repeal was thought to be triggered by the Weatherston case referred to above, 
and another case thought by many to be unjust,58 proposals to repeal the defence had been 
mooted for at least 20 years previously.  Arguably, however, the problem was not with the 
idea that provocation should be a mitigating factor, but with the way in which the defence 
was constructed in New Zealand. The test provided for by s 169 of the Crimes Act 1961 
was notoriously difficult to apply in practice and was notoriously more successful when 
raised by men who either killed their (allegedly) provocative female partners or men who 
(allegedly) made sexual advances toward them. 
New Zealand’s position can be contrasted with other jurisdictions that offer a wider 
range of defences to someone charged with culpable homicide.  The defence of 
diminished responsibility which is used in some other jurisdictions (England and Wales, 
                                                 
whether under this Act or under any other enactment, except so far as they are altered by or are 
inconsistent with this Act or any other enactment. (2) The matters provided for in this Part are hereby 
declared to be justifications or excuses in the case of all charges to which they are applicable.” 
55  Crimes Act 1961, s 23. 
56  Crimes Act 1961, s 23(2). 
57  See R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999 (CA) at 1011. 
58  R v Weatherston, above n 5; in R v Ambach HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-27374, 2 July 2009, a 
Hungarian tourist killed the victim after he had made a sexual advance. 
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and Scotland, for example) acts as a partial defence that will reduce murder to manslaughter, 
much in the same way as did New Zealand’s defence of provocation. In some United States 
jurisdictions “diminished capacity” is employed. There are two variants of diminished 
capacity.  The “mens rea” variant relies on evidence of mental abnormality to negate an 
element of mens rea.59  The “partial responsibility” variant operates in a similar way 
to the partial defence of diminished responsibility in Scotland and England and 
Wales – it relies on evidence of mental abnormality to establish a partial excuse.60 
In the United States the Model Penal Code employs a doctrine called “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance” which reduces murder to manslaughter, but only a small number 
of states fully adopt this approach.61 Other jurisdictions employ iterations of self-defence 
which do not require a threat of imminent harm and better serve defendants who kill in 
response to ongoing domestic violence or coercive control.62   
Furthermore, several other jurisdictions (such as the United States) have degrees of 
murder, in which killings are ranked by seriousness. While there are differences in 
approach depending upon the particular State, generally first-degree murder can require a 
specific intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation; or be committed by particular acts 
such as strangulation, poisoning, or involve lying-in-wait for the victim.  Some first-degree 
murders involve killings committed during a felony, or where a police officer is killed, 
regardless of the level of premeditation. Second degree murder is usually murder without 
these aggravating features.  Third degree murder is often the same as New Zealand’s 
manslaughter offence. 
In New Zealand, in the absence of different degrees of murder and defences such as 
provocation and diminished responsibility, two people who kill can each be convicted of 
murder albeit that their moral blameworthiness is vastly different. Even though differences 
in moral culpability can, to some extent, be considered in sentencing, fairness issues still 
arise. Many would agree that there is a world of difference between a mother who 
suffocates her child while suffering from extreme stress or depression and a personality 
                                                 
59  Stephen J Morse “Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum” (1979) 2 Int’l J L & 
Psychiatry 271 at 275. 
60  At 288. 
61  Paul H Robinson “Murder Mitigation in the Fifty-Two American Jurisdictions: A Case Study in 
Doctrinal Interrelation Analysis” (2014) 47 Tex Tech L Rev 19 at 24. 
62  See ch 4. 
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disorder (see, for example, R v Harrison-Taylor63) and someone who shoots another at 
point-blank range during a robbery.  Yet the outcome for both could be the stigma of a 
murder conviction.  Many, perhaps, would also agree that a person who causes the death 
of a child following a long period of abuse and neglect is (at least) as morally blameworthy 
as someone who intentionally suffocates her child in the same circumstances as the 
example above. However, as several cases show, defendants charged with child 
maltreatment deaths are often convicted of manslaughter, rather than murder.64 As Tadros 
observes, holding someone criminally responsible (by convicting them) has “enormous 
symbolic power” as well as practical consequences.65The difference between murder and 
manslaughter, in terms of how the offence is characterised, can be significant.  Ulbrick and 
others, in the context of arguments about defensive homicide and mentally impaired 
defendants,66 note how important it is to “advocate for a greater range of legal responses 
to cover the nuance and complexities of lethal violence”.67 
Murder versus manslaughter 
The connotation of a murder conviction is that the defendant possessed a “murderous” state 
of mind. In New Zealand, this includes situations where the defendant intended to kill the 
victim; or intended to cause the victim bodily injury that the defendant knew was likely to 
cause death and was reckless as to that result; or intended to kill or cause bodily injury 
known to be likely to cause death to one person and accidentally or by mistake kills another; 
or for an unlawful purpose does an act that the defendant knows is likely to cause death 
and thereby kills the victim.68  It is also murder if the defendant intends to cause grievous 
bodily injury to the victim for the purposes of facilitating, or escaping from listed serious 
offences (what used to be called the felony murder rule).69 The listed offences include 
sexual violation, murder, abduction, kidnapping, burglary, and robbery.70 
                                                 
63  R v Harrison-Taylor HC Auckland CRI-2004-092-1510, 12 September 2005. 
64  See for example, R v Shailer [2016] NZHC 1414 (Moko Rangitoheriri); R v Witika [1993] 2 NZLR 
424, (1992) 9 CRNZ 272 (CA) (Delcelia Witika); R v Leuta; R v Rauf [2002] 1 NZLR 215 (CA) 
(Liotta Leuta); R v Tipene [2001] 2 NZLR 577, (2000) 18 CRNZ 311 (CA) (Mereana Edmonds). 
65  Victor Tadros Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at 1. 
66  See ch 4. 
67  Madeleine Ulbrick, Asher Flynn and Danielle Tyson “The abolition of defensive homicide: a step 
towards populist punitivism at the expense of mentally impaired offenders” (2016) 40 Melb Univ 
Law Rev 324 at 330. 
68  Crimes Act 1961, s 167. 
69  Crimes Act 1961, s 168. 
70  Crimes Act 1961, s 168(2). 
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On the other hand, manslaughter is usually characterised as “involuntary” (excepting 
killing in furtherance of a suicide pact) or “accidental” in the sense that the defendant did 
not intend death as a result, or foresee death as something that could well happen. The 
range of manslaughter cases is also very wide. It can include cases involving the infliction 
serious harm but where the intent to kill or foresight of death cannot be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt.  Manslaughter includes what are referred to as “criminally negligent” 
killings, including vehicular manslaughter where the defendant’s driving is careless or 
reckless, or where a child drowns due to lack of supervision, and many other situations 
where a defendant fails to discharge a duty of care and thereby causes death. 
Where a defendant is charged with murder, in the absence of a specific justification or 
excuse, a court must find them guilty of murder if it is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that all the elements of the offence are present. These are that the defendant committed the 
actus reus (by causing the death of the victim by an unlawful act71), accompanied by any 
one of the mens rea elements for murder (intention to kill or intention to cause bodily injury 
that the offender knows is likely to cause death and is reckless as to that result, and so on).  
If the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that intent to kill or recklessness was 
present, a jury must convict of murder.  If a defendant is charged with murder and the 
court is satisfied that the defendant is responsible for the death but is not satisfied they had 
the mens rea for murder, it must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. 
Where a defendant is charged with manslaughter, and the court is satisfied that the 
defendant committed the actus reus (that is, they caused the death of the victim by an 
unlawful act or omission72), they must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter if (a) they 
had the mens rea for the unlawful act (for example, if the unlawful act that caused death 
was an assault, it must be proved the defendant intended to apply force to the victim); or 
(b) that their omission to discharge a duty of care was a major departure from the standard 
of care expected of the reasonable person to whom that duty applies.73  For example, if the 
defendant is a parent whose child drowns due to a failure to supervise, the defendant’s 
omission will be assessed against the standard of care expected of the reasonable parent or 
                                                 
71  Crimes Act 1961, s 160(2)(a). 
72  Crimes Act 1961, s 160(2)(b). 
73  Crimes Act 1961, s 150A. 
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caregiver; a surgeon whose patient dies due to negligent surgery will be assessed against 
the standard of care expected of the reasonable surgeon. 
It follows then that liability for manslaughter can ensue following circumstances in which 
the defendant made a mistake or was momentarily careless, with a very low degree of 
moral blame.  At the other end of the manslaughter spectrum are cases involving prolonged 
and serious violence, and consequently a high degree of moral blame that might better sit 
alongside that of some defendants convicted of murder. 
Where a defendant is charged with culpable homicide, the role of a jury at trial is to decide 
on the facts, having been directed on the law. Any sympathy or prejudice the jury may 
feel in relation to the defendant should not be taken into account in determining 
culpability.  However, as the following cases suggest, this may not be how juries 
operate in practice. 
Contemporary cases 
R v Apatu74 
In 2009, Wilson Apatu shot dead his neighbour, Layden Rameka, following a dispute. 
He also wounded Rameka’s young son. Apatu admitted going to the house with the gun 
but said he only intended to frighten Rameka and his family. According to Apatu the gun 
went off four times after Rameka grabbed its barrel.75 At a second trial, there was a great 
body of evidence presented about Apatu’s mental state at the time of the killing, including 
that he suffered from anxiety disorder and social phobia, along with mood disturbance and 
substance dependence.  Further, two of Rameka’s children had been tormenting Apatu 
which had caused him significant stress, and which was the catalyst for him confronting 
Rameka. Indeed, the first time Apatu remonstrated with Rameka about the children, 
Rameka responded with a “king-hit”. Apatu was acquitted of murder, wounding with intent, 
and aggravated burglary (the latter arising out of post-shooting events). In sentencing 
Apatu on a charge of unlawfully taking a motor vehicle (also arising out of the aftermath 
of the shooting) to which he pleaded guilty, Justice Miller noted that the acquittal must 
                                                 
74  R v Apatu HC CRI 2009-041-003156, 14 October 2010. 
75  “Apatu family weep at not guilty verdict” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 23 
September  2010). 
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have reflected the jury’s finding that the Crown had not negated, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the possibility that the shooting was accidental.76 
R v O’Brien77 and Churchward v R78 
In R v O’Brien, three 14-year-olds had killed a man, Kenneth Pigott, with a view to 
stealing his car. Evidence was given at trial that suggested that O’Brien thought she was 
just going to knock the victim out. O’Brien’s counsel submitted that because of her 
limited intellectual capacity there was the reasonable possibility that she did not 
appreciate the likelihood that death might result from her actions. Regardless, O’Brien 
was convicted of murder. Similarly, in Churchward v R the defendant, along with her 
younger cousin, killed a 78-year-old man. Churchward was aged 17 at the time of the 
killing and suffered from mental health issues including depression and post-traumatic 
stress disorder.  She was convicted of murder by a jury, despite the jury hearing evidence 
of the foregoing issues.   
R v Wickham79 
Dale Wickham, a multiple sclerosis sufferer, was charged with murder for killing her 
abusive and violent husband, John with a single shotgun blast. While the jury rejected 
Wickham’s claim of self-defence, it found her not guilty of murder but guilty of 
manslaughter on the apparent basis that the killing was accidental. This is even though 
Wickham first called the police, then went to her bedroom to get the shotgun before 
returning to the lounge and shooting John.80 She was sentenced to 12 months’ home 
detention. 
R v Wihongi81 
A few months before Wickham killed her husband, a woman called Jacqueline Wihongi 
fatally stabbed her former partner, Vivian Hirini. As in Wickham’s case, there was a history 
of abuse from Hirini toward Wihongi. On the night of the killing an argument developed 
                                                 
76  R v Apatu, above n 74. 
77  R v O’Brien (2003) 20 CRNZ 572 (CA). 
78  Churchward v R [2011] NZCA 531, (2011) 25 CRNZ 446. 
79  R v Wickham HC Auckland CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010. See ch 4 for a fuller 
discussion regarding this case. 
80  Edward Gay “Turbulent relationship ends in manslaughter” The New Zealand Herald  (online 
ed, Auckland,  15 October 2010). 
81  R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775, (2011) 25 CRNZ 483. See ch 4 for a fuller 
discussion regarding this case. 
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between Wihongi and Hirini about money that Hirini was alleged to have taken from 
Wihongi’s Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) payment. Wihongi also said that 
Hirini demanded sex, which she refused. Wihongi was convicted of murder (she did not 
claim self-defence); therefore, the jury must have found that she either intended to kill 
Hirini or that she intended to cause him an injury that she knew was likely to cause death.82 
At Wihongi’s sentencing, the presumptive sentence of life imprisonment for murder was 
displaced due to her mental impairments, and she was sentenced to eight years’ 
imprisonment. This was uplifted on appeal to 12 years with a minimum non-parole period 
of four years. 
R v Scollay83 
In 2014, Lucille Scollay was found not guilty of murder, but of manslaughter, for 
stabbing her husband through his heart. Mr Scollay was depressed and taking 
antidepressants. He suffered from acute anxiety and rarely left the house. His health 
and wellbeing had deteriorated over many years and he was unable to work. He had 
previously been an intravenous drug user and was on the methadone programme. 
The defendant Scollay was also using methadone and on antidepressant medication. 
Both husband and wife had hepatitis C for some years.84  
Scollay admitted stabbing her husband, but denied she intended to kill him. She said she 
was motivated by a desire to shake her husband out of his deeply depressed state.85 
Regardless, the sentencing Judge observed that Scollay “made a decision to stab [her] 
husband”.86 Further, she admitted that she had made up her mind to do so while she was 
walking down the drive to their house after a night out. Scollay was sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment. 
Comment – formulation of thesis statement 
The outcomes in some of these cases may be fair if moral blameworthiness were the basis 
of criminalisation. In the case of Wickham, considering the longstanding history of abuse 
                                                 
82  Crimes Act 1961, s 167. 
83  R v Scollay [2014] NZHC 465. 
84  At [7]-[8]. 
85  Kurt Bayer “Scollay trial: Guilty of manslaughter” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 13 February 2014). 
86  R v Scollay, above n 83, at [3]. 
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coupled with threats to kill her and the fact that she suffered from multiple sclerosis, 
convicting her of murder for a low degree of moral blameworthiness would be unjust. From 
an evolutionary perspective, she was acting in self-defence.  In Scollay, while the evidence 
points to, at the very least, an intention to cause bodily injury she knew was likely to cause 
death, Scollay’s desperation about her husband’s depression and agoraphobia could 
arguably be factors that mitigate her culpability.  However, given that she intentionally 
stabbed her husband, why was she convicted of manslaughter rather than murder? Why is 
she less culpable than, for example, Wihongi, who also stabbed her abusive and violent 
victim? Apatu’s mental condition and the provocation from Rameka and his children 
undisputedly were crucial factors in his acquittal. However, it is questionable whether, 
absent those features and circumstances, his entry into the premises with a loaded gun, 
intending to frighten, would have resulted in an acquittal. It must be noted, in contrast to 
the defendants in O’Brien and Churchward, that Apatu was, at the relevant time, 43 years 
old, and not a teenager whose brain, and therefore ability to reason and foresee 
consequences, was continuing to develop. 
The fundamental problem with these decisions is that they signal that the outcome for a 
defendant can depend upon the whim of the jury rather than the application of legal 
principles. This is contrary to the rule of law which requires equality before the law. This 
does not mean that all cases should be treated the same, but rather that there should be 
consistent outcomes.  
What happened in Apatu, Wickham and Scollay could be instances of what is known as 
“jury nullification”, in which juries depart from the court’s legal instructions when giving 
their verdict.  This could be for a variety of reasons including concerns that the conviction 
or sentence would be too harsh.87 As Broussard suggests, this allows social prejudices to 
manifest in decision-making.88 While jury nullification might lead to just outcomes in the 
individual case, it is likely to lead to unfairness across the board. Thus, we might ask what 
actually distinguishes Wickham from Wihongi to justify such diverse outcomes for the 
defendants? The answer to this question lies not in the fact that there is a significant 
difference in moral blameworthiness, in relation to the killings, as between Wickham and 
                                                 
87  Thom Brooks “A defence of jury nullification” (2004) 10 Res Publica 401. 
88  D Barret Broussard “Principles for passion killing: an evolutionary solution to manslaughter 
mitigation” (2012) 62 Emory LJ 179 at 192. 
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Wihongi. Rather it is the jury’s application of the law, or lack thereof, in reaching the 
conclusion that Wickham did not have the relevant intention for murder.  There was no 
evidence of accidental discharge of the gun, so it appears there was no reasonable 
foundation for their verdict that Wickham did not intend or at least foresee death, when 
shooting her husband.  What are the legal and moral distinctions underpinning Wickham’s 
conviction for manslaughter versus Wihongi’s conviction for murder?  While undoubtedly 
there are differences in the material facts between these two cases (the Court of Appeal 
noted in Wihongi that the relationship between the couple was “tempestuous, with both 
drinking heavily and violence going both ways”89), was the moral blameworthiness of the 
two defendants sufficiently distinct to warrant different verdicts and vastly disparate 
sentences (12 months home detention versus 12 years’ imprisonment)?  
As the above cases show, outcomes for defendants can vary wildly depending upon several 
factors including the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the range of charging options 
available, and the particular jury.  Other factors such as the quality of legal representation, 
jury selection, racism and prejudice also play a part, as well as factors such as judicial 
summing up and directions to juries.90  However, similar behaviour accompanied by a 
similar degree of moral blame should attract the same label (murder or manslaughter, or 
some lesser offence, or even “not guilty”, depending upon the precise degree of moral 
blame). This approach would better reflect the rule of law requirement of “fair labelling” – 
that the law should be capable of being known in advance, so that compliance is possible. 
In the current context of culpable homicide in New Zealand, this element of the rule of law 
is absent – a defendant cannot know in advance the extent to which their actions will be 
deemed criminal. Further, as Ashworth points out, this principle of fair labelling requires 
offences to be subdivided and labelled “so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude 
of the law-breaking”.91 Tadros also identifies the argument that different forms of violence 
are morally distinct from each other, and the criminal law ought to reflect those moral 
distinctions.92  
                                                 
89  R v Wihongi, above n 81, at [19]. 
90  See Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Securing Fair Outcomes for Battered Women 
Charged with Homicide: Analysing Defence Lawyering in R v Falls” (2014) 38 Melb Univ Law 
Rev 666 at 699-672. 
91  Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, OUP, Oxford, 2003) at 89-90 cited in Victor 
Tadros “The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account” (2005) 65 La L Rev 
989 at 1003-1004. 
92  Victor Tadros “The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse”, above n 91, at 989. 
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Essentially, the argument in this thesis is that if our legal system recognises, in its 
application, different degrees of moral blameworthiness, then it would be as well to be 
upfront about them and to apply them consistently – the jury’s “commiseration [should be] 
actually codified in the law”93.  As noted at the outset, decision-makers do not have the 
option of doing this within the current legal framework so are actually not applying the law 
in all cases. Wickham, Scollay and Apatu are but three illustrations. 
Brian Neeson’s Degrees of Murder Bill 1996 proposed to redefine culpable homicide by 
classifying “murder” as murder in the first, second, or third degree, and sought to redefine 
manslaughter (as culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the first, second, or third 
degree). Under cl 3 of the Bill, murder in the first degree would have been constituted 
by homicides that were “particularly sadistic, heinous, malicious, or inhuman”. 
Murder in the second degree envisaged the same types of killings as covered by the 
existing ss 167 and 168 of the Crimes Act 1961. Murder in the third degree covered 
provoked killings94 or those committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs (other 
than prescription medications). The Bill also sought to reform sentencing for murder 
and manslaughter (including mandatory imprisonment for natural life for murder in 
the first degree). 
There are admittedly problems with the reforms as proposed by the Bill although the 
detail of these is not within the scope of this thesis. It is sufficient to say that the 
measures proposed seem to have been driven more by a concern that the existing law 
was too soft on offenders, than a desire to reflect moral blameworthiness at both ends 
of the spectrum. However, in light of the cases discussed above, it is timely to reconsider 
the question of whether changing the definition of murder and manslaughter will allow 
juries to legitimately recognise mitigating circumstances in determining guilt. In other 
words, this thesis will question whether a degrees of murder approach is actually 
“fundamentally misconceived”, and whether there are other options for reform that might 
better deliver justice in the round.  
DEGREES OR DEFENCES? 
                                                 
93  D Barret Broussard, above n 88, at 193. 




One way of better distinguishing moral culpability is by dividing the current offences of 
murder, manslaughter, and infanticide into a larger range of definitions, or degrees. The 
Degrees of Murder Bill 1996 may not provide the best template, and it is not necessarily a 
requirement that a new class of more serious offences is created.  However, considering 
the tendency of juries to make decisions that they perceive to be fair, they ought to be 
provided with legitimate authority to do so.  
The other fair approach in this context is the creation of a new range of defences to 
culpable homicide.  These might include a defence of developmental immaturity in the 
context of young defendants,95 or a new defence of coercion in relation to battered 
defendants96. Ultimately, as Bradley and Hoffmann suggest:97  
Criminal trials represent public, highly visible, morality plays, through which order and 
balance are restored to a community that has suffered an often grievous loss. However, true 
restoration can occur only through criminal trials that are perceived to be just and fair.        
Bearing in mind that New Zealand has previously rejected a degrees of murder approach, 
this research will consider the question of whether the current law of culpable homicide 
allows us to fairly apportion moral blame for killings.  This involves questioning whether 
the law allows for all relevant factors to be considered in determining culpability, including 
factors relevant to mens rea, actus reus and the existence of a defence. 
CASE STUDIES - OVERVIEW 
If the law is to be fair, it must be able to accurately reflect moral culpability. This thesis 
will examine three case studies that provide specific challenges to the idea of fairness in 
the context of culpable homicide.  They are: cases where young defendants kill; cases 
where victims of violence kill their abusers; and cases involving child homicide. Further, 
these case studies will allow for an analysis of whether the law fairly balances the interests 
of the victim, the defendant, and society generally, given that all of these interests are 
impacted upon by both the fact and nature of convictions for homicide.  
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It is generally accepted that children do not have the same mental capacity and moral 
competence as adults, which is why most, if not all, jurisdictions have an age of majority 
for certain purposes, and an age below which a child is deemed incapable of committing 
an offence. This latter notion underpins the common law doctrine of doli incapax – an 
irrebuttable common law presumption that children under the age of seven are incapable 
of committing a crime.98  In New Zealand, this is expressed in s 21 of the Crimes Act 1961 
and applies to children under the age of ten years. Section 22 of the same Act contains a 
rebuttable presumption in respect of children aged between ten and 14, providing that no 
person within that age range shall be convicted of an offence “unless [they] knew either 
that the act or omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law”. 
Despite these presumptions, in New Zealand a child aged between 10 and 12 can only be 
prosecuted for murder or manslaughter; and if so, will be tried as if they were an adult. The 
fact that such children can only be tried for murder or manslaughter, suggests that 
society views the act of killing someone a more serious offence than say, sexually 
violating them. This is understandable, given the value accorded to the sanctity of human 
life, but it contradicts the basic principle of criminal responsibility, that criminality is based 
upon moral blameworthiness. In this context, the relative seriousness of the criminal act 
is more relevant to punishment than it is to culpability. 
Recent cases such as R v Churchward (discussed above) have seen efforts to present 
evidence about the development of the human brain in order to support claims that the 
defendant did not possess the required mens rea for the offence.99  In Churchward, an 
appeal on the question of the defendant’s intent was supported by evidence from a 
psychiatrist to the effect that adolescents see risks differently to adults, that they are less 
able to control their impulsivity, less future-oriented, and more influenced by their peers. 
In the United States this type of research has been used to support calls to ban the 
death penalty for defendants under 18, and in determining competence to stand trial.100 
                                                 
98  See ch 3 for a fuller discussion of different jurisdictional approaches to this principle. 
99  R v Churchward, above n 78. For further discussion see Brenda Midson “Risky Business: 
Developmental Neuroscience and the Culpability of Young Killers” (2012) 19(5) Psychiatry 
Psychol & L 692; see also ch 3. 
100  See, for example, Elizabeth S Scott and Thomas Grisso “Developmental Incompetence, Due 
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy” (2005) 83 NC L Rev 793. 
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The evidence is also relevant to determinations of legal and moral blameworthiness. In 
establishing mens rea, evidence about the inability to foresee a particular consequence must 
be relevant to the question of whether the offender actually did foresee that consequence 
(as is required, for example, in offences involving recklessness where it must be established 
that the offender had “a conscious appreciation of the risk”101). 
In a 2015 case,102 two teenagers faced trial in relation to the death of shop-keeper Arun 
Kumar who was stabbed to death during a robbery of his dairy.   A thirteen-year-old was 
charged with manslaughter; a fourteen-year-old with murder. According to newspaper 
reports, the fourteen-year-old had a troubled home life due to a drug-addicted mother. 
Furthermore, when he was eight he suffered a brain injury after being hit by a car on a 
pedestrian crossing. Despite evidence that such an injury takes years to recover from, a 
neuropsychologist told the High Court in Auckland that the young person was discharged 
early from hospital and was never seen again. The Court also heard that the defendant was 
addicted to synthetic cannabis supplied to him by his mother.103  The jury found the 14-
year-old not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and acquitted the 13-year-old of 
any crime. While the unanimous verdicts are undoubtedly consistent with the apparent 
degree of moral culpability involved, the question that arises is whether the same justice 
would have been dispensed to similar defendants on similar facts (defendants like 
Churchward and O’Brien, discussed above, perhaps).  It is interesting that the verdicts in 
the Kumar case were viewed with disapproval by many (as evidenced by comments on 
social media), who saw the young defendants as having “got off scot-free”. While members 
of the public who share this view are likely to argue for greater accountability for young 
defendants, reform of the law can have an educative function. In any event, this thesis does 
not argue that there ought to be no accountability. As with all of the case studies canvassed 
here, it is a question of degree.  
Victims of violence or coercion 
For several decades, there has been much research dedicated to understanding the 
psychological and other effects of domestic violence on victims. One of the earliest 
attempts at a comprehensive theory was that of psychologist Lenore Walker via her 
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account of “battered woman syndrome”. Subsequently, Walker’s theories have been 
subjected to criticism,104 although many commentators agree that violent relationships do 
have psychological effects on survivors.105  
Stark argues that while violence is critical in terms of the harm inflicted by abusive 
partners, most women with whom he has worked who only suffered violence retained 
autonomy in key areas of their lives.106 Stark’s model of coercive control is not centred 
on violence as a tactic of control.  He claims that the women he has seen in his practice 
have been adamant that what their partners do to them is less important than what they 
prevent them from doing. In other words, the more debilitating tactics of control are the 
appropriation of the women’s resources, undermining of their relationships with others, 
and essentially depriving them of autonomy. 
Stark’s “coercive control” model assumes that the battered woman’s ability to make 
rational choices is affected by the coercion she faces from the abuser.107 The logic of a 
battered woman’s choice can be located in the dynamics of coercive control. 
The availability of defences for people who kill has particular implications for people who 
kill their abusers. In one of New Zealand’s seminal cases in this regard, R v Wang,108 the 
defendant killed her abusive husband by stabbing him while he was in a drunken 
sleep. The Court heard evidence about serious and ongoing abuse by the husband, Jing 
Wah Li, including threats to kill on the night in question.  Wang was not able to avail herself 
of self-defence because the Court said that she had other options available to her.109 
This ruling ignores the facts of Wang’s language difficulties and what Walker would have 
called “learned helplessness”.  Walker reasoned that helplessness arises when events in a 
woman’s life seem uncontrollable.110 Relying on Seligman’s 1975 experiments with dogs, 
Walker reasoned that helplessness arises when events in a woman’s life seem 
                                                 
104  See, for example, HR Skinazi “Not just a ‘conjured afterthought’: using duress as a defense for 
battered women who ‘fail to protect’” (1997) 85 Cal L Rev 993 at 1009. 
105  At 1009. 
106  Evan Stark Coercive control:  how men entrap women in personal life (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2007) at 13. 
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109  At 539. 
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uncontrollable. Seligman’s experiments revealed that dogs who were repeatedly and 
randomly shocked became unable to escape the shocks even where escape was possible. 
Walker hypothesised that:111 
… women’s experiences of the non contingent nature of their attempts to control the 
violence would, over time, produce learned helplessness as the “repeated battering, like 
electrical shocks, diminish the woman’s motivation to respond. 
Ultimately Wang was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter, on the basis 
of provocation. With the repeal of that defence, there are even fewer options available to 
people who find themselves in similar situations. 
Notwithstanding the repeal of provocation as a defence, evidence of the psychological 
effects of violence may be relevant to the existence of self-defence. However, defendants 
who raise this will often struggle to raise a credible narrative that the force used was 
necessary or reasonable. Indeed, Wang’s claim of self-defence was rejected on the 
ground that she faced no immediate danger:112 
There was no immediate danger to render causing [her husband’s] death a reasonable 
course of action. 
Therefore, the chances of a battered defendant successfully pleading self-defence are rather 
low. Where a pre-emptive strike is used, courts are unlikely to consider that there was an 
honest belief in imminent peril unless the abuser is present, awake, and actively abusive. 
Further, fatal force is unlikely to be considered reasonable if the court believes that 
alternative courses of action are available to the defendant. Given the repeal of provocation, 
if self-defence is unsuccessful then a murder conviction is the only possible outcome if the 
mens rea for murder is established (in the absence of jury nullification).  
The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) has recently considered what can be done to 
assist victims of violence who kill their abusers, releasing an issues paper in November 
2015113 and tabling its final report on 12 May 2016.114 The NZLC has also addressed 
strangulation in light of increasing understanding of the role it plays in the context of family 
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violence.115 In addition, New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice has undertaken a review of 
family violence laws, recognising that:116 
The distinction between a victim and perpetrator is not always clear. Victims of ongoing 
abuse use a range of strategies to cope that can include violence in retaliation to the abuse. 
Ultimately the NZLC decided in favour of amending the Crimes Act 1961 to provide that 
where a person kills as a response to family violence, s 48 may apply even if the threat to 
the accused is not “imminent”.117 
Child homicide defendants 
When it comes to child homicide, New Zealand has a poor record compared with other 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, sitting in 
the bottom third.118  In 2015 and 2016, Fairfax Media, in its series “Faces of Innocents” 
collected data on just over two hundred cases of child homicide that occurred between 1992 
and 2015.119 Looking more closely at the circumstances of these deaths reveals patterns 
about the different motivations involved.  Other researchers have also attempted to identify 
a range of “motives” associated with child homicide.  Recently Friedman and others120 
identified the following contemporary motives: 
1. Fatal child maltreatment, whereby the child dies from abuse, neglect or 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP). 
2. Spousal revenge, which treats the homicide as an expression of the perpetrator’s 
anger at his or her partner/ex-partner. 
3. Where the child is unwanted. 
4. Altruistic, where the child is killed in the belief that he or she would be “better off 
dead”. This is common in murder-suicide cases. 
5. Where the perpetrator is acutely psychotic. 
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The existence of many of these motives is supported by evolutionary theory, as will be 
demonstrated in chs 2 and 5.   
Even at a glance it seems reasonable to suggest that different degrees of moral 
blameworthiness attach to these motives. A parent who kills their child as an act of revenge 
against a partner or someone who kills a child after a sustained period of abuse are on a 
different moral plane to a parent who is psychotic or where the killing is out of a (albeit 
misguided) sense of altruism – although it is difficult to draw any hard and fast boundaries 
(this applies in the case of young defendants and victims of violence as well). Current 
homicide laws are not able to accurately address, in the individual case, higher or lower 
degrees of moral blame where they are apparent.  
In 2005, Sharon Harrison-Taylor was convicted of the murder of Gabriel, one of her eight-
month-old twin boys, by a combination of smothering and strangulation.  Harrison-Taylor 
admitted killing Gabriel by hitting him and holding him down in his cot.  The defence 
raised infanticide. It was clear from the evidence that Harrison-Taylor had a history of 
psychiatric and other problems that impacted upon her state of mind.121 
Infanticide was not accepted by the jury.  The jury also found that the killing was murder 
and not manslaughter.  Harrison-Taylor was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 
minimum parole period of 12 years.122 
In 1999, Desiree Wright killed her eight-month-old son, River, by smothering him.  She 
was initially charged with murder but when the Crown obtained expert opinion establishing 
that Wright suffered from MSBP  (now Factitious Disorder Imposed on Another), it 
accepted Wright’s plea of guilty to manslaughter.123 Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy is 
a condition whereby a sufferer fabricates or induces an illness in a child or other person.124  
The syndrome is recognised in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). 
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As in Harrison-Taylor’s case, the mental disorder suffered by Wright fell short of the legal 
defence of insanity. However, Wright was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to four 
years imprisonment (reduced from seven years on appeal).  
We might ask the same question here as that posed in relation to Wickham and Wihongi: 
what distinguishes these two cases to justify such diverse outcomes for the defendants? 
The disparity is brought into even sharper relief when child maltreatment deaths are 
brought into the mix.  In Iorangi, a case in which the accused had killed his 17-month-old 
son by throwing him across the room for crying during a televised rugby game, the 
sentencing Judge had noted the “absence of any previous indications of violent offending 
and the Probation Officer’s assessment that the appellant presented an extremely low risk 
of re-offending”. 125   However, the Judge also accepted that there were aggravating 
circumstances in that the appellant had assaulted the child on two previous occasions, 
including one instance of head-butting the child.126  Despite these prior assaults, Iorangi 
was sentenced to four-and-a-half years in prison, for manslaughter. Again, this is 
inconsistent with Harrison-Taylor’s sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum parole 
period of 12 years. Of these two defendants, who had more of a “bad motive”? 
It is important to note that what might be argued in this thesis about lower degrees of 
culpability for particular categories of killings is not intended to be insensitive to the 
feelings of homicide victims’ families. The desire for accountability is understandable.  For 
the most part, this thesis does not argue that there should be no accountability or 
responsibility for defendants – it is a question of degree. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Foundations  
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the principal concepts and theoretical framework upon which this 
thesis rests.  As set out in ch 1, the thesis statement is as follows: 
The criminal justice system in New Zealand is underpinned by an assumption of individual 
rationality which is not always supported. Thus, the legal regime for apportioning blame 
in cases of culpable homicide is insufficient to recognise the different degrees of moral 
blame which can exist when one individual kills another.  This leads to inconsistent 
outcomes for factually similar cases, contrary to the rule of law which requires equality 
before the law.  This thesis will consider the question of whether changing the definitions 
of murder and manslaughter will allow courts to legitimately recognise all relevant 
mitigating circumstances in determining guilt, and whether there are other options for 
reform that might better deliver justice in the round. 
The first part of this chapter sets out the research methodology adopted in this thesis before 
undertaking a closer examination of criminal law and criminal justice theories relevant to 
homicide and the attendant concepts involved, including notions of responsibility, 
culpability and moral blame. The final part of this chapter will outline the psychological 
and biological theories that make up the theoretical framework of the thesis and explain 
why they are a relevant and useful lens for examining homicide as an element of human 
behaviour.  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Dobinson and Johns identify two main categories of qualitative legal research: doctrinal 
and non-doctrinal research.127  Simply put, doctrinal research considers what the law is in 
a particular area by reviewing and analysing primary and secondary sources – the principal 
aim is to describe the law and its application.128  Non-doctrinal research falls into three sub-
categories: problem-, policy- and law reform-based research. As Dobinson and Johns point 
out:129 
… all four categories of research, doctrinal, problem, policy and law reform, could be part 
of a largescale research project. A researcher, for example, could begin by determining the 
existing law in a particular area (doctrinal). This may then be followed by a consideration 
of the problems currently affecting the law and the policy underpinning the existing law, 
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highlighting, for example, the flaws in such policy. This in turn may lead the researcher to 
propose changes to the law (law reform).  
This paragraph neatly summarises the principal approach taken in this thesis, albeit not in 
that order. In this thesis, the doctrinal research follows from the identification of the 
problem: that New Zealand’s homicide laws are insufficient to recognise the different 
degrees of moral blame which can exist when one individual kills another. The formulation 
of the problem and the doctrinal research that follows identify that the policies 
underpinning the existing law are what gives rise to the problem: the assumption that all 
criminal behaviour is the exercise of rational choice. Naturally it follows that the research 
must employ a law reform approach to identify solutions to the problem – what results is a 
proposed statutory regime of homicide offences and defences that is set out in ch 6. 
There are two more subsidiary methodologies interwoven throughout the thesis. The first 
is the use of human science/biological science framework to consider the underpinnings of 
human behaviour. This is because criminal behaviour – homicide in the context of this 
thesis – is human behaviour. The aim of employing an evolutionary psychology analysis 
is to try and bring the law’s assumptions of human behaviour (such as the idea of rational 
choice) into alignment with the way in which humans actually behave.  
The second subsidiary methodology is the use of a comparative approach. While it was not 
intended that the thesis take a wholly comparative approach, it considers, where relevant, 
legislation, case law and law reform work in other jurisdictions.130  The comparative 
analysis here is an organic process –  the choices about what jurisdictions to consider have 
been dictated by the issues that arise from the doctrinal analysis.  For example, the absence 
of provocation in New Zealand necessitates a consideration of the iterations of diminished 
responsibility in Scotland and England and Wales; in Australia there had been a great deal 
of law reform around victims of violence who kill; in Canada there have been some useful 
cases dealing with self-defence and subsequent changes to legislation; and so on.  
Reference to United States legislative provisions is a necessary aspect of the law reform 
process, because the United States federal criminal code and most states adopt a degrees of 
murder approach, as does the Model Penal Code (MPC). These provisions provide useful 
templates for the construction of a legal regime that more accurately reflects the varying 
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degrees of moral blame apparent in different killings.  While it is said that there is a division 
between common law states and “code states” (states which adopt the MPC) and “common 
law states”, there is no clear bifurcation. As Walker points out, “[n]o state continues to 
cling to ancient English common law, nor does any state fully adhere to the MPC”131.   
THEORIES OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT  
This thesis contends that the current law of culpable homicide is unfair because it does not 
always allocate legal responsibility based on moral culpability.  This section of the chapter 
will consider the meaning of some of the key concepts upon which the thesis relies, 
including notions of “responsibility”, “culpability”, “moral blame”, “fairness” and 
“justice”. 
Responsibility and punishment 
The concept of responsibility is of central importance to criminal law, as a defendant can 
only be subjected to its penalties if they have been found responsible for some breach. In 
the context of this thesis, I generally use the term “responsibility” to denote a finding by 
the criminal justice system that a defendant has committed a legal wrong for which they 
will be punished.  Ashworth and Horder observe that the main concern of the criminal law 
is to prohibit behaviour that constitutes a serious wrong, whether against an individual or 
some social value or institution.132 However, those authors also acknowledge that:133 
There is … no general dividing line between criminal and non-criminal conduct which 
corresponds to a distinction between immoral and moral conduct, or between seriously 
wrongful and other conduct. The boundaries of the criminal law are explicable largely as 
the result of exercises of political power at particular points in history. 
Not everyone who is responsible for some conduct is held criminally responsible,134 so the 
question arises as to the basis upon which a defendant ought to be held criminally 
responsible. Hart and Honoré note that there are theorists who:135 
… insist that the decisions of courts on the extent of a wrongdoer’s liability are not and 
should not be reached by the application of any general principles but by the exercise of 
the sense of judgment, unhampered by legal rules, on the facts of each case…Instead it 
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should be recognized that the judge, though he may weigh an indefinite number of 
considerations each with some bearing on the question, decides more or less intuitively 
what the extent of a wrongdoer’s responsibility is to be. 
Various theorists have posited general principles as potential answers to the responsibility 
question; and it is clear that there is no one overriding theory or principle that decides all 
cases.  In many cases, including homicide, responsibility is attributed on the basis of 
causation – whether the defendant’s blameworthy conduct caused the criminal result. 
However, causation by itself is usually an insufficient basis for attributing responsibility – 
there also must be some mental element attaching to the defendant’s conduct.  Subjectivist 
theorists argue against criminal liability unless the defendant intended to or knowingly 
caused harm.136 This argument is underpinned by a notion of autonomy which itself is 
based upon a capacity to reason and exercise willpower:137 
… if a legal system is to claim moral authority over its subjects and to respect their 
autonomy, it should adhere to rule-of-law principles in its criminal law, by ensuring fair 
warning, maximum certainty of definition, subjective requirements for criminal liability, 
and so on. 
The alternative theory to subjectivism is objectivism, which locates fault in conduct that a 
reasonable person would not have undertaken.138  An awareness of wrongdoing is not 
essential under an objective approach.139  As Simester and others point out, subjective and 
objective approaches are extreme alternatives, and in the criminal law there is often a 
middle ground.140 
Lacey suggests that while the criminal law sometimes holds defendants responsible simply 
for causing harmful or undesirable outcomes, the current “paradigm of culpability” is 
located in the idea that responsibility is justly attributed to individuals when certain 
cognitive and volitional capacities are associated with the relevant conduct. 141  Lacey 
argues that this paradigm replaced “pre-modern” notions of criminal responsibility in 
which assumptions about, and evaluations of, character played a central role in 
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attribution.142  However, according to Lacey, assumptions about character have never 
wholly been jettisoned from the criminal law’s decisions about responsibility and further, 
in practice, character-based patterns of attribution are back “in style” both in English and 
American criminal law systems.143   
In a similar vein, Tadros rejects the idea that responsibility is necessarily attributed to 
capacity:144 
In attributing responsibility to an agent for an action, we are interested not in what an agent 
had the capacity to do. Nor are we interested in what options that agent had. We are 
interested in the actual processes of reasoning that were involved in performance of the 
action. It is those actual processes that connect the action to the agent.  Whether there is 
anything like ‘real’ choice, then, is irrelevant to criminal responsibility, not because the 
pseudo-choice available in the deterministic world is sufficient to make an agent 
responsible for his actions, but rather because no choice, pseudo or otherwise is required to 
ground an agent’s responsibility. 
Tadros acknowledges that several “contours” of criminal responsibility exist, but suggests 
that they are all underpinned by the idea that “an agent is responsible for an action only 
insofar as that action reflects in the appropriate way on the agent qua agent”.145  Tadros’s 
theory is a character theory of responsibility because “an action reflects on an agent qua 
agent only to the extent that it reflects on  his character”.146 
Central to this proposition is the idea that the agent accounts for their conduct by way of an 
explanation - what Tadros refers to as “motivating reasons”: a rational explanation for why 
the agent acted. 147  Tadros is clear that what he is looking for in terms of rational 
explanations are psychological states at the level of consciousness, and not “scientific or 
deep psychological explanation”.148  According to Tadros, these motivating reasons are 
the constituents of agency, and ground the agent’s responsibility for the action.149  So in 
order to discover whether a defendant is responsible for a wrong, we need to know why 
they did it and whether the motive was truly their own.150  I would suggest, however, that 
if Tadros’s idea of motivating reasons grounding responsibility applies (and the argument 
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is plausible), there seems to be no reason why deeper psychological explanations ought not 
to constitute “motivating reasons”. 
Echoing Tadros’s arguments, Nadler and McDonnell observe that the nature and purpose 
of a defendant’s conduct can be “placeholders for motive, and motive can be a strong signal 
of moral character”.151  Nadler and McDonnell distinguish, however, between character 
theories which attribute responsibility to an inference of flawed character, and motive 
theories which assess responsibility on the basis of the values expressed by the defendant’s 
motives.152  If the defendant’s motives and emotions express values deemed repugnant by 
decision-makers (such as killing in response to an unwanted homosexual advance) then the 
defendant’s culpability is unlikely to be mitigated, regardless of whether they had the 
capacity to control their actions.153 
Tadros also argues that the nature of agency is not simply constituted by the character of 
the agent at the time of an action, but as it persists over time. Character theory introduces a 
temporal aspect to responsibility which considers the agent more broadly than simply at 
the moment of acting; this is thought to lead to more just punishment.154 
Punishment is one of the significant goals of the criminal justice system. Some of the 
criminal justice system’s other goals include the management of crime and those it labels 
criminal, restitution, and restoration of social harmony.   Punishment is, in turn, 
underpinned by the goals of denunciation and degradation, incapacitation, retribution, 
rehabilitation, and deterrence.   
Simester and others observe that: 155 
If we were to dismantle punishment and its forbidding infrastructure, much of the raison 
d’etre of the criminal law would go with it. Despite its importance, however, the question 
why we punish remains a matter of perennial and irresolvable dispute and has given rise to 
a vast and challenging literature. 
Retributivist theorists, once it is established that a legal verdict is well-founded, justify 
punishment on the basis that it is deserved.156 Punishment aims to give people what they 
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deserve based upon their past behaviour.157 Simester and others observe that a “consistent 
retributivist” will confine punishment to wrongdoing and will usually attribute culpability 
to the mental state of the defendant rather than the consequences of their actions.158 
At the other end of the spectrum sits consequentialism, of which utilitarianism is a 
species.159   Utilitarianism justifies punishment only if it advances the welfare of society as 
a whole.160  Consequentialist justifications are forward-looking – punishment is simply an 
instrument for promoting future social welfare.161   According to consequentialist theory, 
as Simester and others observe, “[a] death remains a death whether it ensues from a brutal 
killing or a blameless accident”162 – in other words, the motive or moral element behind 
the defendant’s actions is irrelevant to the question of whether it is justifiable to punish that 
defendant.  
Critics of consequentialist theories argue that they justify unfair or Draconian penalties: 
severe penalties such as death for minor wrongs like parking violations would increase 
collective welfare, but it would simply be wrong to kill someone for, say, double 
parking.163  Further, it is actually the threat, rather than the punishment itself, that deters 
people from wrongdoing, and on that basis, consequentialist theory would justify not 
punishing serious offenders so long as the public believed that they were punished.164  
Greene and Cohen suggest that consequentialists might argue that this would not happen 
in the real world for a variety of reasons, such as that it would lead to absurdities in the law, 
and probable corruption. Greene and Cohen counter that it is wrong to punish innocent 
people and to not punish guilty people because to do so is fundamentally unfair, not 
because it would lead to bad consequences.165 They suggest that retributivist theories better 
apprehend this notion of fundamental unfairness:166 
… in the absence of mitigating circumstances, people who engage in criminal behaviour 
deserve to be punished, and that is why we punish them. Some would explicate this theory 
in terms of criminals’ forfeiting rights, others in terms of the rights of the victimized, 
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whereas others would appeal to the violation of a hypothetical social contract, and so on. 
Retributivist theories come in many flavours, but … what is important for our purposes is 
that retributivism captures the intuitive idea that we legitimately punish to give people what 
they deserve based on their past actions – in proportion to their ‘internal wickedness’, to 
use Kant’s (2002) phrase – and not, primarily, to promote social welfare in the future.  
Smith argues that the linkage between punishment and blameworthiness is not just a relic 
from a “bygone retributivist age”. 167 He proposes that while utilitarians  would reject the 
view that moral blameworthiness is the justification for punishment, most would agree that 
it is an “important limiting principle” for punishment.168  Smith suggests that the insight to 
be gleaned from this idea is that there is utility in moral desert:169  
… a criminal law which distributes punishment according to blameworthiness will more 
effectively achieve its crime-prevention goals than one that punishes regardless of the 
moral sentiments of the community. 
Simester and von Hirsch note that:170 
[T]he criminal law is distinctive because of its moral voice. It removes specified activities 
from the permissible and punishes individuals who venture or stray into its realm. It is a 
complex, authoritative, censuring device. Conduct is deemed through its criminalisation to 
be, and is subsequently punished as, wrongful behaviour that warrants blame. The official 
moral condemnation of activity and actor generates a truth-constraint. When labelling 
conduct as wrongful, and when labelling those it convicts as culpable wrongdoers, the state 
should get it right. 
To this idea Tadros, writing about distinguishing different violent offences, adds:171 
Wrongs must be distinguished on the basis of characteristics that are significant. 
The relevant kind of significance here is moral significance. It may be that there are 
distinctions between instances of wrongdoing that are considered significant socially, but 
that are not morally significant.  It may also be that there is a failure socially to recognize 
moral differences.  Against this, it might be argued that liberal democracies ought to reflect 
in their policies the views and values of the citizenry. But, liberal democracies must also 
protect minorities and those without a strong public voice. The fact that states have a 
responsibility to protect the vulnerable and minorities may constitute a reason to 
criminalize wrongful conduct directed against those groups … 
Depending upon the particular goals of the criminal justice system, there are different 
standards for assigning responsibility.  Whatever approach is taken to determining 
culpability and responsibility in homicide (and other crimes), the necessity and 
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effectiveness of that approach must be driven by the extent to which it achieves one or 
more of the above-stated goals,172 if not the overarching goal: justice and fairness.173 
Lacey sets out to explore “the linkages between particular conceptions of responsibility 
and the substantive role of criminal law in modern social governance”.174  She suggests 
that notions of individual criminal responsibility develop in response to structural problems 
of legitimation and coordination that arise in criminal law systems. In considering the 
“interpretive significance of intersecting relationships between different conceptions of 
responsibility as they shift over space and time”175, Lacey gives an account of several 
conceptions of responsibility. To summarise these conceptions, two are founded in the idea 
of capacity, two in ideas of character, and one based upon causation.  In terms of capacity 
principles, the first is the idea that a person is responsible for conduct which he or she 
chooses.176  The second asks the question whether the defendant had a fair opportunity to 
avoid the thing they did.177 In terms of character principles, the first – the overall character 
principle – attributes responsibility based upon a judgement that the defendant’s conduct is 
evidence of a wrongful or bad character trait, such as a disregard for human life.178  The 
second character principle asks whether the defendant’s conduct expresses a settled 
disposition of hostility or indifference to the relevant criminal law norm.179  Lacey’s fifth 
principle of attribution, with reference to the work of Honoré, suggests that being the cause 
of an outcome may ground an attribution of responsibility. 180  Lacey notes that 
criminalisation does operate with multiple conceptions of responsibility rather than a 
unitary approach.181  While that is true, and probably necessary taking the goals of the 
criminal justice system into account, questions arise as to the fairness of applying different 
models to similar types of behaviour; and, in the context of culpable homicide, whether the 
correct conception is being applied to particular types of defendants.  For example, it might 
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be argued that with regard to young people who kill, it is a capacity model which ought to 
be applied: did the young person, taking into account their stage of development, have a 
fair opportunity to avoid the conduct that led to the victim’s death? However, I suggest that 
in New Zealand at least, and probably elsewhere, it is not a capacity model but a character 
model of responsibility attribution that is being applied.  The demonisation of children is a 
recurring theme in the media, particularly evident following high-profile cases in which 
children or young people are charged with serious crimes (the killing of James Bulger by 
two ten-year-olds being just one example). Stereotypical images of offenders and their 
behaviour encourage the public (including potential judges and juries) to see events in 
simplistic terms and characterise the victims as good and the offenders as evil.  This then 
means that young defendants automatically are defined as deviant outsiders.182 According 
to Rutherford, there is widespread evidence of demonisation of children, primarily 
adolescent males, who are often referred to as “monsters”, “gang-bangers” or “super-
predators”.183  The super-predator label is especially damaging.  Moriearty refers to the 
“superpredator” discourse of 1990s America, noting that while the discourse had receded 
by the early 21st century, the juvenile justice system was irreversibly altered.184  This super-
predator discourse distorted reality in several ways.  It overemphasised violent crime;185  it 
ignored any cognitive or sociological perspective on causes of juvenile crime;186 and it 
overemphasised the link between race and violent crime.187  Regardless of national crime 
rates declining, opinion polls revealed the American public’s fear of violent juvenile 
offenders.188  For example, in a 1997 Los Angeles Times poll, 80 per cent of respondents 
said that media portrayals of violent crime increased their fear of being a victim of crime.189  
Furthermore in a 1999 poll, 62 per cent of respondents believed that juvenile crime rates 
were increasing.  In reality, juvenile crime rates were decreasing at that time.190 Similar 
responses to young offenders are observable in New Zealand as well. New Zealand’s 
criminal justice policy is driven by a perception that the public want a tougher stance taken 
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on crime in general. In relation to young offenders, the approach is evidenced by, for 
example, the 2006 Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill which claimed that:191 
Young offenders, in some cases only children, have been responsible for a recent spate of very 
serious and shocking crimes…There is a clear perception that the youth justice system is too lenient 
towards such offenders, and that the system is not working.  
This quote undoubtedly references highly publicised killings in New Zealand such as that 
of Michael Choy by a group of young people, including 12-year-old Kurariki, and that of 
Kenneth Piggot by three 14-year-old girls, including O’Brien. 192   While the Young 
Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill was defeated in May 2008, some of its intended results 
were achieved by the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Youth Courts 
Jurisdiction and Orders) Amendment Act 2010, namely lowering the age of criminal 
responsibility for ‘serious offences’ or where the child is defined as a ‘previous offender’.  
Arguably, then, New Zealand’s criminal justice system attributes responsibility to young 
defendants, to use Lacey’s words, based upon a judgement that the defendant’s conduct is 
evidence of a wrongful or bad character trait, such as a disregard for human life; or that the 
defendant’s conduct expresses a settled disposition of hostility or indifference to criminal 
law norms.  Young people who kill are seen as “others” – a different category of young 
person. By killing someone, they have broken the social contract that defines young people 
as innocent and vulnerable. When young people act outside of this role, by killing someone 
for example, they are often characterised as evil, super-predators, or monsters; they are of 
bad character. Further, the age at which criminal responsibility is set means that the legal 
outcome for such young people is a change in status from vulnerable youth in need of care 
and protection to adult, and the corresponding attribution of full responsibility that goes 
along with it.  In this respect it is interesting to observe the recent views of Jordan Nelson 
who, at the age of 13, shot and killed his caregiver, Rosemaree Kurth, because he 
mistakenly believed she had stopped him from visiting his mother.193   Nelson recently 
appeared before the Parole Board and told it that the “best explanation” he had for killing 
Kurth was that he had not previously been disciplined. Nelson said that he went from living 
in a situation with no boundaries to living with Kurth and her partner, who had tried to set 
limits, which he objected to. The Parole Board’s report said that Nelson admitted that at 
the time he did not think about the consequences of his actions but is now aware of the 
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ongoing effect of his offending on the victims and their families. The report says that 
Nelson has achieved many accomplishments during his incarceration including being part 
of an award-winning team involved in the Youth Enterprise programme; achieving a 
bronze Duke of Edinburgh award and working towards a silver; and has attained NCEA 
levels one and two. He can speak fluent te reo Māori and is an accomplished carver. 
Importantly, Nelson accepts he is not ready for parole. 194  What all this seems to confirm 
is the idea that Nelson, undoubtedly like many other young killers, is not of bad character; 
rather he did not have the capacity at the time of the killing to make a rational choice. 
Classicist and positivist theories of responsibility 
The classical liberal model of criminal responsibility presumes that defendants have mental 
capacity and it attributes guilt without reference to the defendant’s individual qualities.195  
This reflects one of the central concepts of classicist legal theory – egalitarianism, or 
equality before the law.196  The classical model is still embodied in the general legal 
principles of criminal responsibility administered by courts in New Zealand and other 
common law countries, whereby the authority to punish an individual depends upon that 
individual committing prohibited conduct while possessing a particular state of mind (such 
as intention).197  This, of course, assumes that everyone has the capacity to make a rational 
choice. This idea corresponds with the first of Lacey’s capacity principles,198 that a person 
is responsible for conduct that they choose.   
Because of the unreasonableness of classical theory’s assumption that everyone is rational, 
neo-classicism introduced the possibility of mitigating circumstances which, in some cases 
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can partially, or wholly, reduce responsibility. 199   Neo-classicist theory pays closer 
attention to the idea that the criminal law should only convict those who are culpable in 
some way and we should only label someone a “criminal” if they are morally blameworthy.  
Accordingly, if a person is not morally at fault, the reproach of the criminal law is not 
appropriate.200  This proposition applies in degrees.   
When compared with classicist theories, positivist theories that purport to explain crime 
focus on the actor, rather than the act,201 and recognise that often crime is the result of 
factors beyond the control of the individual, 202  which reduce the individual’s moral 
responsibility. 203   These factors can be embedded in social conditions (the focus of 
sociological positivism) or in the individual (the focus of individual positivism) and can be 
seen, to varying degrees, as overriding the will of the individual, meaning that the notion 
of free will cannot explain all crime.  The divergence between classical and positivist 
approaches to crime can be demonstrated by the ordinary judicial responses to people who 
kill. The case of Harris, referred to in ch 1, is but one example. As noted, Harris was 
executed for killing two teenagers. He was found morally blameworthy despite suffering 
from foetal alcohol syndrome and having been subjected throughout his childhood to 
severe abuse (physical and psychological) by his alcoholic parents.204   
Homicide laws, like many others, have developed from classicist theory, including its 
presumption that individuals are rational actors, but they also incorporate neo-classicist 
ideas of mitigating circumstances.   The question that this thesis raises is, do neo-classicist 
concessions go far enough in recognising different degrees of moral blame?  As observed 
in ch 1, the question is also raised about the adequacy of existing defences to homicide. 
As is apparent from the cases discussed in ch 1, where a strict and non-contextual 
application of the law does not support findings of self-defence, a victim of violence who 
kills her abuser will be liable for murder.  Where a jury does not consider the developmental 
state of an adolescent’s reasoning processes, the adolescent could be liable for murder or 
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manslaughter rather than a lesser, or even no, offence.205 These outcomes reflect the law’s 
assumption of rationality. Yet many such defendants are in a similar predicament to 
Robert Harris, in which it is arguable that severe physical and psychological abuse 
“might have severely impaired the moral sensibilities of most human beings” 206 
(Wihongi is an instructive case here207) or, in the case of young people, that their age has 
not allowed them to develop the moral sensibilities of adults. 
In relation to young defendants, victims of violence who kill their abusers, and some child 
homicide defendants, legitimate concerns exist about their abilities to make rational 
decisions or to act in accordance with rational decisions, in the circumstances in which 
they are placed. It is not enough to assert that these circumstances can be adequately 
addressed in sentencing.  In some cases, the degree of moral culpability may be so low that 
the censure of the criminal law is inappropriate; in which case, there is no authority for the 
state to punish the offender at all. 
This thesis will consider the extent to which neo-classicism mitigates the harshness of the 
classical egalitarian principle of the criminal law in the context of culpable homicide.  Is a 
neo-classicist approach sufficient to reflect the reality that not all are capable of rational 
judgement in all circumstances? If not, will positivist approaches to criminal responsibility, 
acknowledging as they do the role of factors beyond individual control, offer more just 
outcomes?  
It is important to note at this point that there are few situations of homicide in which there 
will be no legal responsibility at all (although the proposals set out in ch 6 do provide for 
some exceptions to that general rule). The argument is that not all defendants ought to be 
held to the same standard – there are degrees of moral blame, in other words, and therefore 
degrees of responsibility. 
Culpability 
Dictionary definitions of the term “culpability” include guilt, blameworthiness, 
responsibility, liability, and fault.  Often within the criminal law culpability is used in all of 
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these senses. 208   Culpable homicide, for instance, is homicide that the law sees as 
blameworthy, for which one may be found guilty, to be at fault, or that one may be legally 
responsible or liable for.  As Feinberg notes, different language is often used to express the 
same idea:209 
An equivalent way of saying that some result is a man’s fault is to say that he is to blame 
for it.  Precisely the same thing can also be said in the language of responsibility.  Of course, 
to be responsible for something (after the fact) may also mean that one did it, or caused it, 
or now stands answerable, or accountable, or liable to unfavourable responses from others 
for it.  One can be responsible for a result in all those senses without being to blame for it.  
One can be held liable for a result either because it is one’s fault or for some quite different 
kind of reason and one can be to blame for an occurrence and yet escape all liability for it. 
It can be seen, therefore, that moral blameworthiness and legal blameworthiness do not 
always coincide. Consistent with retributivist theory, moral blameworthiness is imbued 
with notions of desert – does the defendant deserve to be punished for their behaviour? 
Central to this idea is that the defendant has the capacity to reason; the ability to make a 
choice between one course of action and another. The way in which the criminal justice 
system usually determines this in the individual case is to require some element of intention 
or foresight of harm and recklessness. Although in the context of tortious liability, Lord 
Atkin’s words in Donoghue v Stevenson are instructive: 210 
The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a 
species of ‘culpa’, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing 
for which the offender must pay. 
However, as was observed by Sir Owen Woodhouse, also in the context of tortious liability, 
the extent of liability often depends upon the results of the defendant’s conduct, not by the 
quality of it: 211 
Reprehensible conduct can be followed by feather blows while a moment’s inadvertence 
could call down the heavens. 
This is particularly true in the case of homicide where, for liability to ensue, a death must 
result from a defendant’s conduct. As the quote above from Feinberg acknowledges, one 
can be held responsible for an event without being blameworthy (as generally understood). 
Absolute liability offences, in which the prosecution does not need to prove the defendant 
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acted with fault, are an example. The reverse is also true: an actor can be blameworthy yet 
not responsible.  An example of this occurs when one assaults a victim causing a bodily 
injury, but some intervening event (a novus actus interveniens) causes a more severe bodily 
injury leading to death.  As noted above, in the context of culpable homicide, as with some 
other offences, the notion of causation becomes crucial to determinations of liability. 
Person A kills person B if A’s actions are a substantial cause and an operating cause of B’s 
death.212  If, between A’s act and B’s death, there is some other cause which operates as a 
substantial cause upon B, such that A’s act can be said to be merely part of the historical 
setting in which B’s death occurred, A is not responsible for B’s death.213 
Despite the urging of Mill that the only limitation on individual freedom ought to be to 
prevent harm to others,214 there has always been a moral component to the criminal law.  
Even where the restriction of individual freedom is to prevent harm to others, as in the 
context of homicide, for example, different degrees of moral blame can be identified.  
However, while the criminal law is concerned with assigning responsibility for harms, it is 
not always concerned with moral blameworthiness, since not all offences require mens rea 
in the sense of intention or foresight of harm to be proved (as in absolute liability offences 
described above). Other offences can be established by an objective assessment of fault, 
such as negligence. Sometimes the circumstances also mitigate responsibility, despite the 
presence of intention (self-defence, for example). 
The attribution of moral blame is not simply about intention (or foresight or any other mens 
rea state as generally understood). Moral blame evokes questions about motives, excuses 
and justifications, and capacity. These concepts are broader than questions about mens rea. 
An offender may have intended to kill, yet not be morally blameworthy for doing so. Moral 
blame is, to use Lord Atkin’s words in Donoghue v Stevenson, above, based upon a general 
public sentiment of moral wrongdoing.  
Greene and Cohen consider the notion of moral blame another way: “for centuries, many 
legal issues have turned on the question: “what was he [or she] thinking?”215  If what the 
defendant was thinking was truly an exercise of free will then generally speaking, they will 
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be morally blameworthy. At the centre of neoliberalism – the jurisprudential phase in 
which we currently exist – is the idea of individuals as “rational utility maximisers” or 
“profit and loss calculators”.  These ideas are the linchpins for economic policy which is 
then translated into social policy; hence the law’s assumption that people do have a general 
capacity for rational choice.216   
This question – “what was the defendant thinking?” – can be expressed in different ways: 
was it the defendant or their upbringing? Was it the defendant or their genetic makeup? 
Was it the defendant or their circumstances?217 Greene and Cohen argue that there is no 
“defendant” independent of these other things.218  In other words, the mind and the brain 
are not two separate entities. What is more, they argue, is that: 
… we have little reason to doubt that (i) the state of the universe 10 000 years ago, (ii) the 
laws of physics, and (iii) the outcomes of random quantum mechanical events are together 
sufficient to determine everything that happens nowadays, including our own actions. 
In this sense, Greene and Cohen argue, the combined effects of genes and environment 
determine all of our actions.219  This, as Greene and Cohen admit, is a controversial 
opinion. 220  However, they suggest that neuroscience can assist in explaining the 
mechanical nature of human action in a way that avoids complicated arguments. Their 
explanation is that rather than the mind being a black box, which presumably cannot be 
penetrated to discover the causes of behaviour, the brain is a “transparent bottleneck” for 
all the forces that affect who we are and what we do.221  These forces include those which 
are critical for moral and legal responsibility. And because of advances in neuroscience, 
we may soon be able to gain far more insight into those forces than ever before.222 Greene 
and Cohen speculate that in a world when the “mechanical nature of human decision-
making”223 might be fully appreciated by everyone, it would still be necessary that the law 
punish lawbreakers, because the maintenance of order relies upon it. Greene and Cohen 
argue, however, that distinguishing those who are truly blameworthy from those who are 
victims of circumstance will become pointless.224 This is because, from a deterministic 
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perspective, everyone is essentially a victim of circumstance. This is a highly contested 
view, but even if we assume, simply for the sake of argument, that deterministic theory is 
correct (that is, that free will is a fiction), the law still needs to distinguish between the 
moral blameworthiness of certain types of behaviour. The maintenance of social order 
depends upon on the idea that human agents do possess decision-making capacity and may 
be held legally accountable for their actions, regardless of the neuroscientific evidence to 
the contrary. I will argue that some “victims of circumstance” (in the context of this thesis, 
defendants charged with culpable homicide) are worthier of compassion than others.  Some 
categories of defendants who may be more deserving of compassion than moral censure 
are already recognised by the law. The extent to which insanity and infancy bear upon the 
actions of defendants are examples. The defence of self-defence, which recognises that a 
threat of death or serious bodily injury affects a defendant’s behaviour, is another. And, as 
Nussbaum points out, compassion already plays a role in sentencing:225 
It is natural to consider the defendant’s life at this time, and to adjust the penalty if we think 
that a specific history – for example a history of childhood sexual abuse – might have 
destabilized the personality, making criminal conduct more understandable and to that 
extent less heinous, even if it does not give rise to a successful plea of diminished 
capacity … 
This thesis argues, however, that the existing “compassionate” circumstances to which we 
do not apportion moral blame (or at least, the highest degree of moral blame) do not go far 
enough in recognising the different factors which undermine the assumption of rationality.   
What makes some killings worse, more heinous, or more morally blameworthy, than others? 
At first glance we could say that certain features of the killing automatically make it more 
morally repugnant. Malicious premeditation, killings committed during the commission of 
other serious crimes, torturous killings, and the killing of society’s more vulnerable and 
defenceless people, are some features that might be thought to invoke a higher than usual 
degree of moral blame. At the other end of the spectrum we might include killings where 
a defendant acts with a genuinely altruistic motive (to end a loved one’s suffering, for 
example); where the killing is provoked by the conduct of the victim; and circumstances 
where the defendant’s capacity was impaired in ways which fall outside existing defences. 
These are just some examples. 
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As noted, some of these aggravating and mitigating factors are considered in sentencing, 
but not always. And in any event, sentencing decisions flow from decisions about 
responsibility. Further, the killing of a vulnerable person is not always (highly) morally 
blameworthy if, for example, the defendant is also a vulnerable person. Similarly, not all 
premeditated killings are (highly) morally blameworthy. Sometimes killing a child by 
abuse, or possibly even neglect, can be more morally blameworthy than intending to kill 
them (compare defendants Iorangi and Harrison-Taylor, referred to in ch 1, for example).  
In other cases, factors individual to the defendant make the killing more blameworthy than 
other cases. Compare a forty-year-old defendant with no psychological issues who 
recklessly kills a victim, with a fourteen-year-old who does the same.  Both these 
defendants, under our current system, are held to the same standard, usually by people 
(judges and juries) who have more in common with the forty-year-old than the fourteen-
year-old.  
It might be argued that cases that are at the lower end of the moral blameworthiness 
spectrum are those with which we, as fellow humans, may empathise.  As noted above, 
euthanasia provides a good example: many would empathise with a defendant who assisted 
the suicide of a terminally ill and suffering family member. We could imagine being in this 
position ourselves and possibly, if we were in that defendant’s position, we feel we may 
have done the same thing. Relevantly, at the time of writing, David Seymour’s End of Life 
Bill 2017 (269-1) is before the Select Committee. As set out in the Explanatory Note, the 
purpose of the Bill is to give:226 
…  people with a terminal illness or a grievous and irremediable medical condition the 
option of requesting assisted dying. The motivation for this Bill is compassion. It allows 
people who so choose, and are eligible under this Bill, to end their lives in peace and 
dignity, surrounded by loved ones.  
The Bill carefully defines those eligible for assisted dying, details a comprehensive set of 
provisions to ensure this is a free choice, made without coercion, and outlines a stringent 
series of steps to ensure the person is mentally capable of understanding the nature and 
consequences of assisted dying. 
It is interesting to note that while that Bill has been in progress, Wellington woman, Susan 
Austen, has been acquitted of aiding the suicide of another woman. 227  Austen was, 
however, found guilty on two charges of specific importations of pentobarbitone, a 
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barbiturate. Austen was co-ordinator of the Wellington branch of Exit International, and 
chaired Wellington End-of-Life Choice group. Her acquittal on the aiding suicide charge 
may reflect the jury’s sympathy for both the defendant’s and the victim’s position, despite 
having been told that they must put aside their views on euthanasia in coming to their 
decision.228 The Bill passed its first reading in 2017 with a vote of 76 to 44. The 
timetable for the Select Committee's report on the Bill has now been extended given that a 
record 35,000 submissions were received. 229 
Another example of cases where compassion may be easier to find are those where a child 
dies from a failure to supervise or some other omission with which we can relate. The 
phenomenon of babies dying in hot cars is apposite.  The mother of Mace Caldwell pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter following the death of her son, who she left in her car on a hot 
Friday in January 2015. It was said to be the first New Zealand case of “forgotten baby 
syndrome”, in which a break in usual routines can create a “false memory” of doing 
something one intended to do (such as drop the child at daycare). It is believed that 
Mace’s father usually drove him to daycare on Fridays but was unable to do so that day.230  
Again, many can empathise with the defendant in this type of case. They may think, 
“there but for the grace of God go I” and not wish to stigmatise the defendant with a 
conviction for culpable homicide.  
Some of the options that the criminal justice system currently employs to denote culpability, 
and therefore responsibility, include notions of causation or fault. In terms of the latter, this 
includes subjective mens rea which dominates as a basis for attributing responsibility. 
However, mens rea and other fault standards do not always reflect moral blame.  
Particularly in the case of culpable homicide, mens rea is a very blunt instrument for 
recognising moral blame, as some of the cases referred to in ch 1 attest.  This is, at least in 
part, a reflection of a punitive turn in criminal justice policy and practice, observable in 
New Zealand, and elsewhere, in the last twenty or so years. This has been evidenced by 
legislation such as the Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010 which created the three-
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strikes sentencing regime but also prior to that, the Sentencing Act 2002, the Parole Act 
2002 and the Victims’ Rights Act 2002.   These Acts, according to Oleson “were legislative 
expressions of penal populism” whereby politicians respond to the punitive sentiment of 
the public231 –  “popular punitivism”, in other words. Popular punitivism has been defined 
by Monterosso as “[t]he interplay in late modern society between the media, public opinion 
and politicians that generates a backdrop to the formulation and implementation of both 
criminal justice and penal policy”.232  What this punitive turn has also done in New 
Zealand is to expand categories of mens rea or fault standards to include, more than ever 
before, states of mind such as knowledge, failure to inquire, failure to protect and so on. It 
is  possible to be convicted of manslaughter for, essentially, making a mistake – the 
“forgotten baby” cases are but one example. 
Additionally, tests for mens rea have become increasingly objective, rendering someone 
liable for not knowing or foreseeing (for example) what a reasonable person would have 
known or foreseen. Examples of this in the New Zealand context include the operation of 
s 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, where a secondary party is charged with culpable homicide 
in cases where the principal is charged with murder under s 168 of the same Act; the 
secondary party (as well as the principal) could be liable for murder in the absence of 
foresight of death.233  This is inconsistent with New Zealand’s long history of requiring a 
subjective assessment of mens rea. Smith, writing in 2012, acknowledged the “wide 
consensus that overcriminalization is a serious problem”.234  Smith lays part of the blame 
for this at the door of inadequate mens rea requirements in statutory offences.  He observes 
that drafters are at pains to identify the actus reus elements of an offence but often ascribe 
no, or inadequate, mens rea requirements.235  Smith finds this “troubling because mens rea 
requirements are an essential safeguard against unjust convictions and disproportionate 
punishment”.236  The role of mens rea in criminal law is to exempt from punishment those 
who are not “blameworthy in mind”.237 
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As noted above, the punitive approach in the criminal law is seen in common purpose or 
joint enterprise liability. In Edmonds v R238 the Supreme Court noted the concern that 
rigorous application of joint enterprise liability rules has a tendency to over-criminalise the 
conduct of secondary parties. Common purpose liability is particularly pernicious in 
relation to young defendants, who often engage in risky behaviour in groups. If a principal 
offender is charged with murder under s 168 of the Crimes Act, which deals with felony-
murder offences, a secondary party can be liable for murder or manslaughter even if they 
did not foresee death.  This was precisely what happened in the case of Kurariki, who was 
convicted of manslaughter for acting as a decoy in the planned robbery of a pizza delivery 
worker, which took place when Kurariki was aged just 12 years.239  
The over-criminalisation problem is compounded by the fact that defences to homicide are 
“few in number and framed incredibly narrowly”.240  As noted in ch 1, Smith points out 
that defences have a crucial role in ensuring that criminal responsibility is kept within 
appropriate bounds.241  
Green suggests, however, that governments in Britain and the United States fail to improve 
the means of public consultation to ensure that the public voice is properly assessed before 
it is invoked to justify penal policy – instead they rely upon “a monolithically and 
unqualifiedly punitive public to justify punitive policies”.242 Arguably the same applies in 
New Zealand.  However, Green observes that researchers have long established that when 
the public is better informed, it is less punitive than politicians assert and are highly 
ambivalent about crime and punishment issues. Accordingly,  the public want “both to 
execute criminals and rehabilitate them; to blame individuals for their offending and blame 
the social circumstances; to ‘let them rot in jail’ and prevent them from reoffending”.243 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, New Zealand’s current regime for apportioning 
blame in culpable homicide results in much over-criminalisation, and not just in relation to 
young defendants. The problem is also seen in cases where (usually) women who are 
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victims of abuse, including violence and coercion, respond to the abuse with lethal force. 
There is potential under-criminalisation in other contexts, for example, where 
manslaughter convictions denote a lower degree of moral blame for defendants who fatally 
mistreat children.244 
A number of cases illustrate that not all defendants are treated in the same way. 245 That is, 
they might demonstrate the same degree of moral blame, but the outcomes in case 
disposition differ wildly. The inconsistency of outcomes means that a fundamental 
requirement of the rule of law is absent – the requirement of equality before the law. When 
elements of the rule of law are not upheld, justice is not delivered. Nadler and McDonnell 
contend that people harbour “a generalized social preference to inculpate people with bad 
characters” 246  which is at the heart of the phenomenon they refer to as “motivated 
inculpation: if we have any reason to infer that a defendant has a bad moral character, we 
will be more likely to construe that defendant’s actions as criminally culpable”247.  Using 
a series of experiments, Nadler and McDonnell tested the hypothesis that:248 
… when a fact finder judges a harmful action performed by a ‘bad’ defendant or performed 
with a bad motive, the defendant is perceived as more responsible, and the act as more 
causal and intentional, than when a fact finder judges an identical harmful action conducted 
by a ‘good’ defendant or with a good motive. 
The results of the experiments suggest two things: (a) that a defendant’s motive (with its 
implications about moral character) strongly influence inferences about causation, 
intention and blame; and (b) that moral character, inferred independently from a 
defendant’s motive for creating harm can influence judgments about causation, intent, and 
blame. 249  These implications appear to readily explain the different outcomes in the 
Wickham and Wihongi cases. Wickham suffered from multiple sclerosis, had no antecedent 
criminal or violent behaviour, and appeared to come from a middle-class background. 
Wihongi had a troubled past, including alcohol and painkiller abuse, and she had been 
violent to her victim on other occasions (none of which were actually relevant to whether 
she was acting in self-defence at the time of the killing). 
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Fairness and justice 
What do we understand the concepts of fairness and justice to mean? Wright, in a footnote 
to his discourse on the principles of justice, says:250 
The concept of justice is narrower than the concept of fairness with which it is sometimes 
confused.  While a broad array of actions and situations are said to be unfair, it is not 
common to describe them as unjust unless they also involve [interpersonal relations…that 
are properly subject to regulation through legal rights and duties]. 
On this definition, justice has a legal element which fairness does not necessarily entail.  
However, common understandings of fairness by members of a society are likely to 
promote the delivery of justice in that legal sense. While unfair outcomes are not always in 
breach of the rule of law, if the legislature and courts (judges and juries) agree that certain 
outcomes in decisions about culpable homicide are unfair, then we are on the path to a 
more just approach.   
The evolution of justice? 
Recently much research has been devoted to the idea of social justice in animals, with the 
implication that the research reveals much about human understandings of justice. One 
study revealed that capuchin monkeys demonstrate a sense of fairness, by changing their 
behaviour when they perceive other monkeys are getting an advantage that they themselves 
are not. 251   The study involved the monkeys exchanging tokens with a human 
experimenter. If one monkey received a grape for a token and a second monkey received 
cucumber (to capuchins, cucumber is far less desirable than grape), the second monkey 
eventually refused to participate in the exchanges. The researchers recorded two types of 
incomplete exchanges: either failing to hand back the token or failure to accept or eat the 
cucumber.  Both types of incomplete exchange often involved the capuchins actively 
rejecting the cucumber by, for example, tossing it out of the test chamber. 252  In a 
newspaper interview about the study, de Waal was quoted as saying this self-righteous 
indignation in a primate suggests that “human behaviour has very old evolutionary 
roots”.253  The irrational nature of this reaction suggested that there was no other basis for 
the behaviour except to complain about the unfairness: “[t]he cucumber-holding monkey, 
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after all, gave up a reward for no apparent reason other than to demonstrate disgust at being 
badly treated”.254  This is not to suggest that a biological link exists between capuchin 
monkeys and humans sufficient to amount to a causal factor. Rather it seems that notions 
of fairness are deep drivers of behaviour across all species so perhaps we ought to pay 
closer attention to them. 
There has been more recent research on concepts of fairness in other animals.  Bekoff and 
Pierce, in their book Wild Justice 255  look, with varying degrees of depth, at social 
behaviour in gorillas, baboons, chimpanzees, elephants, bats, wolves, wolverines, monkeys, 
whales, foxes, bears, dogs and cats. A special issue of the journal Social Justice Research 
was published in 2012, in an effort to bring together what was then known about social 
justice in animals.  In their contribution to that issue, Pierce and Bekoff referred to their 
proposition first outlined in Wild Justice, that justice behaviours form one of three major 
clusters of moral behaviour in animals. Justice behaviours include behaviours relating to 
expectations about what an individual deserves and how they ought to be treated relative 
to others. “Fairness” is a specific type of justice behaviour and it relates to how costs and 
benefits are distributed across the group. Fairness involves notions of equity and 
equality.256 The cluster of justice behaviours also includes, or has overlaps with, notions of 
reciprocity, collaboration, punishment, reconciliation, spite, fair play, sharing, retribution 
and forgiveness, as well as emotional responses to injustice and justice such as anger and 
indignation, or pleasure, gratitude and trust.257  What these kinds of research show us is 
that concepts of fairness or justice may not be limited to humans, as once was thought. 
Rather, as Brosnan and de Waal demonstrated from their study on capuchin monkeys, 
these concepts may have deep evolutionary roots.  Why is this important?  The law (in this 
context, criminal law) must keep abreast with current knowledge.  As noted in ch 1, if the 
law is to remain relevant it must reflect what is known about mental states.  If the law does 
not reflect relevant science, it moves too far away from the reality of the community.  
Understanding the scientific underpinnings of behaviour leads to a better appreciation of 
why people kill, and this may impact upon our understandings of how this affects their 
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moral blame – either by reducing it or compounding it. This thesis argues that the law of 
homicide ought to be reformed in a way that supports and promotes society’s deeply held 
notions of justice and fairness.  If a defendant’s actions have deep evolutionary roots, then 
so do decision-makers’ sense of a just outcome. In other words, perhaps we ought to change 
the law so that it aligns with our sympathies – so that courts can legitimately come to a just 
conclusion. If the law says a particular type of killing is not as morally blameworthy as 
another, our empathies may evolve in that direction.   
Just as notions of fairness and justice may have an evolutionary basis, so too do notions of 
forgiveness and revenge.  McCullough, Kurzban and Tabak suggest that revenge and 
forgiveness are both psychological adaptations.258  They propose that revenge is designed 
to deter harm and forgiveness is designed to preserve valuable relationships.259  In that 
sense, both revenge and forgiveness solve adaptive problems. In the case of revenge, it 
changes the wrongdoer’s incentive to emit benefits instead of costs upon the victim.260  
Forgiveness, in terms of an adaptive solution, can reduce the costs associated with 
revenge. 261   Revenge can cause an aggressor and their allies to engage in counter-
revenge.262  Forgiveness works to inhibit this counter-revenge when the costs of revenge 
outweigh its deterrent benefits.263  A deeper understanding of the biological sciences can 
help us to understand these behaviours, and more. It may, for instance, help us to 
understand the moral judgements made by non-defendants, in other words, other parties 
who play a role in the administration of justice such as police prosecutors, defence counsel, 
juries and judges.  For example, studies have shown that normal decision-making is more 
emotional and less reasoned than many have believed.264 In a quest to discover answers to 
questions such as “how do we decide that someone else has done something wrong?”, 
psychologists Greene and Haidt reviewed neuroimaging studies on moral psychology 
which point to the conclusion that emotion is a significant driving force in moral 
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judgment.265  This kind of research clearly has implications for the criminal justice system, 
which requires reasoned, rather than emotional, decision-making. However, it should be 
noted that there is not actually a clear-cut separation between the two, and this is not to say 
that reasoning does not also play an important role in moral judgments. Perhaps, however, 
we have traditionally underestimated the extent to which emotion plays a part. 
Haidt, together with Rozin, has looked at the emotion of disgust and its evolutionary and 
cultural bases.266  They posit that elicitors of disgust have evolved over time from a food 
rejection system driven by pathogen avoidance to avoidance of reminders of human’s 
animal nature, especially death. 267   Nussbaum states that “[s]hame and disgust are 
prominent in the law, as they are in our daily lives”.268 She observes that throughout history, 
disgust has been a powerful weapon in social exclusion:269 
So powerful is the desire to cordon ourselves off from our animality that we often don’t 
stop at feces, cockroaches, and slimy animals. We need a group of humans to bound 
ourselves against, who will come to exemplify the boundary line between the truly human 
and the basely animal. If those quasi-animals stand between us and our own animality, then 
we are one step further away from being animal and mortal ourselves. 
The traditional focus of much of this “projected disgust” is the female body, 270  but 
Nussbaum notes the “central locus of disgust” in more modern United States society, which 
is the male loathing of male homosexuals.271 Aligned with these ideas is the reality that 
particular types of killing evoke more disgust than others. To what extent do these emotions 
factor in to our moral judgments about particular defendants’ behaviour? 
It is of course true that there are other deeply rooted bases for notions of revenge and 
forgiveness and so on that are equally as powerful and historically grounded as biological 
drivers. The analysis presented here is not intended to preclude consideration of those bases. 
Rather, I submit that for the most part, the criminal law has failed to pay due attention to 
biological explanations for human behaviour, including those involved in the evaluation of 
criminal culpability. 
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THE BIOLOGY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR  
The next section of this chapter looks more closely at the biological lenses through which 
we can view the phenomenon of culpable homicide, and in particular, the different degrees 
of moral blame that we might associate with different types of killings. This thesis suggests 
that a finding of free will is not always supported by the facts but we, as a society, accept 
that proposition more readily in some cases than others. The following discussion will 
examine the biological processes involved in guiding behaviour and will provide a basis to 
extrapolate different degrees of moral blame associated with that behaviour. 
At this juncture it is important to re-emphasise the note of caution contained in ch 1 about 
the following analysis, relying as it does on a view of human action which is open to contest. 
In particular, it should be noted that this thesis rejects the view of all human behaviour as 
mechanistic.  Rather the thesis seeks to demonstrate that a broader understanding of all of 
the causes of human behaviour (including not just that of defendants but also other actors 
in the criminal justice system) can potentially pave the way for a more just regime for 
considering moral culpability in the context of homicide. As Gowaty, a “Darwinian 
feminist”272 observes:273 
There are multiple levels or foci of analysis in the modern biological study of behavior 
(including social behavior and social organization of both humans and nonhuman animals). 
We ask questions about neuronal causation (How do sensory signals contribute to “cause” 
behavior?), hormonal causation (How do hormonal signals “cause” behavior?). How do 
cognitive processes “cause” behavior? How do genes cause behavior? How do 
conditioning and other psychological processes cause behavior? How do emotions or 
feelings cause behavior? None of these levels or foci of analysis are alternative to one 
another, meaning that each of these levels of causation or foci of analysis might (probably) 
simultaneously work to “cause” the expression of this or that behavior … 
A better way of explaining the relevance of evolutionary theory may be to avoid the use of 
the language of causation, or at least to talk about potentials instead. Perhaps the 
relationship between evolution and present behaviour can be best explained by reference 
to self-defence. It cannot be disputed that self-preservation is a deep driver of human 
behaviour. Sometimes homicide results as a response to a threat to one’s own safety.  We 
could say that homicide in the context of self-defence is fitness-enhancing – as Blumoff 
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puts it, it reflects “the natural desire in all of us to flourish and reproduce”.274 In other words, 
self-defensive reactions are adaptive.275 The process of natural selection gives rise to a 
homicidal potential (the realisation of which is highly contingent).   However, clearly this 
does not mean the killing is pre-determined or that a person who kills in self-defence is 
predisposed to kill. 
Evolutionary theory 
Key concepts and processes in evolutionary theory 
While Darwin is considered the father of evolution, it was Mendel who discovered the 
precise mechanism by which inheritance occurs.  Darwin had thought that inherited traits 
were a result of blending of the qualities of two parents.  Instead, Mendel discovered that 
each parent’s qualities were passed to offspring intact in packets, or units of heredity, called 
genes.276  One of the fundamental principles underpinning evolutionary explanations for 
human behaviour is that evolution causes individuals to be born with a patterned set of 
emotional and intellectual responses that are encoded into our genes.277  The gene is the 
agent of evolution.278   
The object of evolution, from the standpoint of any individual member of a species, is to 
have equal or greater “reproductive success” than other members of the same species. 
Because resources are limited, the process of evolution is naturally competitive.279  The 
process by which evolution occurs is natural selection – whereby differential reproduction 
occurs due to inherited design differences280 and is the result of a combination of three 
characteristics of the living world: heredity, variation and differential reproduction.281  
Thus, reproductive success is linked to the process of natural selection. When an adaptive 
(advantageous), heritable trait increases an individual’s reproductive success, relative to 
                                                 
274  Theodore Y Blumoff “The neuropsychology of justifications and excuses: some problematic cases 
of self-defense, duress, and provocation” (2010) 50(3) Jurimetrics 391 at 393. 
275  At 421. 
276  David M Buss Evolutionary Psychology: the new science of the mind (Pearson, Harlow, UK, 2008) 
at 10. 
277  Cheryl Hanna “Can a Biological Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Females? Or what’s 
a nice ‘gal’ like me doing at a conference like this?” (1997) 22 Vermont LR 333 at 340. 
278  Bailey Kuklin “Peril Invites Rescue: an evolutionary perspective” (2006) 35 Hofstra L Rev 171 at 
178. 
279  Owen D Jones “Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An introduction and application to child abuse” 
(1997) 75 NC L Rev 1117 at 1132. 
280  Buss, above n 276, at 38. 
281  Jones “Evolutionary Analysis”, above n 279, at 1136. 
58 
 
that of the individual’s contemporaries (differential reproduction) then that trait will 
increase in prevalence in successive generations of a population.282  The converse also 
applies in relation to maladaptive traits – such traits will decrease or die out.283  These traits 
are called adaptations – mechanisms produced by natural selection to solve specific 
problems encountered by ancestral populations during the course of a species’ 
evolution.284 In other words, an adaptation is an attribute which is effectively organised as 
a result of natural selection to achieve some useful function, such as respiration or the 
defeating of rivals. 285  An organism’s set of adaptations was designed to exploit the 
environment in which it evolved and to solve the problems posed by that environment – 
called the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA).286 
Reproductive success is measured not just in terms of the number of an individual’s 
offspring, since relatives other than offspring (parents, siblings, aunts, nephews and so on) 
have shared genes.  Therefore, the reproductive successes of relatives other than offspring 
also contribute to an individual’s reproductive success.  The concept of “inclusive fitness”, 
proposed by Hamilton in 1964, refers to the extent to which an individual increases the 
reproductive success of its relatives.287  Inclusive fitness is the sum of an individual’s own 
reproductive success (referred to as classical fitness) plus the effects the individual’s actions 
have on the reproductive success of his or her genetic relatives.288  Another term for 
inclusive fitness is “kin selection”.289 
Also of relevance to the issue of reproductive success is the process of sexual selection, by 
which sexual organisms compete for mating opportunities.290 Darwin’s theory of sexual 
selection was developed in response to his observation that some evolved features of the 
living world seemed to have nothing to do with survival. On closer inspection, however, 
he realised that these are adaptations that make an organism more successful or competitive 
                                                 
282  At 1137. 
283  At 1137. 
284  John Tooby and Leda Cosmides “Psychological Foundations of Culture” in Jerome H Barkow, John 
Tooby and Leda Cosmides (eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation 
of Culture (Oxford University Press, UK, 1992) at 62. 
285  Martin Daly and Margo Wilson “Family Violence: an evolutionary psychological perspective” 
(2000) 8 Va J Soc Poly & L 77 at 85-86. 
286  Tooby and Cosmides, above n 284, at 69. 
287  Buss, above n 276, at 13; Jones “Evolutionary Analysis”, above n 279, at 1134-135. 
288  Buss, above n 276, at 13.  
289  Kuklin, above n 278, at 182. 
290  At 194-195. 
59 
 
in mating. Under sexual selection, features evolve that make an organism more attractive 
to sexual partners (intersexual selection) or more intimidating to competitors (intrasexual 
selection).291  The peacock’s tail is one example of the former; stags locking horns in 
combat an example of the latter.292 
Evolutionary psychology 
At the heart of an evolutionary approach to behaviour is the idea that in changeable 
environments natural selection favours organisms that can detect changes in the 
environment and respond with behaviour that promotes reproductive success.  
Evolutionary psychology relies upon principles from evolutionary biology to understand 
the way in which the human mind works.  According to evolutionary psychology, the 
human mind involves specialised information-processing circuits that have evolved via the 
process of natural selection to solve adaptive problems that were faced by our ancestors.293 
Jones argues that brains are subject to the same causal processes that shaped the rest of the 
natural world.294  The human mind consists of a set of evolved information-processing 
mechanisms which predispose it to process particular kinds of information which in turn 
produce non-random behavioural patterns.295  Theories of behaviour are theories about the 
human brain.296  Behaviour is the principal output of the brain, therefore behaviour reflects 
evolutionary processes.297  Daly and Wilson suggest that if an aspect of human nature is 
complexly organised, of cross-cultural and pan-historical sweep, then it is likely to be a 
biological adaptation.  For example, mate-guarding 298  in birds is behaviour that has 
paternity assurance as its fitness-promoting function.299 Paternity assurance is the process 
by which the male of a species guarantees that he is not investing valuable resources in 
offspring that are not his own.  Concerns about paternity lead males to act in proprietary 
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ways in respect of their female partners.300   According to Daly and Wilson, hypotheses 
about these kinds of adaptive functions can direct the research endeavour.301  Evolutionary 
theory can be of assistance in formulating psychological hypotheses which, if proved, help 
to predict when people will behave both adaptively and maladaptively.302  
However, as already noted, evolutionary causes of behaviour are not sole causes.  The 
environment, which includes all the unique non-genetic experiences each individual 
encounters, affects the way genes work and causes some genes to switch other genes on 
and off.303  Two individuals may have roughly the same genome (genetic makeup) but 
different experiences cause them to have different expectations.  One individual’s brain 
may be better structured to some tasks than others, simply because of his or her experience 
in that task.304     Daly and Wilson suggest that people are not passive recipients of 
environmental factors but are active interpreters.305 
Daly and Wilson suggest that criminological theory often relies upon behavioural models 
which are unexamined and sometimes even outdated.306 Jones also asserts that law uses an 
outdated model of human behaviour307 – what Tooby and Cosmides call the Standard 
Social Science Model (SSSM) of behaviour 308  – as the SSSM does not reflect an 
understanding of the brain as an evolving physical structure.309  One of the aims of an 
evolutionary psychology analysis is to bring law’s model of human behaviour into 
alignment with the way in which individuals actually behave, and the reasons for such 
behaviour.310 
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The evolution of adolescence 
Until relatively recently, most of the research on cognitive functioning during adolescence 
has been conducted via psychological studies. 311   Cognitive neuroscience or 
developmental neuroscience has recently begun to highlight the neural underpinnings of 
psychological development through adolescence and into adulthood. 312   Cognitive 
neuroscience is an investigational discipline that seeks to understand how, among other 
things, human sensory systems, higher cognitive functions, emotions and consciousness 
arise from the structure and function of the brain.313   The advent of magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) has had a profound effect on cognitive neuroscience.  It is able to provide 
detailed information about the anatomy and physiology of the brain without using harmful 
radiation, 314  permitting observation of brain changes during development in living 
people.315 
The overarching conclusion reached by cognitive neuroscience is that adolescence is a 
developmental stage, during which the brain is still under construction.316  Significantly, 
the prefrontal cortex is the last region of the brain to fully develop, and this process extends 
well beyond adolescence.317  In particular, the regions of the brain that are responsible for 
impulse control, risk assessment, decision-making and emotion take the longest to 
mature.318  This challenges long held assumptions that the brain had largely finished 
developing by puberty.319  The frontal lobes (which control “executive functions” such as 
planning, working memory, and impulse control) are among the last areas of the brain to 
mature and are not fully formed until at least the mid-20s.320  Lenroot and Giedd state:321 
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Notably late to reach adult levels of cortical thickness is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
involved in circuitry subserving control of impulses, judgment, and decision-making. 
This means that even though teenagers may be fully capable in some areas, they do not 
always reason as well as adults.322  Brain researchers also distinguish between “cold 
cognition” and “hot cognition”.  The term “cold cognition” describes thought processes 
that occur in situations of low emotional intensity and “hot cognition” describes those that 
occur in situations of high emotional intensity.323  As Johnson and others define it:324 
Hot cognition refers to conditions of high emotional arousal or conflict; this is often the 
case for the riskiest of adolescent behaviors. 
Research suggests that adolescent behaviour in situations of high emotional intensity (hot 
cognition) is characterised by risk-taking and sensation-seeking.  In cold cognition 
teenagers are better able to foresee the consequences of their actions.325  Under cold 
cognition, by the age of 16, adolescents’ abilities to reason are generally the same as 
adults.326    
There are several areas of the brain that are particularly important to considerations of 
criminal responsibility.  Sapolsky identifies the prefrontal cortex as particularly significant 
in terms of impulse control.327  He draws a distinction between having knowledge of 
something, and being able to control one’s conduct.328  Simply put, the prefrontal cortex 
controls the individual’s conscious conduct, as compared with conduct that is already 
learned, or implicit. 329   As Sapolsky puts it, the prefrontal cortex “provides the 
metaphorical cerebral backbone needed to keep the prior, easier task from intruding.”330  
In short, it helps to suppress impulsive behaviour.331   
There are also developmental processes that impact on behaviour.  Myelination is the 
process by which a layer of fatty tissue deposits itself around nerve fibres, which provides 
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the insulation necessary to efficiently transmit electrical signals between neurons. 332  
Pruning refers to the pruning of neural connections, which is necessary to remove lesser-
used connections so that the ones remaining are more efficient.   These two processes – 
myelination and pruning – continue through adolescence and well into adulthood.333  As a 
result there are improvements over the course of adolescence in a number of aspects of 
executive function including response inhibition, planning, and weighing risks and 
rewards.334 
These results are largely extrapolated from structural studies of the anatomy of the brain.  
Researchers have also used functional MRI (fMRI), which tracks changes in blood flow in 
the brain as subjects are tested, either by being exposed to stimuli or performing tasks.335  
The blood flow is taken to represent brain activity.  One such study was on the activation 
of the amygdala, a part of the limbic system which is involved in interpreting emotion, and 
in particular in determining the presence of threat.336  This study found that in adolescents 
the amygdala became very active during facial recognition activities and that adolescents 
were susceptible to misreading fearful facial expressions, classifying them instead as angry, 
confused, surprised, and happy.337  Functional MRI results support the finding of an 
increasing shift from limbic activity to frontal activity for a variety of cognitive tasks.338 
What this demonstrates is that the parts of the brain responsible for conscious conduct are 
still developing through adolescence. 
Developmental neuroscience is particularly useful when it comes to assessing recklessness 
within the context of criminal culpability.  As Zimring observes:339 
The immaturity of an actor has a pervasive influence on a large number of subjective 
elements of the offense, including cognition, volition, and the appreciation that behavior 
such as setting a fire can produce results like the death of a person. 
Steinberg says that risky behaviour in adolescence results from the interaction between 
changes in two separate neurobiological systems.  One is a socioemotional system which 
is localised in limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain, including, among other structures, 
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the amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex.  The other is a cognitive control system which 
is mainly made up of the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices and interconnected parts of 
the anterior cingulated cortex. 340   Rapid and dramatic increase of a particular 
neurotransmitter within the socioemotional system occurs around the time of puberty, and 
this is presumed to lead to increases in reward-seeking.  At the same time, the cognitive 
control system and its connections to the socioemotional system are insufficiently mature.  
More simply:341 
The temporal gap between the arousal of the socioemotional system, which is an early 
adolescent development, and the full maturation of the cognitive control system, which 
occurs later, creates a period of heightened vulnerability to risk taking during middle 
adolescence. 
Dahl suggests that the process is similar to “starting the engines without a skilled driver 
behind the wheel”.342 
The three behaviour changes that are most often noted in teens across cultures are increased 
novelty seeking; increased risk taking; and a shift toward peer-based interactions.343  
Advances in neuroimaging technology have been instrumental in studying the link 
between these behavioural changes and the brain.344  Functional MRI studies have been 
able to assist with tracing behaviour to distinct processes and structures within the brain.  
For instance, fMRI reveals that neurotransmitter changes related to the onset of puberty 
impact upon sensation-seeking changes in behaviour, whereas maturational changes in the 
frontal lobe impact on impulse control.345 
This information is also relevant to the question of whether an offender knows right from 
wrong, as is required in rebutting the doli incapax presumption. Doli incapax is an 
irrebuttable common law presumption that children under the age of seven are incapable 
of committing a crime.346  Between the ages of seven and thirteen the presumption was 
rebuttable.  The prosecution could rebut the presumption by proving that the child was of 
normal mental capacity and could distinguish between right and wrong.347  Psychologists 
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suggest that although adolescents may know right from wrong and be capable of making 
informed decisions (in situations requiring cold cognition), they access different areas of 
their brain than adults do, largely relying on emotions and gut instinct.348   
There is also a correlation between age, risk-taking and peer influence.  One study found 
that risk-taking increased among both adolescents and college students, but not adults, 
when they were in groups. 349   The results of these kinds of studies have obvious 
implications for young persons charged with homicide as a secondary party. 
Violence against women, and their responses 
Evolutionary psychology, as summarised above, 350  is a useful theoretical tool for 
understanding male violence against women. Gowaty explains:351 
As Darwin pointed out, sexual selection includes within- and between-sex behavioural 
processes. Some of the many behavioral processes that may mediate the gametic contest 
include female-female competition or cooperation, male-male competition or cooperation, 
female choice, male choice, and other behavioral mechanisms we might call anti-female 
choice and anti-male choice. For example, Smuts and Smuts (1992) describe a type of 
sexually selected, anti-female choice behavior that they call ‘intersexual coercion,’ which 
is defined as ‘the use of force, or the threat of the use of force, by a member of one sex (A) 
that functions to increase the probability that a member of the other sex (B) will mate with 
A and/or decrease the probability that B will mate with a rival of A’s.’  
Further, Gowaty adds that because female access to resources is fundamental, selective 
drivers of behaviour include resistance by females to coercive control.352  The killing of 
an abuser may be at the extreme end of the range of behavioural mechanisms. 
Sexual proprietariness 
Wilson and Daly propose that sexual proprietariness is “a psychological adaptation of the 
human male”.353 By this they mean that men are motivated to lay claim to particular 
women, which involves  an element of entitlement.354  For males, sexual selection involves 
the ever-present risk of “cuckoldry” – unwittingly investing resources in biologically 
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unrelated children. 355  A corresponding threat to a female’s fitness is not that she would be 
cuckolded, but that her mate would divert resources to another female. Men’s proprietary 
feelings toward mates are more likely to be about sexual fidelity per se, whereas women 
would be more concerned about allocations of the mate’s resources and attentions.356 
Wilson and Daly observe that male sexual proprietariness can be discerned from:357 
… numerous phenomena which are culturally diverse in detail but monotonously alike in 
the abstract: socially recognized marriage, the valuation of female fidelity, the equation of 
the ‘protection’ of women with protection from sexual contact, the conception of adultery 
as a property violation, and the special potency of wifely infidelity as a provocation to 
violence. 
Johnson argues that it is now “an accepted truth that male sexual jealousy and 
possessiveness are leading correlates of lethal and nonlethal violence against female 
intimate partners cross-culturally”.358 Relevantly, Daly and Wilson suggest that: 
In addition to jealous arousal, sexual proprietariness encompasses motives and actions that 
may be effective in the prevention of a threat of trespass or usurpation, as well as responses 
thereto.359 
Johnson notes that indicators of sexually proprietary and controlling behaviours are 
frequently used in prevalence surveys to understand why men use violence towards 
partners. Some of the types of information sought in these surveys include whether the 
respondent’s partner: gets angry if she speaks with other men; tries to limit her contact with 
family and friends; follows her or otherwise monitors her whereabouts in a controlling or 
frightening way; damages or destroys her property; is constantly suspicious that she has 
been unfaithful; harms or threatens to harm her children.360  Daly and Wilson observe that 
the “most direct testimony” to the linkage between the psychology of jealousy and violent 
action is to be found in homicides. 361   Their review of studies of the motives and 
circumstances of wife-killings from a variety of societies found that the majority of cases 
involved suspected or actual infidelity on the part of the victim and/or the wife’s decision 
to leave the marriage.362 
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‘Battered Woman Syndrome’ 
For several decades there has been much research dedicated to understanding the 
psychological and other effects of domestic violence on victims.  One of the earliest 
attempts at a comprehensive theory was that of psychologist Lenore Walker in her 1979 
book, The Battered Woman. In 1984 she published a follow-up book, The Battered Woman 
Syndrome which detailed a study carried out with 400 battered women.  There are two 
main elements in Walker’s account of battered woman syndrome (BWS): the “cycle theory 
of violence” (cycle theory) and “learned helplessness”. The cycle theory encompasses 
three phases: tension building; an acute battering incident; and loving contrition.363 
In the tension building phase there is:364 
... a gradual escalation of tension displayed by discrete acts causing increased friction such 
as name-calling, other mean intentional behaviours, and/or physical abuse. The batterer 
expresses dissatisfaction and hostility but not in an extreme or maximally explosive form. 
The woman attempts to placate the batterer, doing what she thinks might please him, calm 
him down, or at least, what will not further aggravate him.  
However, the acute battering incident cannot be averted indefinitely, and this is then 
followed by the third phase of the cycle. The third phase consists of kind, loving, and 
remorseful behaviour on the part of the abuser, which reinforces the cycle.365 He may even 
believe himself that he will never be violent again.366 
The cycle theory purports to explain why women stay in abusive relationships. The loving 
contrition phase compensates for the acute abusive incidents. Walker’s study also showed 
that in many cases the third phase of the cycle could be characterised by an absence of 
tension and violence, with no observable loving-contrition, and still be reinforcing for the 
woman.367 
Walker’s theory of learned helplessness also explains why women find it difficult to leave 
abusive relationships.  Relying on Seligman’s (1975) experiments with dogs, Walker 
reasoned that helplessness arises when events in a woman’s life seem uncontrollable. 
Seligman’s experiments revealed that dogs who were repeatedly and randomly shocked 
                                                 
363  Lenore Walker The Battered Woman Syndrome (2nd ed, Springer Publishing Company, New York, 
1984) at 2. 
364  At 95. 
365  At 2. 
366  At 96. 
367  At 96. 
68 
 
became unable to escape the shocks even where escape was possible.368 Seligman and 
other researchers later became “disenchanted with the adequacy of theoretical constructs 
originating in animal helplessness for understanding helplessness in humans”. 369 
Nonetheless, Walker hypothesised that:370 
... women’s experiences of the non contingent nature of their attempts to control the 
violence would, over time, produce learned helplessness as the ‘repeated battering, like 
electrical shocks, diminish the woman’s motivation to respond’. 
It is important to note that Walker’s theories do not describe all abusive relationships. 
Further, Walker’s theories have been subjected to much criticism. Skinazi observes that 
neither Walker’s own findings nor subsequent studies support a conclusion that learned 
helplessness is a common consequence of violent relationships.  However, many 
commentators agree that violent relationships do have psychological effects on 
survivors.371  
Traumatic bonding 
Dutton and Painter’s theory of “traumatic bonding” posits that strong emotional 
attachments develop from two features of abusive relationships – power imbalances and 
intermittent good-bad treatment. 372   As power imbalances increase in an abusive 
relationship, the subjugated party becomes less capable of fending for herself, and therefore 
perceives herself as increasingly in need of the dominator.373  Dutton and Painter also argue, 
drawing a link with Walker’s contrition phase, that a series of positive behaviours on the 
part of the abuser offsets abusive episodes.  The alternating aversive and positive conditions 
produce persistent patterns of behaviour that are difficult to extinguish, and in experiments 
produces strong emotional bonds. 374   When physical punishment is intermittent, and 
interspersed with friendly contact, traumatic bonding is most powerful.375  This emotional 
bond interferes with leaving, and staying out of, an abusive relationship.376 
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Coercive controlling violence 
Johnson, with other researchers, has differentiated among types of domestic violence.377 
Of particular relevance here is coercive controlling violence (previously referred to by 
Johnson and others as patriarchal terrorism and intimate terrorism), a term applied to “a 
pattern of emotionally abusive intimidation, coercion, and control coupled with physical 
violence against partners”.378 This pattern is embodied in Pence and Paymar’s Power and 
Control Wheel379 and many women’s advocates, when using the term “domestic violence”, 
refer to this pattern.380  The central idea of coercive control is that even nonviolent control 
tactics, such as isolation, economic abuse and so on, take on a violent meaning that they 
would not otherwise have.381 Coercive controlling violence can be distinguished from 
situational couple violence, a pattern of violence that is not grounded in the dynamic of 
power and control. Situational couple violence occurs when specific conflict situations 
escalate to violence.382  Distinguishing between these two patterns resolves the gender 
symmetry debate over whether women perpetrate violence against male partners as 
frequently as men do against women.  Johnson’s analysis shows that situational couple 
violence in heterosexual relationships is committed fairly equally by men and women, 
whereas coercive controlling violence is committed almost entirely by men.383  
Furthermore, there are different consequences for the victim of each of these types of 
violence.  Johnson and Leone report that women subjected to coercive controlling violence 
are more likely to: be injured;  display more symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome; 
use painkillers, tranquilizers or antidepressants; miss work; leave their partners and to do 
so more frequently.384 Despite this latter finding, such women are less likely to achieve 
and maintain self-sufficiency.385 
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Stark argues that while violence is critical in terms of the harm inflicted by abusive partners, 
most women with whom he has worked who only suffered violence retained autonomy in 
key areas of their lives.386  Stark’s model of coercive control is not centred around violence 
as a tactic of control.  He claims that the women he has seen in his practice have been 
adamant that:387  
...what is done to them is less important than what their partners have prevented them from 
doing for themselves by appropriating their resources; undermining their social support; 
subverting their rights to privacy, self-respect, and autonomy; and depriving them of 
substantive equality. 
Stark’s “coercive control” model assumes that the battered woman is psychologically 
“normal” and possesses an average level of competence, but this competence is affected 
by the coercion she faces from the abuser.388 
Stark’s model of coercive control is centred on the broad pattern of behaviour designed to 
destroy the victim’s autonomy. 389 As Hanna observes, Stark’s coercive control model 
provides a theory of interpersonal violence that is more complex and accurate than the 
accounts on which the law currently relies.390 At present, the law responds to harm on an 
“incident” basis, such as an assault.  Such a response fails to capture the broad and 
continuous behaviours involved in coercive control.391 As our understanding of domestic 
violence has evolved, a clearer picture has emerged of the causal factors at play when a 
victim of abuse responds by killing.  Stark has sought to reframe392 
… woman battering from the standpoint of its survivors as a course of calculated, 
malevolent conduct deployed almost exclusively by men to dominate individual women 
by interweaving repeated physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation, 
isolation, and control. 
While Stark notes that assault can be an essential part of this strategy, the primary harm is 
the deprivation of rights and resources.393    
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Stark also uses the term “intimidation” to refer to a range of tactics that supplement 
violence and are designed to induce fear and humiliation, such as threats, stalking and the 
destruction of personal property.394 At the extreme end of the scale, victims of coercive 
control may be left with no capacity for independent thought.   
The evolution of child homicide 
Schwartz and Isser observe that while cultural mores, economic development and scientific 
advances have provided more favourable and nurturing family environments than ever 
before, child homicide remains a problem.395   
One of the aims of an evolutionary psychology analysis is to bring law’s model of human 
behaviour into alignment with the way in which individuals actually behave, and the 
reasons for such behaviour.396  In the context of child abuse, we can then consider strategies 
for child protection which may have a greater chance of success. What is more, for the 
purposes of this thesis we can identify, across the wide variety of child homicide cases, 
those killings which are more, or less, morally blameworthy. 
Since genetic relatives are the vehicles of inclusive fitness,397 the basic appetites and 
motives of any species have been shaped by natural selection to produce behaviour that is 
nepotistic, promoting the persistence of the actor’s genes in future generations by 
contributing to survival and reproduction of genetic relatives.398  Natural selection operates 
on behavioural predispositions that influence the way in which organisms treat their young.  
Generating offspring and supporting their reproduction is one of the main processes by 
which genes replicate.399  However, mistreatment of the young, including killing them, is 
not limited to humans and occurs throughout the animal kingdom, in circumstances similar 
to those found in many cases of human child abuse and neglect.400  In this section of the 
chapter I will discuss some of the reproductive strategies that have evolved to increase 
                                                 
394  At 221. 
395  Lita Linzer Schwartz and Natalie K Isser Endangered Children: Neonaticide, Infanticide, and 
Filicide (CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2000) at 39. 
396  Blumoff “Action-Omission Network”, above n 303, at 1017. 
397  Daly and Wilson “Family Violence”, above n 285, at 79. 
398  Daly and Wilson “Crime and Conflict”, above n 305, at 66. 
399  Jones “Law and Biology”, above n 294, at 175. 
400  Martin Daly and Margo Wilson “Discriminative Parental Solicitude: a biological perspective” 
(1980) 42(2) J Marriage and Fam 277. 
72 
 
reproductive success and consider their implications for child abuse and, particularly, child 
homicide. 
Hrdy identified, in nonhuman primates, four classes of infanticide which she suggests are 
adaptive for the primate doing the killing.  The Exploitation Theory attributes some 
infanticides to cases in which an individual directly benefits from an infant’s death by 
exploiting the infant for food or as some form of tool, for example as a human shield.401 
The Resource Competition Model applies to competition between individuals for physical 
resources and attributes some infanticides to instances whereby an individual kills 
unrelated infants and appropriates the resources for itself or his or her own offspring.402 
In humans, Exploitation Theory and Resource Competition Model could potentially only 
explain intentional infanticides. Intentional infanticide has been present in humans for 
centuries: “[h]omo sapiens sapiens, like other primates, has long been a highly infanticidal 
species”.403  In many cases, the biological mother has either committed the killing or has 
been implicated in it.  Contrary to popular discourse, mothers can, and do, act in ways that 
are inconsistent with the nurturing role ascribed to them.  However, we can distinguish 
between intentional killings, and what might be referred to as “child abuse homicides” 
where a child dies after a (or several) battering incidents.  These killings are sometimes 
(depending upon the jurisdiction) classified as manslaughter because the intent to kill 
cannot be proved.  Theories that are, prima facie, of more direct salience in the context of 
these child abuse deaths are Discriminative Parental Solicitude and Reproductive Access 
theories. 
Central to strategies that increase the reproductive success of any organism is the concept 
of parental investment.  Parental investment refers to any investment by a parent that 
increases the offspring’s chance of surviving and reproducing at the cost of the parent’s 
ability to invest in other offspring.404  One way of investing in children is seen in species 
in which there is a long gestation period.405 Trivers argued that the sex that invests greater 
resources in its offspring (often the female) will evolve to be more choosy and 
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discriminating in selecting a mate, and the other sex (usually males) will have to compete 
with other males to mate with females. On this basis Trivers concluded that sexual selection 
is driven by parental investment.406 
Simply maximising the number of offspring produced is not necessarily a dominant 
reproductive strategy.  Because an offspring will only contribute to an individual’s 
reproductive success if it reaches adulthood and also reproduces (or assists its relatives to 
do so), not all offspring give the same return on the parental investment afforded to them.  
Increasing the number of offspring necessarily reduces the parental investment per 
offspring.407 
So, the processes of natural selection and sexual selection have favoured heritable 
predispositions to invest in offspring who show indicators of their potential contribution to 
the parent’s reproductive success.  This results in the phenomenon known as 
Discriminative Parental Solicitude408 (DPS), whereby parental solicitude evolved to be 
discriminative in relation to predictors of the offspring’s probable contribution to the 
parent’s genetic posterity.409  According to this theory, parents increase their reproductive 
success by investing greater resources in a more promising offspring at the expense of 
another, or by abandoning offspring who are sick, weak, or deformed and investing the 
freed resources in other offspring, even future ones.410   
DPS predicts that parents will act as if they value a particular infant in direct proportion to 
its probable contribution to the parent’s reproductive success.411  Some of the factors that 
are relevant to determining which infants will or will not receive solicitousness include the 
degree of relatedness between parent and child, the presence of observable characteristics 
indicative of low return vis-à-vis investment (such as health and age), and the existence of 
alternative recipients of parental investment.412 It should be assumed that the processes 
involved in weighing the costs and benefits of investment are unconscious for most 
individuals.413  Furthermore, opportunity costs for continued investment are higher for 
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males, and males can make smaller investments and yet reap the same returns in terms of 
reproductive success as females.  On this basis, males may be more likely than females to 
end their investment in any given infant.414 
DPS theory would therefore suggest that the following factors are relevant to predicting 
child abuse: youth of infant and signs of health; youth of mother; and availability of 
resources (including absence of partner that may also invest in the infant).415 
Trivers’ theory of parental investment and sexual selection led him to suggest that as a 
product of sexual selection, male-male competition may lead a male to kill unrelated 
infants in order to hasten a female partner’s ovulation.416  Reproductive Access (RA) 
theory predicts that infanticide may be committed if it affords an individual increased 
access to the reproductive investment of a member of the opposite sex.  Because 
breastfeeding impedes conception, killing an unrelated and unweaned infant can be 
adaptive for a male.417  Application of the RA theory would give rise to the following 
predictors of child abuse: an infant is more likely to be killed by an unrelated male; the 
infant is more likely to be unweaned; an infant is more likely to be killed by someone with 
recent access to the mother; the perpetrator has impregnated the mother earlier than would 
have occurred if the infant had not been killed; unrelated males are less infanticidal one 
gestation period after gaining access to the mother; and females will exhibit counter-
strategies to stop invading males from killing infants.418  Hrdy does suggest, however, that 
sexual selection may not be explanatory in terms of human infanticide.  She points out that 
there is no reliable evidence to suggest that human males have adapted to murder infants 
to decrease the reproductive success of their competitors or increase their own.  On that 
basis, the majority of human cases fall into Hrdy’s category of parental manipulation, 
whereby parents themselves terminate investment in a child.419 In any event, the question 
arises whether RA theory would apply to child abuse homicides, as distinct from 
intentional killings.   
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It is important to note, as stated in ch 1, that an evolutionary perspective does not explain 
individual behaviour.  In other words, an individual’s behaviour in specific situations 
cannot be seen as attempts to increase the individual’s own reproductive success.  Rather 
than asking whether or not a particular behaviour contributes to an individual’s 
reproductive success, evolutionary perspective asks: 420 
‘What is the underlying panhuman psychological architecture that leads to this behavior in 
certain specified circumstances?’ and ‘What are the design features of this architecture—
if any—that regulate the relevant behavior in such a way that it would have constituted 
functional solutions to the adaptive problems that regularly occurred in the Pleistocene?’  
Adaptations or maladaptations? 
All creatures do maladaptive things.  These ‘mistakes’ are products of evolved 
psychological processes and mechanisms as much as ‘successes’.421  However, not all 
behaviours are adaptive.422  The inclination to invest discriminately is arguably an evolved 
psychological adaptation but specifically homicidal motives are not – rather they are a 
“maladaptive byproduct of the evolved psyche”.423 
While Hrdy’s research suggests that in primates, infanticide can be seen as an adaptation 
rather than a pathology, Daly and Wilson state that it is implausible that killing a step-child 
would have promoted an assailant’s fitness in the EEA.  However, a preference for one’s 
own offspring would have been adaptive.424  Hrdy notes Daly and Wilson’s finding that in 
North America child homicide is 70 times more likely to occur when an unrelated male or 
step-father lives in the home, but adds that the similarities between this phenomenon and 
sexually selected infanticide does not mean that child abuse is adaptive.425 What has 
evolved, she argues, is “a high threshold for responding in a solicitous way toward an 
offspring not likely to be genetically related”.426 
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Abuse by non-relatives 
When applied to the phenomenon of child abuse, DPS would predict that biological parents 
would eliminate offspring when the minimum parental investment required would have a 
greater yield in terms of reproductive success, if it were directed to another offspring.427  
Natural selection favours individuals that are disposed to trade in one offspring for another 
that is better placed to contribute to the individual’s reproductive success.428 Likewise, 
unrelated infants cannot contribute to an individual’s reproductive success so they do not 
evoke the same solicitousness as a genetic relative.429 
Step-parenting is found across cultures and is not peculiar to humans. Helping to raise a 
new mate’s young is an element of “mating effort” in species in which suitable mates are 
scarce and couples often stay together beyond a single breeding attempt. So, step-parenting 
can actually be favoured by natural selection.430  Trivers posits that an organism deserted 
by its mate after copulation can, as one of its choices, try to induce another organism to 
help raise the young.  This, Trivers argues, is adaptive for the deserted organism, but it 
requires the helper to do something contrary to its own interests. On that basis, we would 
expect adaptations to evolve to protect organisms from such tasks.431  Also, step-parental 
effort will not result in a greater benefit to the step-parent’s reproductive success as will a 
biological child, so we can expect that step-parents will not, on the whole, be as self-
sacrificing as we might expect biological parents to be.432  
Generally, genetic relatedness is a predictor of reduced conflict and enhanced 
cooperation.433  Parental love evolved to enhance the welfare and reproductive prospects 
of one’s descendants, so parental psyches that treat others’ children as one’s own would 
have been evolutionarily unstable.434 The hypothesis that step-parents love their charges 
less than genetic parents and are less likely to care for them is supported by data on both 
child abuse and homicide.435  Bearing in mind that definitional issues arise regarding terms 
                                                 
427  Jones “Evolutionary Analysis”, above n 279, at 1177-178. 
428  At 1178. 
429  At 1177-178. 
430  Daly and Wilson “Cinderella Effect”, above n 424, at 384. 
431  Trivers, above n 404, at 75-76. 
432  Daly and Wilson “Cinderella Effect”, above n 424, at 385. 
433  Daly and Wilson “Evolutionary Social Psychology” above n 409. 
434  Daly and Wilson “Family Violence”, above n 285, at 81. 
435  At 81. 
77 
 
such as “step-parents”436, Daly and Wilson’s research shows that fatal baby batterings are 
up to 100 times more likely to be at the hand of a step-parent in Australia, Britain, Canada 
and the United States. 437  While statistics suggest that parents are the most likely 
perpetrators of child homicide, the data does not always distinguish between genetic and 
non-genetic parents. However, a 2007 British study on the murder of children by fathers 
did make such a distinction.438  Of the 26 fatal child abuse cases439 in which the victim was 
aged between 3 weeks and 4 years, 62 per cent were step-children of the perpetrator and 
38 per cent were birth children. Further, the study took into account the nature of the 
intimate relationship between the perpetrator and the victim’s mother, distinguishing 
between legal marriages (15 per cent), cohabitations (81 per cent) and dating relationships 
(4 per cent). Of the 21 cohabitations, 71 per cent of the perpetrators were step-fathers and 
29 per cent were birth fathers. There was also a correlation between the age of the victim 
and the relationship of victim to perpetrator.  Of the 10 birth fathers, 60 per cent killed 
children under six months of age, compared with six per cent of the 16 step-fathers.440 
Research suggests that while children are probably at greater risk of being killed by 
biological mothers and fathers, these killings are often intentional and motivated by 
different factors than those that are present in step-parental homicide:441 
Of course, biologically related fathers do kill their children. However, their motives seem 
different from those of stepfathers who kill. Biologically related fathers who kill their 
children are often deeply depressed, and many commit suicide upon taking the lives of 
their children. In Canada, forty-four of 155 men who killed their preschool-aged children 
committed suicide immediately afterwards, as opposed to only one of sixty-six stepfathers. 
Furthermore, stepfathers kill in more brutal ways. Eighty-two percent of stepfathers who 
kill, beat their stepchildren to death, whereas fewer than half of genetic fathers who kill use 
such an assaultive means. In one Canadian study, stepfathers were 120 times more likely 
to beat their stepchildren to death, rather than using other, less aggressive means.  
Excess risk from step-mothers (relative to genetic mothers) is similar to that from step-
fathers (relative to genetic fathers) but step-mothers are often absent from data because 
very young children reside with them so infrequently that cases of child abuse or homicide 
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are few. 442   Daly and Wilson found no distinction between step-fathers or mother’s 
boyfriends (in the sense of de facto husbands or cohabitees) in that abuse occurs regardless 
of marital status.443  However a question does arise, not in relation to the marital status of 
the offender, but in terms of his status as a person acting in loco parentis.  In other words, 
is there a correlation between the rate of child homicide and the role the perpetrator plays 
within the family?  There is a whole spectrum of potential relationships that exist between 
child victims and non-related adults living in the same home. Some of the factors that might 
be relevant to the question of child abuse include whether or not the perpetrator assumed a 
parental role. There is a vast difference between someone acting as a step-father, and a 
mother’s boyfriend living in the same home but not parenting the child. Does this 
difference matter? 
In her article entitled “Child Abuse by Mother’s Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?” 
Margolin distinguishes between boyfriends and step-fathers or cohabitees.  Her research 
was drawn from interviews with “single mothers”.  In an examination of interactions 
preceding abusive episodes, she refers to a continuum of family relationships with 
“families with mothers’ boyfriends at one extreme, stepfamilies in the middle, and families 
with both genetic parents at the other extreme”.444  She asks the question: how important 
is absence of genetic relatedness versus the absence of a long shared history with the child 
as a predictor of boyfriends’ abuse?445   
It is of course clear, as frequently observed by critics of Daly and Wilson’s research, that 
the overwhelming majority of step-parents do not abuse or kill their charges. It ought to 
also be observed that the great majority of men are not rapists but that does not mean we 
should not be concerned about men who do rape. Further, the fact that the absence of a 
genetic relationship may explain some abuse does not mean that there is no explanation for 
why most step-parents do not abuse their charges.  The positive disposition of most step-
parents toward their charges could be explained by reciprocity with the genetic parent446, 
or by one of a number of other factors. 
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The failure to protect 
Failure to protect can lead to a manslaughter charge on the basis of criminal negligence so 
it is important to examine this phenomenon more closely. While evolutionary psychology 
can serve to explain the overrepresentation of step-parents (or at least mothers’ boyfriends) 
as perpetrators in child abuse data, the question posed here is whether it also explains the 
failure by some mothers to protect their children from the abuse perpetrated by step-fathers.  
As noted above, while risk from step-mothers may be just as great as from step-fathers, far 
more young children live with their biological mothers and step-fathers than with 
biological fathers and step-mothers.447   
There are a number of ways in which a parent can fail her child, but for most legal purposes, 
failures occur where there is knowledge of a risk of abuse to the child and a failure to notify 
authorities or remove the child from the risk or seek other forms of help for the child such 
as medical treatment.  What does evolutionary psychology tell us about failure to protect 
as a form of “criminal” behaviour? 
The law has long distinguished between acts and omissions, and in general terms liability 
only arises when the defendant is under some legal duty to act and fails to do so.  The 
distinction between acts and omissions has given rise to considerable debate especially 
with regard to the extent to which one should be held liable for failing to rescue someone 
in peril. However, the law has almost always imposed duties requiring action when there 
are status relationships involving power, trust or knowledge imbalances. For example, a 
duty arises where there is a close kinship relationship which requires the superior party to 
aid the weaker party to ensure its survival.448  In New Zealand, as with most jurisdictions, 
a parent owes a duty to protect her child. The duty extends to protecting the child from the 
violence of another.449 Failure to do so renders a parent liable if the omission is voluntary.  
The duty has also been extended by statute to require members of a victim’s household to 
take reasonable steps to protect the victim.450   
At first glance, a mother’s failure to protect is counter-intuitive and inconsistent with 
Discriminative Parental Solicitude.  However, “protecting” an infant is one way of 
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investing in that infant, and such investment, or solicitude, is discriminative.  On that basis, 
DPS can explain failure to protect. The question is what are the circumstances in which a 
mother reduces her investment in a particular infant?  
Sympathies with humankind are evinced in ways consistent with kinship selection. 
Individuals cooperate with biologically close kin to advance inclusive fitness.451  Duties 
that may have existed in the human evolutionary past were probably related to the need of 
all individuals to help themselves and their kin survive and reproduce.452  Blumoff refers 
to the classic “bystander” case of Kitty Genovese, a New York woman murdered while a 
number of neighbours heard and witnessed parts of the attack but did nothing.  The case 
was relevant to a burgeoning awareness of the “bystander effect” whereby people are less 
likely to effect a rescue if other people are present.  Blumoff poses the question why no one 
came to Genovese’s aid, and concludes the reason is that precisely because she was a 
stranger. In other words, she had no kinship relationship to the bystanders.453 Blumoff 
suggests that the duty to aid a stranger does not come naturally.454 One of the reasons for 
the general reticence in imposing duties to act is that in ancestral environments, where all 
of one’s sensibilities were consumed with staying alive, human interactions extending 
beyond the nuclear community would have been unfathomable.455   
On that basis, it could be suggested that the failure of parents to come to the aid of their 
genetic offspring might occur in circumstances that resemble conditions in the EEA.  Did 
such behaviour evolve in circumstances where, as Blumoff suggests, the need to survive 
displaced all other duties, including to one’s offspring? In other words, are mothers who 
fail their children also fighting for survival?  Daly and Wilson refer to a study in which 
women with children fathered by former partners are about five times more likely to use 
women’s shelters than mothers whose children were solely from their current partner. 
There was an even greater risk of homicide.456 What does this tell us about the effects of 
violence on failure to protect? 
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The evolutionary concept of conflict is largely a matter of resource competition. 457  
Elicitors of violence are usually threats to survival and reproduction.458  According to Daly 
and Wilson, disproportionate numbers of violent offenders are drawn from groups lacking 
access to opportunities and protection from the state, so they find themselves in self-help 
circumstances like our human ancestors.459  The human genotype came into being to solve 
problems which, for most of us, are no longer a matter of survival.460 
Evolved adaptations can be expected to be reproductively effective only in environments 
that are not crucially different from those in which the relevant history of natural selection 
took place.461  This hypothesis finds support in Jones’s concept of time-shifted rationality.  
Jones hypothesises that cognitive processes that appear to lead to irrational behaviour are 
actually designed, rather than the result of defects.462  If irrationalities were the result of 
defects they would not be patterned.463  Jones posits the concept of “time-shifted rationality” 
as explaining any trait that results from evolutionary processes on the brain that increased 
the probability of adaptive behaviour in the ancestral past, but which leads to irrational or 
maladaptive behaviour in the present.  In other words, seemingly irrational behaviour 
sometimes results from using old techniques to solve new problems.464 For example, a 
powerful predisposition to pursue sweets was once rational, or “adaptive”.  This is because 
natural selection favoured nervous systems that associated pleasure with the intake of foods 
that were high in calories. Ingesting food with a high calorific value enhanced survival and 
reproduction.  However, the sweet foods available in the EEA did not carry concentrations 
high enough to lead to obesity so there was never a need for a counter-adaptation against 
the eating of sweet things. In modern environments where refined sugar (which contributes 
to obesity) abounds, we are left with a brain that was shaped to crave sweet things. A 
substantively rational predisposition has been obsolesced by events.465  
Humans are “cooperative breeders”, whereby children are raised not only by mothers but 
by fathers and others who act in parental roles as needed.466  When conditions are poor 
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(lack of resources, low support) then choices sometimes are made about which children to 
invest resources in.467  Mothers are not designed to provide for all their children under all 
circumstances but rather have adapted to make choices about their investment in their 
offspring.468  Adoption, fostering, abandonment and neglect, abuse and homicide are all 
within the range of possible behaviours when conditions are unfavourable.469  Roth notes 
that:470 
... the evidence gathered thus far shows that, under stress from a lack of social support, 
economic reversals or disruption in their intimate relationships, women are less likely to 
conceive children, more likely to miscarry and less likely to bond with their children 
emotionally and care for them attentively.  These are exactly the facultative adaptations we 
would expect for cooperative breeders facing adverse conditions. 
In general terms, children who are born at the wrong time, in the wrong number, with 
disabilities, or the “wrong” gender (in the sense of contrary to parental expectations) can 
be at risk.471  How to budget the reproductive effort each parent must expend involves 
several decisions such as how many children to have at one time, how to space them, and 
so on.472 On this basis we might predict that multiple births might be at increased risk. This 
prediction is borne out by research establishing that indeed, twins and other multiple births 
are at a greater risk of infanticide or infliction of traumatic brain injury.473 There are a few 
New Zealand cases which are on point here, including that of Christopher and Cru Kahui, 
twin boys who died from head injuries at three months old. Their father, Chris, was charged 
but found not guilty of the murders.474 Hinekawa Topia was a triplet killed by her father, 
Thomas McGregor, when she was two months old. McGregor pleaded guilty to murder 
and wounding with reckless disregard in relation to another triplet.  He was sentenced to 
life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 17 years. Following the triplets 
discharge from hospital after their birth, Hinekawa had spent significant periods of time 
with other family members to give her parents a break. She returned to their care the day 
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of the killing.475  Cassius Takiari, one of 8-month-old twins, was killed by his father, 
Charlie Lackner. Cassius was diagnosed with a massive brain injury, with swelling and 
bleeding to his brain, and his retinas had become detached. Lackner was sentenced to life 
imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 15 years. The sentencing Judge 
considered it would be manifestly unjust to sentence Lackner to a minimum non-parole 
period of 17 years. His appeal against sentence was dismissed.476 There is also the case of 
Harrison-Taylor, discussed in ch 1.477  She was convicted of the murder of Gabriel, one of 
her eight-month-old twin boys, by a combination of smothering and strangulation. She was 
convicted of murder. As in Lackner v R, the Judge considered that a 17-year term would 
be manifestly unjust and Harrison-Taylor was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 
minimum parole period of 12 years.478   What these cases suggest is that while step-
parenting is a risk factor for child abuse, this is not the only relationship-specific risk facing 
children.  Many millions of infant deaths can be attributed, at least indirectly, to a maternal 
strategy to mitigate the high cost of rearing the infants.  Such strategies include 
abandonment, which is the default mode for a mother terminating investment.479  In the 
context of child abuse deaths, it is arguable that failure to protect can simply be seen as part 
of a range of behaviours that constitute abandonment and neglect.   
SUMMARY 
One of the goals of the criminal justice system is to punish wrongdoers. Two different 
theories, in particular, attempt to explain why this is so – one based upon the notion of 
desert and the other upon the basis of deterrence. While the notion of “moral 
blameworthiness” may not be a requirement for punishment, it does play an important role 
in the management of crime on the (at least arguable) basis that people are more likely to 
be dissuaded from acts that offend against the community sense of what is right.  If the law 
has no moral basis then it may have no power to demand compliance with it.  
If a defendant is found culpable, or blameworthy, in respect of an offence, they are held to 
be responsible for it,480 and punished accordingly. A defendant ought only to be held 
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responsible to the extent to which they had the capacity to freely choose to act in the way 
they did. In New Zealand, as well as elsewhere, the system for apportioning responsibility 
assumes that they did. This is reflected, in New Zealand, by the presumption contained in 
s 23 of the Crimes Act 1961, that the defendant is sane.  However, legitimate concerns exist 
about this assumption of sanity or rationality. In reality, there are the sane and the insane, 
the rational and irrational, and a whole range of degrees of (in)capacity in between.  There 
are a vast number of circumstances and factors that impact upon human behaviour, 
including evolutionary and developmental processes and environmental factors such as 
abuse, violence and coercion. The current one-size-fits-all approach to culpability does not 
allow all these factors to be taken into account and therefore offends against the principle 
of equality of justice.  This chapter provides a backdrop to the three case studies that follow 
in chs 3, 4 and 5. In particular, the theories and concepts discussed here are intended to 
provide a framework within which potential degrees of moral blame attendant upon 





Chapter 3: Young defendants 
INTRODUCTION 
Whatarangi Rawiri, Phillip Kaukasi, Alexander Peihopa, Riki Rapira, and Joseph Kaukasi 
– these names are likely to be unfamiliar to most New Zealanders.  Bailey Kurariki is more 
likely to ring a few bells.   All of the foregoing were convicted for their part in the 2001 
killing of pizza delivery worker Michael Choy. However, Kurariki, the youngest defendant 
at the age of 12 at the time, is the only one usually associated with the killing even though 
he did not strike any blows to the victim.   
Chapter 2 referred to the demonisation of young defendants and how this informs the way 
in which responsibility is attributed to them on the basis of character rather than capacity.481 
The result of such characterisation is that increasingly punitive and controlling measures 
are taken to protect the public from these “demons”. In England and Wales, the period 
following the killing of James Bulger by two ten-year-old boys482 saw numerous measures 
designed to control young offenders.  Of special relevance are the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 (UK) and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK). The latter 
provides for a judge to issue an Anti-social Behaviour Order (ASBO) if it appears that any 
person aged ten or over has acted in an anti-social manner and that such an order is 
necessary to protect others from further anti-social acts.  “Anti-social behaviour” has a wide 
definition and includes graffiti, abusive and intimidating language, excessive noise, 
littering, drunken behaviour and drug activity.  Further, the Police Reform Act 2002 (UK) 
amended the Crime and Disorder Act 1998483 (UK) to provide that a court may make a 
Criminal Anti-social Behaviour Order (CRASBO), after a person has been convicted of an 
offence.  Breaches of ASBOs can lead to imprisonment for a maximum term of six months. 
Breaches of CRASBOs could lead to imprisonment for a maximum term of five years.  
While ASBOs and CRASBOs did not expressly target “young people”, research suggests 
there was a clear association in the minds of the public.  Despite the Home Office’s original 
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intention that ASBOs would not ordinarily be made against those aged under 18, the figures 
for ASBOs issued to young people ranged between 43 and 58 per cent.484  CRASBOs 
made up 70 per cent of all ASBOs issued.  Further, despite the assumption that ASBOs 
would be used only where necessary to curb serious instances of anti-social behaviour, they 
were handed out regularly for very minor infractions.  Cumulatively, the result of these 
measures was that:485 
Anti-social behaviour became a virtual metaphor for the condition of contemporary Britain, 
particularly its youth, manifesting itself almost everywhere as rudeness, loutishness, 
intolerance and selfishness, disrespect, drunkenness and violence. 
ASBOs have now been superseded by Injunctions and Criminal Behaviour Orders under 
the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (UK). 
Two New Zealand cases bring into sharp relief the paradox of the so-called youth crime 
epidemic.  On 8 September 2007 17-year-old Augustine Borrell was stabbed to death 
outside a party.  A few days later The New Zealand Herald ran the headline “Police: 
‘Wanna-be’486 gang killed teen”.487 At that stage, no-one had been charged, or indeed 
apprehended, in relation to the death.  Yet under the subheading “Killed on the streets: 
youth gang victims” the article listed the names of ten other people also allegedly killed by 
“youth gangs”.  Just what the links were to street gangs was not stated in the article.  Clearly, 
the fact that a perpetrator might be a gang member, or a teenager, or both does not 
necessarily mean the same thing as “killed by youth gang”, and yet in the minds of the 
public an association is formed between young people and serious, violent crime.  Later 
the same day, an arrest was made in relation to Augustine’s killing, with The New Zealand 
Herald’s online version reporting that the police did not believe that the man charged was 
part of a gang.488  Haiden Davis, aged eighteen at the time of the offence, was later 
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convicted of Augustine’s murder.  There was never any suggestion that he was acting in 
concert with any other person. 
In the second case, 15-year-old Pihema Cameron was stabbed to death on 26 January 2008.  
A 50-year-old businessman was charged with murder following the stabbing, which 
occurred after Cameron and a friend were caught tagging fences.489  Cameron’s death 
therefore flagged tagging, rather than homicide, as a cause for great public concern. In the 
following days Prime Minister Helen Clark announced the Government’s strategy to deal 
with the problem, which included banning sales of spray cans to those aged under 18, fines 
of up to $2000 for those caught tagging, and making taggers clean up their own work.490  
The issue was given even greater attention due to a degree of public support for the 
defendant, including comments made by Christchurch city councillor Barry Corbett, to the 
effect that if Cameron had not been tagging, he would not have been killed.491  Although 
charged with murder, Cameron’s killer, Bruce Emery, was convicted of manslaughter and 
was sentenced to four years and three months in jail. He was granted parole in November 
2010, having served less than two years of that sentence.492  It is important to observe, in 
the context of an analysis of moral blame, that Emery took a knife from his house and 
chased Cameron and his friend before stabbing Cameron.493  
The media portrayals of these two incidents inform public beliefs in the murderous 
criminality of young people despite that, in both these cases, young people were the victims.  
The reality that these cases highlight is that young people are more likely to be the victims 
of violent crimes than perpetrators.494 Yet in a newspaper report, the Sensible Sentencing 
Trust spokesman, Garth McVicar, is reported to have said, in relation to Pihema 
Cameron:495 
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That young offender... had been doing graffiti before and Emery had been becoming 
extremely frustrated with it.  
That the victim in that case was characterised as an offender in such a blatant way is a 
striking example of the type of character assassination that takes place when young people 
are suspected of criminal offending. When young people are charged with culpable 
homicide, the consequences of such character-blackening can be far more severe, as some 
of the cases canvassed in this thesis demonstrate. This may result in the over-
criminalisation of some young defendants who do not have the sort of guilty mind that the 
law requires. In some ways, many of the young defendants who are charged with culpable 
homicide are victims themselves – vulnerable because of social and economic 
circumstances as well as their developmental immaturity. 
YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Anyone who has ever parented, taught, or spent much time around adolescents knows that 
they are impulsive, influenced by their peers and have trouble foreseeing the long-term 
consequences of their actions.496 
Sometimes such adolescent behaviour results in breaches of the criminal law.  As a general 
principle, the criminal law strives to punish those who violate rules of lawful conduct.497  
As observed in chs 1 and 2, this principle is underpinned by the idea that people are rational 
actors, capable of knowing the difference between right and wrong and making a choice 
between the two.498  As noted previously, on this basis, the criminal law should only 
convict and label as criminal those who are morally blameworthy in some way.  If a person 
is not to blame for some harm, the reproach of the criminal law is not appropriate.499   
So moral responsibility is necessary for criminal liability500  and for this reason legal 
systems generally treat young defendants differently from adult defendants, although 
precisely how differently varies from one jurisdiction to the next.501  There is considerable 
debate, in many jurisdictions, as to when children ought to be old enough to face the 
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consequences of criminal offending,502 and as to what processes should be adopted to deal 
with young defendants.   Doob and Tonry suggest that approaches to youth justice are 
sometimes characterised as falling at different points along a continuum, at one end of 
which is a welfare model and at the other a criminal law or punishment model.503  They 
explain:504 
Although this is an oversimplification, the tension that exists between responding to youths 
who have offended in terms of their social or psychological needs, and punishing them for 
what they have done, is part of the story of youth justice in many jurisdictions. 
Doob and Tonry also note that there has been a decline in the overall importance attached 
to the welfare of the child in Western juvenile justice systems, suggesting that one reason 
may be the politicising of youth justice in many countries.  In other words, the public’s 
belief in an increasing youth crime rate puts pressure on governments to do something 
about it.505  This public perception, driven largely by the media, certainly seems to be that 
serious offences are being committed at an increasingly young age.506  This perception is 
at least in part the result of high-profile cases in which children, sometimes as young as ten, 
have killed.507  When young people commit serious crimes, such as homicide, the facts are 
usually widely publicised. In cases where there is no doubt as to the identity of the 
perpetrator, there will likely be opposition to the “lack of capacity” defences.508  As Taylor-
Thompson notes: 509  
No group more conspicuously challenges conventional views about the innocence of 
childhood and the vulnerability of adolescence than juveniles who kill. 
Similarly, Zimring suggests that teenagers charged with homicide are the worst cases that 
can confront a system that wants to protect young defendants and allow them to develop 
normally into adulthood.510  In light of this, this chapter considers how the criminal justice 
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system ought to deal with children and young people who kill, taking into account current 
research which shows that the brain is not fully developed until at least the early 20s.  This 
research has particular implications in the context of murder because of the specific mens 
rea requirements that must be proved.  At the very least, in New Zealand, a conviction for 
murder requires recklessness – a conscious appreciation of a real risk of death.  This chapter 
will suggest that the criminal justice system can adapt to recent advances in knowledge – 
outlined in ch 2 – by using such knowledge to support specific defences of diminished 
responsibility, or by allowing evidence of general adolescent brain development to support 
defence arguments that a young defendant did not form the mens rea required for murder. 
THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The age at which criminal responsibility begins varies from one country to the next.   It is 
generally accepted that children do not have the same mental capacity and moral 
competence as adults,511 which is why most, if not all, criminal justice systems have an age 
below which a child is deemed incapable of committing an offence.   This notion underpins 
the common law doctrine of doli incapax – an irrebuttable presumption that children under 
the age of seven were incapable of committing a crime.  Between the ages of seven and 
thirteen the presumption was rebuttable.  The prosecution could rebut the presumption by 
proving that the child was of normal mental capacity and could distinguish between right 
and wrong.512 
 
In New Zealand, the irrebuttable presumption of doli incapax is provided for by s 21 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and applies to children under the age of ten years.   Section 22 of the same 
Act provides a rebuttable presumption in respect of children aged between ten and 14.  The 
section states that no person within that age range shall be convicted of an offence “unless 
he knew either that the act or omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law”.513  
However, there is a distinction between the age of criminal responsibility provided for by 
ss 21 and 22 of the Crimes Act, and the age of prosecution.514  Section 272 of the Oranga 
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Tamariki Act 1989515 mandates that children (of or over the age of 10 but under the age of 
12) shall not have proceedings commenced against them for any offence other than murder 
or manslaughter.  It should be noted that the upper age limit was reduced from 14 to 12 
from 1 October 2010.  In summary, children aged ten and up to 12 can only be prosecuted 
for murder or manslaughter and for them to be convicted it must be proved that they knew 
their act or omission was wrong or contrary to law.  Young people – those aged 14 to under-
17 – can be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever. Under the amended law, 12 and 13-
year olds are now liable to prosecution where the offence is one (other than murder or 
manslaughter) for which the maximum penalty available is or includes imprisonment for 
life or for at least 14 years, or the child is a “previous offender”516 under subs (1A) or (1B), 
and the offence is one (other than murder or manslaughter) for which the maximum penalty 
available is or includes imprisonment for at least 10 years but less than 14 years. 
In Australia, the age of criminal responsibility is ten in all jurisdictions, and each State or 
territory retains some form of rebuttable presumption for children aged ten to fourteen, 
either by virtue of legislation or as part of the common law.517  In England and Wales, 
under s 34 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK), the rebuttable presumption of doli 
incapax for children between the ages of 10 and 14 has been abolished, rendering children 
criminally responsible from the time they turn 10 years old.518  In the United States, the 
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common law has recognised the doli incapax presumption as a defence, but some States 
have set minimum ages.519 
Since the 1990s at least, there has been a trend toward increased criminalisation of children 
and young people, by a variety of measures, including lowering the age of criminal 
responsibility. I have already referred, in ch 2, to the approach adopted to antisocial 
behaviour in England and Wales. Writing in the context of the United States’ approach to 
juvenile justice, Tanenhaus argues that the early twentieth century response to juvenile 
homicide was far more flexible than the current approach.  He says:520 
Using the sound bite ‘adult time for adult crime’ as their mantra, critics of the [juvenile] 
court pushed for laws to make it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults.  Their successful 
efforts produced a legal response to serious and violent juvenile crime which flushed pre-
teens, first-time offenders, and even non-violent offenders into an adult criminal court 
system that had all but abandoned the concept of rehabilitation. 
In 1974, a major United States study called “What Works? Questions and Answers About 
Prison Reform” concluded that rehabilitation programs had no effect on repeat offending.  
This study became known as “Nothing Works” and was a foundation for prison reform 
efforts which resulted in incarceration as a primary response to both juvenile and adult 
criminal behaviour.521  This, combined with rhetoric around juvenile “super-predators”, 
formed the basis for the “tough on crime” policies of the early and mid-1990s.522 
In New Zealand this trend towards criminalisation is represented by proposals such as the 
Young Offenders (Serious Crimes) Bill 2006, which while not passed at that time, 
contained provisions that are remarkably similar to some of those that were eventually 
enacted as part of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families (Youth Courts 
Jurisdiction and Orders) Amendment Act 2010.  The overall effect is that children are 
subject to prosecution at a younger age, for a wider range of offences. Such moves, 
particularly in respect of younger children and more serious crimes, is concerning 
considering current research on brain development which shows that the brain is not fully 
developed until the early 20s, much later than previously thought, meaning that children 
and young people are not necessarily capable of thinking like adults.  Furthermore, as 
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Andrew Becroft, New Zealand’s former Principal Youth Court Judge and now Children’s 
Commissioner, points out:523  
… harsher sanctions and shock/‘scared straight’ tactics, while understandably appealing to 
the public, have nowhere been proved to reduce youth re-offending. 
 
It is disturbing to note that in the United States, because of life without the opportunity for 
parole (LWOP) sentences, there are people aged over thirty who are still in prison for 
offences committed when they were aged under the age of 14.524 
Also relevant to the discussion is the right contained in s 25(i) of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 which provides, as a minimum standard of criminal procedure “the right, 
in the case of a child, to be dealt with in a manner that takes account of the child's age”.  
CAPACITY AND CULPABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MURDER AND 
MANSLAUGHTER 
All teenagers do stupid things.  Sometimes those things have disastrous consequences, such 
as the death of an innocent victim.  Children and young people who kill do not always act 
with the mental acuity expected of someone who has reached full maturity, and yet when 
they are charged with murder or manslaughter they are often tried as adults.   In New 
Zealand, the jurisdiction of the Youth Court is not available to children or young people 
charged with murder or manslaughter.  Such cases will be heard in the High Court.525  
Furthermore, the fact that children under the age of 12 can only be tried for murder or 
manslaughter raises some interesting questions.  The moral culpability of a child who kills 
could be indistinguishable from that of a child who rapes.  It appears that the rationale to 
these legal requirements reveals more about the way in which the legal system views 
murder rather than the way in which it views criminal capacity.  This contradicts the basic 
principles of criminal responsibility, which is that criminality is based upon moral 
blameworthiness.  Therefore, criminal offences generally require proof of mens rea – 
prescribed degrees of fault or blameworthiness.  
                                                 
523  Andrew Becroft “Alternative Approaches to Sentencing” (speech delivered to the CMJA Triennial 
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In the context of culpable homicide, a conviction for murder can be satisfied by proof of 
one of several mental states.  These include, among other things, proof that the defendant 
intended to kill (or meant to cause death)526, or meant to cause bodily injury that the 
defendant knew was likely to cause death and was reckless as to that outcome.527  Where 
a defendant commits a culpable homicide in the absence of mens rea for murder, then they 
are liable for manslaughter.  For a child (aged between 10 and 14) charged with murder or 
manslaughter, the prosecution must also prove that the child knew that their “act or 
omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law”.  The position becomes even more 
complex when the child is charged with murder or manslaughter as a secondary party under 
s 66(2) of the Crimes Act, whereby it must be proved that the defendant knew that the 
killing was a probable consequence of the group’s common unlawful purpose.  And if the 
principal offender is charged with murder under s 168 of the Crimes Act, which deals with 
felony-murder offences, a secondary party can be liable for manslaughter even if they did 
not foresee death. 
Determining whether a defendant possessed the requisite state of mind is difficult, and 
therefore statutes usually define mens rea broadly, using general categories.528  Instructions 
are given to juries to help them understand what precisely must be proved to find the 
accused guilty.529  Mens rea elements can be inferred from the circumstances including the 
any background history, post-mortem evidence and the circumstances of the killing 
itself.530 
Young people do sometimes intentionally kill others.  In New Zealand there have been two 
cases in which 14-year-old youths have shot and killed their abusive fathers and have been 
found guilty of manslaughter (having successfully claimed provocation),531 but intentional 
killings are not limited to this type of circumstance.  Thirteen-year-old Jordan Nelson shot 
and killed his caregiver because he mistakenly believed she had stopped him from visiting 
his mother.532 Intentional killings usually fall within s 167(a) of the Crimes Act 1961.  
                                                 
526  Crimes Act 1961, s 167(a). 
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When that section is relied upon it must be proved that the defendant formed an actual 
intent to kill, in the sense that they did an act which they knew would result in death and 
acted to bring about that consequence.  Foresight of death does not equate to intention to 
bring it about, but:533 
… the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence 
was foreseen and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that 
that consequence was also intended.  
Because recklessness is easier to establish than intention and is sufficient for a murder 
conviction, charges are often laid in the alternative under ss 167(a) and 167(b).  Section 
167(b) provides that a killing is murder where the defendant intended to cause bodily injury 
that they knew was likely to cause death and continued regardless of the risk. 
In New Zealand, the test for recklessness is subjective, in that the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant had actual foresight or knowledge of the risk of harm.534  In the context 
of murder under s 167(b) of the Crimes Act, there must be an actual appreciation of a real 
risk of death.535  It is irrelevant whether a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk 
of death.  In this regard, New Zealand’s approach is the same as the subjective approach 
taken in the United Kingdom case of R v Cunningham536, rather than the later objective 
recklessness test adopted in R v Caldwell537.  More recently, in R v G and Another538, the 
House of Lords also reverted to the Cunningham subjective approach.   R v G and Another 
involved two boys, aged 11 and 12, who set fire to some newspapers in a yard, threw them 
under a plastic wheelie bin, and left the yard.  The fire spread to the wheelie bin and a 
building, causing significant damage.  The boys said that they had expected the papers to 
burn themselves out on the concrete floor of the yard and did not realise that the fire could 
spread further.  The jury was instructed that they must consider whether it would “have 
been obvious to the ordinary, reasonable bystander that there was a risk that the fire would 
spread” to the building.539  The jury were further instructed that:540 
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The ordinary, reasonable bystander is an adult.  He does not have expert knowledge.  He 
has got in his mind that stock of everyday information which one acquires in the process 
of growing up. 
On appeal, the House of Lords held that a defendant charged with recklessness could not 
be regarded as culpable if he or she genuinely did not appreciate or foresee the 
consequences of his or her actions.541   The effect of the judgment, as Keating identifies, is 
that:542 
…if children claim not to have foreseen the risks involved in their actions and they are 
believed, they should not be convicted of offences requiring recklessness. 
As noted, this is the approach that has been applied to recklessness in New Zealand, but 
there are still difficulties with its application in respect of young defendants.  Particularly 
relevant is the practical requirement of convincing a jury that the young person is credible, 
if he or she gives evidence that he or she did not perceive the risk.  Despite the test being 
subjective, the jury will base their decision as to what the teenager thought or knew, based 
on what they, as adults, would have thought or known.  Instructions to juries presuppose 
an adult’s conduct and reasoning even when the defendant is an adolescent.543 
In the United States, developmental neuroscience has been used to support calls to ban the 
death penalty for defendants under 18, and in determining competence to stand trial544, but 
the evidence is also relevant to determinations of culpability.  In establishing mens rea for 
particular offences, evidence about the inability to foresee a particular consequence must 
be relevant to the question of whether the defendant actually did foresee that consequence 
(as is required, for example, in offences of recklessness where it must be established that 
the defendant had a conscious appreciation of the risk).   As Steinberg says:545 
[W]e cannot claim that adolescents “ought to know better” if, in fact, the evidence indicates 
they do not know better, or more accurately, cannot know better, because they lack the 
abilities needed to exercise mature judgment. 
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An adolescent may understand that a particular course of conduct is wrong, or contrary to 
law, but may be unable to act in accordance with that understanding because of 
underdeveloped cognitive functioning.546   
Gaps in interpretation may also result from the fact that juries consist of adults, and adults 
who are often from different social and racial groups to the defendant.547  Indeed, the notion 
of trial by one’s peers is notably absent from proceedings in which children and young 
people are tried for homicide. 
Some of the foregoing difficulties involved in prosecuting children and adolescents for 
homicide are demonstrated by several New Zealand cases in which a young person has 
killed.  
Bailey Kurariki 
Kurariki was 12 years old when he participated in a plan to rob a pizza delivery worker.  
The victim, Michael Choy, died from injuries received when he was struck with a baseball 
bat.  Two principal offenders, Alexander Peihopa and Whatarangi Rawiri, were convicted 
of murder under s 168 of the Crimes Act which deals with killings that occur in the 
furtherance of other serious offences, namely aggravated robbery in that case.  Kurariki 
and others were convicted of manslaughter on the basis of secondary liability.548  There 
was evidence of a witness that Kurariki had admitted acting as a decoy by pretending to 
look for money in his pockets, and that he had told Peihopa, “Go, Alex” before Peihopa 
struck the victim.549  
Because Kurariki was under the age of 14, the prosecution was required to prove that he 
knew that his “act or omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law” under s 22 of the 
Crimes Act 1961.   It was argued for Kurariki on appeal that the trial Judge did not properly 
identify the act upon which liability depended for the purposes of this understanding.  The 
Court of Appeal held that under s 22 all acts giving rise to liability for the offence must be 
proved to have been known to be wrong or unlawful.  In the context of Kurariki’s case, this 
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required a finding that Kurariki knew that his conduct was wrong or unlawful in respect of 
all of the following elements: 550 
… forming a common intention with others to rob a delivery driver and help each other to 
do it in circumstances where one of the group would intentionally strike the delivery 
driver … 
Essentially what was required to prove Kurariki liable for manslaughter was foresight that 
one of the group would intentionally strike the victim.  It did not have to be proved that 
Kurariki foresaw the risk of death.  In other words, because foresight of death is not a 
requirement for a principal charged under s 168 (as distinct from s 167), foresight of death 
is similarly not required for a secondary party.  It is arguable that this is not even a 
reasonable corollary in the case of an adult charged as a party but convicting a 12-year-old 
of manslaughter without requiring that he at least foresaw death completely undermines 
the moral underpinnings of the criminal law by endowing a child with cognitive skills well 
beyond his years.  While Kurariki might have known that robbing the victim was wrong, 
the real question should be whether he had the capacity to foresee that death could well 
result from his actions, not the actions of others.   Young people may be able to identify 
their conduct as inappropriate or even dangerous, but other factors such as peer pressure or 
lack of foresight of consequences might lead them to engage in the conduct regardless.551  
In the seminal United States case of Roper v Simmons552, in which the Supreme Court 
found that the imposition of the death penalty for defendants under the age of 18 violates 
the Eighth 553  and Fourteenth 554  amendments, the Court drew parallels with its own 
findings in an earlier case that mental incapacity diminishes criminal capacity even if the 
defendant can distinguish right from wrong.555 
Kurariki was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.  Because of his “extreme youth” 
this was a lesser sentence than that imposed on the other defendants convicted for 
manslaughter.556 No MPI was imposed. 
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O’Brien was 14 years old when she and two other teenagers, Puti Maxwell and Kararaina 
Te Rauna, tried to steal Kenneth Pigott’s car. They intended to trick him to get him to leave 
his car, but he refused. Maxwell saw a hammer in the car and following a discussion 
between her and O’Brien, O’Brien decided to get the hammer and hit Pigott on the head. 
According to the evidence given at trial, in the course of that discussion, O’Brien said “what 
happens if I kill him?”, to which Maxwell said “you will just knock him out”.557   
Following that conversation, O’Brien hit Mr Pigott on the head with a hammer. Thinking 
that he was dead, the three placed him in a nearby river. O’Brien was found guilty of 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. She appealed against conviction and sentence.  
In terms of the appeal against conviction, one of the submissions made on O’Brien’s behalf 
was that, because of her limited intellectual capacity, there was the reasonable possibility 
that she did not appreciate the likelihood that death might result from her actions. The Court 
of Appeal said that the statements that O’Brien made to Maxwell were “uncontradicted 
evidence that [O’Brien] actually envisaged the possibility of killing”558 and the jury were 
entitled to use that evidence to infer that with that knowledge she was reckless as to the 
death.  With respect, while the question asked may allow for an inference of knowledge, 
the answer to it (“you will just knock him out”) could well have dismissed the risk entirely 
in the mind of the defendant.  This is highly likely in the case of any fourteen-year-old, let 
alone one with limited intellectual capacity. 
In terms of the appeal against sentence, it was argued by O’Brien’s counsel that, given her 
age and intellectual impairment, a sentence of life imprisonment was manifestly unjust.  
The Court of Appeal referred to R v Rapira in relation to the sentencing of Peihopa, aged 
15, and Rawiri, aged 17 – the principal offenders in the killing of Michael Choy. In that 
case it was argued on behalf of the appellants that life imprisonment was manifestly unjust 
because of their youth. The Court of Appeal in Rapira accepted the sentencing Judge’s 
approach that the manifest injustice test imposes a high threshold for departing from life 
imprisonment and held that “[w]here the offending is grave, the scope to take account of 
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youth may be greatly circumscribed”.559  The Court of Appeal in R v O’Brien thought that 
those words were apt to describe the case before it:560 
Youth is not necessarily immune to wickedness and, regrettably, that is demonstrated in 
this case. In our view, low intellectual capacity unrelated to the mental elements of criminal 
responsibility, is seldom likely to justify a departure from the statutory presumption. It is to 
be remembered that the fact of conviction for murder will have excluded mitigating 
features such as provocation, and disease of the mind amounting in law to insanity.  There 
may be cases where the circumstances of a murder may not be so warranting denunciation 
and the mental or intellectual impairment of the offender may be so mitigating of moral 
culpability that, absent issues of future risk to public safety, it would be manifestly unjust 
to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. This is not such a case, particularly when the 
circumstances of the offence, which must be considered along with the circumstances of 
the offender, demonstrate premeditated brutality. 
The appeal against conviction and appeal against sentence were both dismissed. 
Ngatai Reweti 
Reweti had just turned fourteen years old when he intentionally dropped a concrete block 
from a motorway overbridge, killing the driver of a car travelling below.  According to the 
sentencing judgment, Reweti picked up an 8-kilogram concrete block from a building site 
and asked his friend if he wanted to drop it off the bridge. His friend declined.  Reweti then 
waited on the northern side of the bridge and waited for a car travelling from south to north 
to pass underneath.561  As the victim’s car passed under the overbridge, Reweti dropped 
the concrete block.  It hit the front windscreen of the car and crushed the driver’s chest.  He 
was killed almost immediately.562 
Reweti was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter.   While his act was, in the 
words of the sentencing Judge, one of “breath-taking stupidity”,563 there was no evidence 
Reweti ever contemplated the natural consequence of his actions.564  There was also 
evidence that he had a frontal lobe abnormality which affected his ability to concentrate, 
had limited verbal abilities 565  and met the diagnostic criteria for several mental 
disorders.566 
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Although Reweti was acquitted of murder on the basis of lack of foresight of death, the 
sentencing Judge remarked:567 
You must have understood that your actions were likely to cause mayhem on the road 
below.  At the very least you should have foreseen that your actions could endanger the 
safety of road users. 
Reweti was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, the Judge taking into account his 
remorse, and his youth at the time of the offending.568   This case is relevant for present 
purposes because it is clear that the jury were not persuaded that he did intend, or even 
foresee, death.569   
Courtney Churchward 
At the age of 17 Churchward and her cousin, Lori-lea Te Wini (aged 14) beat Mr Rowe, a 
78-year-old man, who subsequently died. Both defendants were looking for money to buy 
cannabis. They entered Rowe’s house, first looking for money or valuables in his lounge. 
They then entered the bedroom and Churchward at first raised a wooden walking staff 
above Rowe’s head but then appeared to have had second thoughts and left the bedroom. 
The two defendants then encouraged each other to go back and hit Rowe. The conversation 
between the pair was described by Te Wini as them getting “hyped up”. They both returned 
to the bedroom and Churchward struck Rowe with the staff. When Rowe tried to get up 
and defend himself, Churchward continued to hit him with the staff, to try and stop the 
noise he was making. 570   Te Wini then joined in the attack with another stick. The 
defendants stopped the attack when they turned on the light and saw the injuries to Rowe. 
They then left the house after they ransacked the lounge trying to cover up the attack. They 
took with them Rowe’s wallet, car keys and CD player.  
Both defendants were convicted of murder following a jury trial and were each sentenced 
to life imprisonment with a minimum parole period of 17 years. Te Wini appealed against 
conviction and was granted a retrial. Somewhat oddly, four days before the retrial she 
pleaded guilty to an amended murder charge (based solely on s 167 of the Crimes Act 1961 
and not s 168).  Given that one of the grounds of appeal was inadequate representation, one 
does have to question what advice Te Wini was given in relation to her subsequent guilty 
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plea. In any event, Te Wini was resentenced to life imprisonment with an MPI of 10 years. 
Te Wini appealed that sentence on the ground it was “manifestly unjust” and sought a finite 
sentence of eight to 10 years. That appeal was dismissed.  
Churchward also appealed against her conviction on several grounds, one of which was 
that the trial Judge erred in not directing the jury on the relevance of youth to the question 
of Churchward’s intent. In support of this ground, defence counsel sought leave to lead 
evidence from Dr Chaplow, in which Dr Chaplow surveyed the leading literature on 
adolescent brain development, including information about the difference between hot and 
cold cognition,571 that teenagers have a diminished capacity to control impulsive responses, 
are less future-oriented than adults, and are more likely to be influenced by their peers. In 
giving the judgment for the Court, Glazebrook J observed:572 
As a general rule, we accept that it would be preferable for judges to draw the jury’s 
attention to an accused’s youth and the effect this may have had on intent. However, the 
jury were well aware of Ms Churchward’s youth and her trial counsel had specifically 
drawn attention to it in closing. Her trial counsel reminded the jury that Ms Churchward 
was a ‘young girl’ and that they needed to be sure that, within her ‘young mind’, she had 
developed the requisite intent. We therefore do not consider that the absence of a direction 
on youth has caused a miscarriage. 
The Court of Appeal said that Dr Chaplow’s report was a “double-edged sword” from 
Churchward’s perspective.573  This was because “on the one hand” the report points to 
difficulties adolescents may have in understanding likely consequences and making good 
decisions in “hot” situations,574 but “on the other hand” that adolescents are less likely to 
give weight to consequences over immediate risks and thrills of the current situation.575  
With respect, there is not necessarily an inconsistency between these findings. An 
adolescent may be able to foresee some consequences and not others, and be able to dismiss 
some of the consequences they did foresee, in the heat of the moment.  Foresight of 
consequences is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Interestingly, the Court of Appeal used 
the fact that Churchward did foresee some consequences as a basis for dismissing this 
aspect of the appeal:576 
In any event, in Ms Churchward’s case, the defence position was that she did foresee the 
consequence of her actions: it was to knock Mr Rowe out and, on the basis of Ms 
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Churchward’s own experiences (of which corroborating evidence was called), this should 
not have caused any long term adverse consequences for Mr Rowe. 
Surely, if all Churchward foresaw was that she may knock Mr Rowe unconscious, she did 
not foresee that death may well result. It is also relevant that Churchward did concede that 
she was liable for manslaughter. What the outcome in this case suggests is that even though 
the jury were aware of Churchward’s age, they did not appreciate that her developmental 
stage made it unlikely that she did have the mens rea for murder under s 167; hence the 
absence of a strong direction on youth may have caused a miscarriage of justice.  
Dr Chaplow’s report was given much more attention when the Court turned to determine 
Churchward’s appeal against sentence which was on the basis that a sentence of life 
imprisonment was manifestly unjust and that the presumption of a 17-year MPI should 
have been displaced.  
Dr Chaplow’s report, along with another by a clinical psychologist, were relied upon to set 
out Churchward’s background. Dr Chaplow’s report was again relied upon as summarising 
the literature on adolescent brain development. The Court dealt rather summarily with the 
first ground of appeal – whether life imprisonment should have been imposed – rejecting 
the submission that life imprisonment was inappropriate, and holding that:577 
This was a brutal murder committed in the course of a premeditated home invasion for the 
purpose of robbery. 
On the second ground – that the presumption of a 17-year MPI should be displaced – the 
Court accepted that while there is no automatic displacement of the presumption due to age 
alone, age can be a mitigating factor, falling for consideration under the test for “manifestly 
unjust”.  The Court noted that neurological factors can reduce an adolescent’s culpability 
vis à vis adults, but added:578 
This does not mean that young persons should not take responsibility for their actions – it 
is merely that their actions may be partly explicable (but not necessarily excusable) by their 
state of neurological development. 
The Court referred to R v Rapira – the sentencing of Alexander Peihopa and Whatarangi 
Rawiri – and its qualification that where the offending is grave, the extent to which youth 
can be taken into account is “greatly circumscribed” due to concerns about protection of 
the public, and the need for denunciation and both specific and general deterrence.579  
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Notwithstanding this principle, the Court of Appeal did find that Churchward’s mental 
health issues, upbringing, immaturity, and her attachment to Te Wini at least partly 
explained her offending. The Court was at pains to point out, again, that her offending is 
not to be excused, but rather that “her culpability is lower than if she had been a mature 
adult”.580  The Court thought that a 17-year MPI would be almost as long as Churchward 
had lived and could have a “crushing effect”.581  The Court’s “overall impression” was that 
it would be manifestly unjust for Churchward to serve an MPI of 17 years, and considered 
that 13 years would be more appropriate.582  
Theo Kriel 
Kriel was found guilty by a jury of the murder and indecent assault of Liberty (Libby) 
Templeman.583   At the time of death, Templeman was 15 and Kriel was 14.  They were 
known to each other but were not close friends.  They had spent the afternoon of 
Templeman’s death in the company of other mutual friends. Later in the day, the pair both 
went down to a stream to get a traffic cone that was in the water.  Kriel said that he slipped 
on a rock which accidentally caused Templeman to fall over in the stream.  He said that 
she blamed him for pushing her and became angry with him.  When she went to walk back 
up to the road, Kriel  said that he grabbed her to stop her walking away at which point she 
hit him.  He hit her back and knocked her unconscious. Afraid that she would go to the 
police, he attempted to strangle her and dragged her into the stream. When Templeman’s 
body was found, her upper clothing had been pulled up to expose her breasts, and her lower 
clothing had been pulled down to her knees.  Kriel admitted displacing the clothing to make 
it appear that Templeman was the victim of rape. In an early assertion he said that she was 
breathing when he pulled her into the stream, but in his evidence in court he said that he 
thought she was dead. 
Kriel pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but he was found guilty of murder by a jury.  The 
jury rejected his claims in court that he thought she was dead before he put her in the stream. 
Kriel’s defence was significantly hamstrung by the fact that he had given conflicting 
accounts, and by the fact that he had sought to divert attention away from himself for a 
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period of time after the killing.  However, the jury still needed to be satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he possessed the mens rea requirements set out in s 167 of the Crimes 
Act.  Taking into consideration his age and circumstances there is arguably a reasonable 
doubt that he did.  The problem is that because of his different versions of events, he was 
unlikely to have been believed on the crucial matters.  Consider the following comments 
of the sentencing Judge:584 
The inherent problem with your version of events, which is that the slip caused her anger 
and your fear of the police, is that it seems a slim premise on which to base an allegation 
that Liberty was so angry with you that a fight ensued, and that you felt obliged to punch 
her so that she did not go to the police.  It seems unlikely that she would have reacted in 
such an angry way, even given the defence contention that Liberty could dramatise.  It is 
even more unlikely that you could have thought you were threatened with police action in 
this way, if all that had happened was that you had accidentally pushed her.  I have to say 
that what seems more likely is that you did something to gravely offend Liberty, possibly 
a sexual advance.  When she reacted strongly to this, possibly punching you in the chest, 
(and we know there was a red mark on your chest), you then attacked her in retaliation, 
knocking her unconscious.  However that is speculation and we will never know exactly 
what happened. 
While the Judge acknowledges he is speculating on what happened, in the absence of 
unequivocal admissions from a defendant, a determination of whether they had the 
requisite mens rea is always speculative.  Steinberg notes that an individual’s culpability is 
something that is always judged by someone else.  In other words, culpability is in the “eye 
of the beholder”.585 
Where young defendants are concerned, the assessment of culpability is even more 
speculative than it is with adults.  Most adults would have realised that, in the circumstances 
Kriel found himself, they would not have been threatened with police action. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that a 14-year-old would, especially one who emigrated from 
South Africa when he was seven, and for whom English was not a first language.586  We 
could also take into account, while we are speculating, that he may have been bullied at the 
school he attended, and where Templeman was formerly a pupil.587  While the Judge was 
sceptical of Kriel’s claims that he was afraid Templeman would go to the police588, it is 
plausible that Kriel was afraid, not necessarily of the police, but of the condemnation that 
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might ensue from Templeman’s friends, once they became aware that there had been an 
incident between the two.   
The sentencing Judge was of the view that Kriel’s actions showed considerable 
immaturity:589    
The panicky reaction of trying to hide your wrongdoing, despite the inevitability of your 
actions being discovered, in itself had a childish quality.  There was no hope that Liberty’s 
death, or the general circumstances of it, could ever be disguised.  
However, Kriel’s immaturity was incongruent with his physical appearance:590 
… although possessed of considerable height and strength, you were immature.  You were, 
if anything, young for your age in terms of your social skills and ability to deal with 
situations.  The very attempt to hide your wrongdoing by attacking Liberty had the mark 
of childish panic and then denial.  Your calmness in the days that followed is a source of 
concern.  But it has to be said it was almost a blankness.  
While the sentencing Judge drew a great deal of attention to Kriel’s immaturity, it is clear 
that this was not a factor that was taken into account in determining his culpability for 
murder.  However, it is worthwhile noting that Kriel’s conviction on the murder charge 
was a result of a majority verdict, whereas the jury were unanimous on the indecency 
charge.   
Jordan Nelson 
Two months after he turned 13, Nelson shot and killed Rose Kurth, the partner of a man, 
Mr Lock, who Jordan called “granddad”. At some time prior to the killing, Nelson moved 
the gun and ammunition from where it was stored in the house, to a sleepout. When Lock 
left the house to move some stock, Nelson retrieved the gun from the sleepout and shot 
Kurth while she had her back to him. He then fled the property. 
Nelson had been exposed to domestic violence early in his life and a restraining order had 
been in place for 12 years preventing him having contact with his father. For most of his 
life he was cared for by Lock although he did from time to time stay with his mother and 
had spent a number of months with her from Christmas 2010 until October 2011 when 
Child, Youth and Family placed him with Lock and Kurth. Key features of psychiatric, 
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pre-sentence and Child, Youth and Family reports were summarised by Heath J in his 
sentencing notes:591 
(a) Dr Immelman opines that relevant characteristics are: the state of Jordan’s brain 
development at the time of the killing, problems that he suffered with attachment 
to other people in his life, a prior exposure to domestic violence … and 
communication difficulties. 
(b) At the time of the offending, Jordan was subject to a care and protection order, 
meaning that his place of residence was for determination by Child, Youth and 
Family Services. Jordan wished to spend time with his mother. However, he 
believed that Ms Kurth had denied him that opportunity. It now appears that the 
decision may have been made through Child, Youth and Family Services. 
Whatever the true position, and the tragic consequences of that mistake, there is 
no doubt that Jordan believed that Ms Kurth was responsible for this decision 
and that he was angered by it. 
(c) Notwithstanding Jordan’s separation from his father and his mother since a 
young age, it is clear that Jordan had established a bond with his mother and that 
he was upset that he could not see her. That reaction needs to be viewed through 
the eyes of a 12 or 13 year old boy for whom an issue such as that assumes far 
greater importance than it would for an adult. 
(d) Jordan did not have the ability to evaluate risk, consider outcomes or make 
informed choices at the time of the killing. At his age, and with his state of brain 
development, he was simply not equipped to rationalise solutions. 
(e) Jordan’s early exposure to domestic violence is likely to have been a factor in his 
inability to communicate the degree of distress that he felt at not being able to see 
his mother. Dr Immelman indicates that the offending occurred ‘in the context of 
Jordan feeling extremely powerless and unheard with the relative immaturity of 
his frontal executive brain functioning’. 
 
It is important to note that Nelson pleaded guilty to murder, which meant manslaughter 
was not an available outcome. On this point one may wonder whether he had the best legal 
representation. It is noteworthy that, in sentencing Nelson, the Judge felt it necessary to 
determine Nelson’s culpability.  Ordinarily, determinations of culpability and the question 
of sentence involve two different exercises.592 In any event, in making this determination, 
Heath J considered all of Nelson’s actions in shooting Kurth, including what he did prior 
to and following the shooting, to conclude that Nelson’s actions were “not the actions of a 
calculating killer trying to cover his tracks”593 and were more consistent with “impulsive 
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decision-making rather than a cold blooded intent to kill”.594  Of particular salience, in the 
context of Nelson’s culpability, is the following statement of Heath J:595 
I have approached sentencing on the basis that, irrationally, Jordan formed the view that 
Ms Kurth was responsible for many of his life problems and determined to do something 
about it, without having any comprehension of the consequences of his actions beyond Ms 
Kurth’s immediate demise.  
That Heath J was compelled to make these statements underlines the importance of young 
defendants having competent representation. Those findings, when combined with the 
other evidence in the case, including the psychiatric evidence called on behalf of Nelson 
(consistent with the scientific literature dealing with adolescent brain development outlined 
here in ch 2), cast real doubt on whether Nelson had the mens rea for murder. If the case 
had proceeded to trial, there is a reasonable chance that a jury could have found that 
Nelson’s degree of moral blame was out of step with a murder conviction.  
“P” (the Arun Kumar case)596 
On 10 June 2014 P (aged 13) and R (aged 12), at the urging of an older person living with 
P, set out to steal shoes from a shoe shop.  P took with him a bag containing a knife and a 
metal pole. They decided not to steal from the shoe shop but instead focused their attention 
on a dairy. P scoped out the dairy twice before entering for a final time while R stood in 
the doorway holding the metal pole. CCTV footage revealed much of what went on inside 
the dairy. P demanded money from the shopkeeper, Arun Kumar. Mrs Kumar, the 
shopkeeper’s wife, came into the shop with a phone which she held in the air so that both 
P and R could see it. P produced the knife from the bag which he waved in a threatening 
manner towards Mrs Kumar and knocked the phone out of her hand. When Mr Kumar 
moved from behind the shop counter to intervene, P drove him, by waving the knife at him, 
backwards into the corner of the shop. Mr Kumar bent down to pick up a pole from the 
floor. P attempted to stab Mr Kumar several times, landing two blows to Mr Kumar’s 
shoulder and abdomen. The sentencing Judge rejected any suggestion that P was acting in 
self-defence and considered that all of Mr Kumar’s actions in using the pole were defensive.  
Mr Kumar tried to push P out of the shop, holding P by the shoulder to keep the knife away. 
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While trying to break free from Mr Kumar’s grasp, P stabbed Mr Kumar in the neck. This 
wound proved to be fatal. 
Initially P and R were jointly charged with aggravated assault with intent to rob, but the 
Judge discharged them on that count (as a result of being invited to by the prosecutor), so 
that the Court could focus on the more serious charges: in respect of P, murder under ss 
168(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1961; in respect of R, manslaughter under s 66 and 160(2)(a) 
of the Crimes Act 1961 (party to manslaughter by an unlawful act). 
At the time of trial, P was 14 and R was 13.  R was found not guilty of manslaughter and 
was acquitted. P was found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.  When this 
outcome is compared with Kurariki’s case we can begin to see how inconsistent outcomes 
can lead to significant injustice. Remember that in Kurariki’s case, two principal offenders 
were convicted of murder under s 168 of the Crimes Act (killings in furtherance of other 
serious offences).  Kurariki was convicted of manslaughter on the basis of secondary 
liability.  In the case presently under discussion, P (the principal offender) was also charged 
under s 168. If he had been convicted of murder under s 168 the jury could have convicted 
R of manslaughter if it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that R had foresight that P 
would intentionally strike Mr Kumar with the knife. That they did not find P guilty of 
murder under s 168 can be considered a stroke of good luck from R’s perspective because, 
as the outcome for Kurariki so clearly demonstrates, other young people are not so 
fortunate.  However, it is interesting to observe the views of Lang J on the sentencing 
decision in Kurariki’s case, when sentencing R’s associate, P, for manslaughter.597  The 
Crown in P v R sought to rely on R v Rapira.598 In Rapira, the sentencing Judge adopted a 
starting point of 10 years imprisonment (upheld on appeal) and the Crown in P v R 
submitted that a similar starting point should be adopted for P. However, Lang J considered 
that Rapira did not assist him as it was in “a different league”, involving “extensive 
premeditation and planning by a large number of people”; it was a complex case with 
different people having different roles; and the two principal offenders were convicted of 
murder.599  The real comparison here, however, as I have already hinted, is between the 
moral blameworthiness of  Kurariki vis-à-vis the defendant R in P v R.  The parasitic nature 
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of liability under ss 66 and 168 of the Crimes Act is problematic in many cases, but 
particularly so where young defendants are concerned. It essentially requires that the 
defendant read the minds of their associates.  
Returning now to outcomes for P. For manslaughter, P was sentenced to six years 
imprisonment with an MPI of three years and three months. In his sentencing notes Lang 
J set out in some detail P’s unfortunate history. Because this history is of such relevance to 
P’s moral blameworthiness, I repeat much of it verbatim:600 
[11] … in order to understand both the offending and the jury’s verdict it is necessary 
to go much further back than 10 June. The story really begins before you were born. The 
evidence at trial confirm that your mother drank alcohol and consumed drugs heavily 
whilst she was pregnant with you. This has produced in you some features of children who 
have defects caused by foetal alcohol syndrome.  
[12] Your early childhood was turbulent in the extreme. You were exposed to 
excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs within your family environment. You also 
moved from school to school on a regular basis. Then in 2009 when you were eight years 
of age another significant event occurred. At this time you were struck by a vehicle while 
you were crossing a pedestrian crossing. This caused you to be thrown in the air and to land 
on your head.  You suffered a significant injury to the side of your face and a fracture to 
your skull. The incident also left you with permanent brain injury. The evidence given by 
Dr McGinn at trial was to the effect that an injury of this type required intensive therapeutic 
and rehabilitative intervention.  She said that an adult would be off work for about two 
years as a result of such an injury. As a bare minimum you ought to have been kept in a 
secure environment with very little outside stimuli.  Instead you were returned to school 
just two weeks after the incident. Your mother then continued an established trend of 
moving you from school to school. During the trial I heard evidence that you had attended 
a large number of schools during the years leading up to this incident. This meant that the 
schools you attended were not aware of the existence of your traumatic brain injury, and 
were not aware of the effect that it would have and the needs you would have in a 
rehabilitative and educative sense. 
[13] By the time of this offending you had virtually given up going to school. You 
were spending a large amount of time with friends and associates. You had already become 
accustomed to using alcohol and drugs from an early age. You were addicted to synthetic 
cannabis. Your mother endeavoured to deal with this problem by providing you with real 
cannabis.  There can be no doubt from the evidence given at trial that the house in which 
you were living at the time of offending was no more than a den associated with drug 
consumers and drug dealers. 
[14] On the night before the offending you had stayed up late. You had consumed 
drugs and then you had gone to sleep in the living room. Your associate had gone to sleep 
in your bedroom because he was not supposed to be at the house. During the early hours 
of the morning your associate and another older person began talking about committing 
some form of burglary or robbery. I am satisfied that the older person egged on your 
associate and taunted him when he showed any signs of weakness.  Your associate 
ultimately woke you up and presented you with the idea of the offending. I am satisfied 
that you were not initially a willing participant but eventually you elected to go on with it. 
You were certainly a willing participant as you walked down the street carrying the pole 
and at the time when you walked into the dairy carrying the knife.  
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P appealed against his sentence on three grounds: (a) that the starting point of seven and a 
half years imprisonment was too high; (b) that a discount of 20 per cent for mitigating 
factors was too low; and (c) that the Judge erred in imposing an MPI.  
In the Court of Appeal, the judgment was given by Wild J (on behalf of Miller and 
Winkelmann JJ). The Court firstly found that Lang J’s starting point of seven and a half 
years was not out of step with other cases.  
In terms of the second ground of appeal – that the discount for mitigating factors was too 
low – the defence argued that in combining the discounts for P’s age and traumatic brain 
injury the Judge had not allowed sufficient credit for P’s youth and prospects of 
rehabilitation and reintegration. Lang J had considered that:601 
… limited weight should be placed on [the traumatic brain injury] for sentencing purposes. 
I say that because I am satisfied that the impact of your traumatic brain injury has already 
had a large impact in your case by virtue of the jury’s verdict.  Had it not been for the effects 
of your injury that were explained to the jury, I have no doubt that you would have been 
convicted of murder. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed with Lang J’s approach on this point: 602 
The trial on the one hand, and any resulting sentencing on the other hand, are two different 
and discrete exercises. 
The Court of Appeal held that Lang J’s task in sentencing was to impose a sentence 
commensurate with the crime of manslaughter and with P’s culpability as the person who 
committed that crime. In considering mitigating factors that were personal to P, the Judge 
needed to take full account of his traumatic brain injury. The Court of Appeal agreed with 
both Crown and defence counsel that a proper discount for personal mitigating factors was 
40 per cent. 
In terms of the appeal against the MPI, Lang J considered that all four purposes set out in 
s 86(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 for imposing an MPI were engaged: holding the 
offender accountable for the harm done; denouncing the offender’s conduct; deterring the 
offender and others; and protecting the community from the offender. Lang J considered 
that this last factor was of significant relevance, stating that the head injury makes P 
vulnerable to acting impulsively in situations of stress or complexity. 
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The Court of Appeal considered that Lang J erred in imposing an MPI. Because Lang J 
focused on the protection of the community, the Court of Appeal did not have much to say 
about deterrence and denunciation but did draw attention to the comments of Dr McGinn, 
a neuropsychologist, who stated:603 
Issues of denunciation and general deterrence in my opinion do not apply to the sentencing 
considerations of a child with brain damage. One cannot harshly punish a child in order to 
deter the general population from rule breaking.  Clearly P does not represent the general 
population of serious offenders. His is a unique case that justifies a targeted sentence 
applicable to him, rather than one that will deter others or denunciate such acts in general. 
Even specific deterrence is of limited application to a child who has a brain injury and is 
therefore less able to respond normally to consequences.  
Dr McGinn recommended a sentence that would allow P to be released from prison at the 
age of 16 so that he could be placed in a Child Youth and Family approved placement and 
attend suitable educational and therapeutic programmes.  The Court of Appeal observed 
that this recommendation emphasised that P was a young, developing, person whose 
rehabilitative needs were changing. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the 
imposition of an MPI was inconsistent with the flexibility needed to facilitate P’s 
rehabilitation.  The Court felt protection of the community was best achieved by leaving it 
to the Parole Board and Child, Youth and Family to decide the date and conditions upon 
which to release P on parole.  
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against sentence and substituted a sentence of four 
years and six months.  
Analysis 
When the outcomes in the above cases are compared against each other, it is arguable that  
Reweti and P were treated the most fairly by the criminal justice system, by having their 
age and development considered at both the culpability and sentencing stages.  However, 
these cases would seem to be the exception rather than the rule.  In any event, Reweti and 
P were still convicted of culpable homicide, albeit manslaughter, for killings they 
committed when aged 14 and 13 respectively. 
What seems to be emerging from the more recent cases is that there is a greater 
responsiveness by courts to evidence on adolescent brain development research, at least at 
the sentencing stage.  The problem, however, is that this evidence is still not always seen 
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as relevant to culpability.  Kurariki, O’Brien, Churchward, Kriel and Nelson were all held 
culpable to the fullest extent of the law. Even though Kurariki was found guilty of 
manslaughter, not murder, his offending was still viewed as severe to an extent that is out 
of step with his actual moral blameworthiness, considering his age.   
We must question the outcomes of these cases in light of theories surrounding the 
development of young people outlined in ch 2.  Taking Kurariki’s age into account, was it 
fair to convict him of manslaughter without proof he foresaw that his actions carried a risk 
of death?  Taking Kriel’s age into account, was it fair to assume he had the capacity to 
foresee the risk of death, and even if he did foresee the risk, because of his cognitive 
functioning was he able to act in accordance with that foresight? Was it Reweti’s frontal 
lobe abnormality that resulted in the jury’s finding that he did not foresee death?  If so, is it 
such a huge leap to suggest that because frontal lobes are late to develop in all adolescents, 
they may be simply unable to foresee the consequences of their actions. Were the courts 
determining the culpability of O’Brien, Churchward and Nelson correct to conclude that 
those defendants had sufficient capacity to intend or foresee death? Ought we also to 
question the decision-making of Crown prosecutors when they decide to proceed with 
murder when a young defendant is prepared to plead guilty to manslaughter; or the 
advocacy of defence counsel who does not dissuade a young defendant from pleading 
guilty to murder? All these influences can converge to contribute to inconsistent outcomes 
for young defendants who act in very similar ways. The question is, what can be done to 
avoid these inconsistencies in future cases? 
TAKING DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 
If we accept the finding of cognitive neuroscience, that adolescents generally do not 
possess the same capacity for mens rea as adults, how should this finding be utilised by the 
criminal justice system?  Steinberg and Scott suggest that there is a policy choice available 
between treating immaturity on an individual basis as a mitigating factor, or as the basis of 
treating young defendants as a separate category.604  I would argue that to varying degrees, 
both approaches are able to coexist within a criminal justice system.  Youth should be a 
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mitigating factor at the culpability stage.  Developmental delays could be relied upon to 
support a defence similar to diminished capacity.  Furthermore, young defendants who kill 
can be dealt with by youth processes rather than adult ones.  Potentially these processes 
could include trial by youth panels rather than by a jury of adults.  In essence, there are a 
number of options available to the criminal justice system once it is accepted that young 
killers are a different category of offender to adult killers.  Whatever approach is adopted, 
a sound understanding of the developmental issues with regard to young defendants is 
essential for lawyers to make compelling defence arguments on behalf of their clients and 
to engage their clients effectively in the legal process.605 
Absence of mens rea 
McDiarmid suggests that, in terms of existing mechanisms for defending young people, a 
plea of absence of mens rea is the most promising.606 Even without raising a specific 
defence of the diminished capacity type, as part of standard advocacy, defence counsel 
representing young people charged with homicide should make arguments based on 
current research on brain development,607  and make use of experts in doing so.  Most 
defences are argued on the basis that a defendant did not have the mens rea for the offence 
relied upon – the defences of O’Brien, Kriel and Churchward are relevant examples.  
However, there are definitional issues that arise:608 
On one definition, [the mental element of an offence] could incorporate all aspects of the 
criminal charge which relate to the defendant’s mental state which would encompass both 
his/her attitude to the criminal act and his/her criminal capacity.  Alternatively, it could be 
defined narrowly to represent only the specific mental attitude comprised in the crime’s 
definition which has a direct relationship with the defined actus reus. 
Where a “thin” definition is given to the mens rea element of an offence, it would be 
relatively easy to convince a jury that a young person intended their actions.609  However, 
if the mental element includes broader issues of understanding and development, such as 
the ability to exercise rational control over one’s actions, there is greater scope for an 
argument that the young defendant did not possess mens rea.610  
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If absence of mens rea arguments are to be made on behalf of a young person, it is vital 
that defence lawyers make use of expert witnesses to provide the court with information 
on the implications of brain development research on culpability in the individual case in 
order to argue that mens rea was not present.611  This evidence has a counter-intuitive 
function which is essential in demonstrating to a jury that a defendant’s actions may not be 
consistent with the requisite mens rea. As Puritz and Majd point out, a young person’s 
conduct may appear vengeful when it is actually driven by some other motivator, such as 
a desire to please others or an intolerance of things that seem unfair.612  In R v Makoare613 
the Court of Appeal noted that Courts are reluctant to allow expert evidence on whether or 
not a defendant was acting with intent, as this would be a matter on which the jury must 
ultimately decide.614  However, this case was decided before the enactment of s 25(2) of 
the Evidence Act 2006  which states that expert evidence is not inadmissible simply for the 
fact that it breaches the “ultimate issue” rule.  The Law Commission, when it drafted the 
Code upon which the Evidence Act 2006 was based, said that: 615  
Expert evidence is likely to be substantially helpful if it will help the fact-finder to 
understand the evidence of certain witnesses and avoid drawing the wrong inferences from 
their evidence. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in R v Makoare did not preclude the admissibility of 
expert evidence where a Court must decide if someone is “mentally abnormal”.616  In that 
case, the Court suggested:617 
An expert is then able to supply the Court with scientific or medical opinion which is likely 
to be beyond the experience and knowledge of jurors.  Such testimony may also be helpful 
when the case involves human behaviour which does not conform [with] what a lay person 
might expect. 
Arguably this principle could be extended to acknowledge that adolescents, because of 
their normal development level, may show lack of judgement and impaired decision-
making that affects their culpability.618  It could also, perhaps, be argued that violence is a 
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normal part of life for many young defendants, which could mean that they simply do not 
foresee the risk of death.  Further, evidence about the effects of alcohol and drugs that may 
compound impaired developmental decision-making should be available to the courts. 
Yet one attempt to raise these issues in New Zealand was thwarted by the High Court.  
Petani Fa’avae was 16 when he fatally stabbed a 14-year-old in the chest.  He also stabbed 
another person in the arm. Fa’avae was charged with one count of murder, under ss 167(a) 
and (b) of the Crimes Act 1961619, one of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm and three of assault with a weapon.620  Prior to his trial, defence counsel applied for 
an order declaring admissible at trial the evidence of a child and adolescent psychiatrist.621  
The evidence of the psychiatrist fell into two parts.  The first part related to Fa’avae’s 
personal characteristics and was to the effect that he showed no areas of cognitive defect 
but his vocabulary was mildly limited, which was to be expected given his parents used 
English as a second language.  He did not meet diagnostic criteria for any major mental 
disorder, mental retardation or personality disorder.622  The second part of the psychiatrist’s 
evidence was headed “Opinion Regarding Adolescent Development” and was general in 
nature, containing no reference to Fa’avae.623  Essentially, the evidence canvassed similar 
issues to those presented in ch 2 – that developmental studies indicate that adolescents are 
more likely than adults to be impulsive and engage in risky behaviour, and that the brain 
continues developing through adolescence, and in particular that the frontal lobes, 
“involved in decision-making and impulse control”624 are the last to develop.625 
Defence counsel submitted that the psychiatrist’s proposed evidence would be of assistance 
to the jury because it will warn the jury against assuming that the “conscious appreciation 
of risk” required by s 167(b), which might be expected of an adult, will not necessarily be 
found in a sixteen-year-old.626 
The Judge determined that the evidence was not admissible since the jury would not be 
likely to obtain substantial help from it.  The decision in R v Makoare627 was relied upon 
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as sounding a note of caution about expert evidence on the topic of whether a defendant 
was acting with murderous intent. The Judge noted that the psychiatrist’s evidence was that 
Fa’avae was a completely normal adolescent, and no attempt was made to link the general 
evidence about adolescents as a group to Fa’avae.628  The Judge concluded:629 
The evidence would tend to support the creation of a de facto common law defence, based 
on the proposition that adolescents were less able than older offenders to form the necessary 
murderous intent.  There is no warrant for the creation of such a precedent. 
 
Two issues arise from the decision in this case.  First is the question of whether, if an 
attempt to link the general evidence about adolescents as a group to the defendant had been 
made, the evidence would have been admissible.  This would seem to be a rather 
straightforward matter, requiring defence counsel to refer to aspects of Fa’avae’s conduct 
before and after the killing to support the argument that because of Fa’avae’s 
developmental stage at the time of the killing, he did not consciously appreciate the risk of 
death. 
The second issue is that while the Judge correctly warns against the creation of a de facto 
defence, there is nothing to preclude the legislature from creating a legal one, along the 
lines discussed below.   Either way, evidence of brain development needs to be taken into 
account by the legal system when dealing with young defendants who kill.  This can either 
be achieved by focusing on the capacity for intent, as per a specific diminished capacity 
defence, or by using the evidence to show that the defendant did not actually have the intent 
(via expert witnesses).  The only other way of justly dealing with these issues is to raise the 
age of criminal responsibility. 
An affirmative defence – developmental immaturity 
In respect of almost all other facets of life, the law acknowledges the limitations of 
children’s and adolescents’ capacity.  There are age requirements imposed on the rights to 
vote, to drive, to have sex, to be home alone, to buy cigarettes and alcohol, and to watch 
particular movies.  It is difficult to understand why the law should prevent children from 
engaging in these types of activities and yet insist they are mature enough to intend or even 
appreciate the consequences of a criminal act. What is the justification for this distinction? 
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At present, New Zealand law does not allow for a specific defence that takes into 
consideration the diminished capacity of young people, or indeed any defendant.  The 
defence of diminished responsibility has its origins in Scottish courts in the mid-18th 
century as a way of dealing with mental impairment that did not meet the strict insanity 
test.630 In 2010 the defence was put into statutory form in Scotland.631  Chalmers observes 
that this contains “only the most minor changes to the common law defence”. In 1957, a 
version of the defence was imported into English law by virtue of s 2 of the Homicide Act 
1957632 which provides (in part) as follows: 
1) Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder 
if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested 
or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as 
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a 
party to the killing. 
2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged is by virtue 
of this section not liable to be convicted of murder ... 
 
In the case of R v Byrne633, Lord Parker CJ said that an abnormality of mind is: 
[A] state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable 
[person] would term it abnormal.  It appears...to be wide enough to cover the mind’s 
activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters, and the 
ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability 
to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment. 
The abnormality does not have to be permanent and does not have to constitute a disease 
of the mind. The defence may cover intellectual disability, anti-social personality disorder 
or premenstrual tension.634  The abnormality must also have substantially impaired the 
defendant’s capacity.   In R v Byrne, it was held that substantial impairment was a matter 
of degree and it signified more than some impairment.635   
                                                 
630  Robert S Shiels “The Uncertain Medical Origins of Diminished Responsibility” (2014) 78(6) JCL 
467 at 467. 
631  Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 168, inserting s 51B into the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. See James Chalmers “Partial Defences to Murder in Scotland: An 
Unlikely Tranquility” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished 
Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, England, 2011) at 
167. 
632  James Chalmers “Abnormality and Anglicisation: First Thoughts on Galbraith v HM Advocate 
(No.2)” (2002) 6(1) Edinburgh L Rev 108 at 114. 
633  R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 (Crim App). 
634  Guy Cumes “Reform of Diminished Responsibility in New South Wales” (1999) 6 Psychiatry 
Psychol & L 175 at 176. 
635  R v Byrne, above n 633, at 404. 
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In England and Wales the defence was amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
following a lengthy reform process.636 The new provision reads:637 
2  Persons suffering from diminished responsibility 
[(1) A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be 
convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental 
functioning which— 
(a) arose from a recognised medical condition, 
(b) substantially impaired D's ability to do one or more of the things 
mentioned in subsection (1A), and 
(c) provides an explanation for D's acts and omissions in doing or being a 
party to the killing. 
(1A) Those things are— 
(a) to understand the nature of D's conduct; 
(b) to form a rational judgment; 
(c) to exercise self-control. 
(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning 
provides an explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant 
contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.] 
(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged 
is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder. 
(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or as 
accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of 
manslaughter. 
(4)      The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be 
convicted of murder shall not affect the question whether the killing amounted to 
murder in the case of any party to it. 
 
According to Cornford, the new definition of diminished responsibility is “at least 
ostensibly, little more than a modernisation of the old one”.638 “Abnormality of mental 
functioning” replaces “abnormality of the mind” and it must arise from “a recognised 
medical condition”.  This abnormality explains the defendant’s conduct if it is a “significant 
contributory factor” in causing it. Based upon developmental neuroscience, it is arguably 
the case that young people who kill are suffering from an “abnormality”639 of mental 
functioning which substantially impaired their ability to understand the nature of their 
conduct; form a rational judgment; or exercise self-control. What needs to also be proved 
is that the abnormality was a significant contributory factor in causing the defendant to 
carry out their conduct. One stumbling block here could be the requirement that the 
abnormality in mental functioning arises from a recognised medical condition. Whether 
developmental immaturity qualifies as a recognised medical condition remains to be seen. 
                                                 
636  Andrew Cornford “Mitigating Murder” (2016) 10 Crim Law and Philos 31 at 32. 
637  Homicide Act 1957 (UK), s 2 as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 52. 
638  Cornford, above n 636, at 32. 
639  This is not to say that young people are abnormal, rather their normal development is different to the 
norm of adult capacity. 
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In England and Wales, the Law Commission in its report Partial Defences to Murder, 
observed that diminished responsibility does not include developmental immaturity unless 
it is of such a degree to amount to an abnormality of mind.640  The Commission heard from 
two forensic psychologists, one of whom was of the view that the defence was defective 
because it omits reference to developmental immaturity.  The Commission subsequently 
recommended that diminished responsibility be available on the grounds of developmental 
immaturity for an offender aged under 18 at the time of the killing. 641  This 
recommendation was not carried through into the reform of diminished responsibility in 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.642  
The Scottish diminished responsibility provision is as follows:643 
Diminished responsibility 
(1) A person who would otherwise be convicted of murder is instead to be convicted 
of culpable homicide on grounds of diminished responsibility if the person's 
ability to determine or control conduct for which the person would otherwise be 
convicted of murder was, at the time of the conduct, substantially impaired by 
reason of abnormality of mind. 
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in subsection (1) to abnormality of 
mind includes mental disorder. 
(3) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself— 
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1), or 
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
(4) It is for the person charged with murder to establish, on the balance of 
probabilities, that the condition set out in subsection (1) is satisfied. 
(5) In this section, “conduct” includes acts and omissions.] 
 
It is apparent from a comparison of the provisions that, contrary to the English and Welsh 
defence, the Scottish defence does not require a “recognised medical condition”. This is 
consistent with the decision in Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)644. In that case, the 
elements of the common law defence of diminished responsibility were held to be as 
follows:645 
                                                 
640  Law Commission (England and Wales) Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, 2004) at 
[3.134]. 
641  Law Commission (England and Wales) Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 
2006) at [5.125]. 
642  Law Commission (England and Wales) Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism (Discussion 
Paper, 2013) at [9.6], [9.7]. 
643  Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, s 168, inserting s 51B into the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. See James Chalmers “Partial Defences”, above n 631, at 167. 
644  Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2001 SLT 953 (HCJ). 
645  At [54] (footnotes omitted). See also ch 4. 
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1.  Where, on the facts found proved by the jury, the law holds that the accused's 
responsibility was diminished at the time when he killed his victim, the proper 
course is for the jury to convict the accused of culpable homicide. 
2.   But, precisely because diminished responsibility is a legal concept, it is for the 
trial judge to determine whether there is evidence on which the jury would be 
entitled to convict the accused of culpable homicide rather than of murder, on the 
ground of diminished responsibility. In determining that issue, the judge must 
consider the kinds of issue that we have discussed. In essence, the judge must 
decide whether there is evidence that, at the relevant time, the accused was 
suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired the ability 
of the accused, as compared with a normal person, to determine or control his 
acts. 
3.  The abnormality of mind may take various forms. It may mean that the individual 
perceives physical acts and matters differently from a normal person. Or else it 
may affect his ability to form a rational judgment as to whether a particular act is 
right or wrong or to decide whether to perform it. In a given case any or all of 
these effects may be operating. 
4. The abnormality must be one that is recognised by the appropriate science. But 
it may be congenital or derive from an organic condition, from some psychotic 
illness, such as schizophrenia or severe depression, or from the psychological 
effects of severe trauma. In every case, in colloquial terms, there must, 
unfortunately, have been something far wrong with the accused, which affected 
the way he acted. 
5.  While the plea of diminished responsibility will be available only where the 
accused's abnormality of mind had substantial effects in relation to his act, there 
is no requirement that his state of mind should have bordered on insanity. 
6. It is for the court to determine, having regard always to relevant policy 
considerations, whether any particular abnormality can found a plea of 
diminished responsibility. Thus, no mental abnormality, short of actual insanity, 
which is brought on by the accused himself taking drink or controlled drugs or 
sniffing glue, will found a plea of diminished responsibility (Brennan). Similarly, 
our law does not recognise psychopathic personality disorder as a basis for 
diminished responsibility (Carraher).  
7. If, applying the appropriate tests, the judge concludes that the evidence is not 
capable of supporting a plea of diminished responsibility, he should direct the 
jury that, if convicting, they should convict of murder. 
8. If, on the other hand, the judge concludes that there is evidence to support the 
plea, then he must leave it for the jury to consider. In that event the judge's 
directions to the jury should not simply recite the Savage formula but should be 
tailored, so far as possible, to the facts of the particular case. The amount of detail 
required will also depend on the facts of the particular case and on the precise 
issue in controversy between the Crown and the defence. In essence, the jury 
should be told that they must be satisfied that, by reason of the abnormality of 
mind in question, the ability of the accused, as compared with a normal person, 
to determine or control his actings was substantially impaired.  
Taylor-Thompson suggests that in cases where the prosecution must prove intention or 
knowledge as essential elements of an offence, what she refers to as a defence of 
“developmental negligence” may be appropriate.646   She provides the following example 
of a jury instruction which could be used to signal developmental issues: 647 
In deciding whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent in this case, you may take 
[their] age into consideration in assessing whether [they] had reached a level of 
                                                 
646  Taylor-Thompson, above n 509, at 162.  
647  At 164-165. 
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development that enabled [them] to form the specific intent to kill.  You may consider 
whether developmental immaturity prevented [them] from exercising the sort of judgment 
in which [they] fully appreciated the risks involved or the potential outcome of [their] acts.  
If you find that the defendant lacked the capacity to form the specific intent in this case, 
you must find [them] not guilty and may proceed to consider whether the state has met its 
burden of proof with respect to [any lesser offences]. 
Taylor-Thompson’s proposal could function as a form of diminished responsibility in that, 
if accepted by a jury, it might result in a conviction for a lesser offence.648  It would remind 
the jury that society accepts that adolescents do not make the same decisions as adults and 
that while an adolescent may have the physical capacity to commit an act, he or she may 
not have reached a level of maturity that is needed to weigh up the consequences of a choice 
in the way that an adult is expected to.649  The essence of this type of instruction to the jury 
is to suggest to them that the defendant’s responsibility for the killing is diminished because 
of their mental state (or developmental state) at the time of the killing.   
As Taylor-Thompson acknowledges, the success of this approach depends upon expert 
evidence regarding the defendant’s cognitive development in general and specific 
capacities in the particular circumstances of the killing.650   She acknowledges too that the 
approach has limitations.   She suggests that if jurors are entitled to infer that an actor 
intends the natural and probable consequences of their acts, convincing them that an 
adolescent lacked the capacity to intend their act will be difficult.651   There are also 
admissibility issues in relation to evidence of developmental delays – courts may be 
reluctant to find that such evidence is necessary to help the fact-finder reach a decision.652  
Furthermore, perceptions that the defence is a lenient option for young killers is likely to 
lead to objections.653 
McDiarmid also suggests that there is good reason for the provision of a “bespoke defence” 
for young people within the criminal process654 but, consistent with Taylor-Thompson’s 
concerns about perceptions, McDiarmid acknowledges that public opinion about children 
who commit serious crimes have tempered recommendations for reform in England and 
                                                 
648  At 162. 
649  At 163. 
650  At 163. 
651  At 165. 
652  At 165. 
653  At 168. 
654  McDiarmid, above n 508, at 337. 
123 
 
Wales.655  However, the point that must be consistently asserted in the face of these 
concerns is that any arguments made on behalf of young defendants, or defences asserted 
by them, serve to mitigate responsibility, not to absolve it. In arguing in support of an 
affirmative defence, McDiarmid observes that:656 
… a defence is not a blanket exemption from criminal liability. No child defendant would 
have to plead it and, indeed, making the plea is no guarantee of success, which depends on 
the evidence. 
 
McDiarmid suggests that a test which would acquit a young defendant on the grounds of 
developmental immaturity ought to incorporate several elements: the defendant’s 
knowledge of the difference between right and wrong (both in a moral and legal sense); 
the defendant’s ability to exercise rational control over their actions; and the defendant’s 
understanding of causation.657 Drawing upon the Scottish defence of mental disorder, 
McDiarmid suggests how a defence for young defendants could be worded:658 
A child [or young person] is not criminally responsible for conduct which would otherwise 
constitute an offence and should be acquitted if, due to developmental immaturity, 
(a) s/he was unable sufficiently to know the full implications of, to understand, and/or to 
appreciate the nature of, that conduct, its criminality, its wrongfulness and/or its 
consequences (legal and/or physical); and/or 
(b) s/he was severely restricted in his/her ability to judge whether to carry out the conduct, 
to exercise rational control over the conduct and/or to refrain from carrying it out. 
 
Rather than relying upon absence of mens rea arguments, an affirmative defence based 
upon a young defendant’s neurological development is preferable, and I suggest that an 
approach incorporating elements of both McDiarmid’s and Taylor-Thompson’s proposals 
is a promising way forward. 
Despite Taylor-Thompson’s labelling of her proposal as a defence, it leans more toward an 
“absence of mens rea” argument by use of the words, “[i]n deciding whether the defendant 
acted with the requisite intent …” in the proposed jury instruction. Further, the instruction 
does not provide that age was a mandatory consideration (“you may take … age into 
consideration” (emphasis added)) but it does mandate acquittal if the jury finds the 
defendant lacked the capacity to form the specific intent. McDiarmid’s suggested wording 
is, in one sense, more absolute: “[a] child [or young person] is not criminally responsible 
                                                 
655  At 337. 
656  At 338. 
657  At 340. 
658  At 340. 
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for conduct which would otherwise constitute an offence and should be acquitted …” 
(emphasis added); but could be stronger by replacing the word “should” in the latter part 
of that segment with the word “must”. With those points in mind, I suggest the following 
affirmative defence of “developmental immaturity”: 
(1) A defendant is not criminally responsible for conduct which would otherwise 
constitute an offence and must be acquitted if, due to developmental immaturity: 
(a) they did not fully understand the nature of their conduct, or that it was morally or 
legally wrong, or its legal or physical consequences; and/or 
(b) they were substantially impaired in exercising rational control over their conduct 
and/or refraining from carrying it out. 
(2) Where a defendant is found not guilty of an offence under subs (1)(a) or (b) of this 
section, the court may proceed to consider whether the prosecution has met its burden 
of proof with respect to any lesser offences. 
 
This proposal relies, as do Taylor-Thompson’s and McDiarmid’s, on the causal role 
“developmental immaturity” plays in the responsibility of young defendants.  However, I 
suggest that the focus of the defence should be on the fact of understanding (etcetera) not 
on the capacity for it.659 Just as capacity cannot be assumed, neither can incapacity.  For 
the defence to succeed it must be proved (to the relevant standard 660 ) that due to 
developmental immaturity, the defendant met either of the tests set out in (a) or (b).   
Another key difference proposed here is that I have not specified an upper age limit and 
have avoided the use of definitional terms such as “child” or “young person”.   To that end, 
the scope of the defence could be extended to adults who have suffered developmental 
delays. The expansive scope is arguably necessary in the absence of any other diminished 
capacity defence, and I will address this concern in ch 6 “Recommendations and 
Conclusion”.  
As to the standard of proof, this clearly depends upon the burden ascribed to the defence 
of developmental immaturity. In other words, which party must prove the elements of the 
defence (absence of understanding or substantial impairment etcetera)? The English 
defence of diminished responsibility places the burden of proof on the defendant, under s 
2(2) of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK).  In New Zealand, the defence of insanity also places 
the burden on the defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity by proving that the 
defendant was insane. The rationale for shifting the burden from the prosecution to the 
                                                 
659  The same approach applies to intoxication (at least in New Zealand and England and Wales) as it 
bears upon the question of intent: see R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 (CA) and R v Sheehan [1975] 
2 All ER 960, [1975] 1 WLR 739 (CA). 
660  See below at 124-125. 
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defence in such cases is that the defendant is better placed to provide evidence to discharge 
the burden.  In criminal cases, where the defendant bears a legal burden (as distinct from 
an evidential burden), the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. The defence 
of developmental immaturity could adopt this approach, in which the prosecution must still 
prove all other elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt (namely, in the context of 
culpable homicide, that the defendant caused the death of the victim).  Alternatively, given 
the particular vulnerabilities of young defendants, it may be that a reverse burden is too 
onerous. Instead, an evidential burden – the obligation to show sufficient evidence to raise 
the issue of developmental immaturity – could be imposed. This would only require 
defendants to point to a “credible narrative” of developmental immaturity, and place the 
legal burden of disproving the defence back on the prosecution (as in self-defence). 
The difference between the defence of developmental immaturity and the defence of 
infancy (as provided for by s 21 of the Crimes Act 1961) is that the latter provides for a 
conclusive presumption – no evidence may be brought to suggest that a child under the age 
of 10 was, in fact, capable of committing an offence. A defence of developmental 
immaturity provides an option to defendants – it does not have to be raised if the defendant 
chooses not to (presumably having received competent legal advice). Finally, subs 2 allows 
for a measure of accountability in some cases, potentially reducing murder to manslaughter. 
However, it is by no means certain that manslaughter is the only available verdict if subs 
(1) of the defence is established – a full acquittal on a murder charge ought still to be 
available even if the defendant has committed the actus reus of culpable homicide. 
The defence needs to be accompanied by evidence of how developmental immaturity 
affects decision-making. In other words, the sort of evidence that would accompany an 
absence of mens rea argument, is also a necessary component of an affirmative defence.  
In terms of how this proposed defence could potentially have changed the outcomes in the 
cases examined above, the analysis is necessarily brief and speculative because, of course, 
the outcome does depend upon the court’s weighing of the evidence in each case.   In 
Kurariki’s case, the defence would, at least, have focused the court’s attention on Kurariki’s 
understanding of his own conduct rather than the conduct of his associates. It would 
provide the court with the option of finding he did not have foresight of the lethal 
consequences of agreeing to participate in the robbery. To that end, a full acquittal could 
have been granted, even though the principals were charged under s 168 of the Crimes Act 
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1961.  The absence of this foresight of death (understanding of the physical consequences) 
is also crucial to the determination of the cases against Churchward, O’Brien, Nelson and 
Kriel, and arguably these four defendants could at least have been found guilty of 
manslaughter under the proposed defence.  This would have been a better reflection of their 
moral blameworthiness, and given a sentencing Judge more discretion, while at the same 
time allowing for a more appropriate measure of accountability. In all of those cases there 
was additional background information about the defendants which suggested impaired 
abilities to foresee the consequences of their actions, in addition to their young age. 
It must be noted that there is, however, still the risk of jury nullification if juries are 
unsympathetic to the notion that immaturity bears on criminal responsibility. I suggest that 
strong jury directions might mitigate this risk. 
SUMMARY 
The argument put forward in this chapter is that developmental immaturity is relevant to 
the culpability of young people charged with murder and manslaughter.  It is also relevant 
at other stages of the proceeding, because a just and fair hearing requires the competent 
participation of the defendant in their defence.661  These competencies include the ability 
to understand the nature of the charges the defendant faces, to assist the lawyer, and to enter 
a plea.662 
It must be noted that the use of developmental neuroscience within the criminal justice 
system is not universally supported.  Some say that arguments that a young defendant 
lacked capacity are unconvincing in light of the facts of cases where there is evidence of 
premeditation.663  Morse suggests that while adolescents are clearly different from adults, 
difference does not necessarily entail diminished responsibility.664  Morse argues that 
almost all adolescent killers have the capacity to form, and actually do form, the mental 
states required for the offences they commit.665 
They kill on purpose, or they are aware that they are creating a great and unjustifiable risk 
of death or serious bodily injury, or they kill inadvertently in circumstances in which they 
                                                 
661  Steinberg “Adolescent Development”, above n 545, at 464. 
662  At 464. 
663  See, for example, Terry A Maroney “The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice” (2009) 85 Notre Dame L Rev 89 at 135. 
664  Stephen J Morse “Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments on Zimring’s ‘The 
Hardest of the Hard Cases’” (1999) 6 Va J Soc Pol'y & L 471 at 472. 
665  At 473. 
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should know and are capable of knowing that they are creating a great and unjustifiable 
risk of death.666 
Aronson points out that the vast majority of adolescents do not commit violent crimes and 
are able to control their impulses. 667   It is also true that some adult defendants are 
“impulsive, sensation-seeking risk takers who discount future consequences”. 668  
Furthermore, there is no consensus within the scientific community that brain imaging 
studies should guide legal decision-making and public policy.669 
There are several responses to these criticisms.  First, which is precisely the point that brain 
development studies suggest, is that conduct that a reasonable adult might perceive as 
premeditation might reveal an entirely different motive from the point of view of an 
adolescent.  Second, few people would argue that the question here is not whether the 
young defendant should be held accountable, but the degree to which they are held 
accountable.  As Zimring notes, 
The intentional taking of life without justification requires a punitive response in most 
circumstances when the offender has even minimal appreciation of the nature of his acts 
and their consequences … But, the proper punishment for fifteen-year-olds who kill must 
take into account the offender’s immaturity and other particular circumstances.670 
Steinberg and Scott accept that a juvenile defendant, because of developmental immaturity, 
should be seen as less culpable than an adult, but nonetheless still has some responsibility 
for the crime.671  In relation to risk-taking adult defendants, Steinberg argues that their 
motivations are not developmental but “characterological” and unlikely to change simply 
with the passage of time.672 
Third, while some young defendants may intend to kill, such cases are rare, and the 
majority of crimes committed by young people are likely to be reckless crimes, committed 
under situations of “hot cognition”.   
It is important to acknowledge that neuroimaging techniques do not reveal an “objective 
truth” and do involve an element of subjectivity,673 in that the interpretation of a given 
                                                 
666  At 473-474. 
667  Jay D Aronson “Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice” (2009) 42 Akron L Rev 917 at 929. 
668  Steinberg “Adolescent Development”, above n 545, at 473. 
669  Aronson, above n 667, at 928. 
670  Zimring, above n 510, at 438. 
671  Steinberg and Scott, above n 604, at 1010. 
672  Steinberg “Adolescent Development”, above n 545, at 473. 
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brain image is not necessarily straightforward. 674   This is an area of ongoing 
investigation.675  In the meantime, it is important to be clear that neuroscientific data about 
the structure and function of the brain is not a proxy for an individual’s actual cognitive 
functioning.  However, such information can help in interpreting an individual’s behaviour 
and providing clues as to whether it is likely that they possessed the required mens rea. 
Further: 676 
In addition to showing that juveniles are not as culpable for their actions as adults, the new 
research suggests that juveniles may be more responsive than adults to rehabilitation.  
Because their brains are still learning and creating new connections, research suggests 
rehabilitation will be particularly effective for juveniles.  However, the current trend of 
transferring juveniles to the adult system results in harsher punishment and less 
rehabilitation. 
Utilising developmental neuroscience in the way suggested in this chapter is not simply a 
means by which young killers can be exculpated from responsibility.  It provides realistic 
options for holding young people accountable for their fatal actions while recognising that 
their actions may not accurately reflect their moral blameworthiness.  In essence, the 
contribution that developmental neuroscience makes is in providing support for affirming 
and extending the principle of doli incapax rather than limiting it.  
  
                                                 
674  At 219. 
675  Jay N Giedd “The Teen Brain: Insights from Neuroimaging” (2008) 42 J Adolesc Health 335 at 340. 
676  Tracy Rightmer “Arrested Development: Juveniles’ Immature Brains Make them Less Culpable 
than Adults” (2005) 9 Quinnipiac Health L 1 at 25. 
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Chapter 4: Victims of violence or 
coercion who kill their abusers 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the focus of this chapter on victims of violence or coercion who kill, it must be 
noted that, comparatively speaking, such killings are rare. On the other hand, between 1 
January 2009 and 31 December 2015, 936 women were killed by men (mostly known to 
the victims) in England and Wales.  Of those 936 women, 64 per cent were killed by men 
identified as current or former partners.677 An Australian review found that women were 
three times more likely than men to be murdered in their own home by a current or former 
partner.678  
Perhaps because of the low rate of such homicides, victims of violence who kill their 
abusers679 pose a universal problem for legal systems.680  However, unlike English law 
which provides a defence of loss of control alongside diminished responsibility, New 
Zealand’s legal regime does not have sufficient flexibility to deal with the culpability of 
these defendants.  Arguably other jurisdictions have similar problems, although there is 
data to suggest that the New Zealand criminal justice system’s response to these defendants 
is more punitive than, for example, Australia’s or Canada’s.681 This chapter suggests an 
approach that moves away from a focus on the violence perpetrated against defendants 
toward a holistic approach that focuses on coercive control as it affects criminal 
responsibility.  While the emphasis of this chapter is on the New Zealand position, where 
relevant it will reference Australian, Canadian, South African, Scottish and English and 
                                                 
677  Deidre Brennan “The Femicide Census” (2016) [online] Available at: <1q7dqy2unor827bqjls0c4rn-
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678  Patricia Cullen and others “Counting Dead Women in Australia: An In-Depth Case Review of 
Femicide” (2018) J Fam Viol <doi.org/10.1007/s10896-018-9963-6>. 
679  Use of the term “battered women” has fallen out of favour in recent years, in part due to recognition 
that it is not just women who are battered, and that battering is not an accurate description of the harm 
suffered by victims of violence. The descriptors “victims of violence who kill” or “coerced victims 
who kill” is more apt in the context of this thesis.  
680  Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Battered women charged with homicide in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand: How do they fare?” (2012) 45(3) Aust NZ J Criminol 383. 
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Welsh authorities as the thesis ultimately proposes a framework that could be adapted for 
use in other jurisdictions as well as New Zealand.   
The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) has recently considered what can be done to 
assist victims of violence who kill their abusers, releasing an issues paper in November 
2015682  and tabling its final report on 12 May 2016.683 The NZLC has also recently 
addressed strangulation in light of increasing understanding of the role it plays in the 
context of family violence.684 At the same time, New Zealand’s Ministry of Justice is 
undertaking a review of family violence laws, recognising that:685 
The distinction between a victim and perpetrator is not always clear. Victims of ongoing 
abuse use a range of strategies to cope that can include violence in retaliation to the abuse. 
The NZLC notes that researchers working with victims of family violence have begun to 
centre their analyses on the concept of “coercive control”. A central figure in this research 
is Evan Stark, who has argued that coercive control includes non-physical harm and 
behaviours on the part of the abuser to intimidate and isolate victims.686  Labelling these 
victims of violence or coercion as “murderers” or “killers” when they act to end their abuse 
can be inconsistent with their degree of moral blameworthiness.  Yet in many jurisdictions, 
New Zealand included, there is no present scope for a lower degree of fault to be recognised 
by the criminal justice system at the conviction stage.   This chapter considers some of the 
options for reform in this context, and concludes that the creation of a new offence that 
reflects the lesser degree of moral blameworthiness involved when a victim of coercive 
control kills her abuser, or defences in partial or full mitigation of responsibility, are viable 
options. 
The first part of this chapter sets the scene for considering law reform in this context by 
emphasising the psychological research supporting the concept of coercive control as 
central to domestic violence discourse.  This is followed by an exposition of the legal 
landscape within which claims of mitigation by coerced victims who kill currently fall to 
be considered.  In this section I draw particular attention to R v Wickham and R v Wihongi, 
                                                 
682  Law Commission Victims of family violence who commit homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015). 
683  Law Commission Understanding family violence: reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 
(NZLC R139, 2016). 
684  Law Commission Strangulation: The case for a new offence (NZLC R138, 2016). 
685  Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence – A public 
discussion document (2015) at 11. 
686  Evan Stark Coercive control: how men entrap women in personal life (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2007). See ch 2. 
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as foreshadowed in ch 1, a comparison of which amply demonstrates the potential for 
unfair labelling and punishment that can arise from the existing legal regime.  Finally, I 
move to consider how the problems presented by coerced victims who kill might be 
addressed within the legal system itself. In this section of the article I explore some of the 
approaches taken in other jurisdictions as well as briefly outlining the NZLC’s options. 
SETTING THE SCENE 
 
As canvassed in ch 2, the killing of a violent abuser has evolutionary underpinnings. 
Incapacitating someone who poses a physical threat is a time-honoured strategy.687  It goes 
without saying that killing an abuser in self-defence would have had evolutionary 
advantages over non-lethal strategies – killing eliminates future threats from the abuser.688 
In the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA)689, contexts in which victims were 
likely to kill in self-defence were ones in which there was a lack of kin or allies close 
enough to come to assistance; the failure of other, non-lethal strategies to incapacitate the 
abuser; and a lack of any other options.690  As this thesis demonstrates, these are precisely 
the conditions in which most victims who kill their abusers exist.  Natural selection would 
also have favoured adaptations that led killers to catch their victims alone and by surprise, 
to reduce the chance that they themselves would be injured or killed.691 This again is 
particularly apt in the case of victims of violence or coercion who kill, given the usual size 
and strength disparity between them and their abusers. Furthermore, of particular relevance 
to a self-defence strategy, is the notion of a cognitive system that “irrationally” 
overestimates the likelihood of violence, leading individuals to avoid it.692 As Duntley and 
Shackelford argue, “[it] would be better, on average, to infer that a rival might want to kill 
you when they really do not, than to infer that the rival does not want to kill you when he 
actually does”.693 On that basis, a cognitive bias towards overestimating homicidal intent 
                                                 
687  Joshua D Duntley and Todd Shackelford “Adaptations to avoid victimization” (2012) 17 Aggress 
Violent Behav 59 at 66. 
688  At 69. 
689  John Tooby and Leda Cosmides “Psychological Foundations of Culture” in Jerome H Barkow, John 
Tooby and Leda Cosmides (eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation 
of Culture (Oxford University Press, UK, 1992) at 69. See ch 2 for a fuller discussion. 
690  Duntley and Shackelford, above n 687, at 67. 
691  At 67. 
692  At 68. 
693  At 68. 
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is a psychological mechanism to avoid being killed. In New Zealand, a claim of self-
defence requires an honest belief in a situation of imminent peril. This is a subjective test. 
As I will show in this chapter, courts often do not believe a woman when she claims she 
held such a belief. Evidence of this perceived cognitive “irrationality” may go some way 
to shore up women’s claims that they did honestly believe that they were at risk of serious 
bodily harm, notwithstanding that such a belief may seem unreasonable to observers.   
Some of the elements of coercive control, as described in ch 2, can be seen in the lived 
realities of women charged with killing their abusers, in New Zealand and Australia.  In R 
v Wihongi,694 in addition to a history of violence against Wihongi, the deceased (who 
Wihongi killed by stabbing) was alleged to have taken Wihongi’s Accident Compensation 
payout for his own use.  In R v Wang,695 Xiao Jing Wang killed her violent husband after 
he threatened to kill her and her family and was trying to extort money from them. The 
attending police officer gave evidence at trial that Wang said, in reference to her deceased 
husband, that he was a “very bad man, make money trouble for me, I’m just feeling 
free”.696  While there was some discussion about whether the police officer had mistaken 
the word “money” for “many”, arguably the distinction is irrelevant when considered in 
the context of the violent, coercive relationship. In Wharerau v R,697 Wharerau stabbed her 
abusive partner at a time when he had followed her into a confined kitchen and was “really 
angry” with her. The stabbing followed immediately from an argument about the use of 
Wharerau’s phone.  Wharerau then tried to use the phone to contact her cousin but her 
partner broke it, and threw it on the ground a number of times.698  Similarly, in the 
Australian case R v Kells (Ruling),699 Jade Kells stabbed and killed her partner after he had 
stolen her money and mobile phones.700 While the relationship between the two was 
characterised by violence by both parties, it is significant that, as noted above, coercive 
controlling violence is committed predominantly by men.  Stark also argues that coercive 
control is gendered. In other words, it is exercised by men over women:701 
                                                 
694  R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775, (2011) 25 CRNZ 483. 
695  R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). 
696  At 532. 
697  Wharerau v R [2015] NZCA 299. 
698  Wharerau was convicted of manslaughter following a trial and sentenced to three years and two 
months’ imprisonment. 
699  R v Kells (Ruling) [2011] VSC 679. 
700  Kells was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. 
701  Stark Coercive control, above n 686, at 377-378. 
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Women and men assault their partners in similar ways and with similar motives … But I 
have never had a case that involved a female perpetrator of coercive control, and no such 
cases are documented in the literature.  The asymmetry in coercive control reflects the 
asymmetric nature of sexual inequality, not the fact that women are less aggressive, 
controlling or domineering than men … coercive control is also about gender. 
Interestingly, the NZLC noted that in all of the 29 strangulation assaults studied by the New 
Zealand Family Violence Death Review Committee, the perpetrator was male.702  This 
suggests, consistently with overseas findings, that strangulation, in particular, is a gendered 
assault.703  
The NZLC observed that abusers do not strangle to kill but to show that they can kill.  This 
makes strangulation a unique tool of control and coercion, often accompanied by threats to 
kill, which can traumatise victims even after the assault has ended.704 
According to Stark, “coercive control” answers the question of why victims of violence 
become entrapped in relationships where ongoing abuse is “virtually inevitable”.705 
Cognitive psychologists in the late 1970s and 1980s tried to capture what these women 
were experiencing by comparing it to “coercive persuasion”, brainwashing, and other 
tactics used with hostages, prisoners of war, kidnap victims and by pimps with 
prostitutes.706 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
On the face of it, a victim of coercive control who kills her abuser does not deserve the 
same censure as, say, someone who shoots a bank teller in the head during the course of a 
robbery.  This thesis is premised on the social fact that there are different degrees of moral 
culpability.  For example, in mercy killings, the reduced degree of moral blameworthiness 
derives from altruistic motives. When young people kill, developmental immaturity may 
affect their capacity to reason and foresee the consequences of their conduct.  When victims 
of coercive control kill their abusers, an element of self-preservation, even if not recognised 
by existing self-defence provisions, mitigates fault. Even someone who deliberately shoots 
a bank teller (as in the above example) is at a lesser degree of fault if they themselves had 
a gun pointed at their head.  In other words, to be labelled as culpable, one must be able to 
freely choose to break the law. If the defendant’s choices are constrained or his or her will 
                                                 
702  Law Commission Strangulation, above n 684, at [2.14]). 
703  At [2.18]). 
704  At [2.16]). 
705  Stark Coercive control, above n 686, at 12. 
706  At 12. 
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is overborne by the will of another, the moral fault of the defendant is, or at least may be, 
absent.  The question this thesis attempts to address is how can, or should, the legal system 
accurately reflect these differing degrees of fault? 
As discussed in ch 1, in a murder trial, the role of a jury is to make a decision on the facts, 
having been directed on the law by the judge.  It must find an accused guilty if satisfied, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that she committed the actus reus, accompanied by any one of 
the mens rea elements for murder (for example, intention to kill or intention to cause bodily 
injury that she knows is likely to cause death and is reckless as to that result).707  If the 
prosecution proves that intent to kill or recklessness as aforesaid was present, and there is 
no available defence, a jury must convict of murder; any sympathy it may feel for the 
accused should not be taken into account in determining culpability.  However, as 
identified in ch 1, there is evidence to suggest that this may not be how juries work in 
practice.  This is particularly well demonstrated by a comparison of the following two New 
Zealand cases.  
New Zealand 
Dale Wickham  
On 10 October 2009 in West Auckland, New Zealand, Dale Wickham killed her husband, 
John, with one shotgun blast. Wickham, who suffers from multiple sclerosis, said she had 
been abused by John for years, and that on the night of his death he had thrown a bottle at 
her, attempted to throttle her, and told her he would “gut [her] like a fish”.708  He had 
threatened to kill her with a brick and put her in the pool to make it look like an accident.709 
While the jury rejected Wickham’s claim of self-defence, it found her not guilty of murder 
but guilty of manslaughter on the apparent basis that the killing was accidental.  This is 
despite the fact that Wickham called the police before going into her bedroom to get the 
shotgun and returning to the lounge to shoot John. In sentencing Wickham to 12 months 
home detention, Justice Ellis accepted that Wickham’s multiple sclerosis made her feel that 
                                                 
707  Crimes Act 1961, s 167. 
708  R v Wickham HC Auckland CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010 at [16].  
709  Edward Gay “Husband’s last words: ‘I’ll gut you like a fish’” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 13 October 2010). 
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fewer options were available to her in dealing with the situation she faced at the time of the 
killing. 710    
Jacqueline Wihongi 
A few months earlier, on 5 June 2009 in Napier, New Zealand, Jacqueline Wihongi fatally 
stabbed her former partner, Vivian Hirini. Wihongi had numerous “cognitive deficits”,711 
including those which flowed from a painkiller overdose at age 13. She was sexually 
assaulted at 14, gang-raped at 19, and was the victim of a home invasion by gang members, 
an incident in which she was assaulted with a full beer bottle in front of her children, leaving 
her physically scarred.  Crucially, there was a history of abuse from Hirini. On the night of 
the killing both parties had been drinking and an argument developed between Wihongi 
and Hirini about money that Hirini was alleged to have taken from Wihongi’s ACC 
compensation. Wihongi said that Hirini demanded sex, which she refused. Wihongi was 
convicted of murder (she did not claim self-defence); therefore the jury must have found 
that she either intended to kill Hirini or that she intended to cause him an injury that she 
knew was likely to cause death.712 At Wihongi’s sentencing the presumptive sentence of 
life imprisonment for murder was displaced due to her “mental impairments” outlined 
above, and she was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. This was uplifted on appeal to 
12 years with a minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) of four years.  
What are the moral and legal principles that underpin the disparate outcomes in these cases? 
At first glance it might appear that Wihongi’s failure to claim self-defence might have been 
an influential factor. However, while Wickham did claim self-defence, this was not 
accepted by the jury and so was not a factor in its verdict of manslaughter. In any event, 
the failure to raise the defence should not have precluded the Wihongi jury from 
considering its availability.  Self-defence, under s 48 of the Crimes Act 1961, should be put 
to a jury where there is a credible or plausible narrative of it, even if it is not raised by the 
defendant.713  
                                                 
710  R v Wickham, above n 708. See also Edward Gay “Turbulent relationship ends in manslaughter” 
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It is apparent that the sentencing Judge, and even the Court of Appeal, treated Wihongi’s 
vulnerabilities and her circumstances as relevant to sentencing. The Court of Appeal saw 
Wihongi as:714 
… a battered defendant who has reacted in an extreme way to her abuser in circumstances 
where both the history of abuse and the offender’s cognitive deficits have played a 
significant role in that extreme reaction arising. 
Clearly, however, those features did not hold much sway with the jury in finding her guilty 
of murder.  
I must stress that the problem with these cases is not that Wickham deserved to be 
convicted of murder, or that she deserved a harsher punishment.  The problem lies in the 
jury’s application of the law in reaching the conclusion that she did not have the relevant 
intention for murder.  There was no evidence that the gun discharged accidentally so on 
the face of it, it would appear there was no reasonable foundation for their verdict that 
Wickham did not intend or at least foresee death, when shooting her husband.  What is 
concerning, from a justice point of view, is the question of whether another defendant (such 
as Wihongi), in similar circumstances but with a different jury, would have been acquitted 
of murder.  As noted in ch 1, there are differences in the material facts between these two 
cases. But is the moral blameworthiness of the two accused sufficiently distinct to warrant 
different verdicts and wildly disparate sentences?  Ultimately the real problem with these 
cases is that they signal that the actual consequences for a defendant depend upon the 
caprice of the jury, or the enlightenment or otherwise of the judge, rather than the strict 
application of legal principles.715 What happened in Wickham can be seen as a stark 
example of jury nullification. Recently in New Zealand it has also been suggested that 
lawyers are appealing to juries to consider provoking conduct in coming to its verdict. 716 
Therefore, it would seem that provocation claims are still being heard in murder cases, even 
though provocation as a defence has been repealed as of 7 December 2009 by the Crimes 
(Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009.   
                                                 
714  R v Wihongi, above n 694, at [94]. 
715  See, for example, R v Falls SC Queensland, 3 June 2010 and the analysis in Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie 
Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Securing Fair Outcomes for Battered Women Charged with Homicide: 
Analysing Defence Lawyering in R v Falls” (2014) 38 Melb Univ Law Rev 666. 
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In any event, these issues aside, the legal system has always struggled to deal with women 
who kill in the context of ongoing violence or coercive control. In New Zealand, despite 
there being several instances of this type of killing, no systematic approach has developed.  
Early cases relied upon battered woman syndrome and its effects on the accused’s state of 
mind as relevant to self-defence or provocation.717 In R v Oakes,718 referred to in ch 1, the 
defendant killed her long-time partner, Doug Gardner, by giving him an overdose of 
sleeping pills.  She then buried him in her back garden.  In her defence it was argued that 
she suffered from battered woman syndrome, brought about by years of physical and 
verbal violence perpetrated against her by Gardner.  The Court acknowledged the reality 
of “the syndrome” and its effects.719  The expert called for the defence regarded the 
significant aspect of the syndrome as its effect on woman’s sense of judgment, 
vulnerability and ability to reason.720  The Court noted that evidence that the defendant 
suffered from battered woman’s syndrome makes it more plausible that she could have 
been mistaken about how dangerous her situation was and since reasonableness of force is 
based on the circumstances as the accused believed them to be, a pre-emptive strike might 
therefore be justified.721  However, the Court also observed:722 
It hardly needs to be said that a battered woman has no more right to kill or injure than any 
other person, man or woman. And so that fact that a woman suffers from the syndrome is 
not in itself a defence; the syndrome is not in itself a justification for the commission of a 
crime.  
Oakes was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  She was granted early 
parole after eight years with the Parole Board recognising the need for flexibility in cases 
involving battered women.723 In R v Wang,724 Wang killed her husband, Jing Wah Li, 
while he was asleep in a drunken stupor. Wang had tied Li up with some bathrobe ties, 
tried to strangle him, stabbed him several times in the stomach, and finally put a pillow 
over his face.  There was evidence of a history of violence from Li, and on the evening in 
question he had threatened to kill Wang and her sister and was attempting to extort money 
from her family in Hong Kong.  Wang was convicted of manslaughter on the basis of 
                                                 
717  See, for example, R v Wang, above n 695; R v Oakes [1995] 2 NZLR 673 (CA) and R v Gordon 
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provocation, but she appealed against conviction on the basis that the trial Judge erred in 
not putting self-defence to the jury.   Victims of violence or coercion who kill their abusers 
will often struggle to raise a credible narrative that the force used was necessary or 
reasonable. Indeed, Wang’s claim of self-defence was rejected on the grounds that:725 
There was no immediate danger to render causing [her husband’s] death a reasonable 
course of action. 
The principle in Wang – that an imminent threat of serious harm is required – is still good 
law in New Zealand, meaning that the defence will not usually be available in the context 
of coercive control as killings in that context are often pre-emptive.  While a pre-emptive 
strike is not necessarily fatal to self-defence, the court will take into account any options it 
believes the accused had to seek help in other ways.  
Ultimately, reliance on battered woman syndrome meant the focus was on physical harm 
to the accused which diverted attention away from potentially more significant 
consequences of the abuse and the nature of the coercive relationship as a whole.  The 
problem is compounded now by the fact that provocation is no longer a defence in New 
Zealand, and none of the other defences to culpable homicide are likely to be seen as 
relevant, even if they can prima facie be relied upon.  So, when a victim of violence kills 
her abuser, a conviction for murder is a real possibility unless a sympathetic jury finds them 
guilty of manslaughter, as in the Wickham case, or they are charged with or plead guilty to 
a lesser offence. In any event, there is no consistent approach that can be taken in these 
cases that can accurately reflect the diminished degree of moral blame involved.   
Canada 
In R v Lavallee,726 where the defendant shot her abusive partner in the back of the head as 
he was leaving the room, the Supreme Court stated that waiting until a threat was actualised 
would “in the words of an American court, be tantamount to sentencing her to ‘murder by 
installment’”.727  The Court in Lavallee construed the “imminence” requirement much 
more broadly than the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Wang, to effect that a threat that 
may not be immediate, may still be imminent.  
                                                 
725  At 537. 
726  R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852. 
727  At 883 per Wilson J, citing State v Gallegos 719 P2d 1268 (NM 1986) at 1271.  
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In terms of coercive control evidence, the 2008 trial of Teresa Craig in Ottawa, Ontario 
was the first of its kind in Canada in which such evidence was called in support of self-
defence.728  The killing of Craig’s husband in that case was remarkably similar to that in R 
v Wang729 – the deceased was asleep in a drunken stupor; Craig put a pillow over the 
deceased’s face then retrieved a large butcher’s knife from the kitchen and stabbed the 
deceased four times in the chest.730  Craig was from Malaysia and at the time of the killing 
was “socially, geographically and economically isolated from everyone except the 
deceased and [their son]”.731 However, there was a complicating factor in terms of a self-
defence claim: while there was ample evidence that the deceased psychologically and 
verbally abused Craig, there was no serious physical violence perpetrated by the deceased 
toward her.  But the deceased did have a bad temper and he could be violent, especially 
when drinking, and Craig was afraid of him. 
Craig was charged with first degree murder. She claimed she acted in self-defence. Evan 
Stark gave evidence for the defence on coercive control and explained that “physical 
violence may or may not play a significant role in the abuser’s control over his abused 
partner”.732  Stark gave his opinion that Craig was under the deceased’s coercive control, 
which included emotional and psychological abuse, economic and social isolation, “low-
level” physical abuse (shoving her out of the way, for example), intimidation, and threats 
to take her son away. 
The trial judge refused to put self-defence to the jury on the basis that there was “no air of 
reality”733 to Craig’s self-defence claim, but a defence of absence of mens rea was put to 
the jury and it returned a verdict of not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. Craig 
appealed against conviction and sentence. 
The Court of Appeal for Ontario set out the three elements for self-defence under the then 
s 34(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code:734 
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• an unlawful assault, or at least a reasonable belief by the accused that he or she 
was being assaulted; 
• a reasonable apprehension of risk of death or grievous bodily harm; and 
• a reasonable belief that it is not possible to preserve one’s self from harm except 
by killing the perpetrator of the assault. 
The Court of Appeal observed that self-defence “is a justification for what would otherwise 
be culpable homicide, based on the necessity of self preservation”,735 but echoing the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Oakes736, noted that not every person who kills an abuser 
is justified in doing so:737 
A person who kills another to escape from a miserable life of subservience to that person 
does not act in self-defence absent reasonably perceived threats of significant physical 
harm and reasonably held beliefs that the killing is necessary to preserve one’s self from 
significant physical harm or death. 
Like New Zealand’s self-defence provision, self-defence in the then s 34(2) had both a 
subjective and objective element.  Whether the defendant actually apprehended the risk of 
death or grievous bodily harm was a subjective inquiry into the mind of the defendant at 
the relevant time. That apprehension must be reasonable in the circumstances as the 
defendant perceived them to be. 738 It was the absence of the subjective belief in the instant 
case which led to the failure of Craig’s self-defence claim:739 
There is nothing in the appellant’s testimony or in her statements to the neighbours, the 911 
operator and the police to suggest that she apprehended death or grievous bodily harm at 
the hands of the deceased, or that she believed she had to kill him to save herself. 
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Judge had been wrong to limit the inquiry 
into Craig’s state of mind to her own evidence, and should have examined the evidence as 
a whole, especially that of Evan Stark.  The Court of Appeal, however, held that the trial 
Judge did consider other evidence, including the expert evidence “particularly as it related 
to the objective components of the defence”.740 This suggests, therefore, that in the view 
of the Court of Appeal, Stark’s evidence was not, in fact, particularly relevant to the 
subjective test.  
The Court of Appeal ultimately agreed with the trial Judge’s finding that there was no air 
of reality to Craig’s assertion that when she killed her husband she apprehended that he 
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would kill her or cause her grievous bodily harm or that she reasonably believed she had 
to stab him in self-preservation. 
Sheehy identified from the transcripts from Craig’s trial the prosecution’s attempts to shut 
down self-defence by excluding coercive control evidence, but suggests that even though 
self-defence was kept from the jury in this case, Stark’s evidence “did serve an educative 
function regarding men’s use of coercive control to entrap women”. 741  Sheehy also 
suggests that the changes to Canada’s self-defence law may make it easier for victims of 
violence who kill to use coercive control evidence in the future. 742  Reforms were 
introduced in Canada in 2011 to the effect that a jury must engage in a contextual analysis 
of the reasonableness of self-defence claims, and the ruling in R v Lavallee, to the effect 
that imminence is a factor rather than a requirement, has been codified.743  The new section 
provides:744 
34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if 
(a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or 
another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another 
person; 
(b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or 
protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and 
(c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. 
… 
(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties 
and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the force or threat; 
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there were other 
means available to respond to the potential use of force; 
(c) the person’s role in the incident; 
(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; 
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the incident; 
(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties to the 
incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature of that force or 
threat; 
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the incident; 
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or threat of force; 
and 
(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force that the 
person knew was lawful. 
… 
Subsection (1) does not apply if the force is used or threatened by another person for the 
purpose of doing something that they are required or authorized by law to do in the 
administration or enforcement of the law, unless the person who commits the act that 
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constitutes the offence believes on reasonable grounds that the other person is acting 
unlawfully. 
This new iteration no longer requires that a defendant reasonably believed they faced death 
or serious bodily harm or reasonably believed they had no other alternative, for self-defence 
to be put to the jury. Rather the non-exhaustive list of factors in s 34(2) are relevant to the 
question of reasonableness, and may make it possible to acquit a defendant who kills pre-
emptively in the way that many victims of violence do.745 However, MacDonnell argues 
that the new statutory approach has its advantages in that it is likely to produce more 
contextualised judgments, but it would have been helpful for some contextual elements, 
such as race, to be explicitly mentioned.746  MacDonnell also makes the point that bias and 
discrimination on the part of jurors still exist.747 Therefore, jury nullification is still a live 
risk.  
South Africa 
In South Africa, where domestic violence and coercive control are pervasive “private 
defence” incorporates a range of defences in which a private individual (not a police officer 
or public official) uses force to defend his or her legal interests. Private defence of a person 
allows the use of force to defend against an unlawful attack, provided certain conditions 
are met.  These are: an unlawful attack or threat thereof; which threatens some legally 
protected interest (for example, human life, physical or sexual integrity); the attack must 
be in progress or imminent; the use of force must be necessary; and the use of force must 
be reasonable.748  Despite the imminence requirement, in S v Engelbrecht749 Satchwell J 
sought to invoke the Lavallee approach to circumvent it. In Engelbrecht, the defendant 
killed her abusive partner while he slept.750  In a more recent case, Steyn v S751, where the 
defendant shot her abusive partner, who was armed with a knife, the trial Court found her 
guilty of murder because she acted unreasonably in leaving a locked bedroom and therefore 
placed herself in a position of danger in which she was forced to use the pistol.  The 
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Supreme Court of Appeal did not rely on any overseas authorities, but overturned her 
conviction, noting that it was “necessary in such circumstances to ‘adopt a robust approach, 
not seeking to measure with nice intellectual calipers the precise bounds of legitimate self-
defence’”.752   
England and Wales 
In England and Wales until 2010, the two defences potentially available to victims of 
violence who kill their abusers were diminished responsibility and provocation, both partial 
defences which reduced the defendant’s culpability from murder to manslaughter.753 The 
elements of diminished responsibility have already been canvassed in ch 3. 754  Perhaps in 
England and Wales the most well-known diminished responsibility case in the context of 
domestic violence is R v Ahluwalia755.  The defendant, Kiranjit Ahluwalia, was in an 
arranged marriage. She killed her husband by setting fire to the room in which he slept. 
The context for the killing is summarised in the judgment:756  
The appellant had suffered violence and abuse from the deceased from the outset of the 
marriage. He was a big man; she is slight. Her complaints of violence were supported by 
entries in her doctor's notes. Thus, in October 1981, there is a record of her being hit three 
or four times on the head with a telephone and thrown to the ground. In September 1983, 
a note states she was 'pushed' by her husband whilst pregnant and sustained a bruised hand. 
The next month she had a broken finger due to another argument. She made attempts at 
suicide in 1983 and again in 1986. The Croydon County Court granted her an injunction 
to restrain the deceased from hitting her in 1983. In 1986 the deceased abused the appellant 
and tried to run her down at a family wedding. She obtained her second injunction from 
the court after the deceased had held her throat and threatened her with a knife. He 
threatened to kill her and threw a mug of hot tea over her. Despite the court order, the 
deceased continued his violence, which intensified after January 1989. 
 
At trial Ahluwalia claimed that she did not intend to kill or cause really serious harm to her 
husband, simply to cause him pain. She also claimed provocation, relying upon the history 
of abuse perpetrated against her by the deceased, which had culminated on the night of the 
killing in the deceased threatening to burn Ahluwalia with a hot iron and to beat her the 
following morning if she did not pay him money he had demanded from her. These threats 
were compounded by the fact that the deceased rebuffed all of Ahluwalia’s attempts to 
discuss their relationship and told her that their marriage was over. At trial, the jury was 
directed that the defence of provocation was only available if it was satisfied that there had 
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been “a sudden and temporary loss of self-control on her part as result of acts which would 
have caused a reasonable person having her characteristics as a married Asian woman to 
lose her self-control”.757  She was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, it was held that the trial Judge’s 
directions to the jury on provocation were not in error. However, the Court admitted 
“fresh”758 evidence that Ahluwalia was suffering from a “major depressive disorder” at the 
time of the killing. The Court also considered the evidence of Ahluwalia’s strange 
behaviour on the night of the fire, which included that she stood inside the locked and 
burning house with her son, saying that she was waiting for her husband. She eventually 
handed her son out of a window to witnesses then emerged herself. She was said to have 
“stood staring at the blazing window with a glazed expression”.759  The Court took the 
view that had the fresh evidence been relied upon at trial, there “may well have been an 
arguable defence”760 of diminished responsibility.  Ahluwalia’s conviction was quashed, 
and a new trial ordered. Ahluwalia was subsequently convicted of manslaughter on the 
basis of diminished responsibility and was sentenced to time served. 
That Ahluwalia was subjected to coercive control from the deceased is painfully obvious 
from a letter she had written to him after he left her for about three days a few weeks prior 
to the killing. As noted by Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ, in that letter “she made a number 
of self-denying promises of the most abject kind”.761 The letter read:762 
‘Deepak, if you come back I promise you—I won’t touch black coffee again, I won’t go 
town every week, I won’t eat green chilli, I ready to leave Chandikah and all my friends, I 
won’t go near Der Goodie Mohan’s house again, Even I am not going to attend Bully’s 
wedding, I eat too much or all the time so I can get fat, I won’t laugh if you don’t like, I 
won’t dye my hair even, I don’t go to my neighbour’s house, I won’t ask you for any help.’ 
Subsequently the law on both diminished responsibility and provocation has changed by 
virtue of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK). Diminished responsibility has been 
redefined, as set out in ch 3, although the changes appear to be largely cosmetic, perhaps 
apart from the requirement that the abnormality of mental functioning arose from a 
recognised medical condition. The new defence replacing provocation – partial defence to 
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murder: loss of control – is a more significant revision.763 Section 54 of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (UK) provides: 
(1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not 
to be convicted of murder if— 
(a) D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted 
from D's loss of self-control, 
(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and 
(c) a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same 
or in a similar way to D. 
(2)      For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss 
of control was sudden. 
(3) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all 
of D's circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D's conduct is that 
they bear on D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. 
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted 
in a considered desire for revenge. 
(5) On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with 
respect to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence 
is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue 
with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the 
trial judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply. 
(7) A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is 
liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter. 
(8) The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be 
convicted of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to 
murder in the case of any other party to it. 
Section 55 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides for the meaning of “qualifying 
trigger”: 
(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 54. 
(2) A loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies. 
(3) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of 
serious violence from V against D or another identified person. 
(4) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or 
things done or said (or both) which— 
(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and 
(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. 
(5) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a 
combination of the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4). 
(6) In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger— 
(a) D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was 
caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not 
justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; 
(c) the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be 
disregarded. 
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(7) In this section references to “D” and “V” are to be construed in accordance with 
section 54. 
 
Herring argues that the new loss of control defence is not simply an amended version of 
provocation: “the new defence has a significantly different philosophical underpinning”.764 
Although the new defence, like provocation, requires that the defendant’s act results from 
a loss of self-control, s 54 now also requires that the loss of self-control had one or both of 
two specific “qualifying triggers” (s 54(1)(b)): “fear of serious violence from V against D 
or another identified person” (s 55(3)) and/or “a thing or things done or said (or both) 
which … constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and … caused D to 
have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged” (s 55(4)).765  According to Herring, 
“[t]he new defence moves from a defence based on ‘angry loss of self-control’ to one based 
on righteous indignation or moral outrage”.766 
Section 54 relies upon an objective test: whether “a person of D's sex and age, with a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in 
the same or in a similar way to D” (s 54(1)(c)).  Arguably, however, the inclusion of 
consideration of the defendant’s circumstances imports an element of subjectivity into the 
test.  Under s 55(6)(c), in determining whether an act is a qualifying trigger, sexual 
infidelity must be disregarded. At first glance this might suggest that responding to sexual 
infidelity is incompatible with a defence of loss of control, but the Court of Appeal, 
Criminal Division has held that:767 
… where sexual infidelity is integral to and forms an essential part of the context in which 
to make a just evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of 
subsections 55(3) and (4), the prohibition in section 55(6)(c) does not operate to exclude it. 
It is of significant note that, by virtue of s 54(2), the loss of control need not be sudden. 
This is particularly salient in the context of victims of coercive control who usually kill, not 
in the heat of the moment, but at a time when their abuser is otherwise incapacitated (for 
example, asleep or drunk, or both). 
                                                 
764  Jonathan Herring “The Serious Wrong of Domestic Abuse and the Loss of Control Defence” in Alan 
Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, 
Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, England, 2011) at 66. 
765  Cornford, above n 753, at 32. 
766  Herring, above n 764, at 66, citing Susan Edwards “Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss 
of Self-Control” (2010) 74 JCL 223. 
767  R v Clinton; R v Parker: R v Evans [2012] EWCA Crim 2 (Crim App) at [39]. 
147 
 
Herring suggests that in the context of victims of domestic violence who kill, self-defence, 
diminished responsibility, or loss of control relying on the violence qualifying trigger in s 
55(3) may be the more suitable defences. He also argues that such defendants should be 
able to claim loss of control on the basis of a “serious wrong”, relying upon s 55(4).768  
Herring analysed the question of what is the wrong in cases of domestic violence. In doing 
so, he identifies some specific wrongs associated with domestic violence, one of which is 
domestic abuse as coercive control.  
On 1 March this year, Georgina (Sally) Challen was granted leave to appeal her murder 
conviction in the death of her husband. Her husband had, over a number of years, engaged 
in extramarital affairs. In 2009 Challen left him and bought her own property. However, 
by 2010 she sought a reconciliation with her husband and he agreed, but only on the basis 
she sign a post-nuptial agreement.  In the week before his death she saw on his Facebook 
page an entry from a woman whom he had arranged to meet on Sunday 15 August. On 
Saturday 14 August Challen and her husband spent the morning clearing out their house 
and garage but then he sent her out of the house to get him some lunch. While she was 
away, he rang his female friend and cancelled their meeting on the Sunday.  When Challen 
returned she noticed that the phone had been moved. She called the last dialled number and 
a woman picked up. She then asked her husband whether she could see him the following 
day, to which he said, “don't question me”. According to Challen that was how he often 
spoke to her.  She then prepared a meal and while he ate, she repeatedly hit him on the head 
with a hammer which she had taken to the house in her handbag.769  
Challen’s grounds of appeal relied on new psychiatric evidence and evidence on coercive 
control. Unfortunately, the reported decisions do not clearly articulate the coercive nature 
of the relationship between Challen and her husband. However, Challen’s sons have 
spoken in support of her appeal. One son was quoted as saying that his father was “morally 
corrupt” and always trying to undermine his mother. He discouraged her friendships and 
tried to control her every move. He said his father was “systematically trying to break her 
down, trying to mould her into what he wanted her to be and for her to never answer 
back”.770 At trial, Challen’s defence counsel had relied on diminished responsibility, which 
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was not accepted by the jury. In seeking leave to appeal, Challen’s counsel argued that “[i]f 
the state of scholarship and learning had been at trial, as it now is … then provocation was 
at the very least likely to have been advanced”.771  At the time of Challen’s trial, there was 
little recognition of the long-term psychological consequences of abuse. A more recent 
development has been the criminalisation, in some circumstances, of coercive controlling 
behaviour, by virtue of s 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (UK) which creates the offence 
of “[c]ontrolling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”. The offence 
is constituted by repeatedly or continuously engaging in coercive or controlling behaviour 
towards someone to whom the offender is “personally connected”, having a serious effect 
on the victim where the offender “knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a 
serious effect on” the victim.  Personal connection includes intimate personal relationships, 
where the parties live together and are members of the same family or have previously 
been in an intimate personal relationship. The section does not include people who have 
responsibility for the victim for the purposes of pt 1 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1933 (UK) and the victim is under 16. 
Under subs (4) behaviour has a “serious effect” if it causes the victim to fear, on at least 
two occasions, that violence will be used against B; or it causes B serious alarm or distress 
which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.  “Family member” 
is broadly defined.  
It is a defence to show that in engaging in the behaviour in question, the defendant believed 
that they were acting in the victim’s best interests and the behaviour was, in all the 
circumstances, reasonable. The defendant is to be taken to have shown these facts if there 
is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to them, and the contrary is not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt. This defence does not apply to behaviour that causes the victim 
to fear that violence will be used against her. 
Sheehy observes that the experience of the United Kingdom with this new offence will be 
instructive for other jurisdictions.772  However, Walklate and others question whether 
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criminalising coercive control is the right response to intimate partner violence.  They argue, 
amongst other things, that:773 
the extent to which the concept of coercive control can effectively capture the diversity of 
women’s lives, the different forms and dynamics of violence(s) and the different levels of 
harms incurred, is open to debate. 
 
Those authors question whether the concept of coercive control, which is meaningful in 
clinical practice, can adequately be translated into the realm of the criminal law.774  One of 
the many difficulties here is that in the complexities of intimate relationships there is no 
consensus on what is “normal”, and difficulties abound about how and where we draw the 
line between what is benign behaviour in those relationships, such as wanting to know what 
the other party is doing, and behaviour which can properly be called surveillance or 
stalking.775 
Scotland 
Scots law contains two partial defences to murder: provocation and diminished 
responsibility. The origins of the diminished responsibility defence have been discussed in 
ch 3. 
In Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)776, a case concerning the common law defence rather 
than the statutory provision, the defendant shot her husband while he lay in bed. She gave 
evidence that he had abused her over several years, including subjecting her to violent 
sexual assaults of various kinds. She said that he had threatened to kill her if she did not 
acquiesce, and that she was afraid that he would kill her. She said she killed the deceased 
because “she could not think of any other way in which to bring her tribulations to an 
end”. 777   The defendant pleaded diminished responsibility and defence counsel led 
evidence from two psychologists that the defendant had been suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Neither of these witnesses were medically qualified. The defendant was 
initially convicted of murder but appealed. One of the grounds of the appeal was that the 
trial Judge had instructed the jury that a plea of diminished responsibility requires evidence 
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of a mental disease. The appeal was allowed, with the High Court of Justiciary observing 
that:778  
… many organic disorders in some way affect the operation of the brain and so lead to 
some mental abnormality which could be of relevance in the present context. For instance, 
head injuries and brain tumours may affect the patient’s consciousness and lead to 
personality changes of various kinds. Strokes may result in patients becoming more 
aggressive. Disorders of the thyroid are known to have mental manifestations, while 
hypoglaecemia is well known to affect people's behaviour, sometimes making them 
disinhibited and aggressive. Many drugs administered for therapeutic purposes are known 
to have side effects of various kinds: some will induce drowsiness or confusion, while 
others will lead to euphoria and still others to depression. The mental abnormalities caused 
in these different ways could well impair an accused's ability to determine or control his 
acts and omissions, just as much as the conditions springing from the causes specified in 
the earlier case law. But a lay person, at least, might hesitate to say that someone suffering 
from one of these conditions was suffering from a ‘mental disease’ or ‘mental illness’. This 
confirms that these terms may indeed be too narrow to describe the range of possible 
conditions in respect of which the doctrine of diminished responsibility may apply. 
The Court concluded that, given that external causes could give rise to a mental 
abnormality for the purposes of diminished responsibility, there was no reason why non-
medically trained witnesses such as the psychologists in the present case, could not give 
evidence of such conditions. A new trial was ordered, at which the defendant pleaded guilty 
to culpable homicide (the Scottish equivalent of New Zealand’s manslaughter).  
In a case dealing with failure to protect a child from violence perpetrated by her partner – 
Bone v HM Advocate779 – there was evidence about the size and strength disparities 
between Bone and her partner, and Bone suffered from personality disorders and possessed 
a low level of intellectual functioning. She was afraid of her partner and was isolated both 
socially and geographically.  This evidence was said to be relevant to both diminished 
responsibility and the reasonableness of the alleged failure to protect. 
In terms of provocation in Scots law, it is said that there are now two different forms of 
provocation – provocation by violence and provocation by infidelity.780 Provocation by 
violence is likely to be the most apt in the context of victims of violence who kill, in which 
case there must be provocation by violence, followed by a loss of self-control, and “[t]here 
must be a reasonable or proportionate relationship between the conduct amounting to the 
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provocation and the accused's act”.781  The defendant must also have reacted in the heat of 
the moment – in other words, the provocation must be recent.782 As with other jurisdictions, 
this is likely to prove a stumbling block for victims of violence who kill.  
Although diminished responsibility and provocation are the only two formal partial 
defences to murder in Scotland, it has been suggested that there are six “unofficial 
categories” in which only culpable homicide (essentially manslaughter) is charged even 
though there is evidence upon which a murder charge could be pursued. These categories 
are infanticide, euthanasia, suicide pacts, necessity or coercion, killings “in excess of duty” 
and homicide by omission.783 As these involve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
they are not firm categories.784  Of particular relevance for present purposes is the fourth 
category – necessity or coercion – but as Chalmers points out, Scottish courts have not 
affirmed a defence of necessity or coercion and in Collins v HM Advocate the trial Judge 
directed the jury that coercion was not available.785 
As in England and Wales, a new offence dealing with abusive behaviour has just been 
enacted in Scotland, under the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018: 
1 Abusive behaviour towards partner or ex-partner 
(1)   A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person (”A”) engages in a course of behaviour which is abusive of 
A’s partner or ex-partner  (”B”), and 
(b) both of the further conditions are met. 
(2)   The further conditions are— 
(a) that a reasonable person would consider the course of behaviour to be 
likely to cause B to suffer physical or psychological harm, 
(b) that either— 
(i) A intends by the course of behaviour to cause B to suffer 
physical or psychological harm, or 
(ii) A is reckless as to whether the course of behaviour causes B 
to suffer physical or psychological harm. 
(3)   In the further conditions, the references to psychological harm include fear, alarm 
and distress. 
 
Section 2 of the Act defines abusive behaviour: 
2 What constitutes abusive behaviour 
(1)  Subsections (2) to (4) elaborate on section 1(1) as to A’s behaviour. 
(2)   Behaviour which is abusive of B includes (in particular)— 
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(a) behaviour directed at B that is violent, threatening or intimidating, 
(b) behaviour directed at B, at a child of B or at another person that either— 
(i) has as its purpose (or among its purposes) one or more of the 
relevant effects set out in subsection (3), or 
(ii) would be considered by a reasonable person to be likely to 
have one or more of the relevant effects set out in subsection (3). 
(3) The relevant effects are of— 
(a) making B dependent on, or subordinate to, A, 
(b) isolating B from friends, relatives or other sources of support, 
(c)   controlling, regulating or monitoring B’s day-to-day activities, 
(d) depriving B of, or restricting B’s, freedom of action, 
(e) frightening, humiliating, degrading or punishing B. 
(4) In subsection (2)— 
(a) in paragraph (a), the reference to violent behaviour includes sexual 
violence as well as physical violence, 
(b) in paragraph (b), the reference to a child is to a person who is under 18 
years of age. 
While the provisions do not refer explicitly to coercive control, the effects of abusive 
behaviour reflect a number of features of coercive and controlling behaviour such as 
isolating the victim, controlling their day-to-day movements, and frightening the victim.  
The Act makes a number of associated changes to criminal procedure, evidence and 
sentencing in domestic abuse cases. 786  These include prohibiting a defendant from 
personally conducting the defence and the admissibility of certain expert evidence relating 
to the victim.787 
The Scottish offence, while not relying on the concept of coercive control, gives a more 
expansive definition of abusive behaviour than the English and Welsh offence does in 
defining coercive and controlling behaviour. As noted below,788 abusive and coercive 
behaviour is context-specific and potentially difficult to delimit on this basis. For this 
reason, it might have been preferable for the Scottish provision to make the list of relevant 
effects non-exhaustive. 
Australia 
In some Australian jurisdictions attempts have been made to reform the law around self-
defence to better provide for the realities of domestic violence victims who kill. These 
initiatives include removing the imminence requirement for self-defence; the creation of 
new offences; and reform of, or creation of, partial defences; and facilitating the reception 
of “family violence” evidence. Despite these reforms, there is no unified approach but 
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rather a “disparate array of defences and partial defences, with different technical 
requirements”.789   
Defensive homicide 
In 2005 the Victorian government introduced a new offence of defensive homicide.790  It 
was suggested that the new offence would give a jury and sentencing judge more options 
than the existing “all or nothing” mechanisms for self-defence.791  Section 9AD of the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), entitled “Defensive homicide” provided that: 
[a] person who, by his or her conduct, kills another person in circumstances that, but for 
section 9AC, would constitute murder, is guilty of an indictable offence (defensive 
homicide) and liable to level 3 imprisonment (20 years maximum) if he or she did not have 
reasonable grounds for the belief referred to in that section. 
Section 9AC provided that: 
[a] person is not guilty of murder if he or she carries out the conduct that would otherwise 
constitute murder while believing the conduct to be necessary to defend himself or herself 
or another person from the infliction of death or really serious injury. 
Section 9AD created a new layer of legal and moral culpability sitting between murder and 
manslaughter.792 The new offence attracted a lot of criticism, given that the overwhelming 
majority of offenders convicted of it were male. Of particular concern was the conviction 
of Luke Middendorp for defensive homicide, for killing his estranged partner. Evidence 
was given that Middendorp had been violent to the victim, Jade Bownds, on a number of 
occasions including incidents in which he had smashed her mobile phone; hit her and 
forced her to withdraw money from her account; told her that he would kill her if she tried 
to leave; and tried to strangle her793 – all of the hallmarks of coercive control.  Middendorp 
was almost twice the size of Bownds, and there was a domestic violence order against him 
to protect Bownds.794 
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Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering identified three key concerns with defensive homicide, namely 
that it: 795 
… over-complicated the law of self-defence; that the offence is not operating as intended 
for battered women who kill; and that the offence has mirrored the problems previously 
associated with the defence of provocation. 
The offence was ultimately repealed by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive 
Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), with effect from 1 November 2014. That Act also inserted a 
new range of provisions for self-defence, duress, sudden or extraordinary emergency and 
intoxication. Self-defence is contained in s 322K, and reads: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct 
constituting the offence in self-defence. 
(2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence if— 
  (a) the person believes that the conduct is necessary in self-defence; and 
(b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person 
perceives them. 
(3) This section only applies in the case of murder if the person believes that the 
conduct is necessary to defend the person or another person from the infliction 
of death or really serious injury. 
Of particular relevance in the context of victims of violence who kill, s 322M of the Act, 
headed “Family violence and self-defence” provides: 
(1) Without limiting section 322K, for the purposes of an offence in circumstances 
where self-defence in the context of family violence is in issue, a person may 
believe that the person's conduct is necessary in self-defence, and the conduct 
may be a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them, 
even if— 
  (a) the person is responding to a harm that is not immediate; or 
(b) the response involves the use of force in excess of the force involved 
in the harm or threatened harm. 
(2) Without limiting the evidence that may be adduced, in circumstances where self-
defence in the context of family violence is in issue, evidence of family violence 
may be relevant in determining whether— 
(a) a person has carried out conduct while believing it to be necessary in 
self-defence; or 
(b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as a person 
perceives them. 
These provisions reflect those earlier in force concurrent with the offence of defensive 
homicide. It is of note that these provisions remove the immediacy requirement in cases of 
family violence. In a troubling parallel to Middendorp, Phillip Bracken was acquitted of 
murder on the basis of self-defence, after he shot his partner five times. Interestingly, the 
account Bracken initially gave to police was that he shot Helen Curtis accidentally.  At trial, 
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however, he alleged family violence under s 9AH of the Crimes Act (Vic), which is 
substantially similar to s 322M.796  
However, others argue that abolition of defensive homicide was a premature and 
unjustified response driven by popular punitivism.  Ulbrick and others point out that 
Middendorp was “the first and remained the only case involving a male perpetrator 
convicted of defensive homicide for killing his former female partner”.797  In Ulbrick and 
others’ analysis of defensive homicide cases in which detailed information was accessible, 
27 involved a male perpetrator and male victim, five involved female perpetrator and male 
victim, and only one (Middendorp) involved a male perpetrator and female victim.  Their 
analysis focuses on 15 cases involving male perpetrators who presented evidence of a 
history of mental illness and impairment, and the authors argue that these cases do cohere 
with the intended scope of s 9AD “which sought to take into account that people kill in a 
range of different circumstances and that their culpability may be affected by a range of 
factors”.798 Ulbrick and others set out to “challenge the dominant, populist voices that 
strongly informed the abolition of defensive homicide”.799  They argue that defensive 
homicide was actually working effectively “capturing the very unique and complex 
circumstances inherent to homicide”.800  In their view, it was “expressly contemplated”801 
that defensive homicide would not solely apply to victims of violence who kill their abusers, 
and that it would also be used by individuals with a mental illness or impairment that did 
not fall within the “narrow ambit”802 of Victoria’s statutory defence of mental impairment. 
Ulbrick and others argue:803 
Without a halfway house between murder and manslaughter, it is likely that the moral 
culpability of offenders suffering from mental illness and impairment cannot be adequately 
recognised in the type of conviction or sentence imposed. 
The same argument can be made in respect of victims of violence who kill their abusers.  
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Defence of self-preservation 
Queensland has provided a specific defence to murder for victims of intimate partner 
violence. The Criminal Code (Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another 
Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) amended the Criminal Code (Qld) by inserting a new 
s 304B, which introduced a new partial defence to murder of “killing for preservation in an 
abusive domestic relationship”. Section 304B provides: 
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under circumstances that, 
but for the provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is guilty of 
manslaughter only, if— 
(a) the deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against 
the person in the course of an abusive domestic relationship; and  
(b) the person believes that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death 
or grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the omission that causes the death; 
and 
(c) the person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive 
domestic relationship and all the circumstances of the case … 
This defence has also been criticised on the basis that it has the potential to undermine self-
defence claims in the context of domestic violence.804  Further, it is only a partial defence 
reducing murder to manslaughter and does not apply to defence of others.805 
It appears the use of these offences or defences may reflect the predominant use of 
provocation as a defence, that is, it was used primarily to excuse men’s killing of men or 
women, either in response to perceived or actual infidelity or perceived or actual 
homosexual advances. 
OPTIONS FOR REFORM  
Stark’s likening of coercive control to brainwashing, and other tactics used with hostages, 
prisoners of war, and kidnap victims highlights the issue that the criminal law has so far 
been unable to grasp:  the criminal law ought not to hold wholly accountable all those who 
act under duress or compulsion or coercion.  To be morally blameworthy, individuals must 
freely choose their actions.  In reality, crime is often the result of factors beyond the control 
of the individual which reduce the individual’s moral responsibility.   
As discussed in ch 2, Lacey gives an account of several conceptions of responsibility, two 
of which are founded in the idea of capacity. The first is the idea that a person is responsible 
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for conduct which he or she chooses.  The second asks the question whether the defendant 
had a fair opportunity to avoid the thing they did.806 Dressler makes similar arguments: 
A person may properly be blamed for her conduct if she had the capacity and fair 
opportunity to choose freely whether to violate the moral/legal norms of society.807 
In the context of victims who kill their abusers, capacity principles can be used to attribute 
responsibility.  There is, first, an argument that such a person does not freely choose to kill 
their abuser: their capacity for choice being eroded by coercive control. There are parallels 
here to the complainant of sexual assault who submits to threats of, or actual, force. Such 
a complainant does not truly “consent” but rather yields out of an “inexorable instinct for 
human preservation”808. The second argument using the capacity principles is that a victim 
of violence who kills their abuser may not have had a fair opportunity to avoid the killing. 
In other words, as Dressler argues, they act under duress.809   
Killing an abuser is not always a response to coercive control, but it is a possibility, just as 
it is a possibility that a prisoner of war might do the same thing.  Would the criminal justice 
system hold the prisoner accountable in the same way as someone who is not acting under 
coercion or compulsion? 
The question is how to incorporate these principles into a legal regime that would recognise 
that coercive control affects moral blame. Because depriving a woman of a defence in this 
context is, as Sheehy and others argue, “to throw the weight of the law behind her 
subjugation”.810 
New Zealand Law Commission options 
There are a number of other options for reform identified by the NZLC. These included 
reforming the law of self-defence by, for example, taking the Victorian approach by not 
excluding self-defence if the threat is not imminent or the force used is disproportionate;811 
or by expressly referring to inevitability of the danger rather than imminence;812 or by the 
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creation of a new defence which applies where a defendant is responding to family violence. 
This defence would be underpinned by the principle of necessity. 813  Other reforms 
canvassed by the NZLC in relation to self-defence include evidential reform in relation to 
the reception of evidence about family violence and jury directions. 
The NZLC considered partial defences (including excessive self-defence, loss of control, 
diminished responsibility and killing for preservation), and a separate homicide offence 
which would be more specific than manslaughter. The elements of the offence, as proposed 
by the NZLC, are:814 
(a) the defendant was a victim of family violence perpetrated by the deceased; 
(b) as a result of the family violence, the defendant considered they had no option other 
than to seriously injure or kill the deceased – that is, the defendant was acting to defend 
themselves or another in circumstances as they perceived them to be; but 
(c) the force used by the defendant was not reasonable in the circumstances as the 
defendant believed them to be. 
The NZLC says that this offence would not affect the operation of self-defence, which 
would be available to a defendant charged with the separate homicide offence. 
Ultimately the NZLC decided in favour of amending the Crimes Act 1961 to provide that 
where a person kills as a response to family violence, s 48 may apply even if the threat to 
the accused is not “imminent”.815 
In a specific rejection of the NZLC’s proposals, Wake and Reed suggest that a new partial 
defence of self-preservation should be introduced in New Zealand. Drawing upon 
recommendations made by the Law Commission for England and Wales, Wake and Reed 
put forward a defence that “operates as an imperfect justification; the defendant is justified 
in responding to an unjust attack, but the overall response is wrong”.816 This partial defence 
is nestled with self-defence and reduces murder to manslaughter where the killing is a 
response to fear of serious abuse from the victim toward the defendant or any other person.  
Neither the lack of an imminent threat nor the use of excessive force would necessarily 
negate the defence.817  However, the defence does not automatically apply if self-defence 
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fails. To have it so would mean “the defence would be overly broad in ambit and subject 
to similar criticisms that were levelled at defensive homicide in Victoria”.818 
It is clear that in terms of solutions to the present problem, there is more than one road to 
Rome, many of which could derive from existing criminal law categories such as duress, 
compulsion, necessity, or automatism.  However, because men do not (generally) live in 
relationships characterised by fear for their own lives, I suggest that the path to be taken in 
this context is the one illuminated by the gendered nature of coercive control.  Because 
coercive control is exercised by men over women, centering an offence on coercive control 
could arguably mean that it cannot be exploited by men who kill women.  The provision 
need not be framed in a gender-specific way, rather the hope is that it will not be 
commandeered by men killing women because, as Stark suggests, coercive control is 
unlikely to exist in those relationships.  It is interesting to note that the offence of controlling 
or coercive behaviour in s 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (UK) is defined in gender 
neutral terms, which departs from Stark’s framework in which the focus is exclusively on 
the victimisation of women.819 
To that end, the elements of the provision should require that the accused was in a 
relationship characterised by the exercise of coercive control from another person and she 
used force because she honestly believed she had no other way of escaping that relationship. 
OFFENCE OR DEFENCE? 
Having suggested that the solution to the problem of coerced women who kill lies in 
coercive control, the next question is whether it is better to create a new offence or a defence 
(either partial or full).  There are advantages and limitations inherent in either option.  
Creating a new offence has the advantage of reflecting a lower degree of moral blame but 
still providing for a measure of accountability. The offence does not necessarily need to be 
a category of culpable homicide (although it also could be, as proposed by the NZLC). An 
offence of “using force to escape coercive control” captures the essential elements.  This 
could be a conduct crime (focusing on the use of force) rather than a result crime (wherein 
there must be a death). The structure of the offence could mirror the first two steps of the 
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offence proposed by the NZLC, above, but tailored to the characteristics of coercive control. 
The elements of the offence would require that: 
(a) the defendant was in a relationship characterised by the exercise of coercive control 
from another person; and 
(b) as a result of the coercive control, the defendant considered they had no option other 
than to seriously injure or kill that other person – that is, the defendant used force 
because she honestly believed she had no other way of escaping that relationship or 
protecting herself or another person; and 
(c) the defendant used force against that other person. 
The question of how, or whether, to define coercive control needs to be considered. It is 
interesting that the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in England and Wales does 
not actually delimit what such behaviour is, aside from its effects on the victim. Walklate 
and others question whether:820 
coercive control, rooted in an appreciation of context, can in and of itself be rendered 
measurable in the way in which any risk assessment process assumes or can be readily 
prosecuted in the criminal courts. 
Because of this contextual nature, and because coercive control is constituted by a pattern 
of behaviour rather than relying on specific incidents, it may be that it cannot be readily 
quantified for the purposes of a statutory definition. Rather it would be up to experts to give 
examples of the types of behaviours that constitute coercive control. 
I would omit the reference to unreasonableness of force in the third step of the NZLC’s 
proposed offence. I do not believe there is room for an objective assessment of the force 
used, since what is relevant, in the present context, is the accused’s subjective belief that it 
is necessary.  In any event, there is a potential – possibly strained – argument that in the 
current climate of femicide committed by intimate partners it may be objectively 
reasonable to use deadly force to escape a coercive and controlling relationship. 
The creation of a new offence which recognises the effects of coercive control on the 
conduct of the accused, will mean that the conduct is not necessarily excused. The conduct 
is blameworthy, and punishable, both of which elements consist of degrees.   This would 
serve to respond to the criminal justice system’s requirement that an accused be responsible 
for the harm caused.  It would take into account that while in some cases the killing might 
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be necessary, it may not be proportionate to the harm.  In arguing for a partial defence of 
self-preservation, Wake and Reed observe:821 
A partial defence avoids the stigmatic murder label, it may influence charging practices by 
encouraging guilty pleas thereby avoiding unnecessary trials or by encouraging a trial 
where self-defence might apply on grounds that the partial defence represents a safety-net; 
and, it sends a signal to sentencing judges and society regarding culpability levels. 
Importantly, there is evidence that the lack of a partial defence in New Zealand does not 
accord with societal expectations of how victims of family violence ought to have their 
victimisation and culpability reflected in criminal offending … The implementation of a 
new partial defence would reduce current jury nullification practices, and provide a more 
accurate reflection of the rationale for the verdict returned. 
While it would not be just to convict someone for using force when there really was no 
alternative option available to them, such cases would be covered by the existing self-
defence provision, depending upon the conduct of the defence case and the sympathies of 
legal personnel. In R v Falls822 the accused was acquitted of murder on the grounds of self-
defence even though it was decided in Queensland which has one of the strictest self-
defence regimes in Australia,823 and the accused drugged her abusive husband and shot 
him while he was asleep. As Sheehy and others argue, the success in that case was partly 
due to a judge who “was sympathetic to an expansive reading of the legal requirements for 
self-defence”, 824 and the conduct of the defence which included: 
[A]n expansion of the time frame within which the danger the accused was facing was to 
be understood (with the result that historical and cumulative experiences of violence and 
the risk of future harm were both relevant); an understanding that the danger in battering 
cases includes an element of entrapment; an attention to detail in the range of evidence 
presented in court in order to describe and corroborate this danger; the provision of support 
for the accused’s credibility in her assessment of her situation; up-to-date expert 
explanations of the phenomenon of intimate partner violence and the broader social 
framework within which it occurs; and the use of rhetorical devices to support particular 
normative readings of the material before the Court.825 
It has been argued, however, that certain gender, class and ethnic stereotypes may have 
been relevant in Falls.826 We need to be alive to the risk of courts drawing on stereotypes 
about women’s behaviour and basing decisions upon their characterisation of coerced 
women as “good victims” or “bad victims”.  These factors may have played causal parts 
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in the outcomes in some of the cases referred to here: for example, Falls as compared with 
Kells; Wickham as compared with Wihongi. 
Any reform needs to consider possible negative consequences of introducing the language 
of coercive control into the legal system:827   
[The] presumption of involuntariness, when coupled with the practical challenges of 
measuring the impact of coercion, poses an enormous risk to victim autonomy. If a court 
substitutes its judgment for that of the victim's because it believes her to be coerced, and 
presumes that when she is coerced she cannot make an autonomous decision, it usurps 
control over a decision the victim would like to make for herself, thereby replicating the 
very dynamic it seeks to prevent. 
 
The creation of an offence rather than a defence for coerced women has the potential to 
recognise women’s agency and resists the tendency to characterise them as wholly passive 
victims.  It recognises their social reality without resorting to a conception of coerced 
women as frail or mentally incapable. 
Finally, and importantly, there is an argument that the creation of a new offence will 
provide both for better options for charging decisions and a coherent and consistent 
framework for culpability decisions not presently available.  Juries will be justified in 
taking into account the accused’s circumstances in convicting her of a lesser offence. For 
example, on the facts of R v Wickham, a jury would not need to make a finding that is 
inconsistent with the evidence (lack of intention or foresight) given that the circumstances 
disclose coercive control.  A conviction for a lesser offence gives juries options in cases 
where they feel a murder or even manslaughter conviction carries a stigma which is out of 
proportion to the degree of culpability, yet the accused still bears some responsibility that 
a full acquittal will not recognise. This would reduce the scope for jury nullification and 
the potential for overall unfairness that it gives rise to. 
It is important to note that the Law Commission’s recommendations have been criticised 
for “failing to consider extra-familial vulnerable offenders who kill in self-defence”828 such 
as subjects of human trafficking or modern-day slavery, those trapped by gang membership 
and others subject to abuse by non-intimates or otherwise unrelated parties.  While other 
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vulnerable offenders were not within the Law Commission’s remit, so long as coercive 
control is established in the particular case, there is no reason why an offence along the 
lines proposed here could not be amended so as to include other vulnerable offenders.  As 
Wake and Reed rightly point out:829 
In assessing criminal responsibility, where two individuals respond in a similar way to a 
particular set of circumstances, the question should concern culpability rather than the class 
or category that individual belongs to. 
Other options for reform, relying upon the analysis above, include amending the existing 
self-defence provision and the creation of partial or complete diminished responsibility. 
These will be incorporated into the recommendations set out in ch 6. 
 
SUMMARY 
When victims of violence or coercive control kill their abusers, there is no “malice 
aforethought” in the true sense of that phrase, despite the appearance of willed action. The 
act is not malicious or angry – it is a normative response to coercive conditions. On that 
basis, it is not just or fair to label these victims as “murderers” or “killers”, even though the 
criminal justice system might rightly hold them responsible to some degree.   
The criminal justice system would not classify as morally blameworthy, someone who 
killed a hostage-taker in order to regain their freedom. Yet women under coercive control 
are essentially hostages: they have no autonomy over their own lives. The continual failure 
of the criminal justice system to acknowledge this truth reinforces the notion that women’s 
lives matter less than men’s.   
There is scope in the reform proposed here for like cases to be treated more alike than the 
current approach indicates. If we return to the R v Wickham and R v Wihongi comparison 
for a moment, it is at least arguable that the evidence in each case discloses a relationship 
characterised by the exercise of coercive control from another person and that each accused 
used force because she honestly believed she had no other way of escaping that relationship. 
I suggest that Gay Oakes, who drugged and accidentally killed her husband and was 
convicted of murder, is not on a dissimilar moral plane to the defendant in Falls, who 
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drugged then shot her husband and was acquitted.  What reform ought to do is to reduce 
the chance that these defendants end up with such disparate outcomes. 
It is not intended that this proposal presents a specific solution that will address, in all 
jurisdictions, the problem of victims of violence who kill their abusers. What it does do, 
however, is provide a new framework – based on coercive control – for considering 




Chapter 5: Child victims of homicide 
INTRODUCTION 
The media coverage of the 2015 death of 3-year-old Moko Rangitoheriri and the 
prosecution of his killers has once again highlighted the serious problem of child homicide 
in New Zealand. In 2007, similar outrage was evoked by the killing of Nia Glassie; in 1999 
it was James Whakaruru, and even before James Whakaruru became a household name, 
the case of Delcelia Witika in 1991 made headlines and was described by Justice Gault as, 
“a case of wicked child abuse”830  in which Delcelia was “subjected to violence and 
brutality of almost incomprehensible cruelty and was neglected appallingly”.831 
There are few societies in which child abuse is not a serious issue, with homicide at the 
extreme end of a range of abusive behaviours.832 However, not all child homicides are the 
result of child abuse, as commonly understood. In 2015 and 2016, Fairfax Media, in its 
series “Faces of Innocents” collected data on just over two hundred cases of child homicide 
between 1992 and 2015.833 The database includes information (where available) on the 
name and age of the child, cause of death, perpetrator, relationship of perpetrator to victim, 
and the nature of any charges laid or convictions entered.  At the outset, it is important to 
note that those who kill very young children are almost always caregivers or people in a 
significant relationship to the child.834  Even where the victim is not especially young, the 
nature of the relationship between the child and the perpetrator is often an important factor 
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(including whether the perpetrator is a biological parent or a step-parent or de facto parent 
or is an unrelated person living in the same house as the victim). Alder and Polk also note 
that the form that the killing takes is related to the age of the victim.835   
From the Fairfax Media database, some general patterns emerge. In cases where the mother 
was sole perpetrator, the cause of death was split roughly equally between head or internal 
injuries, drownings and asphyxiation.  When the father was the sole perpetrator, head or 
internal injuries were the cause of death in 45 per cent of cases, with stabbings or throat 
cuttings occurring in roughly 20 per cent, and the remainder consisting of intentional car 
accidents, drowning and asphyxiation.  When de facto fathers and step fathers were the 
sole perpetrator, over 80 per cent of deaths were caused by head or internal injuries, the 
remainder consisting of asphyxiation, stabbings or throat cuttings, and burns. Clearly the 
majority of all deaths were the result of some form of violence in the strict sense of that 
word (negligent drownings or failure to provide medical treatment perhaps being the 
exceptions).   If we look more closely at the circumstances of these deaths, particular 
patterns emerge about the particular motivations involved.  A number of researchers have 
also attempted to identify a range of “motives” associated with child homicide.  For 
example, Friedman and others836 identified the following contemporary motives: 
1. Fatal child maltreatment, whereby the child dies as a result of abuse, neglect or 
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP). 
2. Partner/spouse revenge, which treats the homicide as an expression of the 
perpetrator’s anger at his or her partner/ex-partner. 
3. Where the child is unwanted. 
4. Altruistic, where the child is killed in the belief that he or she would be “better off 
dead”. This is common in murder-suicide cases. 
5. Where the perpetrator is acutely psychotic. 
Other researchers have identified several other categories and it is important to note that 
cases do not always conform neatly to just one – there is significant overlap.837 In this 
chapter I will analyse information from the Fairfax Media database and other New Zealand 
cases where a child has been the victim of homicide in an attempt to identify the different 
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motives that might be relevant in the New Zealand context. From this analysis I will 
construct a legal framework for considering the differing moral culpability standards which 
might apply. To that end, I have identified, from New Zealand child homicide cases 
between 1992 and 2018, the following motives: 
Figure 1: Motives for child homicide 
 
 
This range of motives reflects the actual cases observed in New Zealand. It expands upon 
the motives identified by Friedman and others (and other researchers) in several ways: 
1. It includes the category of “intentional bad motive” which covers cases where the 
primary motive for the homicide is to achieve some other nefarious purpose such 
as to cover up or evade detection for the commission of another crime (sexual or 
other assault, for example). In general, these cases fall to be considered under the 
same general principles as revenge cases in terms of moral culpability.  Examples 
are Steven Williams who killed his partner’s daughter to cover up a prior serious 
assault; Peter Howse who killed his partner’s two daughters to cover up his sexual 
offending in relation to them. It could be argued that revenge cases are actually a 
subset of the “intentional bad motive” category, although this thesis will focus on 
the revenge cases because they constitute a relatively large proportion of the 
“intentional bad motive” cases and the remainder are quite diverse.  
2. The scheme creates a separate category of “other impairment” which includes 
cases that are not classified as either insanity or infanticide, such as where the 
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called MSBP). Under Friedman and others’ classification some of these cases may 
have been categorised as fatal child maltreatment. 
3. Cases of neonaticide which have not been categorised as infanticide are assumed 
to involve “unwanted” children. 
4. I have identified a not insignificant number of cases in which a child dies as a result 
of an act or omission by a parent or caregiver where their failure to observe a 
standard of care is a major departure from the standard expected of a person in their 
situation – these include criminal negligence including vehicular manslaughter, 
failure to protect, failure to supervise and other acts and omissions. Aside from 
failure to protect cases which have a clear link to fatal child maltreatment, criminal 
negligence will not be specifically discussed in this thesis, although some 
recommendations in this category of case will be suggested in ch 6.  
As noted above, many child homicide cases involve more than one motive. The 
classifications depicted in Figure 1 have been classified according to what could be referred 
to as the “primary” motive, considering all the available facts relating to the case.  Because 
of this overlap, the incidence of particular motives may be masked. For example, some of 
the murder-suicides may have been driven by spousal revenge; or some of the murder-
suicides may have otherwise been classified as insanity. It should be noted that one of the 
spousal revenge cases involved five victims and three other cases involved two or three 
victims each. Therefore, the incidence of revenge homicides in Figure 1 may appear over-
inflated. Finally, the infanticide classification refers to the legal determination in the case. 
Some cases may not have met the threshold required, while in other cases charges may 
have not been pursued. At least one of the cases was initially prosecuted as infanticide but 
the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The following discussion proceeds as follows. First, I will address fatal child maltreatment 
where a child dies as a result of abuse or failure to protect.838 That section is followed by a 
consideration of the cases in which a perpetrator commits child homicide as an act of 
revenge, and those in which altruistic motives are present. These categories are considered 
together in this chapter because each involves intention to kill which is not always present 
in cases of fatal child maltreatment.  The third and final category involves cases where the 
killer is psychotic or insane, and cases of “other impairment” which fall short of the legal 
insanity standard.  The category of “unwanted child” is also dealt with in this part of the 
chapter because, although they involve an element of intention, there is evidence to suggest 
                                                 




that a number of these cases are not truly voluntary. Murder-suicides as a primary motive 
are not dealt with in this thesis for the simple reason that the perpetrator of the child 
homicide is not amenable to justice.  However, some of the cases discussed here do involve 
perpetrator suicide as a secondary motive. 
FATAL CHILD MALTREATMENT & FAILURE TO PROTECT 
Included in the following analysis are cases in which the child homicide victim dies as a 
result of a beating or by neglect, or a combination of both; or the defendant becomes 
criminally liable for failing to protect their children from the violence of another. These 
cases are considered together here because although it is argued there are different degrees 
of moral blame attributable to each category, neither involves an intention to kill. 
Homicide by abuse 
Child homicide in the context of child abuse has been identified as a distinct type of child 
homicide, and the one that occurs most frequently.839  This finding is supported by the 
analysis presented above in Figure 1, showing that by far the largest category of child 
homicide in New Zealand involves fatal child maltreatment (40.2 per cent). In general, 
these are cases where the child dies following a beating rather than where the defendant 
sets out to intentionally kill the child.  The last 30 or so years have seen a large number of 
New Zealand children die in these circumstances. The following cases are just a small 
sample.840  
1991: Delcelia Witika, aged 2 years 
Delcelia suffered massive blows to her stomach, rupturing her intestine and causing 
peritonitis.  She had her teeth knocked out, burns to her limbs and buttocks, bruises and 
sores covering her body.841  The pathologist was of the opinion that Delcelia had also been 
subjected to prolonged and chronic sexual abuse.842 She died alone while her mother, 
Tania Witika, and mother’s boyfriend, Eddie Smith, were at a party.  Delcelia had suffered 
systematic abuse over a period of time.  Both Witika and Smith were found guilty of 
                                                 
839  Kate Cavanagh, R Emerson Dobash and Russell P Dobash “The murder of children by fathers in the 
context of child abuse” (2007) 31 Child Abuse Negl 731 at 732. 
840  See generally Brenda Midson “Child Homicide: Charges, Convictions & Sentencing” in Breen (ed) 
Children’s Needs, Rights and Welfare: Developing Strategies for the ‘Whole Child’ in the 21st 
Century (Thomson Dunmore Press, Wellington, 2004). 
841  David McLoughlin “The Canonisation of Tania Witika” North & South (December 1998) 32. 
842  R v Witika, above n 830, at 430, 277-278. 
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manslaughter and each sentenced to 16 years imprisonment.  Witika was also charged with 
failing to provide the necessaries of life, for not intervening in Smith’s attacks on Delcelia. 
1994: Jordan Ashby, aged 3 years 
Jordan Ashby was assaulted over a four-day period, including being punched and struck 
with a metal-studded belt.  His heart, lungs and diaphragm were bruised.  His right adrenal 
gland was in several pieces.  A third of a litre of blood was found in his abdomen.  He had 
a black eye, broken arm, and bruising on his head, face, chest, back and buttocks.  His 
mother’s boyfriend, Phil Rakete, pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to eight 
years in prison.843 
1999: James Whakaruru, aged 4 years 
James was beaten to death by his mother’s boyfriend, Benny Haerewa.  Haerewa used a 
hammer, steel vacuum cleaner pipe, electric jug cord, his fists and his feet.844  He had 
previously spent four months in jail for assaulting James when the child was two.  James’ 
mother, Te Rangi Whakaruru contributed to assaults on James with a vacuum cleaner pipe.  
Haerewa pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.  
Whakaruru pleaded guilty to charges of cruelty to a child and assault with a weapon845 and 
received a non-custodial sentence. 
1999: Mereana Edmonds, aged 6 years 
Mereana had suffered three major brain traumas since birth, the first at approximately 6 
months old and the last approximately three and a half hours before death.  She had suffered 
a range of other non-fatal injuries before her death, including broken bones.846  Mereana’s 
mother, Belinda Edmonds, and her partner, Dorothy Tipene, were charged with 
manslaughter.  Tipene later had the charge reduced to cruelty to a child.  Edmonds was 
convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment (originally five years 
but the sentence was increased on appeal).  Tipene was found guilty on the cruelty charge 
                                                 
843  David McLoughlin “Killing our Kids” North & South (April 1994) 43. 
844  Simon Collins “Never again: how we all failed James Whakaruru” The New Zealand Herald (online 
ed, Auckland, 1 July 2000). 
845  Simon Collins “Violence Scars Five Generations” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
14 February 2002). 
846  R v Tipene [2001] 2 NZLR 577, (2000) 18 CRNZ 311 (CA). 
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and sentenced to 27 months (originally 18 months).  Edmonds had regained custody of 
Mereana only shortly before the child’s death. 
 
1999: Pirimai Simmonds, aged 17 months 
Pirimai suffered severe head and internal injuries after being thrown across the room by his 
father for crying during a televised rugby game.  Prior to being thrown, he was struck on 
the back and shaken.847  Matthew Iorangi was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced 
to four and a half years’ imprisonment. 
2000: Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha (Lillybing), aged 23 months 
Lillybing was shaken by her aunt, Rachaelle Namana, causing a major brain injury.  
Namana, and her sister, Rongomai Paewai, applied a boiling hot cloth to a lump on 
Lillybing’s head causing her face to be badly burned.  Lillybing had a blood clot, and more 
than ninety bruises and abrasions on her body.  In addition, she had sustained life-
threatening genital injuries (not alleged to have been inflicted by Namana or Paewai) for 
which both accused failed to get medical help.848  Namana pleaded guilty to manslaughter, 
ill-treatment of a child, and failing to provide the necessaries of life, and was sentenced to 
6 years’ imprisonment.  Paewai pleaded guilty to wilful ill-treatment of a child and failing 
to provide the necessaries of life, and was sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment. 
2000: Liotta Leuta, aged 5 years 
Liotta’s mother, Sipea Leuta, broke a fanbelt into a metre-long strap and used that and an 
old car aerial to beat Liotta.  Over one hundred bruises were found on his body.  The 
ultimate cause of Liotta’s death was aspiration of gastric contents secondary to multiple 
acute soft tissue injuries.  Leuta was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 6 years’ 
imprisonment.  The sentence was increased to seven years, on appeal by the Solicitor-
General.849 
2000: Tangaroa Matiu, aged 3 years 
Genesis Mahanga was the boyfriend of Tangaroa’s mother.  He beat Tangaroa with a toilet 
brush and a piece of wood, on his feet, hands, back, knees, shoulders, scrotum and head.  
                                                 
847  “Father jailed over death of ‘defenceless’ toddler” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
30 June 2000). 
848  “Lillybing’s Aunts Sentenced to Jail” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 15 June 2001). 
849  R v Leuta; R v Rauf [2002] 1 NZLR 215 (CA). 
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The fatal attack took place over 30 minutes.  Tangaroa had been systematically beaten by 
Mahanga over a period of months.  Tangaroa died of blood loss from his injuries.850  His 
mother, Hoani Rose Matiu, contributed to the assault by Mahanga, and failed to get medical 
assistance for her son.  Mahanga pleaded guilty to manslaughter but was found guilty of 
murder by the jury.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment.  Matiu was found guilty of 
two counts of manslaughter and two counts of cruelty to a child.  Her sentences of 7 years 
for manslaughter and 18 months for cruelty were concurrent.851 
2006: Ngatikoura Ngati, aged 3 years 
Ngatikoura was beaten to death by his mother and her boyfriend, using a baseball bat and 
oar handle, as well as their hands. The beatings took place over two days and were triggered 
by Ngatikoura’s incontinence (some incidents of which were attributed to earlier beatings 
by the pair). Both were found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter and sentenced 
to eight and a half years’ imprisonment. 
2007: Nia Glassie, aged 3 years 
Nia was taken to hospital suffering severe injuries from which she later died. Neighbours 
reported that they had heard Nia screaming and crying, and that she had been seen spinning 
from a clothesline until she fell off.852 Nia's mother, Lisa Kuka, was convicted of two 
counts of manslaughter for failing to provide the necessaries of life (medical treatment) and 
failing to protect Nia from violence. Kuka's partner, Wiremu Curtis, and his brother, 
Michael, were convicted of Nia's murder. Other adults in the house were convicted of 
various counts relating to the abuse of Nia and her siblings. The Curtis brothers were both 
sentenced to life imprisonment with minimum non-parole periods of 17.5 years. Kuka was 
sentenced to nine years imprisonment.853 
                                                 
850  “‘Naughty’ Tangaroa Died of 100 Vicious Blows” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
28 August 2000). 
851  “7 year sentence for mother who failed to protect Tangaroa Matiu” The New Zealand Herald (online 
ed, Auckland, 29 September 2000). 
852  Catherine Masters “Nia Glassie case: behind the neighbours’ silence” The New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, 19 November 2008).  
853  Alanah May Eriksen “Nia Glassie murderers jailed for minimum 17.5 years” The New Zealand 
Herald (online ed, Auckland, 4 February 2009). 
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2015: Moko Rangitoheriri, aged 3 years 
Moko was left in the custody of Tania Shailer and David Haerewa854 while his mother was 
looking after another child who was in Starship hospital. On 10 August 2015, Moko was 
rushed to hospital. At the time, he had extensive facial injuries and swelling. Both of his 
eyes were swollen shut. His stomach was distended. He had bruising, abrasions, and bite 
marks on his body. He was very cold, so much so that the equipment medical staff normally 
used to measure body temperature would not actually work. Moko died later that night. A 
pathologist found the direct cause of Moko’s death to be multiple blunt force injuries, 
including lacerations and haemorrhages deep inside his stomach. There was older bruising 
and damage to his bowel, which had caused it to rupture, which in turn lead to peritonitis 
and septic shock.  Moko’s brain was swollen, with significant clots and haemorrhages on 
his brain, which indicated multiple injuries had been inflicted over a period of days. The 
pathologist also suggested that a further possible cause of the brain swelling and therefore 
death was smothering, as there were mouth and face injuries consistent with that 
conclusion.855 Shailer and Haerewa pleaded guilty to manslaughter and ill treatment of a 
child.  They were both sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter, with a 
minimum period of imprisonment of nine years. They were both given seven years and six 
month’s imprisonment on the ill treatment charges, to be served concurrently with the 
manslaughter sentence. The sentencing Judge, Katz J, noted that, to the best of her 
knowledge, 17 years’ imprisonment is the highest sentence ever imposed in New Zealand 
for the manslaughter of a child, if not the highest finite sentence imposed in any 
manslaughter case in New Zealand. 
The killing of Moko and its aftermath reignited public debate about child abusers and the 
ability of our criminal justice system to deliver justice when their victims die. There was a 
great deal of outrage over the fact that Shailer and Haerewa were able to plead guilty to 
manslaughter rather than face trial for murder, for what was seen by many as intentional 
infliction of serious injuries, combined with severe callousness in failing to get those 
injuries treated.   
Contrary to popular perception, the absence of murder convictions in that case was not a 
result of dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecutors.  A person who causes the death 
                                                 
854  It is interesting to note that Michael Haerewa is an uncle of Ben Haerewa, James Whakaruru’s killer. 
855  R v Shailer [2016] NZHC 1414. 
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of a child by abuse or neglect is liable to a murder or manslaughter charge, but a 
manslaughter conviction is often the more likely outcome because a murder conviction 
requires at the very least that foresight of death be proved.  Foresight of death is a subjective 
test – it is irrelevant that a reasonable person would have foreseen the likelihood. Proving 
that Shailer and Haerewa had this foresight would have been a significant hurdle for the 
prosecution. 
However, the connotation of a manslaughter conviction is that the perpetrator is in some 
way less culpable because he or she did not possess a “murderous” state of mind.  This is 
the source of much public dismay, given that the perception is inconsistent with the conduct 
of the defendant in cases where the death of the child is the culmination of a period of 
severe physical abuse or neglect. 
Prosecuting fatal child maltreatment  
As discussed earlier in this thesis, culpable, or blameworthy, homicide is murder when the 
prosecution proves that the defendant acted with one of the specific intents to kill, or mental 
states, in terms of the Crimes Act 1961.  In short, the prosecution either has to prove an 
actual intent to kill,856 or an intent to cause bodily injury that is known to the offender to be 
likely to cause death, and recklessness as to whether death ensues or not.857  In cases of 
child abuse homicide, the latter category will usually be invoked, as there are few of these 
cases where death is the intended outcome.  In order for a murder charge to result from the 
death of a child in these circumstances, there must be evidence that the actions and mental 
state of the perpetrator fall within s 167(b) of the Crimes Act, in that he or she meant to 
cause to the victim any bodily injury that the defendant knew was likely to cause death, and 
they were reckless as to whether death resulted or not.  In New Zealand, these are subjective 
tests meaning that there must be actual foresight or appreciation of a real and substantial 
risk of death, and a continuation of the conduct regardless of the risk.858  
A person who causes the death of a child may be liable for manslaughter in a number of 
different ways.  They may plead guilty to manslaughter, and the prosecution may proceed 
on this basis. In these cases, manslaughter may result from killing by an unlawful act 
                                                 
856  Crimes Act 1961, s 167(a). 
857  Crimes Act 1961, s 167(b). 
858  R v Harney [1987] 2 NZLR 576 (CA) at 579; R v Fryer [1981] 1 NZLR 748 (CA); R v Piri [1987] 
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(where the mens rea for murder is not present), or an omission without lawful excuse to 
perform a legal duty. In the case of manslaughter by an unlawful act, the perpetrator must 
have acted with the particular mental state required for the unlawful act relied upon, for 
example, an assault.  The defendant must intend to commit the assault for liability to ensue.  
In terms of omissions, the requisite mental element involves the concept of criminal 
negligence.859  Liability for manslaughter may also arise by virtue of an unlawful act 
combined with an omission to perform a legal duty,860 for example, where an assault on a 
child is accompanied by a failure to obtain medical treatment, and the combination of these 
factors causes the death.861 
Where manslaughter arises from an unlawful act, unlawful omission, or a combination of 
both, the manslaughter is characterised as “involuntary” or “accidental” in the sense that 
the defendant did not intend death to result or foresee death as something that could well 
happen. However, the factual matrix surrounding some of the deaths from abuse and 
neglect of New Zealand children makes it more difficult to comprehend why, given the 
conduct of the defendant in cases where the death of the child is the culmination of a period 
of severe physical abuse or neglect, more serious charges cannot be successfully laid 
against the defendants.  The difficulty usually arises because a parent or caregiver does not 
typically kill a child in a one-off isolated, premeditated attack, or even when they do, they 
do not intend to kill, nor are they found to have foreseen the risk of death required by s 
167(b) of the Crimes Act 1961.    
To summarise, the facts that a court must determine in a prosecution for murder include 
whether the defendant intended to kill the child; whether the defendant intended to cause 
bodily injury to the child; and whether the defendant knew the child might well die as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct.  There is rarely direct evidence of the defendant’s state 
of mind, so it must be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. For example, the 
seriousness of the injuries inflicted can be evidence that the defendant knew he or she was 
inflicting grievous bodily injury.  Obviously, any admissions made by the defendant can 
be probative of a particular mental state.  A failure to seek medical help, subsequent to the 
                                                 
859  In the context of manslaughter, criminal negligence occurs where a person fails to discharge or 
perform a legal duty, and the failure to do so constitutes a major departure from the standard of care 
expected of a reasonable person to whom that legal duty applies: see Crimes Act 1961, s 150A. 
860  Crimes Act 1961, s 160(2)(c). 
861  See for example R v Witika, above n 830. 
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injuring, can indicate a consciousness of guilt (although it may also indicate a lack of 
awareness of the severity and immediacy of the child’s condition).  Evidence of prior 
injuries committed by the defendant may be used to show the defendant acted with the 
required mental state for the crime charged.862  In R v Mackness863 the victim, Kelly Gush, 
was kicked twice in the head by her mother’s boyfriend, a man with martial arts training.  
It was found that the appellant’s background in martial arts and statements showing his 
knowledge that the area of the victim’s head to which his kick was directed was sensitive 
to force, was evidence from which it could be inferred that he knew that those kicks were 
likely to cause death. 
Despite the difficulties that have been observed in prosecuting fatal child maltreatment as 
murder, where the death of the child is the culmination of a period of physical abuse and 
neglect it could be argued that death is not only a risk, it is inevitable.  In some cases, 
perpetrators embark on a sustained course of abuse, such that it could be argued that, at 
some point, they were aware of the likely consequences of their actions and continued 
regardless.   
Further, because of increased media coverage including the “Faces of Innocents” project, 
and campaigns such as “Never shake a baby”, the public are much more aware of the 
potentially fatal consequences of child abuse. On that basis, it is at least arguable that a 
person who physically abuses a child would know, at some point during the abuse of the 
child, what they are doing, and be, therefore, in a position to end that abuse before fatal 
consequences ensue.  Similarly, in some instances the amount of force used to kill suggests 
that the perpetrator knew what they were doing. This is because trauma to a child’s internal 
organs or head, resulting in death, requires significant force.864  As noted by the Court of 
Appeal:865 
The fragility of young children, particularly infants, is frequently referred to, and too often 
overlooked.  The lethal consequences of shaking and striking babies is often enough 
publicised. There can be little reduction in criminality these days for a claim that the danger 
was not realised. 
On that basis, it could be said that many of these cases are not inadvertent or involuntary. 
                                                 
862  Phipps “Responding to Child Homicide”, above n 834, at 535. 
863  R v Mackness CA160/03, 24 November 2003. 
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As noted in ch 1, the distinction between murder and manslaughter is crucial for the 
defendant.  In many instances of child homicide, the only thing that distinguishes 
manslaughter from murder, in terms of moral blameworthiness, is that the death occurs 
over a longer period of time rather than an instantaneous intent to kill or cause bodily injury.  
Proposed reform: homicide by abuse 
In the United States, some states have enacted specific provisions, known as “homicide by 
abuse” laws, which do not require that the prosecution prove intent to kill for a first-degree 
murder conviction to result. 866   These provisions vary in their application.  Some 
provisions apply only if the defendant has engaged in a previous pattern of assault of the 
child in question.  Under other provisions, it is simply sufficient for the abuse to result in 
death.  Some provisions apply where the death occurs, “under circumstances manifesting 
an extreme indifference to human life”.867  In addition, all 50 states have enacted legislation 
authorising the creation of Child Death Review Teams which examine the circumstances 
surrounding fatalities suspected to be the result of child abuse or neglect.868 
It can seriously be argued that a death that results after years of abuse and neglect, 
particularly the death of a child, warrants the stigma and penalty as serious as that for 
murder.  Such stigma and penalty is particularly required in light of the fact that a child is, 
by virtue of their status, unable to remove themselves from the situation or otherwise 
protect themselves in any way.   
Increasing the potential number of murder convictions for child homicide would focus 
attention on the consequences of child abuse and neglect and would allow those who 
commit child homicide as part of a pattern of abuse to be attributed the same level of 
culpability as the more serious murders.  Where death results after a period of abuse, the 
defendant should not benefit from the fact that at the time of inflicting the injury that caused 
death, they did not specifically intend to kill the child or did not have the requisite reckless 
                                                 
866  See Phipps “Responding to Child Homicide”, above n 834 at Appendix; Liena Gurevich “Parental 
Child Murder and Child Abuse in Anglo-American Legal System (2010) 11(1) Trauma Violence 
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state of mind required for murder.  To that end, a “homicide by abuse” provision could be 
worded as follows: 
Culpable homicide is murder where the offender, under circumstances manifesting 
reckless869 indifference to human life, causes the death of a person under 16 years of age, 
and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of the 
said person under 16 years of age.   
Admittedly, cases of child homicide will continue to arise that will still constitute 
manslaughter, for example, where the test of “reckless indifference to human life” cannot 
be met, or where there is no prior history of abuse.  However, cases in which the killing is 
the final result of a prolonged period of abuse, such as in most of the cases described above, 
should be caught by the proposed offence, regardless of whether the defendant intended 
death or foresaw that death might result and was reckless as to that outcome.870  While 
under s 167 these are subjective tests, and it must be proved that the offender actually 
intended death, or actually foresaw the risk of death and continued regardless, implicit in 
the draft section above is that foresight of risk can be inferred from the “pattern or practice 
of assault or torture”, and the death itself is evidence of a continuation of the conduct 
despite the risk.  
Homicide by abuse provisions are supported by concerns for consistency. As Phipps notes, 
and as I have argued elsewhere in this thesis, case law reflects the wide disparity of 
sentences that can be imposed for very similar types of conduct.871 A 2011 study of all 
deaths classified as homicide in Utah between 1 January 2002 and 31 December 31 2007, 
showed that child homicide perpetrators were convicted at a similar rate and level of felony 
conviction to adult homicide perpetrators and that severity of sentencing was also similar. 
The Utah State Criminal Code provides that homicide is “child abuse homicide” if the actor 
causes the death of a person younger than 18 years and the death results from child 
abuse. 872   This suggests that child abuse homicide statutes do have some impact on 
achieving consistency, at least when compared against outcomes for defendants who kill 
other adults. 
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Criminal negligence – failure to protect 
In many jurisdictions, failure to protect one’s child from violence makes a parent criminally 
liable if the omission is voluntary. In South Australia and England and Wales, this duty is 
extended to others, such as people who have assumed responsibility for the child or 
members of the child’s household.  In New Zealand the duty also applies to members of a 
victim’s household by s 195A of the Crimes Act 1961. However, due to the psychological 
consequences of an abusive relationship, a person who has care of a child may not always 
be in a position to protect them.  This applies both to mothers who are bound by the 
common law duty, as well as other household members who are bound by the statute.   
The duty to protect 
The enactment of s 195A followed a number of high profile child abuse cases. Most 
proximately connected, in the minds of the public at least, with failures in reporting was 
the case of three year old Nia Glassie who, in July 2007, was taken to hospital suffering 
severe injuries, from which she died on 3 August.873  Her death came amid reports from 
neighbours about the abuse.874  In view of the fact that this case provided some impetus for 
the enactment of s 195A, it is somewhat paradoxical that none of the people (other than her 
mother, Lisa Kuka) who allegedly could have protected Nia by reporting the abuse would 
be liable under s 195A, as it only applies to people living in the same household, or a person 
who is a staff member of any hospital, institution, or residence where the victim resides. 
Kuka’s liability arose by virtue of her position as Nia’s mother, under the common law 
duty to protect one’s children. 
As Herring notes, failure to protect statutes are nearly always used against women and 
often in cases where there is a history of domestic violence.875  In Victoria, Australia, a 
proposal to enact a failure to protect law elicited much opposition on the basis of the 
adverse impact it would have on victims of domestic violence.876 The duty to protect 
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presumes the defendant has the capacity to act positively to protect the victim, but this has 
implications for defendants who are subjected to violence. 
The enactment of s 195A had its imperative in a heightened awareness of the need for child 
protection, as shown in both the Parliamentary Debates and Select Committee report on 
the Bill.877  However, the provision fails to recognise that often defendants may also be 
victims and that some mothers, due to the coercive control imposed exerted over them by 
intimate partners, can also be vulnerable.878  This coercion may negate, to varying degree, 
the voluntariness element of a failure to protect charge.  However, each case needs to be 
considered in light of its own particular facts.  Not every woman who fails to protect her 
child is coerced; not all coerced women will fail to protect their children.   
The psychological effects of abuse have already been outlined in chs 2 and 4 of this thesis. 
Of particular relevance is Stark’s theory of coercive control, which assumes that the 
battered mother is psychologically “normal” and possesses an average level of parental 
competence, but this competence is affected by the coercion she faces from the abuser.879  
The logic of a battered mother’s actions can be located in the dynamics of coercive 
control.880 Stark argues that:881 
... the only rational or ethical assumption on which protective services or justice can 
proceed, is that the child’s safety and the mother’s capacity to protect the child are 
compromised by the same source, the coercive strategies employed by the batterer.  Thus, 
it is our failure to protect, not hers, that provides the proper basis for intervention. 
Yet some commentators argue that a mother who fails to protect is no more a good parent 
than the person who inflicts the abuse.  Liang and Macfarlane, for instance, suggest that a 
mother who intentionally places herself in an abusive relationship should not be 
characterised as a victim of that relationship.882 However, arguments such as these can be 
readily dismissed on the basis that they misunderstand the reality of coercive relationships 
and assume that women voluntarily place themselves within them.  
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Liability under s 195A of the Crimes Act 1961 is contingent upon a failure to take 
reasonable steps to protect a victim from risk of death, grievous bodily harm, or sexual 
assault.  A mother may be liable if her omission constitutes a “major departure” from the 
standard of care expected of a reasonable person to whom the duty applies – that is, gross 
negligence must be proved.883 However, as Miccio observes, “in spite of neutral language, 
the reasonable parent or person is white, male, heterosexual and middle class.”884  While 
the law applies equally to both mothers and fathers, defendants charged with failure to 
protect are almost always female, which cannot be solely explained by the fact that more 
women have custody of their children.885 Society expects that a mother will go further in 
order to protect her child – the mother is expected to take more than reasonable steps, to 
place the child’s needs above her own.886  Accordingly, there is a gender bias in the system 
that holds women accountable for failing to protect their children, but many fathers are 
never held accountable for similar omissions or failing to be involved in their children’s 
lives on any level.887 Jacobs compares the cases of Pauline Zile, the first woman in Florida 
to be convicted for first degree murder based on a failure to protect her daughter from her 
partner’s violence, with that of David Schwarz, whose son was killed by his step-mother. 
No charges were laid against Schwarz, notwithstanding that he was living with the child 
and step-mother during the abuse.888  Jacobs also reports the case of  Kimberly Novy, 
convicted of the murder of her stepson.  She was prosecuted on the basis that if she had not 
inflicted the injuries herself, then she was accountable for failing to protect him from the 
boy’s father, Keith Novy.  Despite evidence that the child’s abuse began at least nine 
months prior to Kimberly meeting Keith Novy, Keith was not prosecuted in relation to his 
son’s death.889  There are numerous other cases where the same gender bias is apparent.890  
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The expectation that a mother must protect her children from harm is especially 
complicated in situations where she is also being victimised by an intimate partner.891  As 
Lindauer observes, “[b]eing a good mother is difficult.  Being a good mother and a victim 
of domestic violence is even harder.”892 The link between spousal abuse and child abuse 
is well established.893 Cavanagh, Dobash and Dobash, in their study on the murder of 
children by fathers, found that violence against the victim’s mother was happening in 71 
per cent of the relationships studied.894  Stark argues that domestic violence against a 
mother may be the single most common context for child abuse or neglect.895  However, 
domestic violence advocates claim that women are held unfairly responsible for failing to 
protect their children from a battering partner’s abuse.896  Rather than establishing male 
perpetrators of domestic violence as accountable for the resulting child abuse, some 
evidence suggests that it has increased the visibility and accountability of abused women 
as mothers who failed to protect their children.897  Consequently, a battered woman who 
kills her abuser may be better able to raise a legal defence than a battered woman charged 
with failing to protect her child.898 Furthermore, some jurisdictions prosecute battered 
women for exposing their children to intimate partner violence.899 
In his article, “A Failure to Protect: Unravelling ‘The Battered Mother’s Dilemma’”, Evan 
Stark tells the story of Lavonne Lazarra, a mother of five, charged with abuse and neglect 
of her children. Stark had been asked to assess whether domestic violence perpetrated 
against Lazarra by her partner, Miguel Sabastian, was a factor in her offending.  Stark sets 
out in detail the history of the relationship between Lazarra and Sabastian, which began 
early in 1991.  By September 1992:900 
Lavonne was increasingly unable to function as an autonomous adult, neglecting basic 
household chores, losing state assistance and living for a time without basic comforts.  The 
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focus of her life shifted to sheer survival: living like a virtual hostage, every element of 
Lavonne’s life was oriented toward placating or resisting Miguel, minimizing the hurt he 
could do to her and the children.  
Sabastian would wake Lazarra up whenever he pleased, either by initiating sex or by 
suffocating her so she would wake gasping for air.  When she did wake, Sabastian would 
feign sleep. Other times he would slap her while she was sleeping.  Eventually Lazarra 
would pretend to be asleep, which led to chronic fatigue.901 
Of Lazarra’s five children, Sabastian was the biological father of the youngest, Miguelito. 
Sabastian clearly favoured Miguelito but singled out Lazarra’s second youngest child, 
Candy, as a target for his anger.902  Candy was fathered by Sabastian’s cousin, a man of 
whom Sabastian was particularly jealous as Lazarra’s most recent partner before him. 
Lazarra began putting Candy in the cellar when Miguel wanted Candy “out of his sight”.903  
Knowing that Candy was a particular target for Sabastian’s violence, and feeling that 
Candy was “too young to be hit”,904 it is not unreasonable to view Lazarra’s conduct as an 
attempt to protect Candy.  This is not a view that prosecutors took, however, charging 
Lazarra with neglect for leaving Candy in the cellar unattended. 
Herring chronicles the case of Sandra Mujuru who was convicted under s 5 of the Domestic 
Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK) for failing to protect her daughter, Ayesha, 
from the violence inflicted by her partner, Jerry Stephens (Ayesha’s father). Stephens was 
convicted of murder.  Mujuru was found to have known of Stephens’ propensity for 
violence since she knew he had been imprisoned for violence against a previous girlfriend.  
By leaving Ayesha in Stephens’ care while she went to work, Mujuru was found to have 
failed to reasonably protect Ayesha.905 
As Herring points out, the court gave little weight to Mujuru’s circumstances as an asylum 
seeker fleeing violence in Zimbabwe.  The sentencing Judge noted that Stephens was twice 
the age of Mujuru and characterised him as a dangerous man with a short fuse.  Herring 
asks:906 
As a young asylum-seeker should she really have been expected to know from which 
authorities to seek advice and how to access the appropriate services? Could she have done 
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this without endangering her child and herself by igniting her partner’s ‘dangerously short 
fuse’? 
Also of relevance to these questions is the fact that on the day Ayesha’s body was found, 
Stephens had assaulted one of his previous girlfriends by hitting her on the head with a 
frying pan and a vase.907 
Regardless of the precise theory explaining a coerced woman’s behaviour, it is clear that 
there are complex dynamics that may compel her to remain with her abuser.908  Further, it 
is understandable why it may have been unreasonable for such a woman to interfere with 
a batterer’s abuse of a child. Based on her experience, she may have reasonably feared that 
interference would either increase the abuse to the child or precipitate deadly violence 
against herself and the child.909  Yet such fears, even though reasonable, are often ignored 
in legal decision-making.  Herring refers to a case in which a woman was criticised by the 
Judge as “putting her interests first” where the partner said he would kill her if she left.910  
Fugate refers to the case of Karen Dalton, whose husband had conducted a regime of 
violence against her and her children, including putting a gun to her children’s heads and 
threatening to kill her son if she tried to leave the relationship. Dalton was also aware that 
her husband had murdered at least two women.  Yet the court took a dim view of her claims 
of coercion, demonstrated through its repeated use of quotation marks around what it 
referred to as her “defense of fear”.911  
In what is arguably a rare decision, in Bone v HM Advocate912, the High Court of Justiciary, 
Scotland, did take into account detailed evidence bearing on the question of the 
reasonableness of the appellant’s inaction. Andrea Bone was charged with manslaughter 
by witnessing and countenancing her partner’s abuse of her daughter.  Bone was convicted 
and appealed, arguing that parental responsibility does not involve criminal responsibility 
where the appellant is powerless to intervene; and that in assessing the reasonableness of 
the alleged failure to protect, regard must be had to the particular circumstances of the 
appellant. In that case, there was evidence about the size and strength disparities between 
Bone and Alexander McClure (her partner), she was eight and a half months pregnant, was 
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affected by personality disorders (including dependent personality disorder) and possessed 
a low level of intellectual functioning. There was also evidence that she had not intervened 
at the time of the assaults because she believed it was not appropriate to argue in the 
presence of her daughter, but she had spoken to her partner afterwards about his violence.  
She was scared of McClure, and was isolated socially and geographically.  The High Court 
of Justiciary agreed with Counsel for the appellant that the relevant test was not a wholly 
objective one:913 
In the context of the question whether a parent witnessing an assault on a child could 
reasonably have acted to protect the child, it is not appropriate to test the matter by reference 
to a hypothetical reasonable parent; rather the test is whether the particular parent, with all 
her personal characteristics and in the situation in which she found herself, could 
reasonably have intervened to prevent the assault. 
What is particularly interesting about this case, in light of the current context, is that while 
it was noted that Bone was scared of McClure, nothing in the judgment indicates he 
inflicted physical violence upon her, as opposed to her child.  This lends support to Stark’s 
theory that physical violence, by itself, may play a less significant role than coercion, in 
terms of impact on victims and their ability to protect their children.  
Should coerced women be seen as helpless victims or as active perpetrators of offences 
against their children? As Chiu asks, “[a]re they purely agents, purely victims, or a 
combination of both?”914  Chiu continues:915 
If battered women are victims, then they do not contribute to the violence and should not 
be penalized in any way; as victims, they are too debilitated to make their own choices. On 
the other hand, if battered women are active agents, then policies should examine, and 
perhaps, even punish their choices. 
Ultimately we might find that coerced women are victims, but not completely helpless 
ones.916  This conclusion finds support in actual cases, such as that of Witika, whose 
daughter Delcelia, died alone while Witika and her boyfriend, Smith, were at a party.917 
The Crown was unable to prove which of the accused actually committed the acts of 
violence against Delcelia, but charged them both, either as principal offenders or as parties 
through encouragement.  On appeal against sentence, the Court of Appeal observed that 
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both Witika and Smith committed acts of violence against Delcelia and were “equally 
culpable”.918 
Witika also appealed against her conviction, arguing that the common law defence of 
duress applied to the charges of failing to provide medical treatment and her secondary 
participation in Smith’s abuse of Delcelia. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, on 
the basis that a claim of duress must be founded on 24 of the Crimes Act 1961, which 
required that the threatener be present during the offending, and there were periods of time 
during which Smith was absent from the house. According to Justice Gault:919 
… it is quite clear that there were substantial periods during which Smith was not present 
and Witika had opportunities to seek assistance and secure medical care for her child and 
otherwise bring an end to her ill-treatment.  While those periods continued she failed in her 
duty.  Her situation was no different from that of a person who has an opportunity to escape 
and avoid committing acts under threat of death or serious injury. 
He continued:920 
The position of battered women indeed calls for sympathy but there can be no justification 
for broadening the grounds on which the law should provide excuses for child abuse. 
What should we make of Witika? A few more facts are illuminating.  In her first interview 
with police on the day Delcelia died, Witika exonerated Smith from any responsibility.  
Two days later she recanted and blamed Smith for all of the injuries.  In a third interview 
after the post-mortem results were made available she acknowledged some responsibility 
for failing to put a stop to Smith’s abuse of Delcelia. She also admitted to some punching 
of Delcelia. Witika’s prevarication is consistent with evidence that Smith had violently 
beaten her on a number of occasions.  A doctor who examined Witika in September 1990 
described her injuries as being close to 10 on a severity scale from 0-10.  Further evidence 
of Witika’s mutability comes from her own diary, in which she wrote:921 
I hit Delc really bad yesterday and it gave me a real fright and that’s when I knew I had to 
stop hitting her.  Not for my sake but for hers. 
I’m really happy with myself, cause I am learning to control my anger and that’s good, 
cause I’m not hitting Delc out of anger and I don’t want to any more either only for a good 
reason. 
These entries, on one hand, show at least a consciousness of the riskiness of her conduct. 
But they also reveal a woman who tried to be a good mother to Delcelia.  Witika, vilified 
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in mainstream news media, is not simply a perpetrator of child abuse but someone who 
made some attempts to alter her behaviour and protect her child. The status of mothers like 
Witika, and the many others charged with failures in respect of their children, is not 
dichotomous: they are not bad mothers or good mothers, perpetrators or victims, agents or 
helpless. They can be all of these things, both at different times and at the same time.   
Even battered women may not see themselves as victims. The law usually perceives 
victimisation as a unilateral exercise of power, in which harm is caused to a “weak” victim.  
Part of the problem with using the term “victim” as a descriptor is that it downplays an 
individual’s strengths and capacities.922 Agency, on the other hand, implies total freedom 
from victimisation, which is not always accurate either. Neither of these two concepts - 
agency or victimisation - completely takes account of women’s experiences of coercive 
relationships.923  As Schneider notes:924 
Portrayal of women as solely victims or agents is neither accurate nor adequate to explain 
the complex realities of women's lives. It is crucial for feminists and feminist legal theorists 
to understand and explore the role of both victimization and agency in women's lives, and 
to translate these understandings into the theory and practice that we develop. 
For many years, the legal picture of the battered woman has been dominated by the  concept 
of learned helplessness – a victim who, due to repeated cycles of violence, is unable to 
escape.925 Contrary to this legal view, studies suggest that battered women make multiple 
attempts to leave.926   Rigid depictions of battered women prevent the recognition of 
significant reactions to abuse, other than failing to protect. For example, some women act 
as a buffer between an abuser and the child; others reduce their working hours so they can 
spend more time at home.927 Brown tells of one woman who used her sexuality to distract 
her partner from harming her son. Despite her efforts, he would interrupt sexual intercourse 
to continue to abuse the child.  Her attempts at distraction were not accepted by the Court 
as actions taken to save the boy’s life.928 
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For some women, failure to protect may actually represent a survival strategy rather than a 
failure.  Some women know only too well that interfering with an intimate partner during 
a violent episode may have engendered only more violence toward herself and her 
children.929  Skinazi argues:930 
Partner assault involves coercion and control over every aspect of a person’s life.  Structural 
inequalities, the systemic nature of women’s oppression, and the harms associated with 
domination and resistance reinforce this power.  Child abuse represents an extension of the 
batterer’s coercive tactics from mother to child.  Hence, if a mother believes that her 
chances to escape with her children are limited, given the backdrop of the assailant’s 
previous conduct (i.e., hunting the family down and threatening to kill them if the mother 
does not return to him), her escape options may be restricted.  In such a situation, the word 
“choice” certainly takes on a new meaning. 
A coerced mother knows what her abuser is capable of when he threatens to harm her or 
the children if she disobeys or leaves.  This explains why a mother may try to placate her 
abuser at almost any cost to save her children from harm, perhaps even staying with the 
partner or “allowing” the abuse, if she thinks it will prevent greater harm to her children.931 
Intervening or shielding a child from a violent and angry person is often not only dangerous, 
but lethal to the intervener and the child.932 
It is important at this point to reiterate that not all mothers who are charged with failure to 
protect their children are victims of violence per se. A mother may believe that she and her 
child are better off financially by staying with an abusive partner, or she may have other 
reasons for staying.  Lisa Kuka, Nia Glassie’s mother, was convicted of failing to provide 
the necessaries of life (medical treatment) and failure to protect her daughter, Nia, from 
violence.  Kuka, who worked away from the home six days a week, admitted that she knew 
of but “turned a blind eye” to the violence in her home because her loyalties were to her 
partner, Wiremu Curtis, who was convicted (along with his brother) of Nia’s murder.933  
There was no evidence raised at trial to suggest that Kuka was subjected to physical 
violence from Curtis or anyone else.  As Stark suggests, however, violence is not the only 
tactic of control. Kuka did give evidence that when she argued with others in the house 
over their treatment of Nia, their excuses were “we look after her[,] you’re at work, where 
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are you[?]”934 It is conceivable, then, that Kuka’s economic situation and the recriminations 
levelled at her for her absence provided a context for her alleged failure to protect. 
A final premise that ought to be acknowledged is that agency is not the same thing as 
control, and even playing an active role does not always connote blameworthiness.935  
Agency does not mean that coerced women have the ability to control their abuse. It is not 
justifiable to penalise coerced women every time they do not use their agency to end the 
abuse.  The lives of abused women are complex, and not every action or choice such a 
woman makes is to avoid or affect future violence.936 
Proposed reform: defending coerced women charged with failure to protect 
In New Zealand, there are no codified defences or common law defences that operate to 
exculpate a mother charged with failing to protect her child from the violence of another. 
This thesis argues for the creation of an affirmative defence that recognises the realities of 
coerced mothers and operates to consider the totality of a woman’s circumstances, 
available resources and the history of her partner’s abusive behaviour, in considering 
whether she has, in fact, failed her child. 
Despite the clear link between spousal abuse and child abuse and neglect, no consistent 
theory has yet been developed for the defence of mothers that is based on the connection 
between the abuse they receive and their ability to prevent harm to their children.937 While 
public awareness of child abuse did increase at the same time as domestic violence 
awareness, the sad paradox is that what also increases is the likelihood of a mother being 
prosecuted for failure to protect.938 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend herself.  The current legal 
position in New Zealand exposes a coerced mother to prosecution for failure to protect, for 
which she is liable if her failure is seen as unreasonable, or as a major departure from a 
reasonable standard of care.  There are no codified or common law defences that operate 
to exculpate her. As I will shortly argue, compulsion and necessity involve stringent tests 
and will rarely, if ever, apply in this context.  Self-defence is clearly inapplicable, 
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provocation has been repealed, and New Zealand does not have a defence of diminished 
responsibility.  
The difficulties encountered in arguing either compulsion or necessity in the context of 
failure to protect charges is summarised in the following paragraphs.  For the defence of 
compulsion to succeed it must be proved that a coerced mother was in fact faced with 
threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm, from a person who is present when 
the offence is committed. The threat does not have to be explicit. She must believe that the 
threats will be carried out. 939   In a relationship characterised by coercive controlling 
violence, while a court could find threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm, the 
defence is likely to fail on the requirement that the threatener be present when the offence 
is committed, as was the case in R v Witika.940 This is particularly the case in failure to 
protect cases because of the ongoing nature of the offence. It is also difficult to prove the 
subjective belief of the coerced mother – the fact that she remains with her abuser is likely 
to be construed by a jury as evidence that she did not take the threats seriously.   
Necessity has similar difficulties, even if it were to apply to threats from another person, 
contrary to the ruling in Kapi v Ministry of Transport.941 Again, a court may find that the 
mother did believe that she faced imminent peril of death or serious injury (whether this is 
on reasonable grounds may be less easy).  They are less likely to find that she had no 
realistic choice but to break the law, or that the failure to protect was proportionate to the 
peril. As mentioned previously, a mother is expected to to place her child’s needs above 
her own942 and is at risk of being criticised for putting herself first for trying to avert a threat 
against her own life.943 
Essentially, both compulsion and necessity presume that the defendant has options that are 
not necessarily available to the coerced mother, and ignore her ability to accurately 
perceive a real risk.  As Skinazi observes:944 
Consideration of the defendant’s heightened ability to predict her partner's behavior toward 
herself and her children – a skill she has developed through a history of abuse with her 
partner – is crucial in determining whether the defendant's responses to his threats were, in 
fact, reasonable. Additionally, because in most of these cases, the paradigm “gun to the 
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head,” or some other obviously extreme example of duress, is not present, or at least not 
apparent, a jury using an objective standard of reasonableness is not likely to believe that 
the defendant acted reasonably under a sufficiently imminent threat. 
In addition, traumatic bonding945 may mean that a victim of abuse becomes emotionally 
dependent on the abuser and is convinced that the violence has stopped or is about to.946 
While the death of child might seem foreseeable to others, that is not necessarily so for 
women within the abusive relationship.947 Brown argues that Dutton and Painter’s theory 
of traumatic bonding could be used as a psychological foundation for an affirmative 
defence of “traumatic paralysis”, the essence of which is the emotional bond a mother has 
with her abuser means she is  her incapable of protecting herself or her children.948   
Skinazi argues that in most United States jurisdictions the asymmetrical treatment of the 
reasonable person standard in duress as compared with self-defence leads to very different 
results.949 Accordingly, she proposes a new duress standard as follows:950 
The defense of duress is determined by considering whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances (including past abuse), the threat (implicit or explicit), or the use of force, 
was such that the actor believed she could not resist, and a reasonable person similarly 
situated could not resist. 
Skinazi’s proposed duress standard stresses a responsible actor who possesses self-
direction and exercises agency. It also distinguishes between mothers who hurt their 
children, and mothers who hurt their children in an effort to protect them.951  Expert 
evidence is essential to explain to a jury that an abused or coerced woman develops survival 
skills, and in light of these skills, it may be reasonable to obey the abuser's instructions.952 
The totality of a woman's circumstances, available resources and the past pattern of her 
partner’s abusive behaviour, may mean she makes a fully controlled decision, based on 
reasonable inferences and involving intentional behaviour.953 This latter point is important, 
as characterising her choices as involuntary may imply that she is psychologically impaired 
and unable to take care of her children.954  
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I would argue, however, that because the defence ought to exculpate only women whose 
will is to some degree overborne by another, explicit reference to coercion ought to be 
made. Also, the use of the term “resist” in Skinazi's proposal unnecessarily limits the 
operation of the defence. While the duress defence usually counters crimes of 
commission,955 what is crucial about coercion in respect of failure to protect is that it 
prevents the mother from acting as much as resisting.  
In New Zealand, self-defence is currently composed of a similar hybrid test which asks 
whether, in the circumstances as the accused believed them to be, the force used in self-
defence (or defence of another) was reasonable. Also, although envisaging different 
circumstances, the now repealed provocation defence constructed a hypothetical person, 
possessing the self-control of the “ordinary” person, yet otherwise having the 
characteristics of the accused. Potentially, these hybrid tests allow for a consideration of 
the totality of the circumstances faced by a coerced mother. Indeed, this was the test held 
to apply in Bone v HM Advocate. 956  It allows a jury to consider the totality of the 
circumstances – “all her personal characteristics and … the situation in which she found 
herself”957 – in determining whether a mother's alleged failure was a reasonable one.  
In New Zealand, the offence of failing to protect a child from the violence of another takes 
on the nature of a strict or absolute liability offence due to the elements that must be proved 
and the absence of a defence. All that must be proved is the omission and that it was a 
major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable mother. Neither the 
defendant's actual conduct, nor her state of mind (apart from knowledge of the abuse)958 
factors into the analysis at all. As Ashworth observes, most of the controversy over strict 
liability offences stems from the absence of a fault requirement for conviction. For the same 
reason, he notes that there is much debate over the extent to which criminalising negligence 
is legitimate.959 Many commentators take the view that, as Horder puts it, it should not be 
possible to “blunder into” conduct that is seen as morally wrong.960 As has been observed 
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frequently in this thesis, the criminal law should only convict those who are culpable in 
some way and we should only label someone a “criminal” if they are blameworthy.  
Another argument against the criminalisation of negligence in the context of failures by 
parents to protect their children is that where there are duties owed by doctors, employers, 
drivers and so on, there are also settled rules or codes of conduct which delimit the 
standards that such defendants are expected to observe. This is not the case in respect of 
parents, for whom there are few, if any, formal rules and a diverse range of practice.961 
Consequently, it is difficult for parents to know the standards they are expected to meet and 
could therefore be found grossly negligent, and liable for manslaughter if the child dies, 
through very little fault on their part.962 
For similar reasons, an affirmative defence is preferable in the context of failure to protect 
charges than relying on evidence that negates mens rea. This is because evidence of the 
mother’s state of mind is irrelevant, once it is established that she owed a duty of care. 
While the court must prove knowledge of the abuse this knowledge is bound up with the 
question of whether the defendant failed to perform a legal duty and whether such failure 
was a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person or parent 
having such a legal duty. In other words, it is not relevant to subjective mens rea. 
Furthermore, courts have traditionally been reluctant to allow expert evidence on whether 
or not an accused was acting with intent, as this would be a matter on which the jury must 
ultimately decide, although s 25(2) of the Evidence Act 2006 states that expert evidence is 
not inadmissible simply for the fact that it breaches the “ultimate issue” rule.  
Notwithstanding that there are valid arguments against the enactment of failure to protect 
statutes, such laws already exist and no doubt will continue to come into existence. I 
therefore suggest that, where such charges arise, from either common law or statutory 
duties, an affirmative defence ought to be available. This defence could take a similar form 
to that proposed by Skinazi, with some modification as follows:  
A person charged with failure to protect a child or vulnerable adult from the violence of 
another is protected from criminal responsibility if she was acting under coercion. Coercion 
is determined by considering whether, under the totality of the circumstances (including 
past abuse), the threat (implicit or explicit), or the use of force, was such that the actor was 
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coerced to the extent she was unable to resist or to take positive action and a reasonable 
person similarly situated could not resist or take positive action. 
There is clearly a gap in the law in New Zealand, and possibly other jurisdictions, that could 
be filled by such an affirmative defence. It could potentially be expanded to apply to 
coerced women facing any charge, not just failure to protect.  
In many cases, convicting a coerced mother for failure to protect will not benefit children, 
but re-victimises both mother and child who have both suffered enough abuse.963  It is 
difficult to see what functions of the criminal law are served by criminalising coerced 
mothers who fail to protect their children. As Fugate argues, courts wrongly assume that 
the threat of imprisonment will encourage mothers to protect their children when they 
otherwise would not.964  Even in cases where a child dies as a result of the abuse inflicted 
by another, little is achieved by convicting a coerced mother for manslaughter.  Often, there 
are other children who will invariably be placed in care, exposing them to a greater risk of 
abuse and neglect. Studies show that there is a low chance of families being reunified after 
removal, and there are substantial risks to children in foster care.965 Consequently, Murphy 
argues that courts should have a complete understanding of the mother's circumstances and 
if she has participated in the abuse or neglect of her children, courts should identify the 
contributing factors, particularly with a view to the possibility of domestic violence.966 
Arguably the preventative function of the criminal law is better served by focusing on those 
who actually inflict violence against children.  Ultimately, a mother who has participated 
in the abuse or neglect of her children should be accountable for the resulting harm, but 
only to the extent to which her participation was truly voluntary.   
SPOUSAL REVENGE AND ALTRUISTIC KILLINGS 
Distressing as they are, cases in which these intentional killings occur, appear to be 
relatively rare. What this category of cases has in common is that, where the perpetrator 
survives, he or she is liable for a murder conviction because of the clear evidence of intent 
to kill. The factor that links spousal revenge and altruistic killings is that each can be 
described as intended (albeit not necessarily pre-meditated). To that end these types of 
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killings are both considered in this section, even though, depending upon the particular 
circumstances, disparate degrees of moral blameworthiness may be involved.  
Spousal revenge 
Spousal revenge killings are those in which the perpetrator’s anger towards another person 
(usually a sexual partner) is displaced onto a child.967 As Resnick points out, the prototype 
for spousal revenge killings can be located in Euripides’s play Medea.  Medea killed her 
two sons following her husband, Jason’s, infidelity. She then told him: “[t]hy sons are dead 
and gone. That will stab thy heart”.968  A series of contemporary cases from New Zealand 
and abroad gives an overview of the characteristics of this type of child homicide. 
In February 2018, former Texas accountant, John David Battaglia was executed for the 
2001 murders of his two daughters, aged nine and six. Battaglia shot his daughters while 
his estranged wife, Pearle, could hear the killings through a speaker phone.969  
Claudia, Tiffany and Holly Bristol were killed by their father, Alan Bristol, on 4 February 
1994 in Whanganui, New Zealand. All died from carbon monoxide poisoning. The 
murders followed a custody dispute between Alan and his ex-wife, Christine Bristol.   
In Melbourne, Australia, Darcey Freeman died when she was thrown from a bridge by her 
father, Arthur Freeman, on 29 January 2009. He was later sentenced to 32 years in prison 
for murdering Darcey.  The sentencing Judge observed:970 
Any motive which existed for the killing had nothing to do with the innocent victim. It can 
only be concluded that you used your daughter in an attempt to hurt your former wife as 
profoundly as possible. 
Similar comments were directed at Robert Farquharson who killed his three sons by 
driving them into a dam.  Justice Cummins observed, in sentencing Farquharson at first 
instance:971 
… you wiped out your entire family in one act. Only the two parents remained: you, 
because you had always intended to save yourself; and their mother, because you intended 
her to live a life of suffering. 
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On 12 February 2014, also in Melbourne, Luke Batty was fatally beaten by his father, Greg 
Anderson, with a cricket bat in front of witnesses at a cricket practice. Greg Anderson was 
then shot by police after he incited them to do so. Anderson had, less than a year earlier, 
been arrested for threatening to kill his former partner, Rosie Batty, and for breaching an 
intervention order preventing him from going to her home.972 
One month prior to Luke Batty’s death, in Dunedin, New Zealand, Edward Livingstone 
shot his son Bradley, aged 9 and daughter Ellen, aged 6, as they lay in their beds. He then 
shot himself in the bedroom he used to share with his former wife, Katharine Webb. 
Contrary to police policy, Livingstone had been granted diversion for an earlier breach of 
a protection order, and was discharged without conviction for a second.973  Ann Stevens, 
a lawyer who represented Ms Webb, said Ms Webb refuted the Coroner's suggestion that 
“best practice” by the relevant agencies might not have altered the tragic outcome. Ms 
Stevens said:974 
That's probably … the most distressing finding, because that implies there's an inevitability 
about this that we just can't accept. Inevitability comes with tides and with the sun rising 
but it doesn't come with human behaviour, in our view. As the report makes clear ... these 
were choices that Mr Livingstone made, choices to murder his children and those choices 
would be different, in our view, given different factors. 
In 1992, Raymond Ratima killed his three sons, Piripi, Barney and Stacey, their uncle, 14-
year-old Phillip Ferguson Jr, their aunt Nicola Ferguson, her partner Bevan Tepu, Nicola 
and Bevan's son Steven, and their couple's unborn baby. He also planned to kill his ex-
partner, Toni, and her parents when they arrived home, but he was overpowered by his 
father-in-law. Ratima had been evicted from their home eight days earlier due to violence 
against Toni. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and at the time of writing remains in 
prison.  
Kevin Little had separated from his partner, Chontelle Murphy, but refused to leave the 
house the couple shared. Ms Murphy said that Little threatened to take the couple’s 7-
month-old child, Alyssa, away from her, and told her that if she left him she would not get 
custody of Alyssa. Ms Murphy applied to the Family Court for an occupation order and 
interim custody of Alyssa, the couple’s 7-month-old daughter. The court papers were 
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served on Little on 23 March 2006.  Two days later, Little drowned Alyssa in the bath. He 
claimed he had a seizure and dropped her in the bath but after hearing expert evidence from 
both the Crown and defence witnesses, the jury convicted him of murder.  He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with a 17-year minimum non-parole period.975  
The psychology of spousal revenge 
Wilczynski, another researcher who has categorised child homicide according to the 
perpetrator’s motivation,976 names one category ‘Retaliating’, in which anger towards the 
perpetrator’s sexual partner is displaced onto the child victim.977 Wilczynski found that 
men were far more likely than women to commit this type of killing.978  Dawson also found 
that where revenge and/or jealousy were identified as a motive for filicide (the killing of a 
child by its parent), filicidal fathers were significantly more common than filicidal 
mothers.979   
Alder and Polk identify several features of a sub-category of paternal filicide which they 
refer to as “filicide-suicide”, in which the perpetrator either attempts or is successful in 
killing themselves as well as the child victim.   The most significant feature of this sub-
category, according to Alder and Polk, is that the vast majority of perpetrators in this 
category are the biological fathers of the children they kill.980  Another significant feature 
is that they occur in the context of separation and custody disputes.981  In Alder and Polk’s 
case-studies, men who committed filicide-suicide tended to be older than mother’s de facto 
spouses who were responsible for fatal child maltreatment deaths, and for the most part 
were not previously physically violent toward their children.982 
While there are other cases involving parents who intentionally kill their children, perhaps 
also in the context of marital breakdown, it cannot always be concluded that the killings 
were for the purposes of spousal revenge. In some cases, the perpetrator may be depressed, 
psychotic, or genuinely (if mistakenly) believed the children would be better off dead 
                                                 
975  R v Little CA 108/07 4 October, 9 October 2007. 
976  Wilczynski Child Homicide, above n 837. 
977  At 45. 
978  At 45.  
979  Myrna Dawson “Canadian Trends in Filicide by Gender of the Accused, 1961-2011” in Thea Brown, 
Danielle Tyson and Paula Fernandez Arias When Parents Kill Children: Understanding Filicide 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland, 2018) at 12. 
980  Alder and Polk, above n 835, at 78.   
981  At 78. 
982  At 78. 
198 
 
(altruistic killings). However, Carruthers notes that anger at a spouse, rather than the victim, 
is an important defining feature of spousal revenge killings.983 Further a number of life 
stressors can usually be seen as present before such a homicide takes place, including 
unemployment, financial difficulties, and relationship breakdown.  
After reviewing the research in this area, Carruthers offers a “folk psychological narrative” 
for explaining spousal revenge killings:984 
… at a time of considerable life stress, the killer’s partner is perceived to do something, 
such as initiate a divorce, which strips the killer of all social power over their partner, or at 
least causes a personally significant loss such as the loss of children or the loss of social 
roles within the family. This feeling may be exaggerated by a bias toward blaming others 
for problems. This generates feelings of anger and a desire for revenge in order to harm 
and regain their social power. Alternatively, the rage is a result of loss of a sense of identity 
following the loss of a social role the killer feels constitutes their identity. A desire to harm 
the former partner is formed. Killing the child is identified as a drastic way to achieve this 
harm. The killer may have borderline personality disorder and may or may not attempt 
suicide after the killing. 
Resnick agrees that the most common “precipitants” for spousal revenge homicides are 
spousal infidelity and child custody disputes.985 In light of the fact that, as noted in ch 2, 
indicators of sexually proprietary and controlling behaviours include harming or 
threatening to harm the woman’s children,986 it seems reasonable to suggest that spousal 
revenge homicides can be an extension of sexual proprietariness, even though the ultimate 
victim of the revenge is neither the target of the sexual proprietariness nor a sexual 
competitor. 
In Johnson’s study, in cases where information was available about the nature of the 
perpetrator’s familial relationships, there were indications that he held a proprietary view 
of his wife and children, and these views existed prior to separation. Furthermore, there 
were indications that these proprietary views contributed to the breakdown of the couple’s 
relationship.987 Johnson observes that further evidence for the existence of this proprietary 
attitude of men towards their partners comes from research which found that men often 
feel resentment and anger because their wives are able to access benefits to enable them to 
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live independently.988  Wilczynski concluded from her study that retaliating cases seemed 
to be “a natural extension of the men’s power and control within their family and sexual 
relationships”.989 
However, it is important to remember, as noted in ch 2, that not all behaviours are 
adaptive. 990   The inclination to invest discriminately in offspring may be evolved 
psychological adaptation, but spousal revenge homicidal motives are arguably 
“maladaptive byproduct[s] of the evolved psyche”. 991   Liem and Reichelmann, also 
relying upon the notion of men’s need for control over their spouses’ reproductive capacity, 
suggest that in an attempt to regain this control following withdrawal or estrangement, men 
may respond with lethal violence in which the children are seen as extensions of their 
mother.992  In Liem and Reichelmann’s study, the term “spousal revenge” was applied to 
cases in which the perpetrator killed both the children and his partner but did not commit 
suicide. In that category of cases, the authors found that often the children were the 
perpetrator’s step-children rather than his biological children.993 Liem and Reichelmann 
used the label “spousal revenge” because the “primary object of aggression is the 
(estranged) intimate partner”.994  It seems, therefore, that the revenge in these cases can 
take the form of physical harm (killing the spouse) or psychological (killing the children 
and leaving the spouse bereft).  From a moral blameworthiness perspective, some might 
argue the difference matters little. Others may argue, on the other hand, that killing children 
as a means to make their mother suffer in perpetuity is “murder most foul”. 
An examination of the cases referred to earlier reveals that they bear some of the hallmarks 
of spousal revenge cases. At the time he killed his two daughters, John Battaglia was on 
probation for earlier harassment of his ex-wife, Pearle. Greg Anderson who killed his son, 
Luke Batty, in Melbourne, was estranged from Luke’s mother, Rosie Batty. Ms Batty told 
an inquest into Luke’s death that Anderson wanted to punish her. The inquest also heard 
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that while there was evidence that Anderson probably had an undiagnosed mental illness 
he “knew how to manipulate the court system frequently challenging intervention orders 
taken out against him” and that he “was a very intelligent man and very much in control of 
situations”.995  Crucially, he had a decade-long history of violence toward Ms Batty, 
including threats to kill and a threat to cut off her foot, and had at one point held a knife to 
Luke and said “[t]his could be the one to end it all”.996 
Livingstone had a prior conviction from Australia, for setting fire to a house occupied by 
his ex-girlfriend and her new partner. In New Zealand, on a supervised visit with his 
children, he gave them bullet casings to give to their mother. Unsurprisingly, Webb 
interpreted this as a threat. Witnesses testified that Livingstone had previously talked about 
killing both his children and their mother.997 Although Webb had taken out a protection 
order against him, Livingstone had breached it on more than one occasion prior to the 
killings. The breakdown of their marriage followed from an incident in which he had raped 
her for over 5 hours.998 Despite a protection order being issued to Livingstone following 
that incident, no rape complaint was actually made. 
Little involves the breakdown of a relationship and potential loss of custody of a child. In 
sentencing Little, Gendall J observed that he made no contribution toward the cost of 
Alyssa’s funeral or headstone which was at odds with his expressions of affection for her. 
He also kept Murphy’s credit card for some months and incurred $1,000.00 worth of debt 
on it which, in Gendall J’s view, indicated an uncaring attitude toward Murphy.999 
In terms of Bristol, as Ruth Busch and Neville Robertson observe, the killing of his 
daughters “was the final act of a sustained campaign of violence and intimidation by  
Bristol against his estranged wife, Christine”.1000  Freeman killed his daughter, Darcey, in 
the aftermath of a custody and access dispute and just prior to the killing had told his 
estranged wife, Peta Barnes, to say goodbye to her children, and that she would never see 
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her children again.1001  There is no mention of any violence toward his estranged wife or 
the children prior to the killing, although Barnes told the court that Freeman had had mood 
swings and anger management issues, and there had been a prior incident post-separation 
in which Freeman had grabbed another child in the course of an argument and Barnes 
feared that Freeman was about to throw the child on the fire.1002   
Similarly, there is no evidence that Farquharson was violent toward his ex-wife, Cindy 
Gambino, or his children, but the killing of his three sons did take place in the context of 
Gambino entering into a relationship with another man.  The sentencing Judge’s comments, 
directed at Farquharson, observed:1003  
You had a burning resentment that you were financing your estranged wife’s new life. She 
had the better house; the better car; the children – all financially provided or supported by 
you; and now she had a new relationship. 
…  
You had love for your children; but it was displaced by vindictiveness towards your 
estranged wife, which led you to these crimes. 
While the Ratima case contains many of the elements of revenge killings, including 
employment and financial difficulties, and relationship breakdown, it differs somewhat 
from the other cases described above in two important ways. First, Ratima killed not only 
his own children, but other members of his ex-partner’s family. Second, by all accounts his 
intention was to harm his ex-partner (and her parents) by killing them, rather than by 
leaving her alive to grieve the loss of her children. 
Prosecuting (and sentencing) spousal revenge  
While some of the perpetrators of spousal revenge homicides also kill themselves, 
including Livingstone and Anderson, discussed above, those who do not commit suicide 
are liable to be charged with culpable homicide.  Freeman was convicted of the murder of 
his daughter, Darcey, and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole 
period of 32 years.  For the murder of his three children, Farquharson is serving a minimum 
sentence of 33 years’ imprisonment. These are both Australian cases. Given that Bristol 
and Livingstone’s suicides meant they were not amenable to justice for killing their 
children, we cannot know what sentences they would have been subject to in New Zealand 
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courts. Little, as noted above, was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 17-year minimum 
non-parole period. Ratima was sentenced to life imprisonment under an earlier sentencing 
regime and is still in prison. 
While the sentencing of Little and Ratima do not provide a solid basis for extrapolation, 
we can obtain some guidance from other “intentional bad motive” cases where the 
circumstances reveal a similarly high degree of moral blame. Mark Lundy, who murdered 
his wife, Christine, and daughter, Amber, in 2000, was originally given a 17-year minimum 
non-parole period but this was increased on appeal to 20 years. Christine’s killing was, by 
all accounts, pre-meditated but it is possible that Amber’s death was unplanned and only 
occurred to prevent her from identifying Lundy. The Privy Council quashed his 
convictions, but he was again found guilty in 2015.1004 Steven Williams intentionally 
killed his partner’s daughter, Coral Burrows, after a night smoking methamphetamine. He 
first beat Coral in “a blind rage” 1005,  then killed her intentionally with a tree branch to 
cover up the crime of earlier assaulting her. 1006  Following this, he disavowed all 
knowledge of her whereabouts. Williams pleaded guilty to murdering Coral and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-parole period of 17 years, raised from 
15 years on appeal.1007  Bruce Howse was given a 28-year non-parole period, reduced on 
appeal to 25 years, on his life sentence for the murders of his stepdaughters, Saliel Aplin 
and Olympia Jetson. His motive for murder was that the complainants had made 
allegations of sexual offending against him.1008 His sentence is one of the longest given 
under New Zealand’s Sentencing Act 2002. Sentencing regimes in Australian states clearly 
provide for longer sentences than permissible under New Zealand’s regime.  
Proposed reform – aggravated murder 
In spousal revenge killings where the spouse is not harmed, the death of the child is a 
(perhaps) undesired consequence or by-product of the perpetrator’s intention to victimise 
their spouse in perpetuity.  In New Zealand, as well as other jurisdictions, spousal revenge 
killings are categorised as “ordinary murder”, where the aggravating features will only be 
relevant to sentencing and not to conviction. As has been discussed at length elsewhere in 
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this thesis,1009 sentencing provisions limit the extent to which moral blameworthiness 
can be considered post-conviction, but do not by themselves determine the moral 
culpability of the defendant.  In spousal revenge homicides, given the presence of intention 
to victimise a spouse by using a vulnerable child, an argument can be made for such killings 
to be elevated beyond the category of “ordinary” murder to a more serious offence which 
recognises the higher degree of moral blame involved. As Webb’s lawyer, Ann Stevens, 
noted (above), Livingstone chose to kill his children. In the absence of any evidence of 
psychosis or evidence that his will had been overborne to the extent that he was incapable 
of exercising a rational choice, his murder of his children to punish his ex-partner, was at 
the more serious end of the spectrum of moral culpability. 
In New Zealand, “ordinary” murder is found in s 167 of the Crimes Act 1961, whereby the 
offender either intends to kill or intends to cause bodily injury he knows is likely to cause 
death and continues regardless of the risk of death. However, there is a more serious form 
of murder, which is contained in s 168 of the Crimes Act 1961 which essentially codifies 
the common law felony-murder rule, in which murders committed in the course of other 
serious crimes are deemed more serious. Section 168(1) provides that:  
Culpable homicide is also murder in each of the following cases, whether the offender means or does 
not mean death to ensue, or knows or does not know that death is likely to ensue: 
(a) if he or she means to cause grievous bodily injury for the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of any of the offences mentioned in subsection (2) …  
The offences listed in subs 168(2) include murder, abduction, kidnapping, sexual violation, 
and so on – offences which are themselves at the serious end of the spectrum of criminal 
offences.  Therefore, the New Zealand legislature has already recognised that some 
murders are more morally blameworthy than others. There seems to be no reason why an 
intentional murder of a vulnerable child in pursuit of vindictiveness towards a spouse ought 
not to be legally recognised as another category of more serious murders – aggravated 
murder, for example. Such cases do generally contain an element of “malice aforethought” 
even if the degree of forethought may be quite small. Even spur of the moment killings in 
these contexts do, in the absence of any psychosis or evidence of diminished capacity, 
establish a “bad motive”. While sexual proprietariness may have evolved from concerns 
about sexual fidelity and its impact upon reproductive success, in contemporary society we 
ought to resist any concession to it as a guiding factor in homicidal behaviour.  These cases 
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can be set apart from cases which involve a genuine desire to alleviate suffering, such as 
some of the “altruistic” killings described below.  
Finally, while we ought not to criminalise, for example, someone who genuinely acts in 
self-defence, we should expect that defendants have the fortitude to resist very trivial 
threats. This also applies to resisting vengeful desires. Indeed, the fact that provocation as 
a defence has been repealed in New Zealand, and in England and Wales the legislature has 
at least attempted to remove sexual infidelity as a qualifying trigger,1010 demonstrates that 
there is no room in law for sexual proprietariness as an exculpating factor. 
Altruistic killings 
An organism behaves altruistically – in the evolutionary sense of the term – if it reduces its 
own fitness and augments the fitness of others.1011  
There is some debate, in the field of evolutionary science, over whether altruism evolved 
for the benefit of the community rather than for the benefit of individual genes – since the 
object of evolution is, as discussed in ch 2, is to have equal or greater reproductive success 
than other individuals. I do not intend to weigh into this debate, however, since what this 
section of the chapter deals with is not evolutionary altruism, but psychological altruism – 
the motivational states that drive behaviour.1012 What this means is that the defendant’s 
behavior in killing is guided by a desire to alleviate some real or perceived suffering. It 
does not mean that the killing is necessarily at the expense of the defendant’s interests 
(although it often is, at least where the victim is a child of the defendant). 
In the context of this thesis, altruistic killings are those in which the defendant perceives 
that the child will be better off dead. For the purposes of this thesis, this category of 
defendant does not include those who are psychotic or legally insane.  Included in this 
category are those who kill terminally ill or significantly impaired children and those who 
kill their children in the belief that they are at a serious risk of harm (for example, from 
another person).  In Wilczynski’s study, altruistic killings were committed almost 
exclusively by women.1013 
                                                 
1010  See ch 4. 
1011  Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish 
Behaviour (Harvard University Press, USA, 1998) at 199. 
1012  At 199. 
1013  Wilczynski Child Homicide, above n 837, at 55. 
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Wilczynski divided altruistic killings into two sub-categories. The first she labelled 
“primary” altruistic killings – cases in which there is an actual degree of suffering in the 
victim and absence of secondary gain for the perpetrator. “Secondary” altruistic killings, 
on the other hand, did not involve actual suffering on the part of the victim, and no 
psychotic delusions on the part of the perpetrator, although the perpetrator could be 
described as “mentally ill”.1014  Several social and psychological factors are seen as being 
at play in secondary altruistic killings including lack of support; stressful life events; 
difficult temperament in the victim; and “the reality of motherhood bearing little relation 
to the idealized societal view of it”.1015 
Resnick also identifies two sub-categories of altruistic killings. The first is child homicide 
associated with suicide, where the perpetrator decides first to kill themselves, but then feel 
they cannot leave their children behind in “a cruel world”.1016  Resnick’s second sub-
category is child homicide to relieve or prevent (real or imagined) suffering.1017 Where the 
suffering is real, the killing could be characterised as euthanasia; but more often the killing 
is the result of a delusion that the child is suffering or at risk of eternal damnation.1018  It 
should be noted that in this category of child homicide, Resnick was specifically referring 
to filicide – which are homicides committed by parents. However, potentially the same or 
similar motives can exist in other relationships.  
The case of Alex Fisher is one such example. Eric McIsaac murdered Alex, his ten-year-
old half-brother, by hitting him twice in the head with a wood-splitter, while Alex slept. 
McIsaac had a “lifelong challenge with mental health problems”1019 but not an “obvious, 
diagnosable mental illness”,1020 nor was he found to be insane at the time of the killing. 
However, the sentencing Judge observed that McIsaac’s mental health issues centred on 
his fixation that Alex was being abused and that McIsaac himself had terminal cancer.  
While many would perhaps argue otherwise, it is possible that Alex’s murder fits within 
the category of altruistic homicides. McIsaac’s and Alex’s mother testified that the brothers 
had a loving relationship and got on well. There was no previous history of violence by 
                                                 
1014  At 56. 
1015  At 56. 
1016  Resnick, above n 836, at 205. 
1017  At 205. 
1018  At 205. 
1019  R v McIsaac [2016] NZHC 1544 at [15]. 
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McIsaac toward Alex which would suggest any other motive for the killing. McIsaac 
pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum non-
parole period of 14 years. The sentencing Judge took into account McIsaac’s early guilty 
plea and his mental health issues in deciding that a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 
years would be manifestly unjust. Another way of framing this could be to consider that 
McIsaac’s motive (to end his brother’s alleged abuse) mitigates McIsaac’s moral 
blameworthiness. 
In 2004, a Nelson father suffocated his 5-month-old daughter. She had been diagnosed 
with “incomplete lissencephaly” and her parents were advised that her brain would never 
develop beyond that of a 13-week-old foetus. The father was charged with murder and 
manslaughter in the alternative but was acquitted of both charges.1021  
In 2016, Donella Knox sedated her disabled 20-year-old daughter, Ruby, before 
suffocating her. Ruby had severe autism spectrum disorder, was intellectually disabled and 
had other physical illnesses including spina bifida and hip pain. Prior to the killing Ruby 
had begun to act in violent and disruptive ways and was no longer being seen by the 
paediatric team because of her age. Knox was advised that nothing could be done for 
Ruby’s pain. Knox pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment, 
life imprisonment being seen by the sentencing Judge as manifestly unjust. The sentencing 
Judge described the killing as part mercy and part self-defence.  Justice Williams 
recognised that the relationship between Knox and Ruby was abusive, not in the normal 
sense, but because of the emotional tie to Ruby. 1022   In a similar case, R v Albury-
Thomson,1023 the defendant strangled her teenage autistic daughter after years of lack of 
assistance in caring for the child.   A successful defence of provocation reduced Albury-
Thomson’s liability for murder to manslaughter. She was initially sentenced to 4 years’ 
imprisonment, which was reduced on appeal to 18 months. 
While there may be debate about McIsaac’s moral blameworthiness, I think few would 
argue that the defendants in these latter three cases ought to be stigmatised as “murderers”. 
Yet, while the Nelson father was acquitted, and Janine Albury-Thomson was convicted of 
                                                 
1021  Monique Devereux “Father cleared of brain damaged baby's murder” The New Zealand Herald 
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manslaughter, Donella Knox is legally classified as a murderer, due to her guilty plea (this 
is another case where the quality of legal representation may have been critical). As in the 
case of spousal revenge homicides, there ought to be capacity for the legal system to 
recognise that altruistic killings are not “ordinary murder”, but compared with spousal 
revenge killings, altruistic killings fall at the lower end of the spectrum in terms of degrees 
of moral blame.  As has been noted elsewhere in this thesis, jury compassion ought to be 
legitimated: where a killing takes place in the context of a genuine desire to alleviate 
suffering, the verdict should be manslaughter (or a lesser offence) and not murder.  
It has been argued that the altruism and mental illness categories of child homicide are 
highly associated and should not be studied separately.1024  This may be clearer in some of 
the cases described above (McIsaac, in particular, perhaps) than others, but while these 
other cases do not have any hallmarks of psychosis or indeed, any psychological disorder, 
the stressors associated with parenting very unwell children could arguably fall within the 
category of “other impairment” discussed below, warranting a consideration of whether 
diminished responsibility or extreme mental or emotional distress ought to apply in these 
cases. 
UNWANTED CHILDREN, PSYCHOSIS, AND OTHER IMPAIRMENT 
Social constructionism emphasises that illness is a product of the interaction between 
biology and socio-cultural perspectives; that the meaning of experience of illness is shaped 
by cultural and social systems, rather than being universal and invariant to time and 
place.1025 Further, Oberman convincingly argues that: 
The law’s binary approach to mental illness, in which one either is sane or insane, 
competent or incompetent, or able-bodied or disabled, simply fails to accommodate the 
vast majority of women who struggle with postpartum mental illness.  The fact of the 
matter is that organic mental illness alone cannot account for much of what goes wrong for 
mothers who find themselves at the intersection of madness and the law.1026 
While Oberman refers specifically to mental illness in women, the law’s binary approach 
also extends to other defendants. In the context of this thesis, this includes people other 
than mothers who commit child homicide, although in Fairfax Media’s database, the cases 
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involving mentally disordered perpetrators mostly concerned biological parents of the 
children they killed. The following discussion includes cases in which the perpetrator of 
the child homicide is psychotic and/or legally insane, and those in which infanticide is a 
potential verdict.  The discussion also considers the innumerable other cases in which – for 
any number of reasons – the perpetrator’s ability to reason is impaired, including cases in 
which the child victim is characterised as an “unwanted” child. It should be noted that some 
of the cases which have been legally classified as infanticide could also fall into the 
category of “unwanted” children. 
As discussed in ch 1, two New Zealand cases are particularly apposite in demonstrating 
that there are defendants who may not have possessed criminal intent were precluded from 
availing themselves of the insanity, or any other, defence.  This has significant 
consequences for defendants in New Zealand, where there is no defence of diminished 
responsibility. 
In 2005, Sharon Harrison-Taylor was convicted of the murder of Gabriel, one of her eight- 
month-old twin boys, by a combination of smothering and strangulation.1027  Harrison-
Taylor admitted killing Gabriel by hitting him and holding him down in his cot.  The 
defence raised infanticide, which was not accepted by the jury.  The jury also found that 
the killing was murder and not manslaughter.  Harrison-Taylor was sentenced to life 
imprisonment with a minimum parole period of 12 years.1028 
At her trial, one expert gave evidence that Harrison-Taylor suffered from a borderline 
personality disorder.  Another expert claimed she had a dissocial personality disorder.   
Regardless of the classification, it was clear that she had a history of psychiatric problems.  
Harrison-Taylor reported sexual abuse by family members and drug abuse during her 
teenage years, and at the time of the killing Harrison-Taylor was suffering from chronic 
pain, taking painkillers, and was exhausted from lack of sleep.1029   
In 1999, Desiree Wright killed her eight-month-old son, River, by smothering him.  She 
was initially charged with murder but when the Crown obtained expert opinion establishing 
that Wright suffered from MSBP, it accepted Wright’s plea of guilty to manslaughter.  
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Wright was sentenced to seven years imprisonment, reduced on appeal to four years.  As 
in Harrison-Taylor’s case, the mental disorder suffered by Wright fell short of the legal 
defence of insanity.  However, as the Court of Appeal noted in that case:1030 
For a person so affected to crave [sympathetic care and attention] at the expense of her 
helpless little child indicates a derangement of personality, the causes of which may not 
always be apparent but the manifestation of which evidences serious mental disorder.  
Even though Wright was not able to avail herself of insanity, the outcome in her case was 
far less severe than that imposed on Harrison-Taylor. Proposed reform in this area, 
discussed below, will potentially equalise the position of defendants in similar positions. 
Unwanted children 
Smithey found that in neonaticides – the killing of a child within the first 24 hours of 
birth1031 – the perpetrator is almost always the mother, and the motivation is to conceal the 
pregnancy.1032  As discussed in ch 2, when conditions are poor (lack of resources, low 
support) then parents sometimes make choices about which children to invest resources 
in.1033  So, abandonment (along with abuse and homicide) are all within the range of 
possible behaviours when conditions are unfavourable. 1034  Oberman notes that while 
women who commit neonaticide come from the full range of socio-economic backgrounds, 
it is their personal financial resources that render them vulnerable, rather than the financial 
position of their family.1035 Ciani and Fontanesi found that the risk of a child being killed 
by its biological mother is highest in the first 24 hours of birth, and particularly so if the 
mother is young, has no other children, and exists in “critical social and economical 
conditions”.1036  Their study confirmed other research in this area which shows that the 
mother rarely commits suicide following the death of the baby, and the killing occurs more 
in the context of abandonment or lack of assistance than by violent killing.1037 While some 
women suffocate or strangle the baby to prevent it from crying, many babies drown in the 
                                                 
1030  R v Wright CA478/00, 2 May 2001 at [7] (emphasis added). 
1031  Alder and Polk, above n 835, at 1. 
1032  Martha Smithey “Infant Homicide: Victim/Offender Relationship and Causes of Death” (1998) 
13(3) J Family Viol 285 at 287. 
1033  Randolph Roth “Biology and the Deep History of Homicide” (2011) 51 Brit J Criminol 535 at 538. 
1034  At 538. 
1035  Michelle Oberman “Understanding Infanticide in Context: Mothers who kill, 1870-1930 and Today” 
(2002) 92 J Crim L & Criminology 707 at 710. 
1036  Andrea S Camperio Ciani and Lilybeth Fontanesi “Mothers who kill their offspring: Testing 
evolutionary hypothesis in a 110-case Italian sample” (2012) 36 Child Abuse Negl 519 at 524. 
1037  At 525. 
210 
 
toilet while the mother is either passed out or trying to clean up the evidence of birth.1038  
Ciani and Fontanesi conclude:1039 
This framework confirms the evolutionary prediction that neonaticidal mothers are trying 
to cope with unwanted offspring, so they may survive and eventually reproduce again in 
more favourable conditions. 
As Oberman notes, the patterns surrounding neonaticides are remarkably consistent and 
distinct from those surrounding the killings involving older children.1040 However, not all 
“unwanted children” are neonates. John Tauwhare was 11 months old when his mother, 
Paula Tauwhare, fed him salt which ultimately killed him. The sentencing Judge, 
McGechan J, said:1041 
You wanted to return to Auckland, probably to be with your boyfriend, the father of the 
child, and from some point in time … you decided to make the child ill, thinking it would 
then be taken from you, probably by Social Welfare, and you would be free to go without 
having this child which had become a nuisance to you and which you no longer wanted. 
The United States case of Susan Smith also stands out, at first glance, as being a case in 
which a mother killed her older children to escape the burden of caring for them and so as 
to further a relationship with a man who did not want children. Smith rolled her car into a 
lake with her children strapped in their car-seats. She initially told police she had been car-
jacked but later admitted rolling her car into the lake. She said that she had intended to kill 
herself but had changed her mind at the last moment.1042  Resnick suggests that if her 
evidence is to be believed, the case is actually one of “altruistic” (attempted) suicide, rather 
than unwanted child.1043 In any event, there are very few, if any, reported cases involving 
older children which could properly fall into this category of unwanted child. Where there 
is a parental “strategy” to divert resources to other children, the homicide would most likely 
fall into fatal child maltreatment or neglect, as discussed above. 
How should criminal justice systems deal with these cases of child homicide?  As already 
mentioned, these killings are more likely to occur more in the context of abandonment or 
lack of assistance than by violent killing,1044 although there may be some difficulties in 
ascertaining the precise cause of death in these cases.  This also may be one factor affecting 
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official statistics of incidence of neonaticide. The Fairfax Media database demonstrates that 
in several cases in which there was at least prima facie evidence of neonaticide, no charges 
were laid. In terms of societal responses to neonaticide, Oberman observes that this occurs 
in a wide variety of ways:1045 
Despite the consistently harsh rhetoric of outrage that these cases generate, some juries and 
judges are quite lenient with these defendants.  It is not unusual for those who investigate 
these cases to elect not to file criminal charges, or for women convicted of neonaticide to 
receive probation rather than a prison sentence … On the other hand, many of these women 
receive exceptionally harsh punishments and are forced to serve lengthy sentences for their 
crimes.  
Oberman suggests that this range of responses may stem from the polarised abortion debate 
in which those who oppose abortion may condemn neonaticide outright, while those who 
are pro-choice may be more likely to be sympathetic to the defendant as they consider the 
circumstances surrounding her pregnancy.  Either way, Oberman argues that the American 
public has very strong reactions to neonaticides and tends to view them as 
incomprehensible, isolated aberrations rather than as commonplace, patterned killings.1046  
In fact, Oberman argues that the comprehensibility of these killings is a defining 
feature:1047 
[N]eonaticide may be seen as a ‘mothering’ decision. Typically, these cases involve young 
pregnant women, who determine, correctly or not, that they would be completely cut off 
from their social support network were they to disclose their pregnancies. More 
importantly, they are convinced that they would be exiled from their families, their homes, 
and their communities were they to attempt to parent their child alone. The terrifying 
thought of parenting with no money, limited education, few job options, and no one to love 
and care for them, surely contributes to the panic and denial of pregnancy typically 
manifested by this population. 
Oberman’s idea here of neonaticide as a comprehensible “mothering decision” contains 
echoes of Jones notion of “time-shifted rationality”1048 – seemingly irrational behaviour 
sometimes results from using old techniques (that were useful in the EEA) to solve new 
problems.1049  Does viewing these killings through this lens change our view of the moral 
blameworthiness involved? What principles of responsibility attribution are relevant here? 
Lacey might ask whether the defendant chose the conduct or had a fair opportunity to avoid 
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it.1050 Tadros would look for “motivating reasons”: a rational explanation for why the agent 
acted.1051  A practical approach might be one which relies upon these ideas and recognises 
the context in which the killing took place as mitigating full responsibility. As Oberman 
notes, these killings are patterned,1052 so rather than leaving the facts of these cases to the 
whim of the jury, creating a specific offence or partial defence based upon this pattern, 
should be relatively straightforward.  For example, it could be that where a killing takes 
place in the first 24 hours of birth in a defendant’s attempt to divest herself of an unplanned 
and unwanted child, the verdict should be manslaughter (or a lesser offence) and not 
murder. Unlike infanticide, the mitigation does not depend upon the biological effects of 
childbirth or lactation, but rather the social forces operating on the defendant at the time.  
A defence could be structured along the same lines as diminished responsibility in England 
and Wales although the requirement that the abnormality in mental functioning arises from 
a “recognised medical condition” might have to be deleted.1053 
Wilczynski also observed that a common reason to kill a child is because the child is 
unwanted. In her study, almost all of the cases in this category involved female 
perpetrators.1054 Wilczynski’s study drew on three samples – an English sample, and two 
Australian samples. Wilczynski classified cases in this category according to the age of the 
victim as well as the stage at which the child became unwanted. The categories were 
children unplanned and unwanted since the time of conception; older unwanted children; 
and children wanted by the parent at conception but not after the birth. The first category 
formed the largest group, most of which were neonaticides.1055 In the English sample, only 
one perpetrator was male – a father who killed his 20-year-old daughter’s incestuously 
conceived child. In general, Wilczynski’s neonaticide cases bore similar features to those 
identified by Oberman. 1056  There was one case in which the child was wanted at 
conception but not after birth, which involved a baby born with Down Syndrome who was 
rejected from birth by her father who killed her at the age of two weeks.1057  Some of these 
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scenarios pose interesting questions in the context of this thesis: is there a difference in 
moral blame between a father who kills an incestuously-conceived child and a young 
mother who kills to conceal a pregnancy? What about between a young mother who kills 
to conceal a pregnancy versus a father who kills a child with Down Syndrome, or some 
other, non-fatal condition? 
Oberman observes, in the context of mothers who kill generally, that mental health issues 
are central to societal responses to this kind of offence. She says that while there is great 
variation in neonaticides in terms of charges laid, where mothers kill older children they 
are almost always charged with murder.1058  However, in terms of case disposition for 
these mothers, there is great variation, ranging from the death sentence to probation.1059 
Oberman has identified a pattern underlying these outcomes which aligns with what is 
referred to as the “mad” versus “bad” phenomenon.1060 The mad category does not just 
refer to confirmed insanity diagnoses but extends to a broad range of circumstances, such 
as those in which Smith, referred to above, found herself. While Smith was characterised 
by the media as a “bad” woman who killed her two sons intentionally so that she could 
marry a rich man, the jury did not accept this version of her, once it discovered her father’s 
suicide, her molestation by her step-father, and her depression and anxiety. While the jury 
could have sentenced her to death, it instead sentenced her to life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole.1061  Tauwhare, above, was charged with murder but convicted of 
manslaughter. She was sentenced to one year and nine months imprisonment. McGechan 
J took into account her personal circumstances, characterised (somewhat indelicately) as 
follows:1062 
You are still only 22. Your mother died very early and you lived away from your father 
from that point.  I am afraid your history became one of neglect, institutional care, foster 
care, special schools and, in the end, you were on the loose and probably on the streets in 
Auckland. You have been, it can fairly be said, one of life’s casualties. You are not insane, 
but you do have the misfortune of a low intellectual level … summed up as ‘borderline’ 
handicapped.  Your reading level for example is only about 8½. You have no life skills. 
You have no work skills. You have very poor communication skills … I suspect you have 
only a limited understanding of what is happening to you now, and you certainly need help. 
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Outcomes like these lend further support to the idea that we ought to give courts as many 
options as possible to be compassionate. 
Psychosis and insanity 
In August 2015 Evelyn Sen killed her four-year-old daughter, Maggie, by giving her an 
overdose of antidepressants. Psychiatrists gave evidence that Sen was psychotic, paranoid 
and depressed, and she believed Maggie to be possessed by “unclean spirits”. Sen was 
found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity and an order was made that she be detained 
indefinitely as a special patient.1063 In September 2003, John Te Huia slit the throats of his 
daughter, Natalia, 18 months, and step-daughter, Tiana aged 4, and killed their mother, 
Angelina Poli.  Te Huia (then known by the name Stanley Smith) suffered from an 
unshakeable delusion that the Mongrel Mob were out to harm them and his family, so he 
had “beaten them to it”. He was initially convicted of murder, but the Court of Appeal 
quashed his convictions and held that he was insane at the time of the killings, and should 
have been acquitted on that ground.1064  In a rare case, both of Dane Gibson’s parents were 
found not guilty of murder by reason of insanity. In May 1994, Dane's mother, Janice 
Gibson, beat him with a concrete paving stone because she said that God told her to. Her 
husband, Lindsay Gibson, restrained Dane while his wife hit him. During the trial, the jury 
was told that the Gibsons believed their son had been possessed by a demon, and that they 
were exorcising him.1065  A psychiatrist gave evidence that the pair were suffering from a 
psychotic illness known as folie a deux (madness of two).1066  
In New Zealand, s 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 creates a presumption that everyone is sane 
at the time of doing or omitting any act.  A defendant can rebut this presumption by proving, 
on the balance of probabilities, that they were suffering from a disease of the mind or 
natural imbecility to such an extent that it rendered her incapable of either understanding 
the nature and quality of the act or of knowing that the act was morally wrong, having 
regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong.  The defence of insanity is 
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based upon the belief that those who lack the power of reason should not be criminally 
responsible.1067 As Liu puts it:1068 
Premised on concepts of free will and personal responsibility, our legal system recognizes 
that, when an individual is incapable of having the requisite criminal intent or mens rea at 
the time the act was performed, a just society cannot hold that person criminally liable. 
Stevens J noted in R v Makahili: 1069  
A finding of not guilty on the ground of insanity will ensure that someone who has no criminal intent 
or capacity to form a criminal intent due to mental illness is not regarded or treated as a criminal. 
What is crucial to the defence is a lack of reasoning, rather than the disease itself:1070 
… it is unimportant whether the relevant incapacity is due to degeneration of the brain, or to some 
other form of mental derangement, or to a physical disorder, such as arteriosclerosis or brain tumour, 
provided it has the effect of impairing the reasoning process. 
Accordingly, Simester and Brookbanks observe that the defence is not designed for the 
therapeutic benefit of the defendant but as a way of attributing criminal responsibility and 
to protect the public from potential recurrence of dangerous behaviour from the 
defendant.1071  This can lead to difficulties when psychiatrists are relied upon to provide 
evidence of disease of the mind:1072  
Because a psychiatrist operates from a professional desire to assist in the alleviation of subjective 
mental distress, she may have difficulty in accepting the law’s insistence that only mental states 
which affect the accused’s rationality are fit candidates for inclusion within this archaic legal category. 
To date, the following have been held by New Zealand courts to constitute disease of the 
mind (although the defendants in the cases may not necessarily have been found insane): 
schizophrenia or paranoid schizophrenia 1073 ; insane automatism (psychogenic 
automatism) 1074 ; “severe personality disorder”, or psychopathy” 1075 ; schizo-affective 
disorder, characterised by psychosis 1076 ; schizophrenia characterised by delusion and 
                                                 
1067  Kimberly Waldron “Postpartum psychosis as an insanity defense” (1990) 21 Rutgers Law J 669 
cited in Lita Linzer Schwartz and Natalie K Isser Endangered Children: Neonaticide, Infanticide, 
and Filicide (CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2000) at 103. 
1068  MS Liu “Postpartum psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?” 
(2002) 4 SCHOLAR 339. 
1069  R v Makahili HC Auckland CRI-2008-092-1873, 4 September 2008. 
1070  AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Brookers, 
Wellington, 2012) at 334. 
1071  At 335. 
1072  At 335. 
1073  R v Makahili, above n 1069; R v Ahlquist HC Auckland CRI- 2007-004-009742, 4 December 2008; 
R v Manuele HC Wellington CRI-2006-032-1144, 7 February 2007 R v Johansen HC Christchurch 
CRI-2005-009-002760, 22 September 2005.  
1074  R v Ericsson HC Wellington AP52/93, M17 & 18/93, 31 March 1993.  
1075  R v Dixon [2007] NZCA 398. 
1076  R v NHM HC Rotorua CRI-2006-063-1548, 14 September 2007. 
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auditory hallucinations 1077 ; acute depressive condition 1078 . On the other hand, the 
following have been held to not constitute disease of the mind: Munchausen’s Syndrome 
by Proxy 1079 ; dissocial personality disorder 1080 ; borderline personality disorder 1081 ; 
personality disorder with predominant antisocial and narcissistic traits1082; narcissistic 
personality disorder1083; personality disorder (not otherwise specified)1084.  
In R v Clark1085 Woodhouse P held that the decision must always be for the jury, rather 
than the experts. A verdict that is inconsistent with the evidence is not necessarily grounds 
for a finding that the verdict was unreasonable. But a jury’s verdict still must be founded 
on the evidence. In R v Rotana1086 it was held that, even though the jury had a right to 
disagree with the experts, there must be a rational basis for doing so. In that case, the jury’s 
verdict was quashed on appeal on the basis that it was unreasonable having regard to the 
substantial evidence of the defendant’s insanity. Since 2003, it is no longer necessary to 
have a jury trial to determine insanity. In cases where the psychiatric evidence is clear and 
undisputed, a Judge can make a finding of insanity with the agreement of the parties. 
Section 20(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) 2003 provides: 
 (2) Before or at a [ ] trial, the Judge must record a finding that the defendant is not 
guilty on account of his or her insanity if— 
(a) the defendant indicates that he or she intends to raise the defence of 
insanity; and 
(b) the prosecution agrees that the only reasonable verdict is not guilty on 
account of insanity; and 
(c) the Judge is satisfied, on the basis of expert evidence, that the defendant 
was insane within the meaning of section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 at 
the time of the commission of the offence. 
Section 20(2) reduces the potential for juries to convict of murder against the weight of the 
evidence, as happened in the Stanley Smith/John Te Huia case above, and R v Rotana.1087  
                                                 
1077  R v McNicholas HC Hamilton CRI-2008-019-003488, 4 December 2008.  
1078  R v Misimo CA182/91, 18 November 1991. 
1079  R v Wright, above n 1031. 
1080  R v Harrison-Taylor, above n 1028. 
1081  R v Harrison-Taylor, above n 1028; R v van Haaren [2008] NZCA 91. 
1082  R v Frost HC New Plymouth CRI-2007-043-471, 21 February 2008.  
1083  R v Parker HC Wellington CRI-2007-485-16, 14 May 2007.  
1084  R v van Haaren, above n 1082. 
1085  R v Clark (1983) 1 CRNZ 132 (CA) at 133. 
1086  R v Rotana (1995) 12 CRNZ 650 (CA) at 655. 
1087  At 655. 
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The problem of personality disorders 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) defined a personality disorder as “an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behaviour” that significantly diverges from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture.1088 These fall within 10 types: paranoid personality disorder, schizoid 
personality disorder, schizotypal personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, 
borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality, narcissistic personality disorder, 
avoidant personality disorder, dependent personality disorder and obsessive-compulsive 
personality disorder.  The subsequent edition of the DSM (DSM-5, 2013) retained a similar 
definition but included an alternative hybrid dimensional-categorical model in a separate 
chapter (Section III) to encourage further study on how this new methodology could be 
used to assess personality and diagnose personality disorders in clinical practice.1089   
As Simester and Brookbanks observe, the law as it relates to insanity is “unconcerned with 
disorders which simply produce disturbed behaviour”.1090  As a result: 1091  
… neurotic disorders, including such conditions as anxiety states, obsessional states, 
hysteria, and various mood (affective) disorders are normally excluded from the category 
‘disease of the mind’.  
Therefore, insofar as the legal system is concerned, there is no clear view on the status of 
personality disorders within the disease of the mind schemata:1092 
On one view, personality or behavioural disorders classified as “psychopathy” or “neuroses” 
will not suffice.  Other writers suggest that severe personality disorders may be included 
because they are regarded as functional psychoses.  The real issue is simply whether there 
is medical evidence that the condition should be regarded as a mental illness, regardless 
whether the defence is able to satisfy the additional tests in s 23(2). 
Interestingly, a study of homicidal women in Finland found that all of those who had 
committed neonaticide (the killing of a newborn) had personality disorders and accordingly 
were held to be not fully responsible for their acts.1093   
                                                 
1088  American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
(4th ed, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
1089  Waugh and others “Psychological Assessment With the DSM–5 Alternative Model for Personality 
Disorders: Tradition and Innovation” (2017) 48(2) Prof Psychol: Res Pract 79.   
1090  Simester and Brookbanks, above n 1070, at 334. 
1091  At 335. 
1092  At 340 (footnotes omitted). 
1093  H Putkonen and others “Finnish female homicide offenders, 1982-92” (1998) 9 J of Forensic 
Psychiatr 672 cited in Schwartz and Isser, above n 1067, at 110. 
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In Australia, under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), the definition of “mental impairment” 
includes “severe personality disorder”. Bronitt and McSherry suggest that even though 
antisocial personality disorder is the disorder most linked to criminal conduct, the weight 
of psychiatric opinion is that it should not be associated with mental impairment, on the 
basis that those with antisocial personality disorders are able to deal with reality and are 
able to reason.1094  Yet possession of the mens rea for murder is not about the capacity to 
reason, or even about the capacity for intent. It is about actual intent.  And if, by virtue of 
a personality disorder, severe or otherwise, a defendant did not actually intend to kill or 
cause bodily injury, or did not have a conscious appreciation that death could well result, 
it would certainly be unfair to not allow that evidence to create a reasonable doubt.  This is 
especially so when we consider that voluntary intoxication can negate mens rea.1095   
On the other hand, one of the problems with personality disorders is that they can be used 
as a convenient label for people for whom there is no other label. To that end, the label is 
contentious and potentially stigmatising.  
Infanticide 
Infanticide is a form of diminished responsibility, in that it provides a partial defence to a 
murder or manslaughter charge, where a mother who kills a child does so because she has 
not fully recovered from the effects of giving birth.  In New Zealand, and in England and 
Wales,1096 it can be both an offence and a defence, which leads to an anomaly in terms of 
the burden of proof.1097   
In R v O’Callaghan Quilliam J observed:1098 
What s 178(3) has done is to recognise that the effects of childbirth, as set out in the 
subsection, may amount to or be equivalent to a disease of the mind for the purposes of s 
23 when otherwise that might not be regarded as a logical or acceptable medical concept. 
Wilczynski observes that infanticide provisions are underpinned by two contradictory 
assumptions:1099 
                                                 
1094  Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, 
Sydney, 2017) at 256. 
1095  ES Steelman “A question of revenge: Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy and a proposed diminished 
capacity defense for homicidal mothers” (2002) 8 Cardozo Women’s LJ 261 at 292. 
1096  In England and Wales infanticide is governed by the Infanticide Act 1938 (UK). 
1097  Simester and Brookbanks, above n 1070, at 590-591. 
1098  R v O’Callaghan (1984) 1 CRNZ 185 (HC) at 186 per Quilliam J. 
1099  Wilczynski, above n 837, at 149. 
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On the one hand, mothers are presumed to be naturally benign, tender and nurturing, and 
therefore incapable of harming their children unless mentally disturbed. On the other hand, 
there are fears that women’s very biology makes them inclined towards murderous attacks 
on their children, and that this requires special provision within the criminal law.  
As a result, there are unique features of infanticide legislation which are contrary to 
traditional criminal law principles, such as the presumption of sanity.1100  
The medical basis of infanticide legislation has been criticised on the basis that it is outdated 
and does not accurately reflect causes of infant killing. It relies upon antiquated opinion 
about the effects of lactation and childbirth.1101  Further, in some jurisdictions at least, the 
level of mental disturbance required is lower than that required elsewhere in criminal 
law.1102 It is now generally recognised that social and psychological stresses play a more 
significant role in maternal infant-killing than mental disturbance and physiological 
factors,1103 there being little evidence that hormonal or chemical imbalances are at play.1104 
However, the defence does require a disturbance of the mind:1105 
Infanticide is an area of sentencing which requires recognition of the circumstance that 
there is a lesser degree of moral culpability born of the fact that there must be the established 
presence of disturbance of the mind before this offence is available to the prisoner.  It is 
also generally recognised that the risk of repetition, and therefore any threat that an offender 
might pos[e] to the community, is not ongoing because it is an offence which is linked to a 
particular mental condition and one which, thankfully, is capable of treatment. 
Despite the acceptance that that there is no association between lactation and mental 
disturbance, there may be some temporal association between childbirth and risk of certain 
types of mental disorder. 1106  Wilczynski identifies three main mental conditions that 
potentially arise in this context. The first is what is referred to as “baby blues” which 
involves mild and transient emotional reactions such as tearfulness and mild anxiety. These 
reactions are not considered an illness, and it is estimated that between 50 and 70 per cent 
of women experience them in first week after childbirth.1107 The second category is post-
natal depression which can occur in the first few months after childbirth and is akin to other 
types of depression. Approximately 10 per cent of mothers suffer from post-natal 
depression with a higher prevalence closer to birth.1108 The third category is referred to as 
                                                 
1100  At 149. 
1101  Bronitt and McSherry, above n 1094, at 336. 
1102  Wilczynski, above n 837, at 155. 
1103  At 156-157. 
1104  Bronitt and McSherry, above n 1094, at 336.  
1105  R v RLT HC Dunedin CRI-2008-012-005987, 18 December 2008.  
1106  Wilczynski, above n 837, at 155. 
1107  At 155. 
1108  At 155. 
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puerperal (or postpartum) psychosis which usually has a rapid onset with symptoms 
including paranoid delusions, anxiety, sleep disturbance and depression.1109 One to two 
mothers out of every thousand develop puerperal psychosis in the first few weeks following 
childbirth.1110 There is debate over whether postnatal depression and puerperal psychosis 
constitute separate disorders given they are very similar to non-postpartum disorders.1111 
Further, even though puerperal psychosis is thought to be primarily hormonal, very few 
women who kill their children suffer from the disorder.1112  
Despite the many criticisms that have been levelled at the defence of infanticide, Brennan 
argues that we do need to bear in mind why the defence was created in the first place, which 
was to avoid the farce of putting a woman through a murder trial and conviction and spectre 
of a death sentence when “everybody knew that this sentence would be reprieved”.1113 
Brennan argues:1114 
Mothers who murder their infants have long been recognised as a special type of offender 
who, in most circumstances, should be viewed with more compassion than censure. This 
is arguably still the case, particularly where mentally or emotionally distressed mothers kill 
their infants in tragic circumstances. Thus, while infanticide legislation certainly has its 
faults, its dubious medical rationale being only one of them, and while it may not be a 
suitable approach to take in every case of maternal infant murder, the offence/defence of 
infanticide does, by offering a more compassionate route, provide for a more expeditious 
means of dealing with troubled women who kill their infants in pitiable situations. 
Ultimately, the infanticide statutes appear to serve the criminal justice system quite well in 
their current form by allowing for special lenient treatment for deserving mothers. 
Accordingly, it may be rash to do away with infanticide. However, cases in which it might 
be relevant could perhaps be classified within the category of “other impairment” discussed 
below.  In 1997 the New South Wales Law Reform Commission argued that infanticide 
should be subsumed within the defence of diminished responsibility, arguing that this 
“would have the advantage of not limiting the type of mental disturbance which might give 
rise to the defence”.1115  
                                                 
1109  At 155. 
1110  At 155-156. 
1111  At 156. 
1112  At 156. 
1113  Karen Brennan “Beyond the Medical Model: A Rationale for Infanticide Legislation” (2007) 58(4) 
NILQ 505 at 519. 
1114  At 534. 
1115  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Partial Defences to Murder (Report 83, 1997) at 3.30 
cited in Lorana Bartels and Patricia Easteal “Mothers who kill: the forensic use and judicial reception 
of evidence of postnatal depression and other psychiatric disorders in Australian filicide cases” (2013) 




There is sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that many parents who kill their children 
are suffering from sometimes quite acute mental distress. There may be factors impacting 
on a defendant’s ability to think rationally, which may not amount to any recognised 
disorder. Oberman notes that the vast majority of women in her study of mothers who kill 
were experiencing some form of extreme emotional distress at the time of their crimes.1116 
Yet their illness may not meet one of the fundamental legal tests for insanity, namely the 
requirement that the illness constitute a “disease of the mind”.   
Given that insanity, for the purposes of the Crimes Act, is a legal, not medical, construct, a 
woman who kills her child even while suffering from a serious mental disorder, may not 
always avail themselves of a defence.  While the mental disorder may, in some 
circumstances, be a factor to be considered in sentencing, disorders falling short of “disease 
of the mind”1117 do not mitigate culpability for the offence.  This has the consequence that 
a defendant who might suffer from “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour 
that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture … manifested in 
impulse control”1118 (for example) is as legally culpable for the offence as someone not 
suffering any such disorder.  This is because the prosecution must prove the mental 
elements required for murder (either intent to kill or intent to cause injury known to cause 
death).  If there is no evidence which casts a reasonable doubt on whether or not the accused 
possessed those mental states, then conviction for murder will most certainly result.  
However, while the insanity defence is set at a very high threshold, it is not my position 
that this threshold be lowered to take account of a plethora of mental illnesses.  It is possible 
to lower the culpability threshold in other ways, but we need to consider what the 
unintended consequences of lowering a culpability threshold might be.  Are there 
consequences to taking away a person’s right to be responsible? What are possible ways 
forward for achieving equity of disposal while recognising degrees of culpability? 
                                                 
1116  Oberman “Understanding Infanticide”, above n 1035, at 713 citing Cheryl Meyer and Michelle 
Oberman Mothers who kill their children: Understanding the Acts of Moms from Susan Smith to the 
‘Prom Mom’ (NYU Press, New York, 2001). 
1117  The defence of insanity is not solely dependent upon a finding of “disease of the mind”.  As set out 
in s 23(2), the disease of the mind or natural imbecility must also be of such extent to render the actor 
incapable of either understanding the nature and quality of their act or of knowing that the act was 
morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. 
1118  From the definition of “personality disorder” in American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (4th ed, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
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In the context of MSBP, Steelman asks whether the law should address it as a particularly 
vicious form of child abuse, or as a psychiatric disease that prevents a defendant from 
exercising proper judgment?1119 Some clearly take the former view, arguing, in the context 
of “Medical Child Abuse” (MCA), also known as MSBP or FDOIA:1120  
Pediatricians should not take into account the apparent intentions of the caregiver when 
there are clinical grounds to suspect MCA. Nor should they rule out the possibility of 
MCA on the basis of the caregiver’s psychiatric history. MCA is no different in 
principle to any other form of child cruelty. 
This thesis considers the question in broader terms – where a disorder falling short of legal 
insanity prevents a defendant from exercising proper judgment, should that be relevant to 
moral blameworthiness?  Steelman suggests that the criminal justice system views MSBP 
as a form of behaviour rather than a disease.  In the desire to punish a defendant for their 
bad act, the relevance of the defendant’s true mental state is ignored.1121  The law fails to 
ensure justice because it does not consider the possibility that the defendant may have been 
operating under diminished capacity.1122  This leads to wide variation in sentencing:1123 
Virtually relying upon the “luck of the draw,” sentences for mothers who killed their 
children while suffering from postpartum psychosis vary from probation to between eight 
and twenty years imprisonment. 
As Barton observed:1124 
The same murder by the same mother could receive different treatment depending upon 
the jurisdictions laws, particular jury, or even the beliefs of a particular judge. 
Writing about neonaticide, Schwartz and Isser make the point that while many cases appear 
at least superficially similar, there are often circumstances unique to the individual that 
point against rational thinking at the time of the baby’s birth.  Schwartz and Isser argue that 
those circumstances need to be considered in determining the charge as well as being 
relevant to sentencing decisions.1125 
                                                 
1119  Steelman, above n 1095, at 264. 
1120  Gregory Yates and Christopher Bass “The perpetrators of medical child abuse (Munchausen 
Syndrome by Proxy) – A systematic review of 796 cases” (2017) 72 Child Abuse & Negl 45. 
1121  Steelman, above n 1095, at 282. 
1122  At 290. 
1123  Liu, above n 1068. 
1124 B Barton “Comment: when murdering hands rock the cradle: an overview of America’s incoherent 
treatment of infanticidal mothers” (1998) 51 South Methodist Univ Law Rev 591 cited in Schwartz 
and Isser, above n 1067, at 111.  
1125  Schwartz and Isser, above n 1067, at 104. 
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Proposed reform – absence of mens rea 
Steelman argues, in the context of MSBP that:1126 
… evidence of … an abnormal mental condition that does not constitute legal insanity, 
should be admissible to prove that the mother could not or did not have the specific intent 
or state of mind to murder her child. 
One of the ways in which consistency in outcomes can be achieved, in terms of convictions 
at least, is by allowing juries to be instructed that they may take an accused’s mental 
disorder (whether it amounts to “disease of the mind” or not) into account in determining 
whether the accused acted with the requisite intent.  This is consistent with the law as it 
relates to evidence of voluntary intoxication, to the extent that such intoxication can be 
evidence from which it can be inferred that the accused did not form the required mens rea 
for the crime charged.  In both cases, it is the fact of intent, rather than the capacity for 
intent that is relevant.  Allowing such evidence (where available and relevant) in child 
homicide cases allows a defendant’s mental state at the time of the offence to be given due 
weight, without going so far as to constitute a defence of diminished responsibility.  It 
would acknowledge that not every case of child homicide involves mental or emotional 
impairment. However, in cases where there is a “credible narrative” of impairment, 
evidence as to any mental disorder may create a reasonable doubt as to her criminal intent.  
“Credible narrative” is the language used in determining whether self-defence should go 
to a jury and there is a strong case for adopting it in this context. The case of Harrison-
Taylor, above, provides a good example where there was a credible narrative of 
impairment and/or mental disturbance from which a properly instructed jury could have 
found that the defendant was not fully accountable for her actions.  
As argued in ch 3 with reference to young defendants, many defences are argued on the 
basis that an accused did not have the mens rea for the offence relied upon.  It is therefore 
vital that defence lawyers make use of expert witnesses to provide the court with 
information on the implications of mental disorder on culpability to support an argument 
that mens rea was not present.1127  This evidence has a counter-intuitive function which is 
essential in demonstrating to a jury that an offender’s actions may not be consistent with 
                                                 
1126  Steelman, above n 1095, at 264-265. 
1127  Patricia Puritz and Katayoon Majd “Ensuring Authentic Youth Participation in Delinquency Cases: 
Creating a Paradigm for Specialized Juvenile Defense Practice” (2007) 45 Fam Court Rev 466 at 
474-475.   
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the requisite mens rea.  See ch 3 for a fuller discussion on these arguments and the 
admissibility of expert evidence on mental states and behaviour.  
Proposed reform – extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
Another means of mitigating the harshness of the classical model of criminal justice in 
cases is the adoption of a defence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED).  A 
few United States jurisdictions adopt a version of the Model Penal Code provision for this 
defence which reduces a murder charge to a manslaughter charge if the:1128 
… murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such 
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's 
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. 
Oberman notes that this provision reflects a modernisation of the “heat of passion” defence 
to homicide.1129  Another name for the heat of passion defence is provocation, which 
provided for reduced charges if the defendant could show that he or she was provoked by 
some external stimulus that prompted an immediate violent reaction.1130  In New Zealand 
this would have arguably fallen within the defence of provocation, and in the same way 
that New Zealand’s defence of provocation utilised a hybrid subjective-objective test, the 
Model Penal Code takes into account the circumstances from the viewpoint of the 
accused. 1131   There must be a reasonable explanation for the extreme emotional 
disturbance, but juries are also required to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
response to the circumstances, from the defendant’s viewpoint.1132 
Wong argues that EMED is broad enough to encompass women suffering from post-
partum psychosis and goes further to suggest that EMED could apply to cases of “slow 
provocation” in which sleep deprived, stressed, overworked, unsupported mothers are 
pushed slowly to the breaking point.1133  This approach would benefit filicidal mothers 
whose psychosis was not severe enough to satisfy the test for insanity but there is also no 
reason why it cannot be extended to other defendants who are pushed to the breaking point 
by other factors.  
                                                 
1128  Model Penal Code (US), § 210.3(1)(b). 
1129  Michelle Oberman “‘Lady Madonna”, above n 1026, at 64. 
1130  Abigail Wong “Filicide and mothers who suffer from postpartum mental disorders” (2006) 10 Mich 
St U J Med & L 571 at 584. 
1131  Michelle Oberman “‘Lady Madonna”, above n 1026, at 64. 
1132  At 64. 
1133  Wong, above n 1130, at 585. 
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Unlike provocation, EMED does not require an immediate response to the provoking event.  
Nor does the provoking event have to be external to the defendant.1134 This makes the 
defence appropriate to cases in which a defendant kills as a result of long standing internal 
emotional stresses.1135  Ford argues that:1136 
The fact that these stresses are often socially and externally induced provides further 
support for their reasonableness as provocative or extremely disturbing events. 
However, some commentators have identified potential problems with the use of an 
EMED defence for filicidal mothers.  It is argued that the fact that criminal behaviour has 
its roots in an individual’s social, economic or cultural background applies more widely 
than the context of mothers who kill.  As Oberman notes, allowing such factors to mitigate 
legal responsibility can have a destabilising effect on the whole legal system, rooted as it is 
in the classical model which focuses on the conduct not the individual.   Yet Oberman’s 
response to this concern is that perhaps:1137 
… our entire jurisprudence of criminal responsibility needs to be reworked in view of 
contemporary understandings of the interplay between mental illness and human behavior.  
This is precisely my point. However, it is important in this “reworking” to be cautious about 
the potential for exploitation. For example, we ought to guard against the possibility that 
an EMED type defence could be used by, for example, a defendant who kills their children 
where the primary motive is spousal revenge, notwithstanding that there may also be 
extreme mental and emotional distress. Likewise, we would not want an EMED-type 
defence to be relied upon to mitigate a “spousal infidelity” killing. Ford suggests that fears 
about the potential for abuse of the defence can be tempered by not considering mitigating 
factors unless society is confident that the defendant is not dangerous.1138  To that we could 
add, “or unless society is confident that the defendant is deserving of mercy”. 
Oberman notes concern that all women would be pathologised if the legal system 
recognised that mental illness may be partly due to the conditions in which a mother 
attempts to raise her child.  Oberman thinks this is unlikely, but even it were so, the law 
might be able to influence change but bringing into focus what might be done to alter the 
circumstances in which many of these killings occur.  Further, I suggest that EMED could 
                                                 
1134  Janet Ford “Susan Smith and other homicidal mothers” (1996) 3 Cardozo Women’s LJ 521 at 532. 
1135  At 532. 
1136  At 542. 
1137  Oberman “‘Lady Madonna”, above n 1026, at 66. 
1138  Ford, above n 1135, at 546. 
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and should apply even where there is no evidence of mental disorder per se, but where 
there is clear evidence of disturbance; and further that the defence ought not just to apply 
to mothers, or indeed, women. 
One further problem that arises with the EMED defence in New Zealand is the fact that the 
legislature has already repealed the provocation defence.  There were thought to be a 
number of problems with the defence, one of which was the confusion surrounding the 
hybrid subjective-objective test that it imposed.1139  It is unlikely at this stage that the 
legislature would be willing to re-enact a provision that has its roots in a provocation 
defence, particularly one that could be availed by an accused who kills an unfaithful partner 
or who kills in response to a sexual advance.   
Proposed reform – diminished responsibility 
In Australia, the majority of jurisdictions include within the purview of insanity or mental 
illness/impairment, situations in which the defendant could not control their conduct.1140 
In addition, some Australian jurisdictions also provide for a defence of diminished 
responsibility or substantial impairment, which essentially apply where the defendant was 
suffering from an abnormality of mind that substantially impaired their mental 
capacity.1141  This defence has been successful where defendants have suffered from 
severe depression and, interestingly, personality disorders.1142 
The elements of the English and Scots diminished responsibility defences have already 
been canvassed in ch 3,  but in the particular context of this chapter, it is worth restating the 
words of Lord Justice General Rodger (for the High Court of Justiciary) in Galbraith v HM 
Advocate (No 2):1143 
While the plea of diminished responsibility will be available only where the accused's 
abnormality of mind had substantial effects in relation to his act, there is no requirement 
that his state of mind should have bordered on insanity. 
                                                 
1139  See the line of cases beginning with R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 (CA) and including R v 
McCarthy [1992] 2 NZLR 550, (1992) 8 CRNZ 58 (CA), R v Campbell [1997] 1 NZLR 16, (1996) 
14 CRNZ 117 (CA), R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA) and R v Makoare [2001] 1 NZLR 318, 
(2000) 18 CRNZ 511 (CA). 
1140  Bartels and Easteal, above n 1115, at 301-302. 
1141  At 303. 
1142  At 303. 
1143  Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2001 SLT 953 (HCJ) at [54] (emphasis added). 
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On the other hand, it was observed in the same case that Scots law does not recognise 
psychopathic personality disorder as a basis for diminished responsibility.1144  Regardless, 
the theory behind a defence of diminished responsibility, were it to be adopted in New 
Zealand, would be to provide a means of dealing with mental, and arguably other, 
impairments that do not meet the strict insanity test, or indeed would not necessarily meet 
the diminished responsibility tests in other jurisdictions.  Because New Zealand does not 
currently provide for diminished responsibility we have a blank slate upon which we can 
write a “bespoke” defence to suit the particular gap that currently exists in the law. Indeed, 
there is no requirement that such a defence centres on the concept of “abnormality of 
mental functioning” or “abnormality of mind” as the defences in England and Wales and 
Scotland do. There is, therefore, scope for other circumstances, such as those faced by 
Knox above, for example, to diminish the responsibility of the defendant.  
SUMMARY 
There is no limit to the circumstances in which child homicide occurs.  Just as the 
circumstances of killings vary, so does moral culpability.  Presently the criminal justice 
system lumps most of these cases together, with the result that Knox, who killed her 
severely disabled, violent and disruptive daughter after years of caring for her, is labelled a 
murderer in the same way as Little who intentionally drowned his daughter after being 
served custody papers. As Ford observes:1145 
Death resulting from child abuse may, in some cases, exemplify a situation in which an 
impulsive and unintended murder is actually more culpable and dangerous than a planned 
and intended killing of one's child. 
Even when we compare Knox’s case to that of the Nelson father who was acquitted of 
murder and manslaughter after killing his 5-month-old daughter who had been diagnosed 
with “incomplete lissencephaly”, we could argue that Knox’s moral culpability was at least 
on the same plane by virtue of the fact that she had suffered years of the extreme stress 
involved in taking care of her daughter. Similarly, how is Harrison-Taylor’s intentional 
killing of her infant son more morally blameworthy than a neonaticide or infanticide case? 
Given that Harrison-Taylor had other children to care for, including Gabriel’s twin, her 
                                                 
1144  At [54]. 
1145  Ford, above n 1134, at 525. 
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conduct, can be viewed as a “mothering decision” in much the same way as neonaticide 
and infanticide cases (albeit that these are misguided decisions). 
A related problem is that when there are potential alternative categorisations for child 
homicide (infanticide, for example) there is an inconsistent approach to determining what 
cases should fall into those categories. Partially this is a result of prosecutorial discretion so 
if more options were available to prosecutors as a sorting tool this would undoubtedly 
reduce the inconsistencies. The same argument applies to judges and juries – giving them 
more options with which to label the defendant’s conduct will lead to outcomes which are 





Chapter 6: Recommendations and 
Conclusion 
This thesis concludes by returning to the James Bulger case and the regret of juror Vincent 
Moss that there were few options available to him and his fellow jurors in determining the 
culpability of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson for killing the young boy.1146  This 
thesis had its genesis in this lament which led to the formulation of the italicised question 
set out in the thesis statement below: 
The criminal justice system in New Zealand is underpinned by an assumption of individual 
rationality which is not always supported. Thus, the legal regime for apportioning blame 
in cases of culpable homicide is insufficient to recognise the different degrees of moral 
blame which can exist when one individual kills another.  This leads to inconsistent 
outcomes for factually similar cases, contrary to the rule of law which requires equality 
before the law.  This thesis will consider the question of whether changing the definitions 
of murder and manslaughter will allow courts to legitimately recognise all relevant 
mitigating circumstances in determining guilt, and whether there are other options for 
reform that might better deliver justice in the round. 
While the Venables and Thompson trial took place in England, New Zealand criminal law 
currently operates within similar, if not more stringent, constraints, as the preceding 
chapters have attempted to demonstrate. This chapter will summarise the proposals for 
reform set out in those chapters and suggest some ways in which those reforms could 
potentially be implemented (alongside other proposals) into a coherent scheme for more 
accurately pinpointing degrees of moral blame in culpable homicide cases. I acknowledge 
that there are alternative frameworks that may achieve the same or similar results. 
Ultimately it is for the legislature to decide what, if any, changes ought to be made to the 
criminal law. 
This chapter will begin by briefly revisiting the theoretical framework of this thesis to 
demonstrate the critical link between science and the law and its application to culpable 
homicide, before proposing new degrees of culpable homicide and its defences. 
                                                 
1146  Vincent Moss, juror in the trial of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson for the murder of James 




SCIENCE AND THE LAW 
One of the major issues at the centre of this thesis is the extent to which human action (in 
the context of this thesis, the killing of one human being by another human being) is 
necessarily the result of the exercise of free will. It is not disputed that human action is the 
product of an extensive range of causes, among which free will dominates. However, other 
causes may have more explanatory power than previously thought, to an extent that, in 
some cases, may exclude a finding that a defendant’s action in killing another person was 
truly voluntary. The criminal law has always recognised some such circumstances. This 
thesis argues that circumstances in which free will may be diminished are much wider than 
the criminal law has historically acknowledged.  Scientific research, as canvassed in ch 2, 
has disclosed a number of factors which may negate a finding of free in will in some 
circumstances, and amplify it in others.  
The reason for exploring the underpinnings of undesirable behaviour is so that we can 
regulate that behaviour.  It is helpful to look for explanations before we look to solutions.  
Despite the fact that there are a multitude of socio-cultural theories explaining homicide, 
very few societies have managed to curb its incidence. The question here is whether 
evolutionary and other scientific theories will assist in that endeavour.  
Evolutionary theorists do not focus on homicide per se, but rather on general patterns in 
human behaviour.1147 For Jones, law is a lever for moving human behaviour in directions 
it would not go on its own.  Accordingly, law’s fulcrum is the behavioural model upon 
which it relies.1148 Based upon the foregoing, it is conceivable that the behavioural model 
provided by evolutionary and other psychologies can at least supplement the models that 
the law has traditionally relied upon.  
It is important to note, however, that law’s reliance on evolutionary theory is not universally 
supported.  Wax suggests that evolutionary theory offers only meagre payoffs in terms of 
implications for legal policy.1149  Others go further – Leiter and Weisberg argue that the 
                                                 
1147  Owen D Jones “Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior” (1997) 8 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 167 at 176. 
1148  Owen D Jones “Time-shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: behavioral economics 
meets behavioral biology” (2001) 95 NWU L Rev 1141 at 1187-188. 
1149  Amy L Wax “Evolution and the bounds of man” (2004) 23(6) Law & Phil 527 at 531. 
231 
 
law and evolutionary biology is a “fad” with a short shelf life.1150 Even Jones, whose work 
has been heavily criticised by Leiter and Weisberg, acknowledges that the question of 
whether biology plays a role in behaviour is different to that of whether it ought to play a 
role in criminal justice.1151 Jones draws attention to the naturalistic fallacy and observes 
that we cannot simply move from facts (biology) to normative conclusions without passing 
through a prism of human values.1152  However, he does note that genetic information can 
be put to any number of purposes, including mitigating responsibility.1153 
I suggest that it is this determination of responsibility which answers in the affirmative the 
question of whether biology ought to play a role (in addition to other factors) in the criminal 
justice system. As discussed in ch 2, the question often asked by decision-makers in 
homicide cases (among others) is “why did the defendant do it?” Understanding the 
motivations behind homicide allows us to draw conclusions about the degree of moral 
blame involved in that killing, as the examples in the following paragraphs demonstrate. 
Where a mother kills her child while she is suffering from substantial impairment (perhaps 
for a combination of reasons – lack of support and resources, physical or mental illness) – 
these factors explain the killing and mitigate responsibility because we, as members of 
society, appreciate that she ought not to be held fully accountable for her actions because 
these factors are beyond her control and impair her ability “to determine or control [her] 
conduct”.1154 Similar arguments can be made in respect of a mother who fails to protect 
her child from the violence of another – the coercive control experienced by the mother 
substantially impairs her ability to determine or control her conduct. The psychological 
effects of prolonged abuse explain her failure to act and are therefore relevant to 
determinations of moral blame.  
Evolutionary theory suggests that because biologically unrelated infants cannot contribute 
to an individual’s reproductive success, they do not evoke the same solicitousness as a 
genetic relative. 1155   This has some explanatory power in the context of fatal child 
                                                 
1150  Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg “Why evolutionary biology is (so far) irrelevant to legal 
regulation” (2010) 29(1) Law & Phil 31 at 34. 
1151  Owen D Jones “Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context” (2006) 69 LCP 81 at 94-95. 
1152  At 94. 
1153  At 94. 
1154  This is the wording used in the Scottish diminished responsibility provision. 
1155  Owen D Jones “Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An introduction and application to child abuse” 
(1997) 75 NC L Rev 1117 at 1177-178. 
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maltreatment committed by mother’s boyfriends. Such killings are not part of a deliberate 
strategy to divest a perpetrator of an unwanted dependant, but they can demonstrate a 
reckless indifference particularly if the killing is preceded by a history of assault or torture 
towards the victim. This reckless indifference makes the killing more morally blameworthy 
than other types of child homicide, even those in which there may be intent to kill, such as 
a “substantial impairment” type of killing as described above. On the other hand, a 
defendant who commits spousal revenge homicide is likely to be seen as more morally 
blameworthy than one who commits a recklessly indifferent child maltreatment homicide, 
because of the intention to victimise their spouse by using an innocent child. Further, while 
male sexual proprietariness may, at least partially, explain spousal revenge homicides, it 
does not excuse or mitigate them. On the contrary, moral blameworthiness is exacerbated 
by the deliberate and malicious use of a child to achieve their nefarious purpose.  
A final example is killing in self-defence. Self-preservation is a deep driver of human 
behaviour, so it is argued that homicide in the context of self-defence is “fitness-
enhancing”. 1156  In other words, self-defensive reactions are adaptive. 1157  So when a 
defendant kills another, in the honest belief their own life was at stake, the killing is 
explained by evolutionary theory and, I should add, moral responsibility is mitigated 
because the legal system accepts the validity of that explanation. 
At the heart of this thesis is the idea that homicide, like any criminal offence, is human 
behaviour. There are myriad reasons for why people kill but looking at the deeper 
motivations for the killing rather than what is apparent on the surface can lead to a better 
ability to more accurately reflect moral blame.  
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Figure 2 is a pictorial overview of the range of proposed offences (degrees of culpable 
homicide and other offences) and defences to culpable homicide.  The dotted lines 
represent alternative possibilities.  Because of the existence of these alternative possibilities, 
were any of these proposals to come into effect, some cross-referencing would need to be 
incorporated. 
                                                 
1156  Theodore Y Blumoff “The neuropsychology of justifications and excuses: some problematic cases 
of self-defense, duress, and provocation” (2010) 50(3) Jurimetrics 391at 393. 
1157  At 421. 
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I will discuss each of the proposals in more detail below.   
Figure 2: Proposed degrees of culpable homicide, lesser offences, and defences 
 
 
The proposals set out in this chapter may vary slightly in their wording and scope than the 
proposals set out in the preceding chapters. The proposals identified in chs 3-5 are broadly 
drawn while the proposals set out in this chapter have been re-drafted to create a coherent, 
internally consistent, regime.  This chapter, for the sake of completeness, necessarily 
includes a discussion of other types of homicides that are not specifically addressed in chs 
3-5 including, for example, “one punch” killings; killings following a pattern of abusive or 
coercive behaviour; killings that are hate crimes; and euthanasia.  It will be apparent that 
these proposals do not include absence of mens rea arguments which are mooted in chs 3 
and 4. This is because the law already provides for these arguments to be made – in many 
cases without much success from the perspective of defendants. For this reason I suggest 
structural change is imperative. 
It must be emphasised that the proposal set out here is only one way of apportioning blame 
for culpable homicide, reflecting as it does a particular view of moral blameworthiness. 
However, this view would, I think, be supported by others. There is a suggestion that New 
Zealanders’ attitudes toward law and order issues may not be as hardline as once 
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thought.1158 At the same time that wide-ranging reforms are proposed to reduce our prison 
population, there are indications that the “tough on crime” sentiment is shifting. 1159 
Further, as mentioned in ch 2, when the public is better informed, it is less likely to take an 
unjustly punitive approach.1160 Euthanasia (and other altruistic killings, for that matter) are 
useful examples of where many would not seek to convict or stigmatise someone who 
acted genuinely to assist another. At the other end of the spectrum, many may also feel that 
someone who kills a child to victimise another parent is worthy of a higher degree of 
condemnation than, say, someone who perpetrates a fatal child maltreatment homicide. It 
is this element of condemnation and stigmatisation (or lack thereof) that is important here, 
rather than the length of sentence. 
However, even if these particular weightings of moral blame are not supported, the 
framework set out below does provide a flexible template into which other conceptions of 
moral blame can be imported.  
Degrees of culpable homicide 
Because the United States employs a “degrees of murder” framework, its range of 
approaches provide a good starting point for the development of a regime appropriate to 
the New Zealand context which better reflects degrees of moral blame identified in the 
preceding chapters.  Title 18 of the United States Code Annotated (USCA), the United 
States federal criminal code, provides the following definitions of murder:1161 
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every 
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, 
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to 
perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, 
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or 
perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or 
children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to 
effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first 
degree. 
Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 
(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, 
Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life; 
                                                 
1158  Laura Walters “Is New Zealand’s attitude towards law and order changing?” (27 July 2018) 
<www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/105215188/is-new-zealands-attitude-towards-law-and-order-
changing>. 
1159  Walters, above n 1158. 
1160  David A Green “Public opinion versus public judgments about crime: correcting the ‘Comedy of 
Errors’” (2006) 46(1) Brit J Criminol 131 at 132. 
1161  18 USCA § 1111. 
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Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years 
or for life. 
(c) For purposes of this section-- 
(1) the term “assault” has the same meaning as given that term in section 
113; 
(2) the term “child” means a person who has not attained the age of 18 
years and is- 
(A) under the perpetrator’s care or control; or 
(B) at least six years younger than the perpetrator; 
(3) the term “child abuse” means intentionally or knowingly causing death 
or serious bodily injury to a child; 
(4) the term “pattern or practice of assault or torture” means assault or 
torture engaged in on at least two occasions; 
(5) the term “serious bodily injury” has the meaning set forth in section 
1365; and 
(6) the term “torture” means conduct, whether or not committed under the 
color of law, that otherwise satisfies the definition set forth in section 
2340(1). 
The United States Model Penal Code (MPC) provides:1162 
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder 
when: 
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or 
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor 
is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual 
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious 
escape. 
(2) Murder is a felony of the first degree [but a person convicted of murder may be 
sentenced to death, as provided in Section 210.6]. 
Section 210.3(1)(b) MPC provides:1163 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: 
(a) it is committed recklessly; or 
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable 
explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall 
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
 
Finally, the MPC also provides for negligent homicide:1164 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed negligently.  
(2) Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree. 
It has been suggested that the MPC is:1165 
                                                 
1162  Model Penal Code § 210.1, Criminal Homicide.  
1163  Model Penal Code Model Penal Code § 210.3, Manslaughter. 
1164  Model Penal Code § 210.4, Negligent Homicide. 
1165  Paul H Robinson and Markus D Dubber “The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview” 
(2007) 10(3) New Crim L Rev 319 at 320. 
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… the closest thing to being an American criminal code. The federal criminal code is too  
unsystematic and incomplete in theory and too irrelevant in practice to function as a 
national code … And the code and its commentaries have been the intellectual focus of 
much American criminal law scholarship since the code’s promulgation. 
The following proposed degrees of culpable homicide structure draws on both the USCA 
and the MPC as each provides useful templates from which to build a framework that 
reflects the degrees of moral blame that have been identified in this thesis and other degrees 
which have not been specifically addressed in the preceding chapters.  Therefore, 
categories such as killing as a hate crime, killing following a history of abuse, one-punch 
killings and others are included in this proposal for the sake of completeness. 
First-degree murder 
It is proposed here that first-degree murder includes the following elements:  
a) Where the killing is one which would fall within the current s 168 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 – in other words, felony murder 
Section 168 provides: 
168  Further definition of murder 
(1) Culpable homicide is also murder in each of the following cases, whether the 
offender means or does not mean death to ensue, or knows or does not know that 
death is likely to ensue: 
(a) if he or she means to cause grievous bodily injury for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of any of the offences mentioned in 
subsection (2) of this section, or facilitating the flight or avoiding the 
detection of the offender upon the commission or attempted 
commission thereof, or for the purpose of resisting lawful 
apprehension in respect of any offence whatsoever, and death ensues 
from such injury: 
(b) if he or she administers any stupefying or overpowering thing for any 
of the purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from the effects thereof: 
(c) if he or she by any means wilfully stops the breath of any person for 
any of the purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from such stopping of 
breath. 
(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1) are those specified in the following 
provisions of this Act, namely: 
(a) section 73 (treason) or section 78 (communicating secrets): 
(b) section 79 (sabotage): 
(c) section 92 (piracy): 
(d) section 93 (piratical acts): 
(e) section 119 to 122 (escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody or 
detention): 
(f) section 128 (sexual violation): 
(g) section 167 (murder): 
(h) section 208 (abduction): 
(i) section 209 (kidnapping): 
(j) section 231 (burglary): 
(k) section 234 (robbery): 
(l) section 267 (arson). 
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Most of the states in the United States have retained the common law felony murder 
rule.1166  In New Zealand, in R v Tuhoro, it was observed that:1167 
Section 168 reflects a policy deeming persons to be guilty of murder when they have 
intentionally inflicted serious injury for the purpose of facilitating the commission of 
specified offences at the higher end of the scale. Uniquely, in relation to definition of 
murder, foresight of a killing is not required; the provision is explicit in that respect. At 
common law death caused in the commission of a felony involving personal violence was 
murder … 
The MPC does not explicitly retain the common law felony murder rule, but it does provide 
for a presumption of recklessness and indifference if the murder occurs in the commission 
of a felony. The USCA requires that all murder is killing with malice aforethought but is 
silent on the question of whether foresight of death is necessary for a first-degree murder. 
It is my view, as already stated in this thesis, that there are problems with the current 
operation of s 168, particularly in the contexts of secondary parties and young offenders. It 
is suggested here, therefore, firstly that first-degree murder requires, at the very least, 
foresight of death; and secondly that the age of prosecution for first degree murder should 
not be lower than 18 years. 
b) Where the killing is a hate crime 
Section 9(1) of the New Zealand Sentencing Act 2002 sets out a list of aggravating factors 
that must be taken into account “to the extent that they are applicable in the case”. I have 
argued elsewhere in this thesis that the nature of a conviction is important because of the 
stigma and social reaction associated with, for example, a conviction for murder rather than 
manslaughter. To that end, at least one of the aggravating factors identified in s 9(1) would 
better reflect moral blame if considered at the conviction stage rather than at sentencing. 
Section 9(1)(h) provides that it is an aggravating factor where an offender commits an 
offence: 
… partly or wholly because of hostility towards a group of persons who have an enduring 
common characteristic such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, sexual 
orientation, age, or disability; and 
(i) the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
(ii) the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic … 
 
                                                 
1166  At 320. 
1167  R v Tuhoro [1998] 3 NZLR 568, (1998) 15 CRNZ 568 (CA) at 573. 
238 
 
Although killing as a hate crime is not within the scope of this thesis, insofar as degrees of 
moral blame go, I suggest there are parallels here with revenge killings. That is, a killing 
driven partly or wholly because of hostility toward that person based on a characteristic 
such as those captured within s 9(1)(h) evidences a “bad motive” on the same plane as the 
spousal revenge killers identified in ch 5 and the other “bad motive” cases where the 
circumstances reveal a similarly high degree of moral blame. These include Mark Lundy, 
who murdered his wife, Christine, and daughter, Amber, in 2000; Steven Williams who 
intentionally killed Coral Burrows to cover up the crime of earlier assaulting her; Bruce 
Howse who killed Saliel Aplin and Olympia Jetson to punish them for, or prevent them 
from, making allegations of sexual offending against him.  
(c) Where the killing is an act of revenge against third party 
Where a victim is killed, partially or wholly, for the purpose of effecting revenge against a 
third party (even where the third party is themselves a victim), this ought to be first-degree 
murder. It does not matter that the death of a victim was not desired, so long as it was 
intended or foreseen as a consequence of the defendant’s intention to victimise the third 
party.  The language employed in the USCA definition of first degree murder is apt to 
describe these kinds of killings: with “malice aforethought” (in other words, intent), 
“willful”, “deliberate”, “malicious” and “premeditated”.  
As discussed in ch 5, the intentional murder of a vulnerable child as an act of vengeance 
against a spouse is in the category of more serious murders. Such cases do generally contain 
an element of “malice aforethought” even if the degree of forethought may be quite small. 
However, even spur of the moment killings in these contexts do establish a “bad motive”, 
which aggravates the killing. A number of these types of killings are preceded by sexual 
proprietariness or coercive controlling behaviour on the part of the perpetrator which, it is 
argued, aggravates the killing. At a time where violence against women is overwhelmingly 
perpetrated by men and, more often than not, in the context of marital breakdown,1168 this 
                                                 
1168  In the four years from 2009 to 2012, 76 per cent of intimate partner violence-related deaths were 
perpetrated by men, 24 per cent were perpetrated by women; 1 in 3 women experience physical 
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deaths occur at the time of actual or intended separation;76 per cent of recorded assaults against 




type of killing ought to be highlighted as malicious and stigmatised by a first-degree murder 
conviction. 
A question arises as to whether the killing of a child as an act of revenge against a non-
spouse also ought to fall within this provision. There is no reason why it should not, so long 
as the death of the child was intentional. Where the death of the child was not intended, but 
that of another person, then it may be difficult to establish the right amount of malice 
required for first-degree murder. Take, for example, the case of Jhia Harmony Te Tua, aged 
2 years old, who was killed by a bullet intended for her father, in the context of gang 
retaliation. The perpetrator fired the gun into the house, presumably unaware that Jhia was 
asleep on a couch inside.1169 While the murder charges were laid on the basis of either s 
167(c) (transferred malice) or s 167(d) (unlawful object), transferred malice would 
arguably be an insufficient basis for a first-degree murder conviction under the scheme 
proposed in this thesis. This would be because the perpetrator did not intend to use the child 
as a means of retaliation. It is this intention to exact revenge via the child’s death that makes 
the killing first-degree murder. 
(d) Where the killing is preceded by a history of abuse toward the victim 
As noted in ch 4, cases in which victims of violence or coercion kill their abusers are 
relatively rare.  On the other hand, the number of women who are killed by men identified 
as their current or former partners is estimated to range between roughly two-thirds to 
three-quarters of femicide. 1170   Intimate partner violence is a serious issue in many 
countries, but New Zealand is said to have one of the worst rates of family violence in the 
world.  The impact of family violence homicide extends far beyond the primary victims, 
such as leaving children to grow up without their mother, and the fracturing of families. 
Sometimes these homicides are even witnessed by children. Over the years many public 
campaigns have been directed at the issue including the “It’s not okay” campaign. The aim 
of this thesis is not to solve the problem of intimate partner or family violence, but one way 
of saying “it’s not okay” is legal condemnation of the conduct. Where a defendant kills a 
current or former partner following a pattern of abusive behaviour (including violence and 
                                                 
1169  R v Check [2009] NZCA 548. 
1170  See above at ch 4. 
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coercive and controlling conduct) this pattern of behaviour elevates the moral 
blameworthiness of the conduct.  
England and Wales and Scotland have both enacted versions of a coercive control-type 
offence, and while some question whether criminalising coercive control is the right 
response to intimate partner violence,1171 one potential benefit of criminalising abusive and 
coercive behaviour is that convictions for the offence could be relied upon as aggravating 
factors which uplift a subsequent killing to first-degree murder. In this sense such killings 
are arguably on the same moral plane as spousal revenge killings. 
Walklate and others express concern about drawing a line between benign relationship 
behaviour, such as wanting to know what the other party is doing, and behaviour which 
can properly be called surveillance or stalking.1172 These are legitimate concerns and, were 
New Zealand to create an offence of coercive control, it would need to be carefully drafted 
in an attempt to draw such a line. Of critical importance, in the context of the current 
discussion, is a victim’s experience of the behaviour in question. If a victim is sufficiently 
concerned about the behaviour to make a complaint to the police (assuming the complaint 
originates from her) and she is at some later point killed by the defendant, then the 
complaint (if substantiated by a conviction) is evidence of non-benign behaviour which 
should justify conviction for first-degree murder. 
Second-degree murder 
It is proposed here that second-degree murder includes the following elements:  
a) Where the killing is one which would fall within the current s 167 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 – in other words, ordinary murder 
Section 167 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides: 
Culpable homicide is murder in each of the following cases: 
(a) If the offender means to cause the death of the person killed: 
(b) If the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known 
to the offender to be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether death ensues 
or not: 
(c) If the offender means to cause death, or, being so reckless as aforesaid, means to 
cause such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person, and by accident or mistake 
kills another person, though he or she does not mean to hurt the person killed: 
                                                 
1171  Sandra Walklate, Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Jude McCulloch “Is more law the answer? Seeking justice 
for victims of intimate partner violence through the reform of legal categories” (2018) 18(1) Criminol 
Crim Justice 115 at 117 and see ch 4. 
1172  At 119. 
241 
 
(d) If the offender for any unlawful object does an act that he or she knows to be 
likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person, though he or she may have 
desired that his or her object should be effected without hurting any one. 
The USCA provides that second-degree murder is any murder that is not first-degree. A 
killing under s 167 may meet the USCA’s definition of a federal first-degree murder if 
certain characteristics were present, such as an intention to kill by poisoning or lying in 
wait etcetera. Interestingly, first-degree murder under the USCA includes premeditation 
which under New Zealand’s current regime would constitute “ordinary” murder as long as 
none of the features prescribed in s 168 are present. Premeditation is always a question of 
degree; questions arise about the point at which the degree of premeditation ought to 
elevate the killing to first-degree murder. This is not a question I attempt to answer here, as 
I propose that second-degree murder should include those cases currently captured by s 
167 but not s 168. Section 167 ought also to capture cases involving defendants aged under 
18 years unless a defence of developmental delay applies, as discussed below.  
b) Where the killing is perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault 
or torture against a child or children 
The above wording is taken from the USCA,1173 which defines “child” as a person who 
has not attained the age of 18 years and is under the perpetrator’s care or control; or is at 
least six years younger than the perpetrator. The term “pattern or practice of assault or 
torture” means assault or torture engaged in on at least two occasions. Under the federal 
criminal code, such a killing is first-degree murder. The provision also defines as first-
degree murder every “murder perpetrated … committed in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate, any … child abuse …”.  The provision defines “child abuse” as “intentionally 
or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child”. The MPC does not contain 
an explicit provision to cover fatal child maltreatment but does provide that murder is a 
first-degree felony where it is “committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life”.1174 
Given the difficulties, identified in ch 5, of prosecuting child homicide as murder (rather 
than manslaughter), it is suggested here that New Zealand enact a “homicide by abuse” 
provision along the following lines:1175 
                                                 
1173  18 USCA § 1111. 
1174  Model Penal Code § 210.1, Criminal Homicide. 
1175  See ch 5. 
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Culpable homicide is second degree murder where the offender, under circumstances 
manifesting reckless indifference to human life, causes the death of a child, and the person 
has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of the said child. 
As noted in ch 5, a number of the United States “homicide by abuse” provisions require 
“extreme” or “gross” indifference or, as in the MPC, “manifest” indifference. However, 
given that the present proposal classifies such killings as second- rather than first-degree 
murder, it is suggested that reckless indifference ought to be the standard – this is a lower 
standard than the United States provisions require, but recklessness is consistent with the 
mens rea standard required under s 167 and, under this proposal, the mens rea for second-
degree murder.  The reason for categorising fatal child maltreatment as second- rather than 
first-degree murder is that, while these killings are more morally blameworthy than 
manslaughter, they do not necessarily involve the same degree of malice that is inherent in, 
for example, spousal revenge homicides. 
c) Where the killing is the result of a “coward’s punch”/a result of the 
unlawful act of assault with intent to injure or injuring with intent 
Presently, even within the limits of the current regime, there is huge variation in the 
circumstances that give rise to manslaughter charges. Section 160(2) of the Crimes Act 
1961 provides: 
(2) Homicide is culpable when it consists in the killing of any person— 
(a) By an unlawful act; or 
(b) By an omission without lawful excuse to perform or observe any legal 
duty; or 
(c) By both combined; or 
(d) By causing that person by threats or fear of violence, or by deception, 
to do an act which causes his or her death; or 
(e) By wilfully frightening a child under the age of 16 years or a sick 
person. 
Where a defendant commits the actus reus of culpable homicide by an assault, for example, 
but does not have the mens rea required for murder, they will be guilty of manslaughter. 
This applies not only to defendants who commit relatively innocuous assaults as well as 
those who assault with more malicious intent. One example of such defendants is what are 
referred to as “one-punch killers” – as the phrase suggests, these defendants hit their victims 




Tyrone Palmer was convicted of manslaughter for the 2016 death of Matthew Coley. 
Palmer appealed against the sentence of 22 months imprisonment. In setting out the facts 
of the case, the Court of Appeal observed:1176 
This was a regrettably familiar offence; a one-punch manslaughter in which the victim was 
felled by an unexpected punch to the head and landed heavily on the ground, suffering 
predictable traumatic brain injury that led to his death. 
Coley was punched once in the head, with considerable force. He did not see it coming and 
had his hands at his sides at the time. He fell back and struck his head on the ground.  He 
died a few days later from “acute subdural haemorrhage”.1177  Shortly after the assault, 
Palmer described it to others as “a king hit”.1178 The Court of Appeal declined to set aside 
the sentence but imposed post-release conditions on the defendant. This case is 
complicated by the fact that the defendant, Palmer, was 16-years-old at the time of the 
killing and had an IQ score of 81. He had also been diagnosed with Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). On the night of the killing he had taken LSD and 
cannabis. These factors, particularly his age, low IQ and ADHD, arguably mitigate his 
liability. However, where these mitigating factors are not present, a question does arise 
about whether these types of killings ought to be categorised as more serious than a 
manslaughter conviction connotes. 
In 2013, Grenville McFarland, at the time a Combat Weapons Specialist for the Navy, was 
27 years old when he killed Tarun Asthana, after Asthana had slapped McFarland’s 
companion on the buttocks. McFarland punched Asthana once in the face with “significant 
force”. 1179  Asthana fell backwards striking his head “heavily” on the ground. 1180 
McFarland was sentenced to two years and four months’ imprisonment. 
In 2011, Matthew Larson, then aged 23, punched Steve Radnoty inside a McDonald’s 
Restaurant in Dunedin. Radnoty died a few hours later. Larson pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter and was sentenced to three years in jail. Larson had 27 previous convictions, 
including one for violence, in which he assaulted a female.1181  It is concerning to discover 
                                                 
1176  Palmer v R [2016] NZCA 541 at [2]. 
1177  At [5]. 
1178  At [4]. 
1179  R v McFarland [2014] NZHC 1106 at [5]. 
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that in August of 2018, Larson was sentenced to two years and ten months in prison for 
injuring with intent to injure a man with whom he had argued over a spilt drink. 
The difficulty in prosecuting these killings as murder is that the prosecution must prove, at 
a minimum, that the perpetrator intended to cause bodily injury to the victim that the 
perpetrator knew was likely to cause death and continued with the punch regardless of that 
risk. This is a subjective test – the perpetrator must have had an actual appreciation1182 of 
a “real risk, a substantial risk, something that might well happen”.1183  Usually perpetrators 
of this type of killing are prosecuted for manslaughter, because of the difficulty of proving, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the perpetrator did actually know of the risk. 
In Australia, a campaign, initiated by professional boxer Danny Green, has attempted to 
change the discourse around this type of attack by rebranding the king hit as a “coward’s 
punch”.1184 In New Zealand there have been calls for longer sentences to be imposed on 
perpetrators of this type of killing.1185 In February 2018, Northland MP Matt King put a 
proposed law into the ballot called the Crimes (Coward Punch Causing Death) 
Amendment Bill. It proposes to insert a new section – s 168A – into the Crimes Act 1961, 
as follows:1186 
168A Assault causing death 
(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years who— 
(a) assaults any other person with intent to hit the other person with any 
part of the person’s body or with an object held by the person; and 
(b) the assault is not authorised or excused by law; and 
(c)  the assault causes the death of the other person. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, an assault causes the death of a person whether 
the person is killed as a result of the injuries received directly from the assault or 
from hitting the ground or an object as a consequence of the assault. 
(3) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) it is not necessary to prove 
that the death was reasonably foreseeable. 
 
                                                 
1182  R v Harney [1987] 2 NZLR 576 (CA) at 579. 
1183  R v Piri [1987] 1 NZLR 66 (CA) at 79. 
1184  The Hon Peter Dutton MP “Stop the Coward's Punch Campaign” (press release, 25 May 2018). 
1185  See, for example, Nicholas Jones “Create ‘king hit’ offence and scrap revenue-gathering speed 
cameras – Winston Peters” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 14 October 2016). 
1186  Crimes (Cowards Punch Causing Death) Amendment Bill 2018. 
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In Dunedin, the death of Steve Radnoty prompted a police campaign directed at young 
men aged between 16 and 18 years, to encourage them to make positive choices when 
confronting situations.1187 
As with fatal child maltreatment deaths,1188 the publicity around “one-punch deaths” and 
“king hits” is likely to raise awareness of their potentially lethal consequences. So, the 
question arises whether, in that context of increased awareness, someone who kills another 
by assaulting them with intent to injure or injuring them with intent to cause grievous bodily 
harm ought not to be guilty of an offence that connotes a higher degree of moral blame 
than manslaughter. Bear in mind that currently the category of manslaughter can include 
cases where a person dies as a result of a defendant’s careless driving, or where a defendant 
fails to adequately supervise a child in their care, or where a surgeon’s conduct in treating 
a patient is a major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable surgeon.  
Where a defendant kills a victim by deliberately assaulting them, not intending to kill but 
nonetheless intending them some harm that is more than merely transitory and trifling,1189 
some might consider the killing more morally blameworthy than manslaughter cases 
constituted by criminal negligence. The higher degree of moral blame is attributed to the 
intention to cause harm by assaulting someone.  
Section 189 of the Crimes Act 1961 creates the offence of injuring with intent: 
189 Injuring with intent 
(1) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years who, with 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm to any one, injures any person. 
(2) Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years who, with 
intent to injure any one, or with reckless disregard for the safety of others, injures 
any person. 
Section 193 of the same act creates the offence of assault with intent to injure: 
193  Assault with intent to injure 
Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years who, with intent to 
injure any one, assaults any person. 
                                                 
1187  Rosie Manins “King-hit initiative welcome” Otago Daily Times (online ed, Dunedin, 19 February 
2014). 
1188  See ch 5. 
1189  The definition of “injure” in s 2(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 means to cause “actual bodily harm”. 
This latter phrase has been held to mean harm that is more than merely transitory and trifling: R v 




The maximum sentence available under these provisions is ten years, the minimum three, 
although actual sentences tend to be beneath the maximum. However, these are sentences 
for perpetrators of assault, not manslaughter – in other words, their victims did not die.  Of 
the three cases referred to above where the defendants were convicted of manslaughter, the 
longest sentence imposed was three years, the shortest 22 months.  It sends a somewhat 
mixed message to society that defendants can be sentenced to similar sorts of sentences, 
regardless of whether death has resulted.  
I must stress that what is problematic here is not the length of sentence. Contrary to the 
suggestion from Winston Peters1190 and others1191, I do not believe that longer sentences 
are the answer, particularly in these times of over-populated prisons. What I am suggesting 
is that it is the moral censure that is critical. One-punch killings, where it can be proved that 
the defendant intended to injure or was reckless as to whether injury occurred, are in a 
different category of killing to what are truly “involuntary” killings, such as the criminal 
negligence cases identified above. If the victim did not die, these defendants would be 
liable for a s 189 or 193 offence at the very least. To that end, it is proposed that they 
constitute second-degree murder rather than manslaughter. The provision could be worded 
as follows: 
Culpable homicide is also second-degree murder in each of the following cases, whether 
the offender means or does not mean death to ensue, or knows or does not know that death 
is likely to ensue: 
(a) where the offender, with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to any one, injures 
any person and death ensues from such injury; or 
(b) where the offender, with intent to injure any one, or with reckless disregard for 
the safety of others, injures any person and death ensues from such injury; or 
(c) where the offender, with intent to injure any one, assaults any person and death 
ensues from such assault. 
 
Manslaughter 
It is proposed here that manslaughter includes the following elements: 
(a) Where the killing is by an unlawful act or omission except where the killing is 
the result of the unlawful act of assault with intent to injure or injuring with 
intent 
                                                 
1190  Nicholas Jones “Create ‘king hit’ offence and scrap revenue-gathering speed cameras – Winston 
Peters” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 14 October 2016). 
1191  Peter de Graaf and David Fisher “Big read: Victim of ‘coward’s punch’ tells of ambush blow’s 
lasting impact - and the MP who came to his aid” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 
19 February 2018). 
247 
 
At present in New Zealand, manslaughter covers all cases of culpable homicide which are 
not murder (killing in furtherance of a suicide pact is also manslaughter). So, where there 
has been a culpable homicide under s 160(2) by an unlawful act or an omission without 
lawful excuse, etcetera,1192 without the mens rea for murder under s 167 or s 168, then 
manslaughter is the only available verdict.  
As discussed above, criminally negligent deaths that do not involve intention to injure 
ought to remain within the category of manslaughter. While many criminally negligent 
deaths are the result of omissions to act, this proposal also applies to unlawful acts (except 
for s 189 or 193). Deaths following simple assault, for example, or careless driving causing 
death, ought not to be prosecuted as second-degree murder.  There is a question, addressed 
more fully below, as to whether every instance of criminal negligence ought to expose a 
defendant to a manslaughter charge, or whether some lesser form of culpability might 
better reflect the moral blame involved.1193  
(b) Partially diminished responsibility (the manslaughter iteration) 
Other jurisdictions, including England and Wales, Scotland, and some Australian states, 
employ defences of diminished responsibility, as discussed in previous chapters. Both the 
English and Welsh and Scottish iterations of the defence require some “abnormality of the 
mind”. In this sense the defence operates by diminishing moral responsibility based upon 
an impairment of mental functioning. Where diminished responsibility or substantial 
impairment applies in Australia, the defences have been successful where defendants have 
suffered from severe depression and personality disorders.1194  However, there is no reason 
why a defence ought not to diminish moral responsibility on grounds other than mental 
impairment, as discussed below.  The question is how to frame the provision so that it 
captures what it is designed to.  As pointed out in ch 5, because New Zealand does not 
already have a specific defence of diminished responsibility, there is a blank slate upon 
which we can write a “bespoke” defence to suit the particular gaps that currently exist in 
the law of culpable homicide.  
                                                 
1192  See s 160(2) above at 239. 
1193  See below at 261-262. 
1194  Lorana Bartels and Patricia Easteal “Mothers who kill: the forensic use and judicial reception of 
evidence of postnatal depression and other psychiatric disorders in Australian filicide cases” (2013) 




As I have suggested elsewhere in this thesis,1195 killings that are committed out of a 
genuine desire to alleviate suffering are unlikely to be conceived as highly morally 
blameworthy even by those who do not support legalisation of euthanasia. The debate 
continues in New Zealand, with David Seymour’s Bill still in progress, so any 
recommendations in this regard could be either supported or thwarted with the conclusion 
of that process. For present purposes, until or unless there are legislative changes to 
decriminalise euthanasia, it is enough to say that a defendant who acts to genuinely assist 
someone who has previously expressed a wish to die, should not be liable for anything 
more than a manslaughter conviction, and a lesser offence is an alternative option.  Under 
the proposal set out here, a person who kills another in this context would have their 
culpability for murder reduced on the basis of diminished responsibility. 
ii. Other altruistic killings 
This is likely to be another contentious category. The circumstances in which a defendant 
acts altruistically include euthanasia, but there are other cases where the victim may not 
express a wish to have their life ended, but nonetheless the defendant is, at least partially if 
not wholly, motivated to end the victim’s suffering, and potentially their own. Some of the 
cases discussed in ch 5 provide examples. These include Knox who killed her 20-year-old 
daughter, Ruby, who had several severe disabilities and was violent; Albury-Thompson 
who strangled her teenage autistic daughter after years of lack of assistance in caring for 
the child; and a father who suffocated his 5-month-old daughter who had been diagnosed 
with an illness that was incompatible with life. It is critical to recognise that not all victims 
may have the capacity to express their wishes or communicate in conventional ways. In 
the wake of Ruby Knox’s death, an autism advocate has spoken out about the fact that what 
has been notably absent from the case and its aftermath is Ruby’s voice.1196 So we do need 
to be alive to the reality that when these tragedies occur, the focus ought not to be solely on 
the circumstances of the defendant but also that in some way, the perspectives of the victim 
(to the extent that it can be ascertained in retrospect) and other family members, are factored 
into the equation. One way of doing this is already provided for in the criminal justice 
                                                 
1195  See ch 2. 





system via victim impact statements, but that process is currently relevant only at the 
sentencing, rather than culpability, stage.  Ought there to be scope for the views of family 
members to be given at the trial stage? 
Another difficulty presented by this category of cases is how to frame a statutory provision 
that can take account of cases like those mentioned above while excluding non-genuine 
cases. Of course, whether a case is genuinely altruistic or not is a matter of personal 
judgment but, in reality, courts make these sorts of judgments all the time. When a 
defendant claims self-defence, for example, the court must decide whether or not to believe 
that the defendant had an honest belief in circumstances justifying the use of deadly force.   
Like euthanasia, a genuinely altruistic killing should not attract anything more than a 
manslaughter conviction at the most.  In many ways such killings are comparable to killing 
in furtherance of a suicide pact, as discussed below. Neither case requires a recognised 
disorder (or biological factor as in infanticide) which bears on culpability (although these 
may also be present).  
iii. Killing in pursuit of suicide pact 
Section 180 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides that killing in furtherance of a suicide pact is 
manslaughter, not murder. It states: 
180 Suicide pact 
(1) Every one who in pursuance of a suicide pact kills any other person is guilty of 
manslaughter and not of murder, and is liable accordingly. 
(2) Where 2 or more persons enter into a suicide pact, and in pursuance of it 1 or 
more of them kills himself or herself, any survivor is guilty of being a party to a 
death under a suicide pact contrary to this subsection and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years; but he or she shall not be 
convicted of an offence against section 179. 
(3) For the purposes of this section the term suicide pact means a common agreement 
between 2 or more persons having for its object the death of all of them, whether 
or not each is to take his or her own life; but nothing done by a person who enters 
into a suicide pact shall be treated as done by him or her in pursuance of the pact 
unless it is done while he or she has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of 
the pact. 
(4) It shall be for the person charged to prove that by virtue of subsection (1) he or 
she is not liable to be convicted of murder, or that by virtue of subsection (2) he 
or she is not liable to be convicted of an offence against section 179. 
(5) The fact that by virtue of this section any person who in pursuance of a suicide 
pact has killed another person has not been or is not liable to be convicted of 
murder shall not affect the question whether the homicide amounted to murder 
in the case of a third person who is a party to the homicide and is not a party to 




I propose that killing in pursuit of a suicide pact is manslaughter, not murder, but 
manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility as discussed above. 
iv. Infanticide 
Section 178 of the Crimes Act 1961 currently provides for both the offence and defence of 
infanticide: 
(1) Where a woman causes the death of any child of hers under the age of 10 years 
in a manner that amounts to culpable homicide, and where at the time of the 
offence the balance of her mind was disturbed, by reason of her not having fully 
recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or by reason 
of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent upon childbirth 
or lactation, to such an extent that she should not be held fully responsible, she is 
guilty of infanticide, and not of murder or manslaughter, and is liable to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years. 
(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder or manslaughter of any child of 
hers under the age of 10 years there is evidence that would support a verdict of 
infanticide, the jury may return such a verdict instead of a verdict of murder or 
manslaughter, and the defendant shall be liable accordingly. Subsection (2) of 
section 339 shall be read subject to the provisions of this subsection, but nothing 
in this subsection shall affect the power of the jury under that section to return a 
verdict of manslaughter. 
(3) Where upon the trial of a woman for infanticide, or for the murder or 
manslaughter of any child of hers under the age of 10 years, the jury are of 
opinion that at the time of the alleged offence the balance of her mind was 
disturbed, by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving 
birth to that or any other child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason 
of any disorder consequent upon childbirth or lactation, to such an extent that she 
was insane, the jury shall return a special verdict of acquittal on account of 
insanity caused by childbirth. 
(4) If the jury returns a special verdict under subsection (3), the Judge must order that 
the woman be examined by 2 medical practitioners and the following provisions 
apply: 
(a) pending the receipt by the Judge of certificates from the medical 
practitioners, the woman must be detained in a place that the Judge 
thinks appropriate, and that place must be one of the following: 
(i) a hospital within the meaning of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992: 
(ii) a facility within the meaning of the Intellectual Disability 
(Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003: 
(iii) a prison: 
(b) if each of the medical practitioners certifies that the woman is no longer 
insane and that she is in no need of care and treatment in a hospital 
within the meaning of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992 or in a facility within the meaning of the 
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, 
the Judge must order that the woman be discharged from custody 
immediately: 
(c) unless each of the medical practitioners certifies in accordance with 
paragraph (b), sections 23 to 29 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally 
Impaired Persons) Act 2003 apply, so far as they are applicable, as if 
the references in those sections to the Court were references to the 
Judge. 
(5) If, under subsection (4)(c), the Judge makes an order that the woman be detained 
in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 or as a special care recipient under the 
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Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, section 
33 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 applies. 
(6) Repealed 
(7) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the jury, upon the trial of any 
woman for infanticide or for murder or manslaughter, to return a verdict, 
otherwise than under this section, of acquittal on account of insanity; and where 
any such verdict is returned the provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally 
Impaired Persons) Act 2003 shall apply accordingly. 
(8) The fact that by virtue of this section any woman has not been or is not liable to 
be convicted of murder or manslaughter, whether or not she has been or is liable 
to be convicted of infanticide, shall not affect the question whether the homicide 
amounted to murder or manslaughter in the case of any other party to it. 
 
In New Zealand, infanticide is already a form of diminished responsibility, providing a 
partial defence to murder or manslaughter charge, where a mother who kills a child does 
so because she has not fully recovered from the effects of giving birth.  While the 
medicalisation of infanticide has been criticised, and it is now generally recognised that 
social and psychological stresses play a more significant role than physiological factors,1197 
Brennan argues that infanticide does offer a more compassionate means of dealing with 
troubled women who kill their young children.1198  In 1997 the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission (NSWLRC) argued that infanticide should be subsumed within the 
defence of diminished responsibility. The NSWLRC suggested that doing so would not 
limit the type of mental disturbance which might give rise to the defence.1199 For these 
reasons, I would include within the category of infanticide, set out below under the 
proposed diminished responsibility provision, that where a woman causes the death of her 
child within the first 24 hours of its life (in other words, where she commits neonaticide), 
that there is a presumption that the balance of her mind was disturbed for the purposes of 
the section.  As discussed in ch 5, neonaticides are patterned killings so rather than leaving 
the facts of these cases to the vagaries of the courts, creating a partial defence based upon 
this pattern is a pragmatic approach which recognises the context in which the killing took 
place as mitigating full responsibility.  
While it could be argued that the 24-hour period following birth is an arbitrary boundary, 
in reality the law creates these kinds of distinctions in all sorts of circumstances. Indeed, of 
particular relevance in the context of the killing of children, under the present law, a child 
                                                 
1197  Ania Wilczynski Child Homicide (Oxford University Press, London, 1997) at 156-157. 
1198  Karen Brennan “Beyond the Medical Model: A Rationale for Infanticide Legislation” (2007) 58(4) 
NILQ 505 at 534. 
1199  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Partial Defences to Murder (Report 83, 1997) at 3.30 
cited in Bartels and Easteal, above n 1196, at 304. 
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does not become a “human being” for the purposes of the homicide provisions until “it has 
completely proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother, whether it has breathed 
or not, whether it has an independent circulation or not, and whether the navel string is 
severed or not”.1200  Hence, killing an unborn child is not homicide, although under s 182  
of the Crimes Act 1961 “[e]very one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 
years who causes the death of any child that has not become a human being in such a 
manner that he or she would have been guilty of murder if the child had become a human 
being”.  On that basis, there is already an arbitrary line between when a child is or is not 
considered a human being, which is subject to intense debate in which many argue that the 
killing of an unborn child is murder, regardless of the age of the foetus. Debate may ensue 
regarding the presumption of diminished responsibility in neonaticide cases, but this ought 
not to be a factor which militates against enacting it. 
Section 178(3) provides for a court to make a finding of insanity by reason of the defendant 
“not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or by 
reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent upon childbirth or 
lactation”. If this provision is to be retained, and I suggest it should, it should be subsumed 
within the existing defence of insanity. Presumably the effects of giving birth or the effect 
of lactation etcetera to the extent that the defendant is insane would constitute puerperal 
psychosis, that is, a disease of the mind.1201 
v. Substantial impairment 
The theory behind a defence of partially diminished responsibility, were it to be adopted in 
New Zealand, would be to provide a means of dealing with mental, and arguably other, 
impairments that do not meet the strict insanity test, or indeed would not necessarily meet 
the diminished responsibility tests in other jurisdictions.   
It is proposed here that a defence of substantial impairment ought to be subsumed into 
partially diminished responsibility, reducing a murder conviction to manslaughter. The 
definition of “substantial impairment” ought to be broadly drawn to encompass not only 
mental disorders falling short of insanity but also other factors which diminish 
                                                 
1200  Crimes Act 1961, s 159. 
1201  See ch 2. 
253 
 
responsibility such as the psychological effects of severe trauma,1202 violence, or coercive 
control.1203  
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, I propose that a partially diminished responsibility 
provision ought to be enacted which will operate to reduce a second-degree murder 
conviction to manslaughter: 
Partially diminished responsibility 
(1) A person who would otherwise be convicted of second-degree murder is instead 
to be convicted of manslaughter on grounds of diminished responsibility if: 
(a) The killing arose out of the defendant’s genuine desire to alleviate the 
deceased’s physical suffering due to a terminal illness where there is a 
credible narrative of the deceased’s desire to end their life; or 
(b) The killing arose out of the defendant’s honest and reasonable belief that the 
killing was necessary to end the suffering of the deceased; or 
(c) The killing is in pursuit of a suicide pact entered into by the defendant and 
the deceased. For the purposes of this section the term suicide pact means a 
common agreement between 2 or more persons having for its object the 
death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his or her own life; but 
nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact shall be treated as 
done by him or her in pursuit of the pact unless it is done while he or she has 
the settled intention of dying in pursuance of the pact; or 
(d) The defendant causes the death of any child of hers under the age of 10 years 
in a manner that amounts to culpable homicide, and where at the time of the 
offence the balance of her mind was disturbed, by reason of her not having 
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or 
by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent 
upon childbirth or lactation. Where the defendant causes the death of any 
child of hers within the first 24 hours of the child’s life there is a presumption 
that the balance of her mind was disturbed within the meaning of this section. 
(e) The person's ability to determine or control conduct for which the person 
would otherwise be convicted of murder was, at the time of the conduct, 
substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind, including mental 
disorder.  Abnormality of the mind may be congenital or derive from an 
organic condition, from some psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia or 
severe depression, or from the psychological effects of severe trauma,1204 
violence, or coercive control. Abnormality of the mind need not be a 
recognised medical condition.1205 
(2) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself— 
(a) constitute abnormality of the mind for the purposes of subsection (1)(e), or 
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
(3) It is for the person charged with murder to establish, on the balance of 
probabilities, that any of the conditions set out in subsection (1)(a)-(e) are 
satisfied. 
(4) In this section, “conduct” includes acts and omissions. 
 
                                                 
1202  This definition is drawn from Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2) 2001 SLT 953 (HCJ) at [54]. 
1203  Note that this is one proposed method of dealing with victims of violence who kill their abusers. 
Other, alternative proposals, will be discussed below. 
1204  This definition is drawn from Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2), above n 1204, at [54]. 
1205  Compare the English and Welsh provision. 
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Subsections (1)(a)-(d) above are obviously drafted to attribute culpability to euthanasia, 
altruistic killings, killings in pursuit of suicide pacts, and infanticide, respectively. 
Subsection (e) is designed to provide for diminished responsibility arising from some form 
of “substantial impairment”, characterised as “abnormality of mind” which ought not to be 
narrowly or medically construed. Examples of what may constitute “abnormality of mind” 
are included in the provision to make it resoundingly clear that the factors giving rise to the 
“abnormality” need not arise in the individual but can be caused by external events, such 
as those faced by defendants like Donella Knox, or by a combination of external events 
and internal characteristics, such as those faced by Harrison-Taylor. The subsection also 
explicitly includes the effects of violence and coercive control which means that the 
defence can be utilised by defendants such as Wihongi to place their culpability on the 
same level as defendants such as Wickham. 
Lesser offences 
There is nothing in New Zealand’s law that mandates a conviction for culpable homicide 
in every case where one person has caused the death of another. So, there is nothing to 
prevent the creation of offences which are less morally blameworthy than any of the 
degrees of culpable homicide set out above.  
Lesser offences due to diminished responsibility  
The diminished responsibility provision set out above, under manslaughter, only operates 
to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter. In other words, it only partially excuses 
a defendant. This is because in many cases the circumstances only warrant partial 
mitigation. However, there will be cases where greater mitigation is deserved. For that 
reason, depending upon the particular circumstances, the manslaughter iteration of 
diminished responsibility ought to provide the potential for conviction for lesser offences 
(such as assault or injuring with intent and so on). To that end, where the defendant is found 
to be guilty of manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility, courts could be asked 
to consider whether the defendant’s culpability is such that they should be instead 
convicted of any lesser offence. The provision could be inserted into the diminished 
responsibility section set out above, with the following wording: 
Where a defendant is convicted of manslaughter on the basis of any of the conditions set 
out in subsection (1)(a)-(e) above, the court may substitute a conviction for any lesser 
offence, if satisfied that a manslaughter conviction is manifestly unjust taking into 
consideration all of the circumstances of the case. 
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This provision borrows the language from s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 which 
provides for a court, in certain circumstances, to impose a minimum period of 
imprisonment of at least 17 years unless it is satisfied that it would be manifestly unjust to 
do so.  Such a provision, in allowing the court to take account of all the circumstances of 
the case, could provide a means of dealing with some of the concerns identified above in 
relation to the ability of victims to communicate their wishes (where this is applicable).  
Using force to escape coercive control 
Another example of a potential non-homicide offence identified in this thesis is the offence 
of using force to escape coercive control, as discussed in ch 4.  
This would be a conduct crime (focusing on the use of force) rather than a result crime 
(wherein there must be a death), meaning a defendant could be liable for an assault-type 
offence, even if death did not result. The proposed offence, set out in ch 4 and reproduced 
below, mirrors the first two steps of the offence proposed by the New Zealand Law 
Commission in its report Victims of family violence who commit homicide, namely that:1206 
(a) the defendant was a victim of family violence perpetrated by the deceased; 
(b) as a result of the family violence, the defendant considered they had no option other 
than to seriously injure or kill the deceased – that is, the defendant was acting to defend 
themselves or another in circumstances as they perceived them to be; … 
However, rather than “family violence” I propose that centring the offence around the 
effects of coercive control is more appropriate, given the suggestion by Stark that it is not 
violence per se that overrides the victim’s free will. The elements of the offence would 
require that: 
(a) the defendant was in a relationship characterised by the exercise of coercive control 
from another person; and 
(b) as a result of the coercive control, the defendant considered they had no option other 
than to seriously injure or kill that other person – that is, the defendant used force 
because she honestly believed she had no other way of escaping that relationship or 
protecting herself or another person; and 
(c) the defendant used force against that other person. 
Because of the contextual nature of coercive control, and because it consists of a pattern of 
behaviour rather than specific incidents, it is proposed that coercive control ought not to be 
defined in the provision. Rather it should be left to the courts to determine whether or not 
the relationship was characterised by the exercise of coercive control, and they should be 
                                                 
1206  Law Commission Victims of family violence who commit homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015) at [8.36]. 
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able to rely on the evidence of experts – potentially practitioners working in the field of 
intimate partner violence – to assist them in making this determination. 
One of the potential problems with the creation of this offence is that it may not be fair to 
convict someone for using force when there really was no alternative option available to 
them. Similarly, the defence of diminished responsibility, discussed above, only reduces 
second-degree murder to manslaughter (unless the court substitutes a conviction for any 
lesser offence on the basis of manifest injustice, as suggested above). For this reason, 
alternative proposals are identified below whereby self-defence is amended to explicitly 
remove the imminence requirement; or that a separate full defence of killing to escape 
coercive control be enacted; or that a defence of wholly diminished responsibility be 
created. 
Lesser offences due to developmental immaturity 
The defence of developmental immaturity, below, provides for the possibility of conviction 
for lesser offences where a defendant is found not guilty of a culpable homicide offence. 
The defence provides that the court may proceed to consider whether the prosecution has 
met its burden of proof with respect to any lesser offences, such as any relevant non-fatal 
offences against the person. 
Defences 
Insanity and automatism 
Section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides for the defence of insanity: 
(1) Every one shall be presumed to be sane at the time of doing or omitting any act 
until the contrary is proved. 
(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted 
by him or her when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to 
such an extent as to render him or her incapable— 
(a) Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or 
(b) Of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard 
to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. 
(3) Insanity before or after the time when he or she did or omitted the act, and insane 
delusions, though only partial, may be evidence that the offender was, at the time 
when he or she did or omitted the act, in such a condition of mind as to render 
him or her irresponsible for the act or omission. 
(4) The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to 
be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person 




Section 23, and its earlier iterations, were developed from the M’Naghten Rules which 
arose out of M’Naghten’s Case1207. For the purposes of the defence, insanity is a legal, not 
medical, concept. Similarly, the term upon which it relies, “disease of the mind” is a legal 
term. Section 23 includes what is known as automatism – “action without conscious 
volition”1208 – where the automatism is due to a disease of the mind, and therefore falls 
within the meaning of s 23(2)(a) where the defendant did not understand the nature and 
quality of the act or omission.  Automatism is not always caused by a disease of the mind. 
In cases where the automatic state is caused by some factor external to the defendant, such 
as a blow to the head, the automatism is said to be a condition imposed on the defendant 
which renders their actions involuntary. This is referred to as “sane automatism” and 
entitles the defendant to a complete acquittal.1209 Where the line is drawn between “internal” 
and “external” causes of automatism is arbitrary, and the determination in any individual 
case often falls to be decided on policy grounds.1210 
Despite the fact that, as noted in ch 5, the definition of “disease of the mind” excludes a 
number of disorders, I would not recommend statutorily changing the definition but rather 
the decision as to whether a particular disorder meets the definition ought to remain with 
judges. However, as discussed in ch 5 and above, some impairments which do not meet 
the definition of “disease of the mind” ought to be covered by diminished responsibility – 
“substantial impairment” – reducing a murder charge to manslaughter, or some lesser 
offence as outlined above.  
I would, however, amend s 23 to explicitly incorporate s 178(3) of the Crimes Act 1961 
which provides for insanity by reason of the defendant “not having fully recovered from 
the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or 
by reason of any disorder consequent upon childbirth or lactation”. This section would not 
affect the operation of infanticide as diminished responsibility, as set out above.  Section 
23 could be amended by inserting a new subs (2A) to read: 
For the purposes of subs (2) of this section, disease of the mind includes not having fully recovered 
from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by 
reason of any disorder consequent upon childbirth or lactation. 
                                                 
1207  M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200, 8 ER 718 (HL). 
1208  R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999 (CA) at 1011. 
1209  See R v Cottle, above n 1208 and Police v Bannin [1991] 2 NZLR 237, (1991) 7 CRNZ 55 (HC). 




Section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides: 
48  Self-defence and defence of another 
Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or herself or another, such force 
as, in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, it is reasonable to use. 
Present difficulties with the operation of self-defence have been discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis. I would propose that the defence could be retained with the amendment proposed 
by the New Zealand Law Commission to the effect that where a person kills as a response 
to family violence, s 48 may apply even if the threat to the accused is not “imminent”.1211 
This would be to provide a safeguard against overcriminalisation of victims of violence 
who kill their abusers, in the event that the other recommendations proposed in this thesis 
(such as the diminished responsibility iterations) prove to be under-inclusive of those types 
of circumstances.  
As Wake and Reed observe, where two individuals respond in similar ways, it should not 
matter that one defendant may be a victim of violence from an intimate partner and the 
other subject to coercion from, say, a fellow gang member.1212 In other words, coercion 
may exist in other, non-intimate relationships, as well.  Any amendment to self-defence 
should recognise this, and could be achieved by simply adding a subsection to the existing 
defence, as follows: 
 Self-defence and defence of another 
(1) Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or herself or another, such 
force as, in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, it is reasonable to use. 
(2) Where the force referred to in subsection (1) is in response to coercion, that subsection 
may apply even where the person is responding to a threat that is not imminent. 
This amendment would not provide for an automatic acquittal where a defendant kills her 
abuser, but it would make the test in the section easier to satisfy by rebutting the 
presumption that the defendant did not fear for her life and was not justified in using force 
just because her abuser may not have posed an immediate threat.  
                                                 
1211  Law Commission Understanding family violence: reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 
(NZLC R139, 2016), at [7.39], [7.47]. 
1212  Nicola Wake and Alan Reed “Reconceptualising the contours of self-defence in the context of 
vulnerable offenders: a response to the New Zealand Law Commission” (2016) 3(2) JICL 1 at 27. 
See ch 4. 
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Another way of accommodating the wide range of circumstances in which a defendant 
may have an honest belief in circumstances justifying the use of deadly force is to enact a 
provision similar to that enacted in Canada following the decision in R v Lavallee.1213 As 
set out in ch 4, the new Canadian iteration of self-defence allows courts to take into account 
a non-exhaustive list of factors in determining the reasonableness of the defensive act as 
set out in s 34(2):1214 
(2) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties 
and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the force or threat; 
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there 
were other means available to respond to the potential use of force; 
(c) the person’s role in the incident; 
(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; 
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the 
incident; 
(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties 
to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature 
of that force or threat; 
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the 
incident; 
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or 
threat of force; and 
(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force 
that the person knew was lawful. 
Subsection (f.1) – “any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the 
incident” – could be useful in cases where the coercion or threat is posed by people in non-
intimate relationships such as other gang members; and the subsection in its entirety would 
provide a court with much greater guidance in determining whether or not the defendant’s 
defensive act was reasonable, and therefore justified.  
Wholly diminished responsibility (the defence iteration) 
As previously discussed, the diminished responsibility provision set out above (the 
manslaughter iteration), only operates as a partial defence to reduce second-degree murder 
to manslaughter. While I have provided for the possibility of conviction for lesser offences, 
above, there will also be cases where a defendant ought to be completely excused. There 
should be few such cases, where the defendant is attributed no responsibility for a killing, 
but to leave those circumstances unaccounted for is to undermine a regime that is intended 
to apportion responsibility fairly in as many cases as possible. For that reason, I propose 
                                                 
1213  R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852. 
1214  Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 34(2). 
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the adoption of a general defence of wholly diminished responsibility, that depends upon 
the concept of “substantial impairment” as in the manslaughter iteration, but which 
provides scope for a full acquittal similar to the present ability of a court to discharge 
without conviction in ss 106 and 107 of the Sentencing Act 2002. The defence could be 
drafted as follows:  
Defence of wholly diminished responsibility 
(1) Where a person's ability to determine or control conduct for which the person would 
otherwise be convicted of culpable homicide was, at the time of the conduct, 
substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind, including mental disorder, 
to the extent that the court is satisfied that the direct and indirect consequences of a 
conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence, the court may 
discharge the person without conviction. 
(2) A discharge under this section is deemed to be an acquittal. 
(3) Abnormality of the mind may be congenital or derive from an organic condition, from 
some psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia or severe depression, or from the 
psychological effects of severe trauma, violence, or coercive control. Abnormality of 
the mind need not be a recognised medical condition. 
(4) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other substance 
at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself— 
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1)(e), or 
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
(5) In this section, “conduct” includes acts and omissions. 
(6) For the avoidance of doubt, this section does not apply to the following: 
(a) killings provoked, partially or wholly, by sexual infidelity, alleged or otherwise, 
on the part of the victim or any other person; or 
(b) killings provoked by a sexual advance made by the deceased, whether of the 
same or different gender to the defendant, that does not amount to criminal 
conduct on the part of the deceased; or  
(c) killings that, apart from this section, would be first-degree murder.  
 
Subsection (6) is included to avoid the risk that the defence could be exploited by 
defendants who it was not intended to exculpate, such as a defendant who kills in response 
to sexual infidelity or one who kills in response to an unwanted sexual proposition.  
Similarly, a defendant who kills their children where the primary motive is spousal revenge 
ought not to be able to avail themselves of “substantial impairment” notwithstanding that 
they may also be suffering psychological trauma in the context of marital breakdown. 
However, there could be some difficulties with this exclusion. An example where it might 
prove problematic is a case in which a victim of violence kills her abuser following years 
of violence and coercive control. The killing may have been immediately preceded by a 
discovery of infidelity on the part of the abuser, which should not affect the operation of 
the diminished responsibility defence. While it may be necessary to specify that killings 
provoked solely by sexual infidelity (for example) are excluded from the defence, it would 
be relatively easy for defence counsel to structure their defence in such a way as to avoid 
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such a suggestion. On balance it is probably better to retain the exclusions. Defendants who 
kill under those circumstances will still be able to avail themselves of the manslaughter 
iteration to reduce a potential first- or second-degree murder conviction to manslaughter, 
along with the existing insanity defence in relevant cases.   
As already mentioned, the circumstances in which there ought to be a full acquittal for 
homicide are rare. However, a successful self-defence claim results in a full acquittal so the 
law ought to also provide for the same outcome in cases which may be wholly excused or 
justified on other grounds.  
Coercion as a defence to failure to protect 
While the general defence of diminished responsibility, set out above, does apply to 
omissions as well as acts, as an alternative, a specific affirmative defence of coercion is 
proposed. As canvassed in ch 5, this could be framed as follows:  
A person charged with failure to protect a child or vulnerable adult from the violence of 
another is protected from criminal responsibility if they were acting under coercion. 
Coercion is determined by considering whether, under the totality of the circumstances 
(including past abuse), the threat (implicit or explicit), or the use of force, was such that the 
actor was coerced to the extent they were unable to resist or to take positive action and a 
reasonable person similarly situated could not resist or take positive action. 
As discussed in ch 5, criminal failure to protect are charges are almost always proffered 
against mothers as opposed to fathers, and often in cases where there is a history of 
domestic violence.1215   However, the defence as proposed is not gender-specific and 
available to anyone charged with a failure to protect offence if the test set out in the section 
is met.  As with the defence of diminished responsibility (as well as the manslaughter 
iteration) the focus is on the defendant’s ability to control their own conduct (or resist the 
coercion from others). It is not the presence of coercion which is determinative of outcome, 
but the extent to which the defendant’s action or omission was truly voluntary.  Unlike the 
diminished responsibility provisions outlined here, however, an objective element has been 
incorporated into coercion as a defence to failure to protect. This is consistent with criminal 
negligence provisions already in place in New Zealand – particularly s 150A of the Crimes 
Act 1961:  
 150A  Standard of care applicable to persons under legal duties or performing 
unlawful acts 
                                                 
1215  Jonathan Herring “Familial homicide, failure to protect and domestic violence: who's the victim?” 
(2007) Crim LR 923 at 929. 
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 (1) This section applies in respect of— 
(a) the legal duties specified in any of sections 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 
and 157; and 
(b) an unlawful act referred to in section 160 where the unlawful act relied 
on requires proof of negligence or is a strict or absolute liability offence. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, a person is criminally responsible for omitting to 
discharge or perform a legal duty, or performing an unlawful act, to which this 
section applies only if, in the circumstances, the omission or unlawful act is a 
major departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person to 
whom that legal duty applies or who performs that unlawful act. 
While it is true that there are no settled rules or codes of conduct that set out the standards 
that parents are expected to meet,1216 this is an argument against criminalisation of parental 
failures, which can be unduly harsh for that reason. However, in the context of a defence, 
assessing the defendant’s failure against “reasonable people similarly situated” is helpful 
to the defendant by recognising the circumstances in which they found themselves, but also 
recognises that not all failures to protect ought to be excused. Just as the force used in self-
defence must be reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, so 
must a defendant’s failure to protect a child in their care.  On the other hand, killing under 
insanity or abnormality of mind (as required by diminished responsibility), will not be 
reasonable (albeit that it might be excusable).  
The cases that fall to be considered under this head are what are generally referred to as 
criminally negligent deaths. Similar cases are those in which a parent is liable for 
manslaughter for failing to supervise a child around water or the “forgotten baby syndrome” 
cases where children are unintentionally left in hot cars.1217  While under the proposals set 
out in this thesis, these latter cases would be categorised as manslaughter, there are 
arguments against this degree of criminalisation. As noted in ch 5, there is debate as to 
whether it is legitimate to criminalise negligence.1218  It is worth noting the words of Sir 
Duncan McMullin in his 1995 report to the Minister of Justice regarding whether there 
should be a change to the standard of care relevant to the duties in ss 155 and 156 of the 
Crimes Act 1961:1219  
… There is the philosophical argument that manslaughter is an inappropriate crime for acts 
of mere carelessness as distinct from gross negligence or recklessness. 
                                                 
1216  See ch 5. 
1217  See ch 2. 
1218  Andrew Ashworth “Conceptions of overcriminalization” (2008) 5 Ohio St J Crim 407 at 411.  
1219  Sir Duncan McMullin, Report of Sir Duncan McMullin to Hon Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice, 
on Sections 155 and 156 of the Crimes Act 1961 (Wellington, 1995) at [12.1]. 
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Further, Sir Duncan observed, in the context of s 156 of the Crimes Act 1961 which 
imposes duties on persons in charge of dangerous things, that the section:1220 
… means that a motorist who kills a pedestrian crossing the road while the motorist’s 
attention is diverted for a few seconds by an advertising hoarding, can be found guilty of 
manslaughter. Fortunately the Police have taken a common sense view in applying the law 
and charge only the worst cases of driving causing death with that crime. But a prosecution 
for manslaughter nonetheless remains open. One could multiply examples in other walks 
of life where a single act of forgetfulness or inattention could on the present law result in a 
prosecution for manslaughter. 
Sir Duncan’s words here are apt to describe the case of a parent who turns their back for 
the very short space of time in which a child can drown, or a parent who genuinely forgets 
their child is in the car. There is little evidence of a common-sense view taken to 
prosecutions of this type of case in recent years at least and even if there was, as Sir Duncan 
notes, a prosecution for manslaughter is still a possibility. It is not entirely clear how reform 
here could be achieved, given that the law still ought to include the possibility of 
manslaughter convictions where the omission is particularly grievous. Perhaps this an 
instance of where proper directions to juries become critical. In relation to the meaning of 
“major departure” in s 150A of the Crimes Act 1961, in R v McKie1221Justice William 
Young said that Judges are likely to tell juries that:1222 
…they should only convict if satisfied that, having regard to the risk of death involved, the 
conduct of the accused was so bad as to amount, in the judgment of the jury, to a crime. 
In JF v Police1223 Justice Toogood observed that in determining whether a departure 
was major, by reference to community standards:1224  
…the seriousness of the appellant’s breach of duty and the circumstances in which the 
appellant was in when it occurred are highly relevant and, when looked at as a whole, the 
conduct must be so bad as to justifiably be considered criminal. 
These principles need to be underscored, particularly in cases where the death occurs from 
a moment’s inattention or forgetfulness. 
Developmental immaturity 
As the law currently stands, the only “defences” available only to children and young 
people are contained in ss 21 and 22 of the Crimes Act 1961: 
                                                 
1220  At [12.1]. 
1221  R v McKie HC Dunedin T13/00, 31 July 2000. 
1222  At [30]. 
1223  JF v Police [2013] NZHC 2729, (2013) 26 CRNZ 764. 
1224  At [39]. 
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21  Children under 10 
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of any act done or omitted 
by him or her when under the age of 10 years. 
(2) The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to 
be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person 
who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence. 
 
22  Children between 10 and 14 
(1) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of any act done or omitted 
by him or her when of the age of 10 but under the age of 14 years, unless he or 
she knew either that the act or omission was wrong or that it was contrary to law. 
(2) The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to 
be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person 
who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence. 
 
As discussed in ch 3, children and young people who kill do not always act with the 
foresight or reasoning of someone who has reached full maturity and yet, in New Zealand 
and elsewhere, when they are charged with murder or manslaughter they are tried as adults.   
Yet the moral blameworthiness of a child who kills could be indistinguishable from that of 
a child who commits any other type of offence, so it seems irrational, and inconsistent with 
basic principles of criminal responsibility, to only prosecute them for culpable homicide or 
serious offences.  It is also inconsistent with contemporary research on adolescent brain 
development which, as canvassed in ch 3, suggests that adolescence is a developmental 
stage, during which the brain is still under construction.1225  Of particular relevance is the 
finding that the prefrontal cortex is the last region of the brain to fully develop, and this 
process extends well beyond adolescence, 1226  and the regions of the brain that are 
responsible for impulse control, risk assessment, decision-making and emotion take the 
longest to mature.1227 All of this challenges the previously-held assumption that brain 
development was complete at puberty.1228  
The cases discussed in ch 3 demonstrate the potential for inconsistent outcomes in cases 
where young people have killed. Some of these defendants will remain in prison for a 
                                                 
1225  Wisconsin Council on Children and Families Rethinking the Juvenile in Juvenile Justice: 
Implications of Adolescent Brain Development on the Juvenile Justice System (2006) at 13.  
1226  Robert M Sapolsky “The frontal cortex and the criminal justice system” (2004) 359 Philos Trans R 
Soc Lond B Biol Sci 1787 at 1792. 
1227  Jay D Aronson “Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice” (2009) 42 Akron L Rev 917 at 923. 
1228  Sara B Johnson, Robert W Blum and Jay N Giedd “Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise 




number of years for acts that they committed when they were essentially children. And 
once they enter the adult system the chances of their rehabilitation become increasingly 
remote. For this reason, it is proposed in this thesis that the statutory regime for 
apportioning blame in culpable homicide cases includes a specific defence of 
developmental immaturity, as set out in ch 3 and repeated below: 
Developmental immaturity 
(1) A defendant is not criminally responsible for conduct which would otherwise 
constitute an offence and must be acquitted if, due to developmental immaturity: 
(a) they did not fully understand the nature of their conduct, or that it was morally or 
legally wrong, or its legal or physical consequences; and/or 
(b) they were substantially impaired in exercising rational control over their conduct 
and/or refraining from carrying it out. 
(2) Where a defendant is found not guilty of an offence under subs (1)(a) or (b) of this 
section, the court may proceed to consider whether the prosecution has met its burden 
of proof with respect to any lesser offences. 
 
The enactment of this proposal means that s 22 of the Crimes Act 1961, set out above, 
would be surplus to requirements. 
The proposed defence relies on the causal role “developmental immaturity” plays in the 
responsibility of young defendants.  However, the focus of the defence ought to be on the 
fact of understanding rather than on the capacity for it.1229  For the defence to succeed, the 
defendant must raise a credible narrative regarding either of the tests set out in (a) or (b).  
The prosecution must rebut the defence beyond reasonable doubt. 
Finally, the proposal does not specify an upper age limit and avoids the use of definitional 
terms such as “child” or “young person”.   This is so as to make the defence available to 
adults who have suffered developmental delays. What is important here is that it is the 
developmental delay which gives rise to the absence of understanding or foresight (or 
whatever mens rea element is relied upon) rather than the age of the defendant. 
While young defendants may, prima facie, be eligible for the general defence of diminished 
responsibility, above, I suggest there is a strong argument for a separate defence. This is 
because the defence of diminished responsibility requires an abnormality of mind which, 
although is given an expansive definition, does not adequately capture developmental 
                                                 
1229  The same approach applies to intoxication (at least in New Zealand and England and Wales) as it 
bears upon the question of intent: see R v Kamipeli [1975] 2 NZLR 610 (CA) and R v Sheehan [1975] 
2 All ER 960, [1975] 1 WLR 739 (CA). 
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immaturity. While the defence should apply, as mentioned above, to defendants of any age, 
immaturity is, in most cases, a normal phase of development. This defence could sit 
alongside the current s 21 of the Crimes Act which provides the conclusive presumption 
that a child under the age of 10 is incapable of committing a crime. A defence of 
developmental immaturity would work as a type of rebuttable presumption in relation to 
defendants aged over the age of ten.  
SUMMARY 
Summary of proposals 
Degrees of culpable homicide 
Section 1 – first-degree murder 
(1) Culpable homicide is murder in the first degree in each of the following cases, 
whether the offender means or does not mean death to ensue, or knows or does 
not know that death is likely to ensue: 
(a) if he or she means to cause grievous bodily injury for the purpose of 
facilitating the commission of any of the offences mentioned in 
subsection (2) of this section, or facilitating the flight or avoiding the 
detection of the offender upon the commission or attempted 
commission thereof, or for the purpose of resisting lawful 
apprehension in respect of any offence whatsoever, and death ensues 
from such injury: 
(b) if he or she administers any stupefying or overpowering thing for any 
of the purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from the effects thereof: 
(c) if he or she by any means wilfully stops the breath of any person for 
any of the purposes aforesaid, and death ensues from such stopping of 
breath. 
(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1) are those specified in the following 
provisions of this Act, namely: 
(a) section 73 (treason) or section 78 (communicating secrets): 
(b) section 79 (sabotage): 
(c) section 92 (piracy): 
(d) section 93 (piratical acts): 
(e) section 119 to 122 (escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody or 
detention): 
(f) section 128 (sexual violation): 
(g) section 167 (murder): 
(h) section 208 (abduction): 
(i) section 209 (kidnapping): 
(j) section 231 (burglary): 
(k) section 234 (robbery): 
(l) section 267 (arson). 
(3) Culpable homicide is murder in the first degree where the killing is committed 
partly or wholly because of hostility towards a group of persons who have an 
enduring common characteristic such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, age, or disability; and: 
(a) the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
(b) the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic. 
(4) Culpable homicide is murder in the first degree where the killing is committed 
partly or wholly because of a desire to exact revenge on a third party. 
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(5) Culpable homicide is murder in the first degree where the killing is preceded by 
a history of abuse or violence or the exercise of coercive control toward the 
victim. 
Section 2 – second-degree murder 
(1) Culpable homicide is murder in the second degree in each of the following cases: 
(a) If the offender means to cause the death of the person killed: 
(b) If the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury 
that is known to the offender to be likely to cause death, and is reckless 
whether death ensues or not: 
(c) If the offender means to cause death, or, being so reckless as aforesaid, 
means to cause such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person, and by 
accident or mistake kills another person, though he or she does not 
mean to hurt the person killed: 
(d) If the offender for any unlawful object does an act that he or she knows 
to be likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person, though he or 
she may have desired that his or her object should be effected without 
hurting any one. 
(2) Culpable homicide is murder in the second degree where the offender, under 
circumstances manifesting reckless indifference to human life, causes the death 
of a child, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault 
or torture of the said child. 
(3) Culpable homicide is also second-degree murder in each of the following cases, 
whether the offender means or does not mean death to ensue, or knows or does 
not know that death is likely to ensue: 
(a) where the offender, with intent to cause grievous bodily harm to any 
one, injures any person and death ensues from such injury; or 
(b) where the offender, with intent to injure any one, or with reckless 
disregard for the safety of others, injures any person and death ensues 
from such injury; or 
(c) where the offender, with intent to injure any one, assaults any person 
and death ensues from such assault. 
Section 3 – manslaughter 
(1) Culpable homicide that is not murder in the first or second degree is manslaughter. 
(2) Culpable homicide is manslaughter on the grounds of partially diminished 
responsibility where: 
(a) The killing arose out of the defendant’s genuine desire to alleviate the 
deceased’s physical suffering due to a terminal illness where there is a 
credible narrative of the deceased’s desire to end their life; or 
(b) The killing arose out of the defendant’s honest and reasonable belief 
that the killing was necessary to end the suffering of the deceased; or 
(c) The killing is in pursuit of a suicide pact entered into by the defendant 
and the deceased. For the purposes of this section the term suicide pact 
means a common agreement between 2 or more persons having for its 
object the death of all of them, whether or not each is to take his or her 
own life; but nothing done by a person who enters into a suicide pact 
shall be treated as done by him or her in pursuit of the pact unless it is 
done while he or she has the settled intention of dying in pursuance of 
the pact; or 
(d) The defendant causes the death of any child of hers under the age of 10 
years in a manner that amounts to culpable homicide, and where at the 
time of the offence the balance of her mind was disturbed, by reason of 
her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or 
any other child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of 
any disorder consequent upon childbirth or lactation. Where the 
defendant causes the death of any child of hers within the first 24 hours 
of the child’s life there is a presumption that the balance of her mind 
was disturbed within the meaning of this section. 
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(e) The person’s ability to determine or control conduct for which the 
person would otherwise be convicted of murder was, at the time of the 
conduct, substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind, 
including mental disorder.  Abnormality of the mind may be congenital 
or derive from an organic condition, from some psychotic illness, such 
as schizophrenia or severe depression, or from the psychological 
effects of severe trauma, violence, or coercive control. Abnormality of 
the mind need not be a recognised medical condition. 
(3) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself— 
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1)(e), or 
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
(4) It is for the person charged with murder to establish, on the balance of 
probabilities, that any of the conditions set out in subsection (1)(a)-(e) are 
satisfied. 
(5) In this section, “conduct” includes acts and omissions. 
(6) Where a defendant is convicted of manslaughter on the basis of any of the 
conditions set out in subsection (2)(a)-(e) above, the court may substitute a 
conviction for any lesser offence, if satisfied that a manslaughter conviction is 
manifestly unjust taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case. 
 
Lesser offences 
Lesser offences due to diminished responsibility – see s 3(6) above 
Section 4 – using force to escape coercive control 
(1) This section applies where: 
(a) the defendant was in a relationship characterised by the exercise of coercive 
control from another person; and 
(b) as a result of the coercive control, the defendant considered they had no option 
other than to seriously injure or kill that other person – that is, the defendant used 
force because she honestly believed she had no other way of escaping that 
relationship or protecting herself or another person; and 
(c) the defendant used force against that other person. 
(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the defendant will be guilty of an offence of using force 
to escape coercive control and not culpable homicide. 
 
Defences 
Insanity and automatism 
(1) Every one shall be presumed to be sane at the time of doing or omitting any act 
until the contrary is proved. 
(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted 
by him or her when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to 
such an extent as to render him or her incapable— 
(a) Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or 
(b) Of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard 
to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. 
(3) Insanity before or after the time when he or she did or omitted the act, and insane 
delusions, though only partial, may be evidence that the offender was, at the time 
when he or she did or omitted the act, in such a condition of mind as to render 
him or her irresponsible for the act or omission. 
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(4) The fact that by virtue of this section any person has not been or is not liable to 
be convicted of an offence shall not affect the question whether any other person 
who is alleged to be a party to that offence is guilty of that offence. 
(5) For the purposes of subs (2) of this section, disease of the mind includes not 
having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, 
or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent 
upon childbirth or lactation. 
Self-defence and defence of another 
(1) Every one is justified in using, in the defence of himself or herself or another, 
such force as, in the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, it is 
reasonable to use. 
(2) Where the force referred to in subsection (1) is in response to coercion, that 
subsection may apply even where the person is responding to a threat that is not 
imminent. 
(3) In determining whether the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
court shall consider the relevant circumstances of the person, the other parties 
and the act, including, but not limited to, the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the force or threat; 
(b) the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether there 
were other means available to respond to the potential use of force; 
(c) the person’s role in the incident; 
(d) whether any party to the incident used or threatened to use a weapon; 
(e) the size, age, gender and physical capabilities of the parties to the 
incident; 
(f) the nature, duration and history of any relationship between the parties 
to the incident, including any prior use or threat of force and the nature 
of that force or threat; 
(f.1) any history of interaction or communication between the parties to the 
incident; 
(g) the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to the use or 
threat of force; and 
(h) whether the act committed was in response to a use or threat of force 
that the person knew was lawful. 
Defence of wholly diminished responsibility  
(1) Where a person's ability to determine or control conduct for which the person 
would otherwise be convicted of culpable homicide was, at the time of the 
conduct, substantially impaired by reason of abnormality of mind, including 
mental disorder, to the extent that the court is satisfied that the direct and indirect 
consequences of a conviction would be out of all proportion to the gravity of the 
offence, the court may discharge the person without conviction. 
(2) A discharge under this section is deemed to be an acquittal. 
(3) Abnormality of the mind may be congenital or derive from an organic condition, 
from some psychotic illness, such as schizophrenia or severe depression, or from 
the psychological effects of severe trauma, violence, or coercive control. 
Abnormality of the mind need not be a recognised medical condition. 
(4) The fact that a person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other 
substance at the time of the conduct in question does not of itself— 
(a) constitute abnormality of mind for the purposes of subsection (1)(a), or 
(b) prevent such abnormality from being established for those purposes. 
(5) In this section, “conduct” includes acts and omissions. 
(6) For the avoidance of doubt, this section does not apply to the following: 
(a) killings provoked, partially or wholly, by sexual infidelity, alleged or 
otherwise, on the part of the victim or any other person; or 
(b) killings provoked by a sexual advance made by the deceased, whether 
of the same or different gender to the defendant, that does not amount 
to criminal conduct on the part of the deceased. 




Coercion as a defence to failure to protect 
A person charged with failure to protect a child or vulnerable adult from the violence of 
another is protected from criminal responsibility if they were acting under coercion. 
Coercion is determined by considering whether, under the totality of the circumstances 
(including past abuse), the threat (implicit or explicit), or the use of force, was such that the 
actor was coerced to the extent they were unable to resist or to take positive action and a 
reasonable person similarly situated could not resist or take positive action. 
Developmental immaturity 
(1) A defendant is not criminally responsible for conduct which would otherwise 
constitute an offence and must be acquitted if, due to developmental immaturity: 
(a) they did not fully understand the nature of their conduct, or that it was 
morally or legally wrong, or its legal or physical consequences; and/or 
(b) they were substantially impaired in exercising rational control over 
their conduct and/or refraining from carrying it out. 
(2) Where a defendant is found not guilty of an offence under subs (1)(a) or (b) of 
this section, the court may proceed to consider whether the prosecution has met 
its burden of proof with respect to any lesser offences. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Tadros argues that in order to discover whether a defendant is responsible for a wrong, we 
need to know why they did it and whether the motive was truly their own.1230 The above 
proposals are the results of an analysis of the varied motivations which sit behind cases of 
culpable homicide and represent an attempt to elicit from these motivations different 
degrees of moral blame. As noted in ch 1, when Brian Neeson first introduced a Bill to 
create a degrees of murder approach in New Zealand, it coincided with the Government’s 
review of sentencing and parole, from which the Sentencing Act 2002 eventuated. That 
process was signalled as dealing with some of the problems in the homicide regime at the 
time.   
As I have adverted to elsewhere in this thesis, I do not believe that longer or harsher 
sentences are the answer to the problems with the current homicide regime. At the time of 
writing a great deal of attention is being given to the issue of our already over-crowded 
prisons.1231 While a review of the sentencing regime is not within the scope of this thesis, 
if the proposals outlined here were to be implemented there would need to be some thought 
                                                 
1230  Victor Tadros Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) at 31-32.  






given to its impact on sentencing. It will be necessary to pay careful attention to sentencing 
for second-degree murder given that it encompasses cases which, at present, are usually 
classified as manslaughter. In particular, the rules surrounding the imposition of MPIs will 
need to be reevaluated.  
Twenty-two years have elapsed since the New Zealand (Degrees of Murder Bill 1996 (157-
1) was introduced, sixteen since the Sentencing Act 2002 was enacted. In that time, the 
defence of provocation has been repealed, and the three-strikes sentencing regime 
introduced. New Zealand has seen too many horrific child abuse homicides, has an 
appalling record on family violence and has failed to fairly treat defendants who kill in 
response to that violence. While New Zealand is often looked to as a world leader in 
restorative justice, particularly in relation to young defendants, this does not translate well 
into policies for young people who kill. It is also of great concern that those more likely to 
be victims of child homicide often share the same demographics of the young offender 
community – in other words, children and young people who are marginalised due to 
poverty, unstable family environments and lack of other resources such as adequate 
education and health.  Yet, apart from the repeal of provocation, the amendment to s 150A 
of the Crimes Act 1961 and creation of new duties, there has been no change to the 
substantive culpable homicide provisions since the Crimes Act 1961 came into force. 
Legislative reform is overdue. 
As identified in ch 1, factors such as the quality of a defendant’s legal representation, issues 
around jury selection, and juror bias on the basis of race, class, gender (for example) all 
play a role in outcomes. Other factors to be considered are the adequacy of judicial 
summing up and directions to juries. Consider, for example, a case with facts similar to 
those in R v Wihongi: where the defendant has numerous “cognitive deficits”,1232 including 
those which flowed from a painkiller overdose at age 13; was sexually assaulted at 14, 
gang-raped at 19, and was the victim of a home invasion by gang members. This is all in 
addition to the history of abuse from the deceased, who had also taken money owned by 
the defendant and, on the night of the killing, demanded sex from the defendant. On these 
facts, there is a strong argument for diminished responsibility – either on the basis of the 
manslaughter iteration or the defence – on the grounds of substantial impairment due to the 
psychological effects of severe trauma, violence, or coercive control. However, the 
                                                 
1232  R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775, (2011) 25 CRNZ 483 at [94]. 
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defendant has used violence against the deceased on other occasions. In the absence of a 
strong direction to the jury, they could use the fact of prior violence by the defendant of 
evidence that points against diminished responsibility and, or alternatively, they could 
believe that that prior violence means she is more morally blameworthy in relation to the 
murder charge, regardless of the probative value of that prior violence. 
The fact that Wihongi is Māori is also relevant – overrepresentation of Māori in the 
criminal justice system is a serious problem and occurs at every stage of the criminal justice 
process from investigation to arrest to prosecution, conviction and sentencing. This is 
compounded by the three-strikes legislation which is misconceived and should be repealed. 
There are a number of other enhancements that must be made in a range of areas such as 
the law of evidence, prosecutorial guidelines, legal professional practice and so on.  
Ultimately the most significant problem is that the law as it currently stands is a very blunt 
tool for determining moral blame in culpable homicide cases. It is not fair to leave it to 
courts to try and apportion blame without the proper tools to do so, but most importantly it 
is not fair to those who are most affected by these decisions – both the defendants and 
victims’ families.  
Undoubtedly there will be concerns about the proposals contained in this thesis: some will 
be perceived as too soft, others too harsh. As noted above, there are alternative ways of 
reforming the law of homicide. Any such reform should take account of the realities of 
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